I am currently working in mechanism design and auction theory, focusing on the characterization of the incentive compatible mechanisms in specific settings.

Non-bossy Single Object Auctions, with Debasis Mishra, Economic Theory Bulletin, 2014. [Detailed Version]

Abstract: We consider a class of mechanism design problems in private value environment where the type of an agent is a single number. The preference over transfers is quasilinear for every agent. We give a complete characterization of dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms for these problems. Further, by imposing a suitable version of anonymity and non-bossiness along with dominant strategy incentive compatibility, we characterize the Groves mechanisms.
 

Abstract:  We consider the single object auction model with allocative externalities in private valuation and quasi-linear setting. We model externalities by assuming that every agent has a private valuation (for the object) and a strict ranking of other agents. The utility for an agent when another agent gets the object is the product of his own valuation and a real number that depends on the rank of this agent in his ranking. When the only private information is the valuation of the agents, we characterize the implementable allocation rules and, use it to derive the optimal auction. The optimal auction collects payments from agents who do not get the object.