Does Social Identity Constrain Rural Entrepreneurship? The Role of Financial Inclusion¹

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Abstract

This paper examines whether better financial access can mitigate the impact of social identity on entrepreneurship. Using a novel dataset of Indian villages and distance to bank branches, we find that proximity to a bank branch improves non-agricultural entrepreneurship of underprivileged caste groups in India, with a significant entry occurring in sectors which were dominated by the privileged caste groups. We find that this effect is mediated by the uptake of institutional credit by under-privileged groups. Our results show that the financial inclusion can break rigid social norms around caste and occupation in India.

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1. Introduction

Social identity plays a critical role in influencing the livelihoods of people. In India, the graded caste identity of individuals segregates and limits their occupational choices. Audretsch *et al.* (2013) show that the persons belonging to social classes that are lower in social hierarchy are less likely to be self-employed as compared to their counterparts in high castes. They are underrepresented in ownership of enterprises. Specifically, Scheduled Castes (SCs) - the historically most disadvantaged castes in India, and Scheduled Tribes (STs), comprise 16.4% and 7.7% of the population, respectively but owned only 9.8% and 3.7% of enterprises (Iyer *et al.*, 2013).

Enterprises owned by under-privileged groups face significant social, economic and political barriers. These enterprises are observed to be relatively new in age; smaller in size; operated with smaller capital base and traditional technology; exhibit slower growth; and mainly run by single owner or family labour (Thorat and Sadana, 2009; Jodhka, 2010; Audretsch *et al.*, 2013; Iyer *et al.*, 2013). They appear to have survival as motivation and not commercial gains (Deshpande and Sharma, 2013). In addition, caste identities in India are tied to the occupation with no or little mobility into other sectors (Banerjee and knight, 1985; Thorat and Joshi, 2020). This restriction may force under-privileged groups to remain in less productive sectors.

One of the key obstacles for such differences is found to be the lack of access to formal credit. Raj and Sasidharan (2018) show that the firms owned by socially-disadvantaged groups have a lower probability of obtaining credit from a formal institution. Caste-based disparities also appear in farmer's access to bank credit in rural India (Kumar, 2013; Karthick and Madheswaran, 2018; Kumar and Venkatachalam, 2019; Fisman *et al.*, 2017; Rao, 2018; Tiwari *et al.*, 2022), as well as in the informal markets (Khanna and Majumdar, 2020). Additionally, smaller size of firms owned by under-privileged groups may serve as a further detriment since small firms have significantly less access to formal credit (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Beck *et al.*, 2006; Ayyagari *et al.*, 2008; Bloom *et al.*, 2010).

We examine the role of access to finance in mitigating the impact of social identity on entrepreneurial development. Though several studies have recorded caste-based disparities in access to formal credit, the contribution of finance in muting the impacts of caste identity and encouraging entrepreneurship among under-privileged castes remains largely un-studied. We address this issue by studying whether proximity to bank branches improves overall entrepreneurship for under-privileged caste groups in India. Caste identity not only restricts the mobility of individuals across occupations but also across sectors (Banerjee and knight, 1985; Thorat and Joshi, 2020). Does access to financial sources help in mitigating these caste rigidities? We test it in two ways. First, we explore their entrepreneurial expansion into nonagriculture sector – a sector with higher productivity than the agriculture sector. Second, we reclassify sectors based on high concentration of *general* caste owners, defined as those nonagricultural sectors where *general* caste occupied majority of the enterprises (more than 50%) in the base year of the study (1998). So, we explore whether under-privileged groups have been able to enter *general*-dominated sector. Proximity between a bank and borrowers should reduce access costs for borrowers and also improve information collection by banks on the underrepresented groups, thereby spurring credit delivery for them. On the other hand, any discrimination based on social identities in the credit markets or elite capture would erode any impact of financial access for the under-privileged groups. To test these hypotheses, we investigate whether an improved proximity between the banks and the borrowers leads to entrepreneurial activity through the credit channel i.e., an uptake of formal credit.

We utilize the withdrawal of Service Area Approach (SAA) in 2005 which removed several restrictions on bank operations (Garg and Gupta, 2023). The next section describes this policy and the subsequent expansion in bank branches in detail. Figure 1 shows the growth in the establishment of bank branches from 2005 onwards, which was substantially higher in rural areas. We exploit this sudden growth in rural bank branches as our natural experiment.

We develop a novel village-bank branch matched dataset which records the distance of each village to its nearest village/town with a bank branch (banked-centre) for each year from 1950 to 2019. We use this measure as a proxy for physical access to the nearest bank branch. Using the SHRUG data set (Asher *et al.*, 2021), we merge our data on distance to banks with the village-level data from three rounds of Economic Census (EC) 1998, 2005 and 2013. Economic Census records the caste group of the enterprise owner. For each village, we obtain the number of enterprises owned by the following four caste groups- General, Other Backward Castes (OBCs), Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (indigenous tribes).

We use a Difference-in-Differences (DID) research design to identify the causal impact of proximity to bank branches on entrepreneurship. We compare outcomes of un-banked villages which received a bank branch in its *neighbourhood* of 5 km after 2005 (Treatment Group) against the villages where the nearest banked centre remained more than 5 kms away in 1998, 2005 and 2013 (Control Group). Our threshold of 5kms is motivated by RBI's latest financial

inclusion strategy of establishing a bank branch within 5kms of every village in India by the year 2022 (RBI, 2019). As a robustness check, we also conduct our analysis with the threshold of 3kms.

Although we study entrepreneurial activity for all caste groups, our main focus remains on SC and ST category. While SC population is spread across the country, the tribal population is more concentrated.⁵ The latter resides mainly in mountainous, hilly and forested areas. They are separated from the mainstream population with their physical inaccessibility, lingual, cultural differences. Both these caste groups have not progressed on entrepreneurship front as much as other castes such as *General* and OBCs. The OBC category was defined in 1980 based on the Mandal Commission Report. Previously, this category was part of the *General* category. Iyer *et al.* (2013) discusses that how OBCs are the middle castes. Although, by definition, they are labelled as socially and educationally backward, they have not suffered as extreme discrimination as SCs. In addition, OBCs have made a significant entrepreneurial progress (Iyer *et al.*, 2013). They are not under-represented in enterprises as their share in total enterprises has converged with their share in total population. For these reasons, we focus mainly on SC and ST groups while also comparing their outcomes with *General* and OBCs groups.

We find that the proximity of bank branches improves number of SC enterprises. The impact arises mainly from the non-agricultural sector – a high-productivity sector. For the ST group, we observe a decline in agriculture sector and no impact in the non-agriculture sector. Though it remains surprising that the tribal population has not benefitted from financial expansion, our results largely support other studies which also find almost negligible or no impact of other policy interventions on the tribal population. For example, Howard and Prakash (2012), Prakash (2020), record negligible impact of reservation quotas on the consumption expenditure, and probability of finding a high-skilled job, and Gang *et al.* (2017) record no occupational diversification for ST population group. Further, on the privileged groups, we find a positive impact in non-agriculture sector for the General castes and OBCs.

We also find that after improved proximity to a bank branch, SCs expand into the sectors dominated by the *General* caste, defined as those sectors where the share of the *General* caste was more than 50% in 1998. These results reassure that the financial inclusion efforts can help

⁵ Out of all village with ST population, 49.4% villages are ST dominated villages (where ST population is more than 50%). The corresponding number for SC dominated villages is 20%.

overcome disadvantages associated with traditional practices and social identities while enabling sectoral mobility.

The proximity can plausibly enable banks to collect soft information for excluded groups who usually do not have hard information on creditworthiness such as land rights and other tangible assets (Mohanty, 2001; Prakash, 2015). Improved assessment of their creditworthiness can potentially lead to more credit disbursement thereby spurring entrepreneurship. We test this hypothesis by including a measure of credit uptake in our main specification. Our results show that the SC group - under-represented in credit access, is able to gain due to bank branch proximity. The impact on SC entrepreneurship (overall and non-agriculture sector) appears to be mediated by formal credit uptake.

We conduct heterogeneity tests to explore factors which may strengthen or weaken the observed impact. We find that the evidence on sectoral mobility weakens as the distribution of caste groups becomes more skewed i.e., the dominance of the *General* caste group increases to 60% or 70%. It indicates that as barriers to entry increase the role of credit in entrepreneurship growth diminishes.

Our results are robust to several additional checks. These include rejecting divergence in pretreatment trends between the treated and control group; using 3kms as a threshold to define proximate bank branches; using an alternative Two-way Fixed Effects (TWFE) specification which uses contemporaneous covariate and a subset of control group villages matched on propensity for treatment.

Our work contributes to several strands of the literature. First, we show that the lack of credit is a binding constraint for SC firms (Jodhka, 2010; Iyer *et al.*, 2013; Raj and Sasidharan, 2018). Recently, Goraya (2023) has shown that the under-privileged caste groups have higher marginal product of capital but lack credit. Removing credit constraints for these groups will yield higher growth in the country. We study the removal of one type of constraint—physical proximity between enterprises and banks—and find significant gains in entrepreneurship for under-privileged group (SCs) in the overall, non-agricultural sector and also in the sectors dominated by general caste. Further, entrepreneurship of this group improves due to uptake of formal credit.

Second, we contribute to the literature on the role of caste system in economic outcomes. Traditionally, under the *Jajmani* system, the occupations are segregated by castes, where individual born in one particular caste is restricted to adopt occupations limited to that particular caste. The existing research has shown that the markets are segmented based on caste identities in today's India as well. Jodhka (2010) finds that a majority of respondents in a survey in Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, felt that their caste identity was perceived as more important than their professional identity. Guerin *et al.* (2015) based on survey of two districts of Tamil Nadu, show that the practice of 'untouchability' restricts 'Dalits' to enter sectors related to food, clothes and transportation. In particular, caste identities made lower-caste individuals to transport small quantities over small distance, whereas the more lucrative long-distance transportation was captured by upper and middle castes. Thorat and Joshi (2020) provide evidence that the modern India is not free from the social evils like 'untouchability'. Further, Thorat and Madheswaran (2018) provide evidence of how discrimination based on identity leads to economic loss in terms of closing down of business and operating at lower profit margins. We show that such rigidities can be attenuated to some extent through financial inclusion. Specifically, our results on sectoral mobility demonstrate that the under-privileged groups can enter conventionally secluded economic spaces.

Finally, our paper contributes to the literature of finance and entrepreneurship. The role of credit in the establishment and growth of enterprises is well recognised (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Fafchamps and Schundeln, 2013; Bruhn and Love, 2014; Qin and Kong, 2022), specifically in poorer regions (Paulson and Townsend, 2004). Beck and Demigruc-Kunt (2006) and Ayyagari *et al.* (2008) consider finance to be the most important constraint impacting the growth of firms. Based on a systematic review of SME finance literature, Kersten *et al.* (2017) find a positive and significant effect of SME finance on capital investment, firm performance, and employment. In the context of India, Kapoor *et al.* (2017) show that the availability of subsidised credit to eligible firms in 1998 improved their growth and also established firmbank relationship in the long run. Unfortunately, despite these benefits, not all population groups have uniform access to credit. We provide evidence that access to banks can improve entrepreneurial activity for those who lacked credit.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional background on caste structure and why proximity to banks is important. This is followed by a review of policies on bank branch expansion in India over the years in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss our novel village-bank matched panel data, along with other datasets that we use. Section 5 describes the methodology. Section 6 presents our key results and mechanism. Section 7 presents the heterogeneity results. Section 8 presents the various robustness checks. We conclude in Section

9. For SC and ST caste groups, we will use under-privileged and marginalized groups interchangeably.

2. Institutional Background

a. Caste-System in India

India is a Hindu majority country which has followed a graded caste system for centuries. The origin of it is found in the religious text of Hinduism. It divides the society into four major groups called *Varnas* – Brahmins (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas (community of traders), Sudras (workers and craftsmen). Apart from these four major categories, there was fifth category known as the *Ati-Sudras* who were called *Dalits*. This segment of the society were the outcastes and completely excluded from the Hindu caste system.

The *jajmani* system essentially imposed a labour structure on the caste structure in the country. In this system, each caste was assigned traditional occupations. The Brahmins, Kshatriyas and Vaisyas were labelled as high caste groups and they were the land owners whereas the Sudras - lower castes were engaged in low-paying menial jobs such as sweeping and provided services to the upper castes. The last group- *Ati-Sudras* were assigned jobs which were considered physically and socially impure such as cremation of dead bodies, manual scavenging etc. As these were also the outcastes, they had no right to use public goods such as public wells or schools; were not allowed to own land, participate in religious activities and festivals, and were not allowed to enter houses or shops of the high castes. The system restricted mobility across occupations and sectors so much that the occupations assigned to one caste were passed from generation to generation.

The Constitution of India, defines the hierarchy in a different manner. The first three varnas – Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas are considered the *general* (forward) caste. The *Ati-Sudras* who suffered social evils like extreme deprivation, social exclusion, and untouchability, form the population group that we know today as the scheduled castes – SCs. Constitution defines the tribal population (*Adivasis*) as scheduled tribes (STs). The people in-between higher castes and SC/STs, who are socially and educationally backward are called Other Backwards Castes (OBCs).

The government has implemented affirmative action policies for the welfare of the population who was lagging behind socially, economically and politically. Initially, the affirmative action

defined reservation quotas in educational institutes which were later extended to employment in government sector as well. The categorisation of population in different classes is important as these define who can avail benefits in reservation quotas. For instance, the reservation policies initially defined for SCs and STs were also extended to the OBCs in 1980, with the recommendation of the Mandal Commission. Despite these affirmative action policies, SCs and STs significantly lag behind the other castes in the entrepreneurial activities (Table 2). Hence, it is important to analyse their entrepreneurial growth.

b. <u>Relevance of proximity between the lender and the borrower</u>

The literature points to two rationales on why distance between the borrower and lender could play an important part in the lending decisions. Firstly, the large distance, by itself implies a large travel cost which may pose as an additional financial burden on the borrower. Secondly, more proximity may strengthen the relationship between the banks and borrowers. Banks can understand the financial profile of the proximate area in a better way as higher proximity may enable banks to collect soft information about the informationally opaque borrowers in the local area. Additionally, banks can monitor the loans more accurately and reduce the supervision cost. Unlike credit scores, soft information is costly to obtain, difficult to quantify and transmit. Proximity can lower the cost of collection of the soft information. Obtaining it, thus, improves lending decision by banks (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Brevoort and Hannan, 2006; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Ergungor, 2010; Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012; Ho and Mallick, 2017; Nguyen, 2019).

Arguably, the advent of digital means of banking may lower the importance of proximate bank branch. Borrowers may rely less on brick-and-mortar branches. Similarly, banks may also obtain credit histories and other information about the credit-worthiness of the borrowers without being proximate. Peterson and Rajan (2002) demonstrate this in the USA where technical advancements make communication between lenders and borrowers more impersonal and enabled banks to lend at a distance. On the contrary, some studies show that the proximity between the lender and the borrowers is very crucial despite several improvements in technology. For example, Brevoort and Hannan (2006) show that the large distance between the lender and the borrower acts as a deterrent to the lending. This holds more for the small banks as they rely more on the 'relationship banking' whereas the larger banking organisations can obtain hard information about the potential borrowers. Ergungor (2010) also finds that, in low- to moderate-income neighbourhoods of Ohio (USA) where people lack credit histories, the mortgage lending increases with the presence of a bank branch. However, no impact occurs in high income neighbourhoods where borrowers are likely to furnish credit scores. In a recent study on branch closures in USA, Nguyen (2019) provides evidence that the distance between the borrowers and lenders is crucial despite the outreach of technology. The branch closures led to a decline in small business lending and the impact was most severe in cases where credit disbursement is heavily dependent on the soft-information about the borrower.

This suggests that, in areas where people do not have credit histories, the physical presence of banks might help in reducing the cost of collecting soft information. A developing economy like India with large rural population is suitable to test such hypotheses. Based on a survey of 17,100 bank customers across 17 countries including India, Srinivas and Wadhwani (2020) found that branches are still the dominant channel for simple operations such as account opening and obtaining debit cards, as well as complex operations such as obtaining loans. A recent survey by NABARD (2018) on financial inclusion in India recorded low usage of online means of banking. The proportion of respondents who reported to have used mobile and internet banking was low at 1.6 percent and 0.8 percent respectively. Thus, adoption of digital banking may be limited to urban areas and at early stages in the rural parts of the country, thereby, highlighting the important role of a brick-and-mortar branch in financial services.

c. Why proximity may matter more for under-privileged groups?

In the context of our study, information friction in credit market becomes even more pertinent. Marginalized caste groups in India are asset poor. Thus, accessing formal credit remains an obstacle unless the lender can compensate absence of hard information with soft information (Liberti and Petersen, 2019). Further, informal networks of credit which use soft information may also remain inaccessible to the marginalized groups since rich moneylenders usually belong to the upper caste groups. Thus, proximity between lender and borrowers may remove information friction in the credit market. Evidence for such information frictions have been recorded elsewhere. Fisman *et al.* (2017) show how cultural proximity between lender and borrower in India may mitigate information frictions in the credit market thereby improving "*credit access and loan size dispersion*".

3. Expansion of banking sector in India

Banking sector has expanded in urban as well as rural areas of India. Figure 1 plots the number of new branches opened in rural and urban areas during 1950-2019. The pace of its expansion

varied under different policy regimes of bank branch expansion. In pre-Social Banking Period (1949-1969), RBI adopted a demand-following model where it provided licenses to branches in areas with adequate demand for financial services. In the social banking period (1969-1990), RBI devised mandatory location-based quotas for establishing new branches. Specifically, banks with less (more) than 60% branches in rural areas were supposed to open 3 (2) rural branches for every 1 urban branch (RBI, 1970). Consequently, there was a sudden jump in the rate of branch establishment in rural areas.

In 1990, quota-based restrictions were withdrawn. Instead, to serve the credit needs of rural areas, RBI adopted a Service Area Approach in 1989. Under this policy, existing branches were designated a cluster of 15-25 villages based on contiguity and proximity between villages and banks (RBI, 2004). This designated branch, known as the Service Area Branch, was responsible for meeting the credit needs of the assigned villages. However, if a borrower wanted credit from a non-service area branch, it required a 'no-dues' certificate from the service area branch.

SAA limited the scope for banking operations. The branch expansion reversed to urban areas, as opposed to what was observed in the social banking period (Figure 1). A Study by Devarajan (2004) based on Kannur district in Kerala, observed a decline in credit-deposit ratio in the state after implementation of SAA. The study also recorded very low awareness among people in Kannur district about the scheme, as only one-eighth out of 492 persons surveyed could identify their service area bank. Banks also did not follow the prescribed procedure for planning their service area plan. Recording caveats of financial system for rural poor, Basu (2005) described that the SAA has restricted the newer and more innovative entrants in rural lending; they further state that the removal of SAA could help stimulate the entry of new branches in rural areas of the country.

Taking cognizance of low entry of branches, RBI withdrew SAA in 2004. Banks were now supposed to submit annual branch expansion plans and RBI committed to evaluate the plan and respond to banks within 4 weeks. This was in stark contrast to the period from 1990 to 2005 when each application was approved on a case-by-case basis. Thus, a more predictable environment was created for banks to expand⁶. We observe the effect of these measures in Figure 1. After 2005, there is a sharp increase in bank branch establishment, especially in rural areas and a decline in closure of bank branches (Figure 2). We exploit these changes in bank branch expansion to study its impact on rural entrepreneurship.

⁶See Young (2020)

4. Data

a. Outcome variable: Caste-wise Ownership of Enterprises

Our outcome variables come from the Economic Census (EC) of India which enumerates all non-farm enterprises in the country⁷. It collects indicators such as gender and caste of the owner, NIC code, major source of finance, size, and size of employment of each enterprise, among others. For our analysis, we use EC 1998, 2005 and 2013, which recorded the caste categories of the owner. We include the following from these three rounds as outcome indicators at the village level.

To estimate the caste-wise impacts, we consider the total number of enterprises owned by four caste groups, namely, General, OBC, SC and ST.⁸ The NIC codes are available up to 3 digits for each enterprise. Using this indicator, we compute the number of enterprises in agriculture and non-agriculture sectors, owned by each caste group. Figures 3 shows that the overall entrepreneurship has increased in the country where the share of rural enterprises has increased from 56% in 1998 to 59.4% in 2013. Table 2 presents summary statistics of all indicators.

Our final sample includes 6,34,173 village-year observations. One can observe caste-wise disparities in entrepreneurship as the *General* caste group has 11 enterprises per village on average, the number reduces to 3.45 enterprises for SCs and 2.7 for STs groups. The OBC group has the highest number of enterprises at 14 per village indicating their entrepreneurial progress. Similar level of ordering can be observed for the non-agriculture sector as well.

Further, the census documents the 'major source of finance' of each enterprise, where the response is one of the following: formal, informal, self-financed and government aid. In order to capture the institutional credit uptake by enterprises in a village, we compute the number of caste-wise enterprises with formal finance as their major source of finance. The use of formal finance (as major source of finance) remains much lower overall along with caste-wise differences. For instance, for *General* caste, there are 0.29 enterprises (nearly 1 enterprise per 3 villages) which have reported institutional finance as major source of finance. The number for OBC is similar at 0.29. The same indicator remains much smaller for SC and ST groups at 0.06 and 0.05 respectively. In other words, there is one SC-owned enterprises with institutional

⁷The sectors not covered in EC are the following. In case of agricultural activity, establishments classified under 011 and 012 of Section A of NIC 2008; in case of non-agricultural activity, establishments engaged in Section O of NIC 2008 (public administration, defence, compulsory social security), Section T of NIC 2008 (territorial organization and bodies) and Section R of NIC 2008 (illegal gambling and betting activities)

⁸ We utilize single-owner firms.

credit for nearly 16 villages. This is relatively worse for STs as the same figure stands at one enterprise with institutional credit for every 20 villages.

To create a panel of villages, we use the Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Dataset on India (SHRUG) created by Asher *et al.* (2021), which provides village-level identifiers compatible with Economic Censuses (1998, 2005 and 2013) and Population Census (1991, 2001, 2011) of India. The rich diversity of information present in the Economic Census combined using SHRUG IDs makes it possible to observe the trends in economic activity in a village over time.

b. Explanatory variables: Access to finance

The population census 2001 and 2011 record whether a village has a bank or not, and if not, the distance to the nearest branch. However, the distance is measured in coarse intervals of 5 km such as 0-5km, 5-10km, and so on. We use a more refined measure of village level financial access than the one used in other studies so far or available in these two rounds of population census. We define financial access as the straight-line distance of each un-banked village to its nearest banked village/town⁹.

Using three datasets—RBI Commercial Bank Directory¹⁰ (as on October 31, 2019), Population Census 2011 and GIS-shape files¹¹ for boundary of Indian villages—we compute this metric from 1951 to 2019. The complete detail of construction of our measure of financial access is explained in Garg and Gupta (2023) along with its limitations. The average distance of unbanked villages is plotted in Figure 4. Our measure of proximity shows that the bank access in rural areas has improved drastically over the past decades, as the average distance of unbanked villages to the nearest banked centre has declined from 43.5 kms in 1951 to 4.3 kms in 2019.

c. Other variables

⁹ Several measures have been used in literature as proxy of access to banks/finance. First is the geographic and demographic penetration of bank branches where the total number of bank branches either divided by total area or total population (Alessandrini *et al.*, 2010; Beck *et al.*, 2007, 2008; Zhao and Jones-Evans, 2017). Recent studies have used straight line distance and travel distance to the nearest bank branch, distance that users are willing and able to travel for the service (Koomson *et al.*, 2020; Langford *et al.* 2021; Camacho *et al.* 2021).

¹⁰ The RBI Commercial Bank Directory is obtained as on October 31, 2019. It provides the details of each commercial bank branch in the country with the name of the state, district, and rural centre (roughly equivalent to a village) where the branch is situated.

¹¹ The spatial data we use is the GIS shape files which provides us the location of each village in terms of latitude and longitudes of the boundary of each village. This data is obtained from the research team at the World Bank. These GIS shape files are compatible with Population Census 2011 (henceforth, PC 2011).

We obtain other indicators which could potentially influence economic activity in rural areas. One such important factor is the availability of paved roads. Recent studies have estimated the impact of village roads on several aspects of human development such as easier access to different government services e.g., health and education services, labour market, and goods market. Asher and Novosad (2020) show that the construction of new paved roads in rural areas led to large reallocation of labour from agricultural to the non-farm work outside the village. Thus, road availability in rural areas cannot be ignored as a confounding factor in this study. Other indicators are the close substitute of a commercial bank branch in rural areas such as Primary Agricultural Credit Society (PACS). We also obtain population size, literacy rate, and availability of power at the village level. All these indicators are obtained from the population census of 2001 and 2011.

5. Methodology

As our objective is to analyse the impact of proximity of a village to a bank branch on its economic activity, our study group is formed by the unbanked villages. We use a difference-indifferences research design for our study by constructing the following treatment and control groups:

- Control Group: This group consists of those unbanked villages which remained more than 5kms away from a banked centre in all years of study i.e., up to 2013. There are 187,814 such villages.
- Treatment Group: These unbanked villages were more than 5kms away from a banked centre up to 2005, but a new branch was opened within 5kms between 2006 and 2013. This group comprises of 74,444 villages.¹²

Table 1 provides the distribution of the treatment and control group villages in our study.

a. Identification

Identifying the impact of bank branches on rural entrepreneurship in India is challenging. After 2005, policies introduced by RBI provided more control to banks over branch placement, which makes branch location endogenous to several unobservable village-level factors. For example, banks may enter areas which already exhibit high levels of economic activity. Additionally,

¹² 274,009 villages had a bank branch within 5km prior to 2005. We exclude these villages in our analysis.

banks may observe the upward trajectory in economic potential of a village to determine branch location. Difference-in-differences research design allows for the inclusion of village-fixed effects. These address the time-constant village factors which influence bank branch location decisions such as level of the economic activity.

Following Wing *et al.* (2018), we address the concern of time-varying factors by including time trends of pre-treatment levels of some relevant covariates of the villages. We follow the literature on determinants of bank branch location to decide which covariates to include in the empirical specification. Factors such as size and density of population, level of education, the share of urban population, size of the profitable market, growth rate, unemployment rate, and level of economic activity are found to be significant drivers of bank branch availability (Alama and Tortosa-Ausina 2012; Ansong *et al.*, 2015; Crocco *et al.*, 2010; Fernández-Olit *et al.*, 2019; Hegerty 2016; Maudos 2017; Ghosh 2012; Zhang *et al.*, 2021). In particular, we first run a logit regression of the treatment Indicator of a village (1 If the village received treatment and 0 otherwise) on various socio-demographic and economic covariates. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of each variable from the probit regression.

Infrastructure such as roads and domestic power; size of population, literacy rate, proximity to town, and presence of other financial service providers such as PACS are strong determinants of proximity to a bank branch. In particular, the presence of a road and domestic power supply increase the probability of a proximate bank branch by 2.9% and 5%, respectively. On the other hand, other lending institutions such as PACS deters proximity of bank branches by 2.4%.

b. Empirical Specification

Our empirical specification takes the following form:

$$y_{vdt} = \gamma . Treat_{vd} * Post_t + \varphi_v + \varphi_t + \varphi_{dt} + Z_{vd(2001)} * Trend + \varepsilon_{vdt} \dots \dots (1)$$

where, y_{vdt} is the outcome variable in village v, district d and at time t. $Treat_{vd}$ takes value '1' for villages which received treatment and '0' otherwise, $Post_t$ takes value '1' for year 2013 and '0' for pre-treatment years – 1998, 2005. The coefficient, γ , on the interaction term measures the ATE on y_{vdt} after bank branch becomes proximate within 5kms.

 φ_v are village fixed effects which address time-invariant village-level unobservable factors. In addition, we saturate the specification with year fixed effects, φ_t , and district-year fixed effects, φ_{dt} . The former account for macro factors while the latter address local time-varying factors affecting the district of the village. These are crucial since RBI introduced several

changes in bank branch expansion policies over time. Further, RBI's push for branch expansion centred on the size of the banked population at the district-level. $Z_{vd(2001)}$ are covariates of the village from PC 2001, namely, literacy rate, size of population, distance to town, road, presence of domestic power and PACS. The interaction term $Z_{vd(2001)} * Trend$ represents the time trend of each of these variables.

c. Strength of the Treatment

Before we move to the results, we discuss the strength of the treatment received by the treatment group. Table 4 reports the average distance to the nearest banked centre. In 1998, the average distance was 8.45kms and 9.81kms for treated and control villages, respectively, which remains nearly unchanged in 2005. By 2013, proximity for treated villages improves as the average distance declines to 3.25kms. In contrast, control group villages remain 8.43kms away from the nearest banked centre.

6. Results

a. Growth in Entrepreneurship across Caste Groups

We start with examining the impact of bank proximity on caste-wise entrepreneurship. Table 5 reports the results for all enterprises across caste groups (General, OBC, SC and ST) and sectors (agriculture and non-agriculture). All the models include the village fixed effects, year fixed effects, district-year fixed effects, and time-trend of the control variables with robust standard errors which are clustered at the village level.

Panel A reports the effect on the total number of enterprises. Of all caste categories, we find a positive impact for SC owned firms (column 3) in treated villages, while ST owned firms decline significantly by -0.15 units (column 4). The effect on total number of enterprises may mask heterogeneity across sectors. In panel B, we measure the impact on the number of agricultural enterprises. We find OBC and ST-owned agricultural enterprises to decrease by 0.168 (column 2) and 0.089 units (column 4), respectively. However, general owned and SC-owned agricultural firms do not observe a significant decline.

Panel C reports the effects on the non-agricultural sector. As expected, we find a positive impact for *General* and OBCs as these groups are more entrepreneurial in nature. It is encouraging to see that the financial access also had a positive impact the most under-privileged caste group as SC entrepreneurship has expanded into non-agriculture sector in treated villages. Specifically, *General*, OBC and SC-owned enterprises increase by 0.261, 0.243 and 0.088 units, respectively, while the number of ST enterprises does not change significantly.

A negative impact on overall ST enterprises in treated areas raises concern. Their presence in agriculture sector declines with an improved proximity to bank branches but it does not increase in non-agriculture sector. It could partly be due to the fact that they reside mainly in geographically isolated areas where economic-opportunities remain lower. Kijima (2006) also shows that the differences in living standards of STs and the non-SC/STs are partly due to geographical reasons. Other evidence suggests much less progress for the STs vis-à-vis the SC population. While most of the studies in context of minorities club the SC and ST categories, few studies segregate the analysis. For instance, Howard and Prakash (2012) show that the impact of employment quotas has not been same across minority populations. STs are less likely to choose high-skill occupation and more likely to choose low- and middle- skill occupations than the SCs population, partly because STs live in geographical areas where the opportunities of high-skill occupations are scant. In a similar study, Prakash (2020) finds no impact of employment quotas on ST members' likelihood of finding a salaries job and on the monthly per-capita consumption expenditure. The whole impact was found for SC members. Another related study by Gang, et al. (2017), finds that the occupational structure of SC household is converging towards that of the mainstream population, whereas the occupational diversification and the convergence story is absent for STs. They remain as cultivators and nonagricultural labourers. In this context, our results on STs do not appear too distinct. Our results are important for policy point of view that ST group may require larger entrepreneurial push in spite of provision of financial access points.

For the rest of the paper, we will focus our attention on SC-owned enterprises since this caste group has been the most excluded and discriminated against community. Understanding the and exploring impact of financial inclusion on entrepreneurs of SC community can, thus, advise policies on their upliftment.

b. <u>Mechanism</u>

Proximity to bank branches should lower the intermediation costs in credit markets. In the context of our study, we expect that the observed impact on the enterprises should be mediated through the credit uptake. This is because, people in rural areas generally are more credit constrained as compared to the urban population. It remains even more critical to understand if this relationship holds for the SC group. The under-privileged groups in India are likely to

lack tangible assets for collateral. Historically, Dalits (SCs) had no right to own land (Thorat, 2002). Using IHDS data of 2005, Desai and Dubey (2012) record that Dalits are less likely to hold land even in modern India. Lack of assets, especially land can serve as a significant barrier to financial inclusion (Chaudhuri and Cherical, 2012; Khanna and Majumdar, 2020). With arrival of a bank in closer neighbourhood, better soft information collection may compensate for lack of hard information on collateral. Evidence for this trade-off between hard and soft information in credit markets has been recorded by Liberti and Petersen (2019).

Economic Census records the major source of finance for each enterprise. We use this to compute the number of enterprises (in a sector-caste category) with institutional credit as the major source of finance. Using the following specification, we test for the mediating role of credit uptake in entrepreneurship:

$$y_{vdt} = \gamma. (Treat_{vd} * Post_t) + \beta_1. (Treat_{vd} * Post_t * FF_{vdt}) + \beta_2 * FF_{vdt} + \sum \varphi_i + \varepsilon_{vdt} .. (2)$$

where, as above, y_{vdt} is the number of enterprises and FF_{vdt} is the corresponding number of enterprises which reported institutional credit as a major source of finance. In addition to the variables shown, we also include time trend of all the covariates and all fixed effects ($\sum \varphi_i$) from equation (1).

If credit uptake mediates the rise of SC entrepreneurship, the estimated effect, γ , should attenuate while the coefficient of triple interaction term ($Treat_{vd} * Post_t * FF_{vdt}$), β_1 should be positive and significant.

Table 6 shows the credit mechanism results for SC group. The coefficient on triple interaction is positive in both columns, and significant for all and non-agricultural enterprises. Further, the coefficient on difference-in-difference interaction term becomes smaller. This shows that the observed positive impact on SC enterprises in Table 5 is mediated via uptake of formal credit in the treated areas. Therefore, the entrepreneurial activities of this under-privileged group increase overall and especially in non-agriculture sector with an improvement in access to banks followed by an uptake of formal credit.

7. Heterogeneity across Sectors Dominated by General Caste

So far, we observe a positive increase in the non-agriculture sector for the SC caste group. However, the whole non-agriculture sector is a large domain, the categorisation of sectors in the Economic Census data allows us go deeper into it.

Caste system in India segregates individuals based on the occupations assigned to each caste (Munshi, 2019). Existing studies have shown that the mobility of the under-privileged caste groups across occupations, sectors and generations has remined lower due to the rigidities of the caste system. Jodhka (2010); Guerin *et al.* (2015); Thorat and Madheswaran (2018) show instances of *untouchability*, discrimination in supply of inputs; and consumer-based discrimination against SCs.

In this context, we analyse whether proximity to bank branches enables SC group to enter those sectors which were predominantly dominated by the *General* caste. To test it, we first select the set of non-agricultural sectors where the share of *General*-owned enterprises exceeded 50% in 1998. Table 7 reports these sectors, which comprise of mostly higher value manufacturing. We hypothesise that a larger presence of *general* caste indicates higher exclusion and barriers for under-privileged groups. These barriers could be in the form of absence of business networks or a skill gap compared to the *General* castes (Drall and Mandal, 2021).

We then measure the impact on the number of SC-owned enterprises in these sectors. Table 8 reports these results. We find that the SC entrepreneurship significantly increases in the *General*-dominated sectors (columns 1 and 2, respectively). The coefficient is 0.057 and is statistically significant at 1%. We further check how this result varies as social barriers dominate more by looking at the sectors where the share of *general* caste is more than 60% or 70%. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 provide the results. We find that the impact increases slightly to 0.062 for sectors at 60% dominance and decreases sharply to 0.008 for sectors where the *General*-caste dominance is more than 70%.

Overall, our results suggest that the bank branch proximity helps rural society to overcome the rigid norms set by the caste system. However, the sectoral mobility reduces as the social barriers increase.

8. Robustness

In this section, we discuss the robustness of our estimated impacts.

a. Assessment of Parallel Pre-Trends

We explore if the major variables of interest exhibit parallel trend in the pre-treatment period for the control and treated groups of villages. A diverging pre-treatment trend would indicate that the treated villages were already growing at a faster rate than the control villages. In other words, the presence of factors other than the treatment (the proximity to bank branches) may have led to post-treatment results.

To check for parallel pre-trends, we limit our analysis to the pre-treatment time-periods—1998 and 2005. We use the following specification:

$$y_{vdt} = \gamma . Treat_{vd} * I(2005)_t + \varphi_v + \varphi_t + \varphi_{dt} + Z_{vd(2001)} * Trend + \varepsilon_{vdt} \dots (3)$$

where, $I(2005)_t$ takes value '1' for the year 2005 and '0' for 1998. Other variables are as defined previously. The coefficient on $Treat_{vd} * I(2005)_t$ now measures the DID estimates between the treated and control group *prior to the treatment*. A statistically significant γ would indicate diverging pre-trends.

Panels A, and B in Table 9 present the results for SC- and ST-owned enterprises respectively. Results are presented for total, agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. γ remains insignificant for each outcome variable. Hence, all outcome variables exhibit parallel pretrends.

b. Assessment using contemporaneous covariates:

The bank branch proximity is not random and found to be correlated with socio-economic characteristics of villages, namely, size of population, literacy rate, distance to town, availability of PACS, roads, and power. These variables may confound with covariates of entrepreneurship at the village level. In our main specification, we control pre-treatment determinants of bank branch proximity, each interacted with time-trend, to address this concern. In a parsimonious model, one would want to include the contemporaneous levels of these variables for years corresponding to the data used from Economic Censuses (1998, 2005 and 2013). However, the population census data– a source for the village level facilities and socio-economic variables are only available for the years of 2001 and 2011.

In this section, we restrict our analysis to the years 1998 and 2013. We change the main specification by replacing the time-trend variables with the near-contemporaneous indicators for population, literacy rates, distance to town, presence of road, PACS and power supply of the villages. We also include village, year, and district-year fixed effects. Our empirical specification takes the following form:

$$y_{vdt} = \gamma.Treat_{vd} * Post_t + \varphi_v + \varphi_t + \varphi_{dt} + Z_{vdt} + \varepsilon_{vdt} \dots \dots (4)$$

where Z_{vdt} does not refer to the time trend of control variables as in previous equations, but it includes *near*-contemporaneous levels of these covariates from PC 2001 and 2011.

Table 10 presents the results. Like previous results, this model also suggests an increase in the SC enterprises in non-agricultural sector and in general-dominated sectors in treated villages in 2013.

c. Assessment of Results with 3km as Threshold to define Financial Access

As another robustness check, we use a lower distance threshold. In the main specification, we defined the treated group as those villages which received a bank branch within 5kms post-2005. Now, treated indicator takes value 1 if the village received a bank branch within 3kms after 2005. Results are reported in Table 11. Our results remain robust as we observe a positive and significant coefficient for SC enterprises in non-agriculture sector and the general-dominated sectors.

d. Assessment using a Matched Control Group

To further assess the robustness of our results, we conduct the analysis using a matched control group. We match the treated villages to a subset of a control group using the Coarsened Exact Matching method (Iacus *et al.*, 2012). Variables used for matching are size of population, literacy rate, distance to town, availability of PACS, roads, and power. Table 12 provides the results for SC-owned enterprises in the non-agricultural and *general*-dominated sectors. The results remain close to our main analysis—SC-owned enterprises increase in the non-agricultural sector and in *general*-dominated sectors.

9. Conclusion

Under-privileged social groups in India have been historically excluded from certain sectors of the economy due to the rigidities of the caste system. They lacked mobility across occupations,

sectors of operation, and across generations. Due to social evils like 'untouchability', they suffered consumer discrimination. In this paper, we explore the role of financial inclusion in improving entrepreneurship among under-privileged social groups in India. Our study suggests that the expansion of bank branches into rural areas has provided economic gains not only to the forward and middle class but also to the under-privileged caste group, mainly SCs. Using a novel dataset of Indian villages, we show that the proximity to a bank branch, defined as a bank within 5kms of a village, improves the non-agricultural entrepreneurship for SC population group. Further within non-agricultural sector, the SC group appear to be entering in those sectors where upper castes-owned enterprises have dominated prior to the treatment. We find evidence that these results are mediated by the uptake of credit from institutional sources.

For STs – other under-privileged caste group in the country, we find a decline in the agricultural enterprises, whereas the non-agricultural enterprises do not change in the treated villages. This result supports other studies which also find either negligible or no impact of STs in context of reservation quotas and occupational diversification (Howard and Prakash, 2012; Prakash, 2020; Gang *et al.*, 2017). The observed could partly be due to their geographical isolation from the rest of the population as also recorded by Kijima (2006) in context of disparities in living standard of STs and non-SC/STs. Testing it, remains outside the scope of the present work.

We contribute to the literature on the benefits of financial inclusion. Specifically, we show that the institutional credit uptake allows under-privileged individuals to improve entrepreneurship. Reassuringly, it also opens economic opportunities in sectors where they had lower presence, possibly due to rigid social norms.

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Tables and Figures



Figure 1: Number of New Branches opened each year in Rural and Urban Areas

Notes: (i) Data Source: RBI Commercial Bank Directory as on October 2019.



Figure 2: Branch Closure/Merger/Conversion: All India Level

Data Source: Data obtained from RBI Branch Banking Statistics of various years.



Figure 3. Number of Enterprises: All India Level

Data Source: Economic Census rounds of 1998, 2005, and 2013.

Figure 4: Average distance to nearest village/town with commercial bank: All unbanked villages (1951-2019)



Note: (i) Data Source: Computed by authors using following data sets: (a) RBI Commercial Bank Directory as on Oct, 2019. (b) Population census 2011. (c) Spatial Database for South Asia - World Bank.

	Number	Proportion*
Treatment Group	74,444	13.90
Control Group	187,814	35.06

Table 1: Treatment and Control Groups

Notes: (i) *Proportion of villages with respect to all 535,663 villages in Economic Census 2013. While computing the total number of unbanked villages, we remove uninhabited villages as per Population Census 2011. (ii) Treatment group consists of those unbanked villages which were more than 5kms away from a banked centre up to 2005, but came within 5kms between 2006 and 2013. (iii) The control group consists of those unbanked villages which remained more than 5kms away from a banked centre in all years of study i.e., up to 2013.

	Obs	Mean	SD	Min	Max
General	6,34,173	11.10368	60.67506	0	19069
OBC	6,34,173	14.54717	49.97081	0	8827
SC	6,34,173	3.453586	13.67178	0	2495
ST	6,34,173	2.743382	15.54861	0	6615
Non-agricu	lture				
General	6,34,173	7.428547	54.68873	0	18917
OBC	6,34,173	9.369387	37.86877	0	8632
SC	6,34,173	2.322187	9.89327	0	1275
ST	6,34,173	1.500302	10.24775	0	6227
Agriculture					
General	6,34,173	3.675133	19.94523	0	1939
OBC	6,34,173	5.177786	25.45204	0	2114
SC	6,34,173	1.131399	7.357388	0	1738
ST	6,34,173	1.243072	10.44845	0	1362
Formal Fina	ance				
General	6,34,173	0.299291	3.673309	0	1013
OBC	6,34,173	0.297214	3.407983	0	828
SC	6,34,173	0.065659	0.88493	0	157
ST	6,34,173	0.054949	1.015705	0	444

Table 2: Summary Statistics (1998, 2005, 2013)

Notes: (i) Obs refers to number of villages over three rounds of data. (ii) Mean refers to average value of respective indicator per village.

Correlates of treatment dummy			
Coefficient SE			
Literacy rate ₂₀₀₁	0.316***	0.008	
Population (log) 2001	0.005***	0.001	
Distance to nearest town ₂₀₀₁	-0.002***	0.0001	
Pavel road dummy ₂₀₀₁	0.029***	0.002	
Ag credit society ₂₀₀₁	-0.024***	0.003	
Power dummy ₂₀₀₁	0.051***	0.003	
Observations	2,33,398		
District Dummy	Yes		

Table 3: Determinants of Treatment

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Notes: (i) Table reports results form a Probit model. The dependant variable is the treatment dummy. It takes value 1 if an unbanked village comes within 5kms of a banked centre between 2005 and 2013 and 0 otherwise. (ii) Explanatory variables are taken from PC 2001. (iii) Results show that which kind of villages received treatment by 2013. (iv) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table 4: Mean Distance of un-banked villages to the Nearest Banked-Centre (kms)

	1998	2005	2013
Treated	8.45	8.3	3.23
Control	9.81	9.84	8.42
Data Source: The	e financial ac	cess is derive	ed using
spatial data, PC 2	2011 and RB	[commercial	bank
directory.			
anoutiji			

	General	OBC	SC	ST
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Dependant Variable: Nu	mber of All En	terprises		
Treated*Post 2005	0.224	0.051	0.105*	-0.156***
	(0.137)	(0.171)	(0.058)	(0.036)
B. Dependant Variable: Nu	mber of Ag En	terprises		
Treated*Post 2005	-0.047	-0.168*	0.016	-0.089***
	(0.075)	(0.098)	(0.03)	(0.02)
C. Dependant Variable: Nu	mber of Non-A	Ag Enterprises		
Treated*Post 2005	0.261***	0.243**	0.088**	-0.015
	(0.081)	(0.1)	(0.036)	(0.02)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time trend of Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,34,145	6,34,145	6,34,145	6,34,145

Table 5: Impact on Enterprises: By Social Group

Note: (i) The table reports impact on caste-wise ownership of enterprises (total and sector-wise) in a village level panel for 1998, 2005 and 2013. (ii) The estimates are computed on the basis of equation (1). (iii) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (iv) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects. (v) Each specification also includes time trend of covariates – size of population, literacy rate, distance to the nearest town, paved road dummy, PACS dummy and power-supply dummy. (vi) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (vii) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (viii) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table 6: Testing the Credit Channel

	SC Enterprises	
	All	Non-Ag
Treated*Post 2005	0.07 (0.058)	0.048 (0.037)
Treated*Post 2005*SC_InstFin	0.526** (0.21)	
Treated*Post 2005*SC_NonAg_InstFin		0.666*** (0.206)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Time trend of Covariates	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,34,145	6,34,145

Dependant Variable: Number of Enterprises

Note: (i) Table reports tests for credit channel for SC enterprises (total and non-agriculture) in a village level panel for 1998, 2005 and 2013. (ii) The estimates are computed on the basis of equation (2). (iii) SC_InstFin refers to the number of SC-owned firms that reported institutional finance as major source of finance. Similarly, SC_NonAg_InstFin classify those firms in non-agriculture sectors. (iv) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (v) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects. (vi) Each specification includes time trend of control indicators (literacy, population size, PACS, distance to town, paved road, power). (vii) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (viii) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (ix) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

	Share of General-
	owned enterprises in
Sector	1998
Health and Social Work	0.506
Financial Intermediation	0.508
Real Estate	0.521
Manufacture of Wood Products	0.525
Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products	0.527
Manufacture of Other Transport Equipment	0.532
Computer and Related Activities	0.537
Financial Intermediation	0.587
Other Retail Trade	0.596
Retail Trade	0.611
Air Transport	0.618
Other Business Services	0.624
Manufacture of Precision Instruments	0.625
Land Transport	0.627
Insurance	0.654
Recycling	0.678
Water Transport	0.688
Manufacture of Fab Metallic Products	0.697
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery	0.719
Auxiliary Transport Activities	0.719
Manufacture of Furniture	0.734
Manufacture of Textiles	0.750
Hotels and Restaurants	0.826

Table 7: General-caste dominated Sector as per EC 1998

Number of SC Enterprises	Sectors with presence of General caste group in 1998 (%)			
	50%	60%	70%	
Treated*Post 2005	0.057*** (0.022)	0.062*** (0.018)	0.008** (0.004)	
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
District-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Time trend of Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	6,34,145	6,34,145	6,34,145	

Table 8: Evidence of sectoral mobility: Movement of SC enterprises towards generaldominated sectors

Note: (i) The table reports the impact on SC enterprises in general dominated sectors in a village level panel for 1998, 2005 and 2013. The dominance of general caste is defined at 50%, 60% and 70% in three models respectively. (ii) The estimates are computed on the basis of equation (1). (iii) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (iv) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects. (v) Each specification also includes time trend of covariates – size of population, literacy rate, distance to the nearest town, paved road dummy, PACS dummy and power-supply dummy. (vi) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (vii) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (viii) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

Table 9: Testing Parallel Trends

Number of enterprises	All	Ag	Non-Ag
Treated*I(2005)t	0.022	0.0	0.032
	(0.05)	(0.018)	(0.038)
Observations	3,57,330	3,57,330	3,57,330

Panel A: SC Caste Group

Panel B: ST Caste Group

Number of enterprises	All	Ag	Non-Ag
Treated*I(2005)t	0.045 (0.03)	0.009 (0.013)	-0.052 (0.02)
Observations	3,57,330	3,57,330	3,57,330

Notes: (i) Table reports the results for pre-trends in pre-treatment period. (ii) An insignificant coefficient of interaction terms shows parallel pre-trends. (iii) The estimates are computed on the basis of equation (3). (iv) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (v) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects. (vi) Each specification includes time trend of control indicators (literacy, population size, PACS, distance to town, paved road, power). (vii) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (viii) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (ix) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

	Number of SC-owned enterprises	
	Non-agriculture sector	<i>General</i> -Dominated Sectors
Treated*Post 2005	0.173**	0.147***
	(0.074)	(0.044)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Time trend of Covariates	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,24,718	4,24,718
Adjusted R-Square	0.37	0.35

Table 10: Model with Contemporaneous Control Variables (2001 and 2011)

Note: (i) The table reports results for outcome indicators in a village level panel for 1998 and 2013. (ii) The estimates are computed on the basis of equation (4). (iii) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (vi) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects. (vii) Each specification includes control indicators (literacy, population size, PACS, distance to town, paved road, power). (viii) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (ix) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (viii) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

	Number of SC-owned Enterprises	
		General-
	Non-Agriculture	Dominated
	Sector	Sectors
Treated*Post 2005	0.155***	0.089***
	(0.04)	(0.026)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Time trend of Covariates	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,83,341	9,83,341
Adjusted R-Square	0.486	0.467

Table 11: Impact on Entrepreneurship within 3kms Threshold

Notes: (i) Table reports the results after we change the distance threshold to 3kms in a village level panel for 1998, 2005, and 2013. (ii) The estimates are computed on the basis of equation (1). (iii) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (iv) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects. (v) Each specification includes time trend of control indicators (literacy, population size, PACS, distance to town, paved road, power). (vi) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (vii) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (viii) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.

	Number of SC-owned Enterprises	
	Non-Agriculture Sector	<i>General-</i> Dominated Sectors
Treated*Post 2005	0.08**	0.044**
	(0.033)	(0.019)
Village Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
District-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Time trend of Covariates	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,60,489	5,60,489
Adjusted R-Square	0.448	0.416

Table 12: Assessment using a Matched Control Group

Notes: (i) Table reports the results of difference-in-difference specification 1 using matched control (ii) The matched control group villages are obtained using the Coarsened Exact Matching Method proposed by Iacus et al. (2018). Covariates used for matching are: literacy, population size, PACS, distance to town, paved road, power. (iii) Top 1% of each outcome variable are winsorized. (iv) Each specification includes village fixed effects; year fixed effects; and district and year fixed effects; time trend of control indicators (literacy, population size, PACS, distance to town, paved road, power). (v) Following Abadie et al (2017), standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity within villages. (vi) Values in parentheses are standard errors. (vii) Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.