

# Male Sterilization and Persistence of Violence: Evidence from Emergency in India

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## Abstract

Can forced sterilization programs targeting men lead to male-perpetrated violence? This paper investigates the impact of a government-mandated male sterilization program introduced in India on the rise of violence. Launched in April 1976, the program predominantly targeted men and saw heterogeneous implementation across India over 10 months. Using various household surveys and newly digitized historical data sources, we study whether the program triggered unintended effects on violence, measured by crime rates. Using a difference-in-differences strategy by exploiting geographical variation in coercion intensity, we find that an increase in exposure to the program led to an increase in violent crime rates of 7% for the average district, which persisted over time. Violent crimes against women primarily drive the increase in crime rates, as rapes are increasing by 22% for the average district. We find that the program was ineffective in reducing fertility, so we hypothesize that a forced sterilization program targeting men may increase violence against women through two main channels: the program inducing trauma and impacting perceptions of masculinity. In line with those channels, we see that districts with high coercion intensity correlate with more harmful gender norms: higher levels and acceptance of Intimate Partner Violence, lower bargaining power of women and lower contraception adoption.

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# 1 Introduction

Since the beginning of the 19th century, many countries have implemented Malthusian policies (Malthus, 1798), which aim to curve fertility rates to avoid potential issues due to overpopulation and limited resources. However, some programs have faced allegations of enforcing coercive measures such as involuntary sterilizations, forced abortions, and other practices which infringe upon individual autonomy and reproductive rights. Notable examples of such programs include China’s “One-Child Policy” and India’s 1977 Family Planning Program (Liu and Han, 2023; Gupte, 2017a). Furthermore, critiques and ethical concerns surrounding population control initiatives have intensified, particularly in light of human rights violations stemming from the use of violence or instances of cultural insensitivity (León-Ciliotta et al., 2022; Alsan and Wanamaker, 2018; Patel, 2017; Kendall and Albert, 2015; Pegoraro, 2015).

Extensive literature exists on the negative influence of forced program implementation and coercion on trust, health, and economic consequences (Lowes and Montero, 2021; Nunn, 2008), as well as how it leads to backlashes against the intended goals of such programs (Fouka, 2019; Wheaton, 2020). However, one natural but unexplored channel is that forced programs could create a feeling of general discontent against the state, and then lead to built-up anger and trigger unintended effects on violence in the public and interpersonal spheres. Violence has major economic and social consequences, surprisingly not documented in the implication of the implementation of forced programs.

In this paper, we examine how a forced male sterilization program in India from April 1976 to February 1977 influenced violence. The program used coercive methods -and sometimes resorted to violence- to implement a policy which aimed to reduce fertility during *Emergency India*, a state of emergency declared by the government to fight poverty. The program resulted in sterilizing 8.1 million people comprising 6.2 million men, as compared to 1.5 million in the previous year, one of the largest compulsory sterilization programs in history. Forced fertility policies may influence violence through several mechanisms, including the potential for reduced fertility leading to changes in gender roles and ratios, the possibility of trauma induced by the procedure, and the impact on perceptions of masculinity that may trigger resorting to violence. We aim to fill the gap in the link between forced programs and violence by addressing the following question: Could coercive male sterilizations lead to a rise in male-perpetrated violence?

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We create a novel dataset by digitizing district-level government and administrative documents on sterilizations and crime rates, from 1972 to 2013. We measure the degree of districts' implementation of coercive methods with the growth rate of sterilizations conducted between 1975-76 and 1976-77, which approximates the surplus sterilizations performed during that period, meaning that a high increase in sterilizations during 1976-77 indicates coercion (Pelras and Renk, 2023). We use static and dynamic difference-in-differences strategies with geographical variation in coercion intensity to investigate the impact of exposure to the program on crime rates.

We find that exposure to coerced sterilization increases violent crime rates by 7.3% for the average districts, which persists over many years. This effect is primarily driven by rapes, which increase up to 145% in the most exposed district, with an average increase of 28%. We document that rapes are likely committed by younger cohorts rather than the ones directly targeted by the program of forced vasectomies and that the effect remained significant in highly exposed districts until 2013, the end of our study, pointing to the possibility of cultural transmission of violence against women.

We also find a small effect on murders, which increase by 4% on average. Additionally, we observe a reduction in the female population in the more heavily impacted districts, hinting at potential gender-based violence targeting women.

Our dynamic difference-in-differences setting documents that the parallel trends assumption holds, indicating that the results are causal. To test the robustness of the results, we use alternative treatment measures. We first incorporate past sterilization achievements in the measure, the growth rate between the mean of yearly sterilization rates between 1970 and 1976 and the sterilization rate in 1976-77. We then use only the differences in sterilization rates between 1976 and 1977. The causal link between the sterilization program and the increase in violent crimes remains robust.

Finally, we explore plausible mechanisms through which a forced sterilization program targeting men may influence violence towards women. First, reduced fertility could lead to changes in gender roles and ratios and predict an increase in domestic violence (Aizer, 2010; Anukriti, 2014). However, using a representative household survey, we demonstrate that heightened coercion intensity slightly increased birth rates, predominantly among families lacking a son born before 1976, indicating that the program did not reach its intended goal of reducing fertility. Then, the procedure could have induced trauma, and impacted perceptions of masculinity, triggering violence (Bosson et al., 2009). In line with this channel, we use the 1999 Demographic and Health Survey to study whether high coercion intensity districts are correlating with more harmful gender norms for women. We indeed find that coercion intensity correlates with higher levels and acceptance of Intimate Partner Violence, lower bargaining power of women, and lower contraception adoption, suggesting more harmful attitudes against women.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we add to the literature on the backlash of forced interventions and their long-lasting effects ([Nunn, 2008](#); [Lowes and Montero, 2021](#); [Alsan and Wanamaker, 2018](#); [Liu and Han, 2023](#); [Fouka, 2019](#); [Wheaton, 2020](#); [De la Rupelle and Zhang, 2023](#)). Extensive research in this literature consistently demonstrates that interventions characterized by coercion or violence, are often associated with detrimental effects on health, education, and wealth outcomes. In terms of wealth outcomes, forced interventions have been found to perpetuate cycles of poverty, hindering economic progress within targeted populations. Closer to our setting, [León-Ciliotta et al. \(2022\)](#) study the long-run effects of a coercive family planning program in Peru that sterilized 300,000 women, highlighting the negative impact of the usage of contraceptives on children's health. Our paper is the first to study that forced programs can lead to an increase in interpersonal violence and to find a positive impact of forced sterilizations targeting men on violence against women.

Second, this paper also contributes to the literature on cultural norms, identity and violence. Previous studies have shown that men's behaviour can be heavily influenced by norms surrounding masculinity ([Akerlof and Kranton, 2000](#)) and that men may be more likely to engage in violent or aggressive behaviour to defend their honour or assert their masculinity. For example, [Cao et al. \(2021\)](#) study the impact of honour norms on crime and show that areas with a stronger culture of honour have higher rates of violent crime, especially among men. [Baranov et al. \(2023\)](#) study how the shortage of women during Australia's colonial past led to the emergence of a hyper-masculine identity among men, which resulted in higher crime rates and poorer mental health for men and boys. Forced sterilization could also have negative consequences on masculinity norms and thus negatively impact well-being. Our study contributes to this literature by examining the impact of a possible shock on men's sense of virility ([Scott, 2014](#)) on violent behaviour, using the historical context of the forced vasectomies policy in India. We find that forced intervention on men's bodies or fertility abilities is associated with a rise in violence against women.

Finally, we also add to the literature on the impact of sterilization on well-being ([Rao, 1997](#); [De la Rupelle and Dumas, 2020](#); [Anukriti, 2014](#); [Byker and Gutierrez, 2021](#)), that have demonstrated worse health outcomes for women and increased incidents of domestic violence stemming from female sterilization. Regarding *Emergency India*, [Sur \(2023\)](#) and [Pelras and Renk \(2023\)](#), find it led to higher mistrust in medicine and institutions, lower demand for public healthcare, and worse child health outcomes. We contribute to this literature by showing that the implementation of a coerced male sterilization program was ineffective in achieving its intended goal of reducing fertility but moreover created a violent backlash against women from men not targeted by the program, remaining relevant for more than 35 years after the implementation of the program.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the historical background of the Emergency period. Section 3, presents the datasets used for this paper. Section 4 states our empirical strategies. Section 5 shows the results. Section 6 shows robustness tests. In section 7, we explore potential mechanisms that would drive the results. Section 8 concludes.

## 2 Emergency and Forced Sterilizations: Historical Background

### 2.1 Policy Objectives During the Emergency Period

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, India underwent a period characterized by economic and political turmoil. Following the Green Revolution, food production declined. The international oil crisis of 1973 had amplified the cost of imported oil, leading to a sharp decline in export revenues and a record-high inflation rate ([Jaffrelot and Anil, 2021](#)). Moreover, in June 1975, the conviction of Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India and leader of the Indian National Congress, by the Allahabad High Court for electoral malpractices during the 1971 national election put her Prime Ministerial position in jeopardy.\* In response, she declared a National Emergency on June 25th, ostensibly to stabilize internal disorder ([Gwatkin, 1979](#); [Jaffrelot and Anil, 2021](#)).

In June 1975, the government initiated incentivized sterilization, offering radios or payment as incentives; however, the program faced participation rates that were deemed insufficient to meet their intended targets. In February 1976, the government introduced a comprehensive five-point program encompassing family planning, tree planting, a ban on dowry, an adult education program known as "each-one-teach-one," and the abolition of social caste distinctions.† Emphasizing the critical necessity of population control, the government argued that family planning was consistent with all religious beliefs, and therefore, no individual should be exempted from sterilization on religious grounds ([Mehta, 2012](#)). These assertions were notably supported by Western nations, with the World Bank providing 66 million US dollars in humanitarian aid to India between 1972 and 1980 to support the implementation of sterilization programs ([Gupte, 2017b](#)). Consequently, compulsory sterilization became integrated into a broader poverty reduction initiative.

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\*Frequent strikes within the Indian National Congress due to diverging viewpoints resulted in its split in 1969. Indira Gandhi won the 1971 central elections with the radical slogan "garibi hatao" (eradicate poverty).

†Among these, the family planning program stood out as the most significant point and was the primary focus of implementation within the five-point program.

## 2.2 Practical Implementation Methods

Prior to the Emergency, states had the authority to decide on family planning, and although the prospect of implementing compulsory sterilization was considered in certain states, no definitive actions were taken. However, with the imposition of the Emergency, Indira Gandhi introduced Constitutional amendments, centralizing the authority for formulating family planning programs within the central government. Subsequently, the National Population Policy was drafted in 1976, prompting the central government to rally state political leadership and local administration to establish sterilization targets and camps. These targets were computed based on past sterilization accomplishments, with each state being assigned quotas to be fulfilled by any means necessary. <sup>‡</sup>

The central government advocated for state-level incentives and disincentives for family planning, and it decided to allocate aid to states based on their family planning performance. Additionally, it authorized and endorsed coercive measures for sterilization. State governments had the authority to withhold employee promotions and payments, including those of school teachers, until they either underwent sterilization themselves or met their assigned quotas. This was enforced through the threat of employment termination to ensure compliance. Furthermore, the government mandated the presentation of sterilization certificates for access to basic amenities such as housing, irrigation, ration cards, and public healthcare facilities. Households with two or three children were notably pressured into sterilization through a combination of monetary incentives and disincentives (Tarlo, 2003; Schlesinger, 1977; Jaffrelot and Anil, 2021). This aggressive family planning program resulted in 8.3 million sterilizations in 1976–77, the majority of which (6.2 million) were vasectomies, a substantial increase compared to the 1.5 million vasectomies performed in 1975–76. Approximately 2,000 men lost their lives due to botched procedures. Figure 1 illustrates the district-level spatial distribution of sterilizations conducted during 1976–77.

The procedure entailed the surgical interruption of the vas deferens, the conduits for sperm. This involved a minor incision in the scrotum, where the vas deferens were either cut or obstructed. At the time, vasectomies were considered a definitive sterilization method as reverse procedures were not performed.


While some district and state leaders were aligned with Indira Gandhi’s objectives, others may have complied out of fear, given the prevalent practice of imprisoning political opponents without trial at the time. Additionally, Sanjay Gandhi planned to visit various districts and states, exerting pressure on local governments to employ coercive methods to demonstrate quota fulfilment (Jaffrelot and Anil, 2021). The specific channels guiding districts in opting for coercive methods lack clear

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<sup>‡</sup>District officers and police commissioners were commended with gold medals for their dedicated efforts in achieving these set targets (Gupte, 2017b).

identification. Section 5 studies potential channels for the implementation of coercive methods.

Figure 1: Spatial distribution of sterilization intensity in 1976-77



Source: Jolly, KG, Family Planning in India, 1969-1984: A District Level Study

Notes: This map shows the district-level geographical variation of the share of sterilized couples in 1976-77, the year of implementation of the forced sterilization program. Darker shades indicate that more individuals underwent sterilization during the program. Source: [Jolly \(1986\)](#)

There are documented instances of police violence, perpetrated against both men and women, as a means to coerce men into undergoing vasectomies. [Scott \(2014\)](#) presents evidence of various police brutalities, including the use of weapons and tear gas. She emphasizes that both men and women lived in a constant state of fear due to the actions of the authorities.

## 2.3 Perceptions of the Emergency

[Scott \(2014\)](#) examines the perspectives of the Emergency of various actors in Indian society. She initially highlights the lack of coherent planning in this program, indicating that states and districts were encouraged to compete with each other, leading to a sense of gamification.

In *The Shah Commission Final Report: General Observations* (1990), several official complaints from civilians who were wrongfully coerced into undergoing vasectomies are documented. The study reports that 548 unmarried men were forced into the procedure, and almost 2,000 men died as a result of botched surgeries. Additionally, [Guha \(2007\)](#) reports instances where individuals



of all ages and even those who were physically incapacitated were forcibly taken to sterilization camps. Numerous testimonies from men attest to the coercive nature of the program.

“The officers said you could keep your job only if you get sterilised. I didn’t have time to think. When I reached my duty we were told this... I agreed to it because I had to save my job and bring up my family.”

– Tarlo (2003)

Scott (2014) underscores that men were primarily targeted for two main reasons. Firstly, the urgent pressure from the government on states and districts compelled them to prioritize vasectomies due to their less invasive and quicker nature compared to tubectomies (female sterilizations). Secondly, men, particularly state workers, were predominantly threatened through their employment, as fewer women were working at the time.

The program engendered a sense of emasculation among men for three primary reasons. Firstly, the state’s imposition of fertility control undermined the traditional masculine role of determining the ideal number of children for the family. Secondly, the threat posed to the masculine identity as breadwinners destabilized their traditional role. Finally, the invasive nature of vasectomies, coupled with the stigma surrounding them and the perceived risk of loss of sexual abilities, further compounded feelings of emasculation. The masculine response to this program is documented by the emergence of the anti-Emergency slogan:

“Indira Hatao, Indira Bachao”

‘Abolish Indira and Save Your Penis’

– Scott (2014)

## 2.4 Transition and the Post-Emergency Landscape

In 1977, a series of widespread protests erupted across India, demanding an end to the Emergency and the initiation of new elections. In response, Indira Gandhi, under counsel, opted to terminate the Emergency period and the forced sterilization program, subsequently paving the way for the organization of elections. The public voted her out of power, electing two opposition party politicians from the Janata Party, Morarji Desai (1977-79) and Charan Singh (1979-80), as successive Prime Ministers, who did not re-conduct the sterilization program.

In 1978, the new Government appointed a commission of inquiry, led by Justice Jayantilal Chhotalal Shah, to investigate any illegal practices during the Emergency period. *The Shah Commission Final Report: General Observations* (1990) uncovered numerous illicit practices, particularly



concerning coerced vasectomies. The commission documented complaints from unmarried and elderly men who were coerced into undergoing vasectomies, highlighting the pervasive confusion and forced nature of that era.

Despite discontent about the program, Indira Gandhi was reelected for the fourth time as Prime Minister in 1980. During this last term, she faced escalating opposition from Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, an orthodox Sikh leader gaining popularity. In 1983, Bhindranwale was accused of plotting terrorist activities against India and amassing weaponry within the Golden Temple, his religious headquarters. In June 1984, after failed negotiations between the National Congress Party and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, Indira Gandhi authorized the Indian army to carry out “Operation Blue Star,” leading to his removal and subsequent death. A few months later, Indira Gandhi herself was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards, triggering a wave of violent unrest in India, known as the “anti-Sikh riots” (Das and Rohilla, 2020).

## 3 Data

### 3.1 Treatment: the growth rate of sterilized married couples between 1975-76 and 1976-77

To construct our treatment variable, we rely primarily on the comprehensive dataset provided by Jolly (1986), which documents the percentage of couples sterilized in all Indian districts spanning from 1970 to 1980. Complementing this dataset, we extend our research to include the data on tubectomies and vasectomies obtained from the Government’s State or District statistical abstracts, covering approximately 66% of the total districts.<sup>§</sup> Furthermore, we supplement our analysis with information extracted from the annual yearbooks of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare spanning the years 1971-72 to 2000-2001<sup>¶</sup>, providing state-level insights into the prevalence of vasectomies, tubectomies, and the average age of men undergoing vasectomies.

Through analysis of state-level yearbooks, we observe from Figure 2 that vasectomies were the primary form of sterilization during this period. This indicates that the proportion of sterilized married couples can be used as a suitable proxy for understanding the spatial distribution of vasectomy rates in different districts. This enables us to examine the effects of the forced sterilization program across Indian districts. In Figure 3, we display the linear relationship between steriliza-


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<sup>§</sup>This extensive sterilization dataset was collated through joint efforts with fellow researchers Balasubramanyam Pattath, Charlotte Perlas, and Andréa Renk. The dataset, alongside the one from Jolly (1986) that we digitized specifically for this study, is employed in Pelras and Renk (2023).

<sup>¶</sup>Digitized by Andréa Renk for Pelras and Renk (2023)

tions on the left and vasectomies on the right. We sourced this data from the government's state or district statistical abstracts, where the percentage of married couples from Jolly (1986) is multiplied by the district-level population from the Indian Census of 1971. These graphs confirm the reliability of the Jolly (1986) dataset for studying sterilizations in India and its suitability as a proxy for vasectomies during the same period.

Figure 2: Average of vasectomies and tubectomies performed in India 1970-80



Notes: Authors' computation using the annual state-level yearbooks of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

This graph represents the average of vasectomies and tubectomies performed in India between 1970 and 1980. It shows that most of the forced sterilizations performed in 1976-77 were vasectomies and that there was a considerable increase in the number of vasectomies performed compared to previous years. The peak of vasectomies in 1973 was the result of the introduction of a voluntary vasectomy program.


We acknowledge the substantial pressure imposed by the government and the concerns about data integrity. However, we argue that official data is unlikely to have been compromised due to stringent monitoring protocols and close workplace supervision. Furthermore, historical records do not provide evidence of internal resistance or data manipulation attempts.

For the empirical analysis, we define district-level coercion intensity as:

$$CI_d = \frac{Ster_d^{77} - Ster_d^{76}}{Ster_d^{76}}$$

Figure 3: Coherence between the Ministry of Health Dataset and Jolly (1986) 1976-77

(a) Sterilizations performed and percentage of sterilized married couples  
(b) Vasectomies performed and percentage of sterilized married couples



Notes: These graphs show the linear regression between the number of sterilizations and vasectomies performed using the source of the Indian Health Ministry, and Jolly (1986) that we use for our treatment variable, the share of sterilized couples, times the population at the district level in 1976-77. These graphs validate the relevance of the source of data for our treatment variable to study vasectomies.

Where  $Ster_d^{77}$  and  $Ster_d^{76}$  are percentages of sterilized couples in the year 1976-1977 and 1975-1976 respectively.


The variable  $CI_d$  can be interpreted as the growth rate of the percentage of couples who were sterilized between the years 75-76 and 76-77. It indicates coercion intensity, with higher values suggesting districts significantly increased sterilization performed because of pressure, likely implying the use of coercive methods to promote vasectomies. Figure 4 shows the spatial distribution of the coercion intensity index, the measure goes from -0.84% to 26.72%. We discuss several robustness measures in Section 6.

### 3.2 Main outcome: crime rates at the district-level from 1972 to 2013

We digitized district-level crime data available on the Indian National Bureau of Crimes website, detailing annual reports of crimes reported to or by police forces, all under the Indian Penal Code, from 1972, the first year available, to 2013.

Gender information of perpetrators and victims at the district level is unavailable, but state-level aggregates are computed by gender. These tables reveal that men commit crimes at rates ranging from 4 to 4485 times more than women, with a mean of 90 times higher.

Figure 4: Coercion Intensity Index: All India



Source: Jolly, KG, Family Planning in India, 1969-1984: A District Level Study

Notes: This map represents the geographical variation of our treatment variable, coercion intensity throughout India. The coercion intensity index is defined as the growth rate of the share of sterilized married couples between 1975-76 and 1976-77. Darker shades indicate a higher use of coercion in the district.


We categorize crimes into different types: violent crimes (murder, rape, and kidnapping), property crimes (robbery, counterfeiting, theft, dacoity<sup>||</sup>, burglary, and trust), riots, and cheating crimes and then we run separate regressions for each category. The descriptive statistics of this dataset can be found in Table 1. Rape crimes encompass all reported instances of rape. However, it's important to note that the Indian Penal Code excludes certain forms of rape, such as marital rape and same-sex crimes. Additionally, all sexual activity with a minor below the age of sixteen is considered rape under the law.

We are able to follow 197 districts each year from 1972 to 2013 out of approximately 360 districts in 1972. If one year the district was not present in the official, due to missing reports or forgetfulness, we dropped it from the database, except for the four districts of Delhi which were lacking for one or two years, as the capital is an important place to keep in our analysis. We could match this data to the sterilization dataset, represented in Figure 5. We then winsorize each crime and

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<sup>||</sup>Equivalent of banditry.

Figure 5: Coercion intensity Index: Crime Dataset



Source: Jolly, KG, Family Planning in India, 1969-1984: A District Level Study

Notes: This map represents the geographical variation of our treatment variable, coercion intensity focusing on the districts present in our analysis of crime rates. The coercion intensity index is defined as the growth rate of the share of sterilized married couples between 1975-76 and 1976-77. Darker shades indicate a higher use of coercion in the district.

the coercion intensity variables at the 1% level (removing the bottom and top 1 percent to avoid the effect being driven by extreme values.) We then have a total of 8225 observations, except for property crimes that were removed from the online-available dataset from 2000 to 2012, which restricts the analysis to 5873 observations.

Although we recognize the potential for under-reporting in crime data, especially for sexual and violent offences, researchers working with Indian police data generally assume a consistent pattern of under-reporting each year ([Anderson and Genicot, 2015](#)). Hence, we proceed with the common assumption that analyzing variations in reported crimes reflects actual variations in the occurrence of these crimes.

We note that the total number of crimes observed does not align with the sum of individual crime categories. This discrepancy arises because the records from the National Bureau of Crimes do not

	Mean	
Total crimes	2294.02	
Violent crimes	92.45	
Property crimes	828.21	
Riots	141.93	
Rapes	17.23	
Cheating	37.54	
Murders	47.10	
Observations	8225	5873

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of crime rates 1972-2013

*Notes:* This table presents the yearly average numbers of crime rates per 1 million inhabitants in India from 1972 to 2013 for the districts of our analysis, except for property crimes that stop in 2000.

distinctly categorize every type of crime in their documents. Therefore, the differences between the observed total and the sum of individual categories account for other types of crimes, such as defamation cases, which are not explicitly delineated in the records.

To assess whether the districts included in our analysis differ from those excluded due to our cleaning process, we perform a test of the difference of means between the two groups, as presented in Table 2, utilizing various variables from the 1971 Indian Census. Our findings indicate that the districts retained in the analysis are generally representative of the overall population. However, it is noteworthy that the number of farmers and the population of scheduled castes are overrepresented in the crime dataset.

Table 2: Summary of districts in the crime dataset and not

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mean in the dataset	Mean not in the dataset	Difference 2-1	P-value
Total population - 1971	1691862	1523772	-168091	0.15
Main Workers - 1971	558320	500139	-58181	0.13
Farmers - 1971	407749	325191	-82559	0.00
Household industry - 1971	20054	17099	-2955	0.13
Literates: ages 25-34 - 1971	75188	83783	8596	0.33
Literates: ages 35+ - 1971	107447	116828	9381	0.46
Primary school or higher- 1971	306778	337486	30707	0.39
Middle school or higher- 1971	141507	160846	19339	0.34
Total scheduled caste pop - 1971	270297	193308	-76989	0.00
Total scheduled tribe pop - 1971	98183	129516	31333	0.20
Observations	188	151	339	339

*Notes:* This table shows correlations between state and district-level demographic and political variables and our coercion intensity measure. This shows that the implementation of coerced vasectomies is only correlated with the share of middle school achievers, which historically makes sense as coercion mainly took the form of threats towards state workers, more likely to achieve higher education. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### 3.3 Additional variables and covariates

We consider that districts with strong state capacity, which have a high ability to implement programs, may have been able to implement more forced vasectomies and may be the ones with more crime rates reporting due to more police forces presence. While our approach does not necessitate random treatment, factoring in state capacity helps us explore links between administrative capabilities and forced vasectomies, enriching our understanding of their connection to crime rates. To do this, we digitized state-level police force data from the National Bureau of Crimes website for 1972-2013. This dataset was not available after 2013, which makes it the last year of our study.

[Oldenburg \(1992\)](#) previously showed a positive correlation between male-female ratios and crimes, particularly murders. As the crime dataset does not provide any information on the specific characteristics of victims, studying the censuses could shed light in some areas. We use the 1971, 1981 and 1991 Indian censuses to compute sex ratios. We also track two age groups, specifically those aged 0-5 and 5-10 years old in 1971, as they would correspond to the 20-25 and 25-30 age groups in 1991. Due to our census data limitation which categorizes individuals as 35 and older, we were unable to follow older cohorts.



## 4 Empirical Strategy

### 4.1 Main specification

To understand the effect of the 1976-77 forced sterilization campaign on crime rates, we use spatial differences in coercion intensity and time variation. Our dataset spans 1972 to 2013, offering insights into long-term crime trends. We employ a two-way fixed effects approach.

We use a difference-in-differences analysis:

$$Y_{d,s,t} = \theta_t + \eta_d + \beta * CI_d * Post_t + X_{s,t} + v_{d,s,t} \quad (1)$$

$Y_{d,s,t}$  is the crime rate per 1 million inhabitants, of violent and property crimes, murders, riots, cheating and rapes, in district  $d$  at time  $t$ .  $\theta_t$  and  $\eta_d$  are time and district-fixed effects.  $CI_d$  is the Coercion Intensity Index at the district level.  $Post_t$  takes 1 after 1976, as the shock of forced vasectomies lasted 6 months starting April 1976. Finally,  $X_{s,t}$  is the state-level control, including only the number of total police forces. Time and district fixed effects help us control for individual and time-specific variations, enabling us to estimate the causal effects of coercion intensity on crime rates.  $\beta$  is the coefficient of interest.\*\*

This identification strategy accounts for any district-level characteristics that may influence the outcome, assuming the parallel trends assumption holds. ††

Finally, we examine sex ratios at the district level to gain deeper insights into the demographics of crime victims, given that crime data do not specify this information. We use a similar difference-in-differences analysis as in equation 1, With  $Y_{d,s,t}$  being the number of men divided by the number of women in district  $d$  at time  $t$ .  $CI_d$  is the coercion intensity measure, and  $Post_t$  takes 1 for the census waves of 1981 and 1991, i.e. after the forced vasectomies episode. A positive and significant  $\beta$  means that the number of men increased compared to the number of women in districts with high coercion intensity.

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\*\*The coefficient  $\beta$  divided by the mean of the outcome indicates the percentage increase in the outcome for every 1 percentage point increase in the coercion intensity variable after the forced vasectomy period.

††The recent difference-in-differences literature (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille, 2020; Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021) does not impact our study. Our treatment, coercion intensity, was applied simultaneously to all districts in the same year, eliminating staggered implementation. Importantly, the possibility of negative weights for the coefficients does not pose a threat to our identification.

## 4.2 Threats to identification

The crucial assumption in difference-in-differences models is that treatment and control districts follow similar trends in the absence of treatment (parallel trends assumption). To validate our assumptions, we conduct event-study designs in both analyses to examine pre-treatment trends.

To assess the parallel trends assumption, we introduce a treatment dummy variable for coercion intensity in our analysis. This variable must accurately reflect districts with high exposure while maintaining a balance between those with low and high coercion intensity. The median value of coercion intensity is 3.38%, implying a 3.38% rise in the proportion of sterilized married couples between 1975-76 and 1976-77. Since this value does not represent a significant increase in coercion, we opted to assign a value of 1 to districts with coercion intensity exceeding the mean of 5.1%. Subsequently, we re-examine the outcomes for districts with the highest coercion intensity, the top 25% of our sample, denoting coercion intensity above 6%.

$$Y_{d,s,t} = \theta_t + \eta_d + \beta_t \times Dci_d \times \sum_{i=1972}^{\geq 2013} P_t + X_{s,t} + v_{d,t} \quad (2)$$

In equation 2, we use event study methodology to analyze crime rates per 1 million inhabitants by regressing them on year-specific dummy variables.  $Y_{d,s,t}$  is the number of crimes per 1 million inhabitants in district  $d$  in year  $t$ . Instead of using a single dummy variable set to 1 after 1976, we now employ a dummy variable  $P_t$ , which equals 1 for each year from 1972 to 2013 (excluding 1976) and includes linear time trends. The event study design illustrates the  $\beta_{d,t}$  coefficients for each year, helping us compare high and low coercion intensity districts for better result interpretation.  $Dci_d$  is a dummy that takes 1 if the district had a coercion intensity,  $CI_d$  above the mean, 5.1%. We also do the regression for the 25% more exposed district,  $Dci_d$  then takes the value 1 for a coercion intensity above 6%.  $\theta_t$  and  $\eta_d$  are time and district fixed effects.  $X_{s,t}$  is a state-level control variable which is the number of total police force at the state level in year  $t$ .

Another potential concern is the presence of other interventions that may have targeted the same districts over the years, especially in our long-term analysis of crime patterns. However, we find this threat to be unlikely for several compelling reasons. First, our treatment variable  $CI_d$  is continuous, making it unlikely to represent other program implementations. Second, there were no subsequent similar programs in India after the period we examine. Third, it is improbable that a program capable of influencing violence would have been implemented with the same intensity in the same regions due to various factors, such as political changes and shifts in the state's workforce. In fact, [Pelras and Renk \(2023\)](#) suggests that households more exposed to the program were

more likely to vote for incumbent parties, indicating a change in representation after the Emergency period. Finally, the other programs initiated by Sanjay Gandhi during the Emergency were not implemented with the same intensity or proven efficacy and are unlikely to have had an impact on violence.<sup>‡‡</sup>

## 5 Results

We first study the implementation of coercion intensity to have a better understanding of this program, then we present the results on crime rates.

### 5.1 Investigating the implementation process of coercion intensity

While our identification strategy allows us to identify a causal impact of the program on crime rates whether the program was randomly implemented or not, we still provide information regarding the implementation process of coercion intensity. We correlate 1977 forced vasectomies and several socio-economic variables from the 1971 Indian Census, Ministry of Health Reports, and the Lok Sabha elections of 1971. These variables include population size, the proportion of farmers and workers, the share of the literate population, the number of achievers of primary education and middle education, the share of scheduled tribes and finally the share of candidates from the same party as Indira Gandhi, the Indian National Congress (INC) elected at the state level. Correlating these variables with our measure of coercion intensity gives insights into the factors determining the implementation of forced vasectomies.

In Table 3, the implementation is observed to correlate with a higher proportion of middle school achievers, presumably due to the reliance of the program on educated state workers, who are more likely to have attained middle-school education. Coercion intensity also exhibits correlations with a lower population, a higher proportion of farming population, and a greater number of scheduled castes. However, these correlations are relatively low and do not suggest a direct pathway through which violence could evolve. Surprisingly, the absence of a clear association between the share of political leaders from the Indian National Congress, the party of Indira Gandhi, and the program's implementation raises intriguing questions. Although this lack of correlation does not explicitly uncover the reasons behind the varying implementation of the reform across districts, it provides insight into the absence of discernible mechanisms that could establish the exogeneity of the treat-

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<sup>‡‡</sup>The other programs announced were tree planting, a ban on dowry, an adult education program known as "each-one-teach-one," and the abolition of social caste distinctions.

ment. However, as discussed in Section 4, the potential endogeneity of the treatment does not pose a threat to our identification strategy.

Table 3: Correlations between Coercion Intensity and 1971 District and State-level variables

	(1) Coercion Intensity
Population	-0.0463*** (0.0151)
Farming population	0.131* (0.0674)
Working population	-0.0515 (0.0647)
Household Industry	0.319 (0.264)
Primary school achievers	-0.0892 (0.0552)
Middle school achievers	0.238*** (0.0818)
Scheduled castes	0.0964*** (0.0244)
Scheduled tribes	0.00595 (0.0142)
Literate population - 25 years old	0.230 (0.347)
Literate population - 35 years old	-0.137 (0.171)
Share of candidates from the INC, state level	6.286 (4.896)
Observations	315

*t* statistics in parentheses

*Notes:* This table shows correlations between state and district-level demographic and political variables and our coercion intensity measure. This shows that the implementation of coerced vasectomies is only correlated with the share of middle school achievers, which historically makes sense as coercion mainly took the form of threats towards state workers, more likely to achieve higher education. \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

## 5.2 Impact of coercion intensity on crime rates

We present the results of the regressions on crimes, up to 2013. As reliable data regarding police forces at the state level were not accessible beyond 2013, making it challenging to control for this fact, we conclude our analysis at 2013.

In Table 4, we observe a long-term positive relationship between coercion intensity and violent crimes, finding that a 1 percentage point increase in coercion intensity corresponded to a 1.5% increase in overall violent crimes. The mean of coercion intensity is 5.1%, so the increase is

Table 4: Impact of Forced Vasectomies on Crime Categories 1972-2013

<i>Dep. Var.: rates of</i>	(1) Total crimes	(2) Property Crimes	(3) Violent Crimes
Coercion Intensity $\times$ Post	13.09 (13.25)	-1.39 (5.03)	1.33** (0.56)
Observations	8225	5873	8225
Standard errors clustered district-level	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	2294.02	828.21	92.45

Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of running the static difference-in-differences specification shown in equation 1 of coercion intensity on crime rates per 1 million inhabitants. The unit of observation is the district. We control with police forces at the state level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table 5: Impact of Forced Vasectomies on crime rates 1972-2013


<i>Dep. Var.: rates of</i>	(1) Rapes	(2) Murders	(3) Cheating	(4) Riots
Coercion Intensity $\times$ Post	0.94*** (0.31)	0.43** (0.25)	-1.21*** (0.38)	-0.95 (0.72)
Observations	8225	8225	8225	8225
Standard errors clustered district-level	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	17.23	47.10	37.54	141.93

Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of running the static difference-in-differences specification shown in equation 1 of coercion intensity on crime rates per 1 million inhabitants. The unit of observation is the district. We control with police forces at the state level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

7.3% for the average district, with a maximum increase of 38% for the more coerced district. Furthermore in Table 5, when examining specific crime categories, we found that rapes increased by 28% for the average district, murders by 4.7%, cheating decreased by 16.5%. In the most exposed district, with a coercion intensity of 26.72%, rapes increase by 146%.

Figure 6: Event Study: Impact of coercion intensity on rapes 1972-2013



*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 2. The dependent variable is the number of rapes per 1 million inhabitants. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals. We control with police forces at the state level.


Figures 6, 7 and 8 show event-study plots for rapes, murders and riots. We first note that the parallel trend assumption holds in the analyses of murders, but not riots. For rapes, we generally observe parallel trends with a potential small pre-trend in 1975. However, we show in Figure 9 that the parallel trends assumption holds for the highest districts exposed to forced vasectomies. We, then, do not find a causal effect for the analysis of the decline in riots, as targeted districts seemed to have lower rates of political opposition against the police or the state.

We can see a change in trends following 1977 that becomes significant after 1985. The assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 marked a turning point in Indian history, with the ensuing violent episodes, the anti-Sikh riots, potentially contributing to a surge in violence during that period and a relish of violence. It could also be the symbol of the end of this dark episode in India's history, and the end of the fear that such a program would happen again. We observe a strong pattern of increase of rapes, persistent until the end of our study in 2013, which spans over 35 years since the program's implementation.

We conduct the event study for the top 25% most exposed districts (Figure 9). The influence of coercion intensity on rape rates in these districts remains as well significant until the end of our study in 2013.


In Figure 10, we analyzed the age groups of rape perpetrators in India using data from the Bureau

Figure 7: Event Study: Impact of coercion intensity on murders 1972-2013



*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 2. The dependent variable is the number of murders per 1 million inhabitants. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals. We control with police forces at the state level.


Figure 8: Event Study: Impact of coercion intensity on riots 1972-2013



*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 2. The dependent variable is the number of riots per 1 million inhabitants. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals. We control with police forces at the state level.



Figure 9: Event Study: Impact of coercion intensity on rapes for the 25% more exposed districts




*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 2, with high coercion district being the top 25% of our sample with a coercion intensity of 6%. The dependent variable is the number of rapes per 1 million inhabitants. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals. We control with police forces at the state level.

of Crimes (1988-2020). It is evident that the most common age groups for committing rapes are 18-30 and 30-50 years old. Notably, the Ministry of Health's reports indicate that the average age of men who underwent vasectomies in 1977 was 35. This suggests that the individuals committing the crimes are more likely to be a different generation from those directly targeted by forced vasectomies, as the latter group would have been 46 years old in 1988, potentially implicating their children. This observation aligns with a growing body of literature on the relationship between exposure to violence during childhood and adolescence and the display of violence in early adulthood (Mrug et al., 2016).

Although individual characteristics data is absent in the Indian crime dataset, it is important to note that within this dataset, rape is categorized as an offence against women. To better understand if the observed effect on murders, albeit small (Figure 7), might also target women, we analyze the sex ratios from the Indian censuses in 1971, 1981, and 1991. Oldenburg (1992) has previously shown a positive correlation between male-female ratios and murders in Uttar Pradesh, suggesting that murders could potentially be a form of violence that disproportionately impacts women.

In Table 6, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in coercion intensity is associated with a small increase in sex ratios over time, for the overall population. We find that this result is also significant for the two age groups we were able to follow. These results suggest that murders could be directed against women as well. Murders increase by 4.7% for the average district. This translates to an

Figure 10: Age-groups of rape perpetrators in India, 1988-2020



Notes: This figure shows the percentage of rapes that are committed by different age groups in India, from 1988 to 2021. Men belonging to the 18-30 years and the 30-50 years age groups are the ones who commit around 90% of rape incidents in India.

Table 6: Sex ratios and coercion intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Dep. Var. Sex ratio of the</i>	Total population	0-5 y.o in 1971	5-9 y.o in 1971
Coercion Intensity $\times$ Post	0.0007** (0.0003)	0.003*** (0.0009)	0.002** (0.001)
Observations	991	966	966

Notes: This table presents the results of running the static difference-in-differences specification shown in equation 1 of coercion intensity on the sex ratios in India, defined as male relative to females. The unit of observation is the district. A positive coefficient means a relative decrease of women relative to men. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

increase of 2.21 murders per year per district, totaling 750 murders per year overall. Assuming an average of 750 murders per year from 1977 to 1991, the last year of available census data, would result in an additional 12,000 murders in total. If these murders were disproportionately targeted at women, the male-to-female sex ratio would marginally increase from 107.50 men for every 100 women in 1971 to 107.51, indicating a negligible change, at the size of the effect we find in Table 6.

The prominence of crimes against women in our analysis suggests that the forced vasectomies program of 1976-77 may have played a role in shaping or reinforcing prevailing concepts of masculinity, thereby influencing patterns of violence in society (Bosson et al., 2009). We discuss this mechanism further in Section 7.

## 6 Robustness

To ensure the robustness of our findings, we employ alternative treatment measures. While we believe our measure strongly represents coercion and is also used by Pelras and Renk (2023), a potential critique is the possibility that coercive methods might have been applied in districts that were already reaching high numbers of voluntary vasectomies in 1976. To address this concern, we introduce a new approach: we calculate the growth rate between the annual mean achievements spanning from 1970 to 1976 and the achievements specifically in 1977. This adjustment allows us to factor in the influence of prior achievements on our analysis.

Table 7: Impact of Forced Vasectomies on Crime Categories with an alternative treatment measure

<i>Dep. Var.: rates of</i>	(1) Total crimes	(2) Violent crimes	(3) Property crimes	(4) Riots
Coercion Intensity $\times$ Post	6.510 (17.59) (90.52)	1.439* (0.842) (4.290)	5.869 (4.635) (22.71)	-0.00639 (0.683) (3.511)
Observations	8267	8267	5903	8267
Standard errors clustered	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	2526.83	112.78	846.20	127.47

Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of running the static difference-in-differences specification shown in equation 1 of coercion intensity on crime rates per 1 million inhabitants with an alternative measure for coercion intensity, the growth rate between sterilization share in 1976-77 and the means of past sterilization shares. The unit of observation is the district. We control with police forces at the state level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

We can see in Table 7 that the effect on violent crimes persists with this new measure. Especially, in Table 8 and Figure 11 we see that the persistent effect remains on rapes. This alternative treatment confirms the causal impact of forced vasectomies on the increase of rapes.

Table 8: Impact of Forced Vasectomies on crime rates with an alternative treatment measure

<i>Dep. Var.: rates of</i>	(1) Rapes	(2) Murders	(3) Cheating
Coercion Intensity $\times$ Post	0.852* (0.441)	0.514 (0.347)	-0.729 (0.541)
Observations	8267	8267	8267
Standard errors clustered	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean	32.24	49.00	52.90


Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of running the specification shown in equation 1 of coercion intensity on crime rates per 1 million inhabitants with an alternative measure for coercion intensity, the growth rate between sterilization share in 1976-77 and the means of past sterilization shares. We control with police forces at the state level. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Another potential critique of our main treatment variable is that the growth rate will give more weight to small increases in low-sterilization districts. For example, an increase of 1 percentage point in sterilizations in 1977 where the rate was 1% in 1976 may not necessarily be because of the use of coercive measures but would mean a growth rate of 100% with our main variable. To overcome that, we simply use the differences between sterilization rates between 1976 and 1977. A higher difference would also indicate higher coercion but with a restricted range compared to the growth rate.


We can see in Figure 12 that the persistent effect remains on rapes. This alternative treatment confirms the causal impact of forced vasectomies on the increase of rapes.

Figure 11: Event Study: Impact of coercion intensity on rapes with an alternative measure: growth rate incorporating past achievements



*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 2, with high coercion district being above the mean of an alternative measure taking into account past achievements of sterilization. The dependent variable is the number of rapes per 1 million inhabitants. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals. We control with police forces at the state level.

Figure 12: Event Study: Impact of coercion intensity on rapes with an alternative measure: differences in sterilization achievements



*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 2, with high coercion district being above the mean of an alternative measure only using differences between sterilization achievements. The dependent variable is the number of rapes per 1 million inhabitants. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals. We control with police forces at the state level.

## 7 Mechanisms

We hypothesize that a compulsory male sterilization program may impact violence through various channels. First, reduced fertility rates may lead to women spending less time caring for children, prompting their increased involvement in the labour force. These shifts could potentially contribute to instances of domestic violence, in line with findings from the male backlash literature ([Aizer, 2010](#); [Erten and Keskin, 2018](#); [Bhalotra et al., 2021](#); [Anukriti, 2014](#)). Second, the forced medical procedure itself might cause psychological trauma and elevate the risk of subsequent criminal behavior and domestic abuse ([Oehme et al., 2012](#); [Becker-Blease and Freyd, 2005](#); [Mrug et al., 2016](#)). Lastly, by targeting men and their sense of masculinity ([Scott, 2014](#)), the program could instigate feelings of emasculation, potentially fostering a desire to reaffirm masculinity through the adoption of masculine-oriented norms, including resorting to violence ([Baranov et al., 2023](#); [Bosson et al., 2009](#)).

One might express concern that the observed increase in violence against women is merely due to an increase in reporting rather than an actual rise in the number of crimes. It could be plausible that during this period, characterized by a sense of emasculation among men ([Scott, 2014](#)), women may have felt more empowered to report instances of aggression, given that their traditional notions of virility were being challenged. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be empirically tested. However, we argue that this explanation is unlikely for two primary reasons. Firstly, the period was marked by widespread abuse by police forces, which could lead to a sense of mistrust in government and institutions among women, discouraging them from reporting offences. This phenomenon, predicted by the literature and partially documented by [Pelras and Renk \(2023\)](#) for the Emergency period, that show a significant turnover of political representatives in more heavily affected districts following the forced sterilizations. Secondly, this explanation contradicts the masculinity channel discussed in Section 7.2.

We explore the fertility, trauma and masculinity channels in the following sections, but due to limitations in data availability, we are unable to disentangle the last two channels and therefore treat them collectively.

### 7.1 Fertility and labour force participation

#### 7.1.1 Data

To study the effect of coercion intensity on fertility, we use the National Sample Surveys (NSS) of 1986-87, 42nd round. The dataset is the Survey on Maternity, Child Care, Family Planning,

and Utilisation of the Public Distribution System. We restrict the sample to include only the immediate family of the head of the household because the data only gives a clear characterization of the children of the head of the household. This leaves us with 75% of the sample and 54,044 households.<sup>§§</sup>.

**Outcome variables.** Our primary outcome variable focuses on the count of births to examine the program's effects on fertility. This count encompasses all mothers within the age range of 15 to 50, who are either spouses of the household head or household heads themselves.

**Control variables.** The 42nd round of NSS encompasses a comprehensive set of individual and household characteristics, which we utilize for controlling factors such as age, sex, education levels of household members, caste, and occupation sectors in our analysis. Detailed summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 9. Additionally, we augment these variables with district controls from the 1971 census.

Table 9: Summary Statistics: Maternity Survey

	N	Mean	s.d.
<i>Household Characteristics</i>			
Hh with 1 child before 1976	54173	0.31	0.46
Hh with 2 children before 1976	54173	0.23	0.42
Hh with 3 children before 1976	54173	0.20	0.40
Hh with $\geq 4$ children before 1976	54173	0.14	0.35
Educated males	50937	0.49	0.46
Educated females	54173	0.27	0.41
Low caste	54173	0.26	0.44
Rural	54173	0.66	0.47
Hh size	54173	5.72	2.59
<i>Mother Characteristics</i>			
Age	54794	39.27	10.11
At least 8 years of education	54794	0.26	0.44
Husband has at least 8 years of education	54794	0.41	0.49
No. of living children	54794	2.81	1.74
Husband salaried or self-employed	54794	0.73	0.45

*Notes:* This table presents the summary statistics of our sample for the fertility and education study.

We also use the 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 Indian censuses to compute the share of female labour force participation, defined as the share of working women in the population of women older than 15 at the district level.

<sup>§§</sup>For example if household  $i$  has two daughters-in-law and three grandchildren, we will not be able to distinguish the mothers based on the serial number of grandchildren because all grandchildren have the same serial number i.e. 6



### 7.1.2 Empirical strategy

To assess the effect of the excessive sterilization in 1976-77 on the number of births, we utilize spatial differences in coercion intensity and household-level variation in the number of children a couple had prior to the coercive campaign. Since the program primarily targeted husbands with children, we focus on children born after 1977 in households with already existing children before 1977, specifically in districts with high coercion intensity. These households were most likely affected by the program, making it the key area to observe its effects.

We run the following regression equation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Post\_N}_{i,d} = & \alpha + \sum_{n=1}^{\geq 4} \text{Pre\_N}_{i,d,n} \beta_n + \gamma \text{CI}_d + \sum_{n=1}^{\geq 4} (\text{CI}_d \times \text{Pre\_N}_{idn}) \mu_n \\ & + \psi_1 \text{MAge}_{i,d} + \psi_2 \text{MAgesq}_{id} + \mathbf{X}'_1 \phi_1 + \mathbf{X}'_2 \phi_2 + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ids} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where  $\text{Post\_N}_{id}$  is the number of children born post-1976 in household  $i$  in district  $d$ .  $\text{Pre\_N}_{idn}$  is the dummy that takes the value 1 if the number of children born before 76 is equal to  $n$  where  $n \in \{1, 2, 3, \geq 4\}$ , for household  $i$  in district  $d$ .  $\text{MAge}$  is the mother's age, and  $\text{MAgesq}$  is the mother's age squared in 1976. The vectors  $\mathbf{X}_1$ ,  $\mathbf{X}_2$  comprise household and district level controls,  $\delta_s$  is state fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at the district level.<sup>¶¶</sup> Including the state and time-fixed effects with a district-level treatment variable, helps pinpoint the treatment's effect within districts while accounting for state and time variations.

We implement the following event-study design ( similar to crime rates) to understand the effect on number of births at the district level:

$$Y_{d,t} = \theta_t + \eta_d + \beta_t \times \text{CI}_d \times \sum_{t=1972}^{\geq 1985} P_t + v_{d,t} \quad (4)$$

In contrast to our primary analysis where a dummy variable took the value of 1 after 1976, we now employ  $P_t$ , a dummy variable that equals 1 for a specific year  $t$  ranging from 1972 to 1985. We exclude 1976, one year prior to the treatment, following the convention in event study literature, and incorporate linear time trends. Here,  $\text{CI}_d$  represents a treatment dummy variable for “high” coercion intensity. We assign a value of 1 to districts with coercion intensity exceeding the mean of 4.5%.<sup>\*\*\*</sup> The event study graph plots the  $\beta_{d,t}$  coefficients for each year, differentiating between

<sup>¶¶</sup>Household controls include: the share of educated females in the household, the share of educated males in the household, caste and urban sector dummies. District-level controls include a share of the scheduled caste population in 1971, the share of the scheduled tribe population in 1971, the share of the literate population in 1971 and the share of the urban population in 1971.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>The variation in mean values between crime and fertility analyses is because the fertility analysis covers all

high and low coercion intensity districts for easier result interpretation.

For the labour force participation, we use the same regression as the main specification, equation 1. The variable *post* takes 1 for the 1981 and 1991 waves, 0 otherwise.

### 7.1.3 Impact of coercion intensity on fertility and labour force participation

We find that a 1 percentage point increase in coercion intensity leads to a very small positive increase in fertility post-1976.<sup>†††</sup> By splitting the sample between households that yet did not have sons before 1976 and the ones that did, we see in columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 that this result is mostly driven by families who did not have a son. These results indicate that there was a backlash on the number of births in districts with higher forced vasectomies and that parents were afraid of not being able to have sons. This result contributes to a large literature on son preference in India (Sen, 1992). As well, we see an increase in births in families with three children who already have a son, meaning that large families also feel pressure to have more children. We also split the sample between household belonging to dominant castes versus oppressed castes, are the one belonging to dominant castes may be more likely to have information of the current crisis in India and would be more likely to anticipate a potential reimplementation of the program. We see in Table A8 and Table A10 that the effect on the number of births is almost essentially coming from the dominant castes, that may indicate an potential fear of reimplementation of the program.

To better understand the fertility results, we conducted an event study analysis. As seen in Figure 13, the increase in fertility became noticeable in 1983, aligning with Indira Gandhi's fourth term in office during a period of heightened tensions with Sikh religious militants. This suggests that households in the districts previously affected by the 1976-77 forced vasectomies may have been concerned about a potential re-implementation of such a program.

Although we see a small positive effect of coercion intensity on the number of births, we find that sterilization in 1976-77 did have a negative impact on the number of births in the short run in the households that were potentially most impacted. The results are provided in Table A12. This negative evidence on fertility shows that a household's exposure to sterilization is jointly determined by the district of residence and the number of children the household had before 1976.

We see in Table 11 that female labour force participation declines by 1% with an increase of 1 districts, whereas the crime analysis includes 197 districts.

<sup>†††</sup>We also observe that coercion intensity increased the probability of having at least one child after the program happened. Results can be found in Table A9. A one percentage point increase by 0.02% the probability of having one more child for couples already having one child, in line with the results on the number of children.

Table 10: Impact of forced vasectomies on number of births

	Whole sample		No sons born pre 1976		At least one son pre 1976	
	(1) Poisson	(2) OLS	(3) Poisson	(4) OLS	(5) Poisson	(6) OLS
Coercion intensity	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
One child pre 76 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)		
Two children pre 76 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Three children pre 76 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)
Four children pre 76 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Observations	54044	54044	23129	23129	30915	30915
Household Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.234	1.234	1.695	1.695	0.888	0.888

*Notes:* This table presents the results of a static difference-in-differences specification state in equation 3 of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts, and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

percentage point in coercion intensity.<sup>†††</sup>

Table 11: Female labour force participation and coercion intensity

<i>Dependant Variable:</i>	Female Labour Force Participation
Coercion Intensity $\times$ Post	-0.003*** (0.0005)
Observations	1301
Mean	0.28


Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of running the static difference-in-differences specification shown in equation 1 of coercion intensity on female labour force participation in India, defined as the share of female workers in the total population of women. The unit of observation is the district. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

As we find that the program had the opposite effect of reduced fertility and an increase in female labour force participation, we rule out this channel as a mechanism for violence.

<sup>†††</sup>This result echoes the work of [Prasad \(2022\)](#) who studies the link between the female sterilizations performed during the program and labour force participation, using the 1993 Demographic and Health Survey to create a measure of the fraction of women who were sterilized in a district in a year during the Emergency period. While this treatment measure has potential issues of misrepresentation at the district level and may not be reflective of the forced program that targeted men, we also find with our measure that the program led to a decrease in female labour force participation.

Figure 13: Event Study: Births 1972-1985



*Notes:* This figure plots the estimated  $\beta$  coefficients from a regression of the form given in equation 4. The dependent variable is the number of births. The event takes place in 1977. The coefficient of 1976 is normalized to zero. The vertical lines reflect the 95% confidence intervals.

#### 7.1.4 Robustness on fertility: Placebo tests and alternative treatments

To assess the robustness of our fertility results, we conducted placebo tests. Specifically, we manipulated the timing of household treatments to investigate the impact of forced vasectomies on births across the study period from 1967 to 1985. We conducted separate regression analyses for households with varying numbers of children (one, two, three, and four or more) for each year, using the same regression equation as presented in Equation 3. The results for each year are summarized in Tables A1 to A7.

Notably, we observed statistically significant coefficients for households with more than two children in the year 1973, but no such significance was evident in the years preceding it. Furthermore, the results for 1979 and 1982 indicated a significant effect on births, reaffirming the earlier observed effect on fertility.

We also explore an alternative measure of coercion intensity. In 1973, as illustrated in Figure 2, there was a notable surge in sterilization procedures, mostly vasectomies, largely attributable to the commencement of incentivized sterilization initiatives in India. To assess coercion intensity differently, we calculate the growth rate between 1972 and 1973 as a control variable, to see the effect on births of a voluntary vasectomy program. Figure A1 shows the geographic variation in “placebo”

coercion intensity in the year 1973.<sup>§§§</sup> While the sterilization intensity in 1973 was comparatively lower than that in 1977, our analysis in Table A11 reveals that incentivized sterilization programs resulted in reduced offspring numbers for households residing in districts with higher sterilization rates. This finding adds to our understanding of why the coercive measures implemented during the 1977 sterilization episode did not yield the anticipated impact on fertility. Several factors may contribute to this phenomenon: potential resistance towards forced government policies, or concerns among families where husbands did not opt for vasectomy that the program might resurface in subsequent years, motivating them to have more children.

## **7.2 The role of trauma and masculinity in inducing violent behaviours against women**

It is important to consider the concept of masculinity and its potential role in explaining the increase in crimes during this period. The forced vasectomy campaign, which targeted men as a means of population control, may have threatened traditional notions of masculinity and provoked a sense of emasculation among some individuals (Scott, 2014). The resulting feelings of insecurity, loss of power, and diminished social status could have contributed to a heightened propensity for engaging in criminal behaviour as a means of reestablishing a sense of control or asserting dominance. There is a large and diverse psychology literature that documents the link between manhood and the use of aggression and violence. Bosson et al. (2009) review theories and evidence highlighting that manhood is a status that must be earned and demonstrated throughout life. This means that a possible shock on gender roles could impact men in reasserting masculinity norms. They suggest that this urge to affirm masculinity can lead to the use of aggression from men, as violence is identified as being a manly and visible behaviour.

Extensive psychological research suggests a connection between male violence towards women and exposure to childhood and adolescent trauma (Oehme et al., 2012; Becker-Blease and Freyd, 2005; Mrug et al., 2016). Although our findings do not directly identify the age of the perpetrators of crimes in high-coercion districts, evidence indicates that a majority of rape cases in India are committed by younger men, suggesting that they would have been children or adolescents during the *Emergency*. It is conceivable that witnessing the government's threat to their fathers or experiencing violence at home during that period could be considered traumatic exposures, potentially leading to increased levels of violence in adulthood.

While our dataset does not allow us to definitively establish a causal link between forced vasc-

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<sup>§§§</sup>When compared to 1976-77, we see that there are differences in the districts that were exposed to higher intensities in 1973 versus 1976.

tomies and disruption in masculinity norms or domestic abuse, we seek to address this gap through a compensatory approach. We conducted a simple difference analysis using the 1999 Demographic and Health Surveys, which is the first household-level survey in India to include inquiries on domestic violence. Leveraging this dataset, we explore the correlation between coercion intensity and various variables, such as Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), bargaining power, and fertility dynamics.

We faced challenges conducting an age group analysis because the dataset only covers women aged 15 to 49 years old, leaving a 22-year gap between 1977 and 1999. This gap made it difficult to target the exact cohort of women affected by the 1977 program. Additionally, by 1999, masculine norms would have already diffused, making it challenging to identify a specific age group more affected than others. Consequently, we could not establish a direct age-related causal connection.

Our study focuses on married women who are either household heads or are spouses of household heads, resulting in a dataset comprising 27,449 observations. Employing a simple difference analysis, we incorporate several household and district-level controls to uncover correlations between exposure to forced vasectomies and various factors related to violence, female empowerment, and fertility dynamics.

$$Y_{id} = \alpha + \beta \text{Coercion Intensity}_d + \gamma X_d + \kappa X_i + \varepsilon_{id} \quad (5)$$

The outcome variables in Table A13 include a dummy variable for IPV that takes 1 if the husband already beat his wife and several dummy variables related to acceptance of violence. The questions asked are “Is it acceptable for husbands to beat their wives if the wife ...” and ask if she’s being unfaithful, if she shows disrespect, if she goes out without asking him, if she neglects the house or the children and if she does not cook properly. A positive result indicates a positive response. In Table A14, the first four column outcome variables are questions about decision-making, 1 indicates that the wife takes part in the decision-making process and 0 that she has no word in it. Columns 5 and 6 are questions about if the wife needs permission from her husband, to go to the market or visit family, 1 indicates that she does. Finally, in Table A15, Column 1 indicates if the wife is sterilized if the couple talks about male sterilization and the number of children desired by her husband.

In Table A13, we see that districts with a higher incidence of forced vasectomies demonstrate an association with elevated levels of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and higher acceptance of such violence. This correlation suggests that the coercive nature of the sterilization program may have had broader negative implications for gender dynamics and relationships within these districts. Additionally, in Table A14, the presence of higher forced vasectomy rates is linked to lower

bargaining power for women, indicating reduced decision-making autonomy in matters related to household affairs, including the ability to visit markets or family members.

Furthermore, the coerced vasectomy campaign seems to correlate with diminished rates of female sterilization within the affected districts. This trend may be attributed to a heightened prevalence of male sterilization, which in turn reduces the utilization of female-based contraceptive techniques. Additionally, discussions and discourse pertaining to vasectomies appear to be less prevalent within these communities. Within these districts, husbands seem to have a higher inclination for expanding their families, hinting at the possibility of altered fertility beliefs.

## 8 Conclusion

Can forced program implementations lead to a backlash on violence? In this paper, we study the impact of a unique historical event, the implementation of a male coercive sterilization program in India from April 1976 to February 1977, on violence. The program used coercive methods - and sometimes resorted to violence- to implement a Malthusian policy in India during a state of emergency declared by the government to fight against poverty.

Using newly digitized district-level governments and administrative documents on sterilizations and crime rates, we employ a two-way fixed effect strategy to find the causal impact of forced vasectomies, proxied by the growth rates of the share of sterilized couples between 1975-76 and 1976-77, on crime rates in India.

We find that an increase of 1 percentage point in coercion intensity leads to an increase of 7.3% of violent crimes for the average district, while it does not impact other crime categories. Rapes drive the increase in violent crime rates, increasing respectively by 28% for the average district. The increase in rapes is persistent through time and remains significant until 2013, the end of our study, for the 25% districts more exposed to forced vasectomies. Murders increase slightly with coercion intensity. We document that the murders may be directed towards women, as we see a decline in the number of women related to men in high coercion intensity districts.

We study plausible mechanisms and observe that the implementation of the program did not result in reduced fertility, its intended goal, but rather a small increase in births. This suggests a spillover effect stemming from households' fear of a potential second implementation of the program. Additionally, we find that highly exposed districts are associated with more harmful gender norms towards women, suggesting a reaction to trauma and threat towards masculinity.

This paper provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence that the implementa-



tion of a compulsory male sterilization program resulted in increased violence against women, with a cultural transmission through time. Our contribution adds to the extensive economic literature that highlights the adverse repercussions of enforced measures and their limited efficacy.

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## Appendix

Table A1: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1967

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 67=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 67=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 67=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 67=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	39356	39356
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	2.024	2.024

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Post\_}N_{id} = & \alpha + \sum_{n=1}^{\geq 4} \text{Pre\_}N_{idn} \beta_n + \gamma \text{CI}_d + \sum_{n=1}^{\geq 4} (\text{CI}_d \times \text{Pre\_}N_{idn}) \mu_n \\
 & + \psi_1 \text{MAge}_{id} + \psi_2 \text{MAgesq}_{id} + \mathbf{X}'_{1i} \phi_1 + \mathbf{X}'_{2d} \phi_2 + \delta_s + \varepsilon_{ids}
 \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

In Table A4,  $\text{Post\_}N$  is the number of children born post-1970 in household  $i$  in district  $d$  in state  $s$ .  $\text{Pre\_}N$  is the dummy that takes the value 1 if the number of children born before 70 is equal to  $n$  where  $n \in \{1, 2, 3, \geq 4\}$ .  $\text{MAge}$  is the mother's age, and  $\text{MAgesq}$  is the mother's age squared in 1970.

Table A2: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1968

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 68=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 68=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)
# children pre 68=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 68 $\geq 4$ $\times$ Coercion intensity	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	40853	40853
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.967	1.967

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A3: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1969

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 69=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 69=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 69=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
# children pre 69=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	42465	42465
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.883	1.883

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A4: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1970

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 70=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 70=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 70=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 70 $\geq$ 4 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Observations	44762	44762
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.817	1.817

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A5: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1973

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
# children pre 73=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01* (0.01)
# children pre 73=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.01)
# children pre 73=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
# children pre 73=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Observations	49631	49631
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.581	1.581

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.



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Table A6: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1979

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
# children pre 79=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01** (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
# children pre 79=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
# children pre 79=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)
# children pre 79=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Observations	55383	55383
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	0.858	0.858

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A7: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1982

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Coercion intensity	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.00)
# children pre 82=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.01** (0.01)	0.01** (0.00)
# children pre 82=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)
# children pre 82=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)
# children pre 82=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)
Observations	55344	55344
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	0.454	0.454

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A8: Effect of coercion on number of births post-1976 for mothers of dominant caste

	OLS	
	(1)	(2)
Coercion intensity	0.005* (0.002)	-0.006 (0.004)
children pre 76=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.009** (0.003)
children pre 76=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.018** (0.007)
children pre 76=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.024*** (0.008)
children pre 76=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.008 (0.008)
Observations	40060	40060
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	0.207	0.207

*Notes:* This table presents the heterogeneity results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A9: Effect of coercion on probability of birth post-1976

	OLS	
	(1)	(2)
Age of mother in 1976	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.002)
Coercion intensity	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
children pre 76=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.004*** (0.001)
children pre 76=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.002 (0.001)
children pre 76=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.003** (0.001)
children pre 76=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.002 (0.001)
Observations	54044	54044
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	0.213	0.213

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A10: Effect of coercion on probability of birth post-1976 in mothers of oppressed caste

	OLS	
	(1)	(2)
Age of mother in 1976	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)
Coercion intensity	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
children pre 76=1 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.004* (0.002)
children pre 76=2 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.001 (0.002)
children pre 76=3 $\times$ Coercion intensity		0.001 (0.002)
children pre 76=4 $\times$ Coercion intensity		-0.000 (0.002)
Observations	13984	13984
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	0.229	0.229

*Notes:* This table presents the heterogeneity results on the impact of coercion intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A11: Effect of placebo intensity (1972-73 spike) on number of births post-1976

	Poisson (1)	OLS (2)
Placebo Coercion intensity	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
# children pre 76=1 $\times$ Placebo Coercion intensity	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)
# children pre 76=2 $\times$ Placebo Coercion intensity	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)
# children pre 76=3 $\times$ Placebo Coercion intensity	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.01)
# children pre 76 $\geq$ 4 $\times$ Placebo Coercion intensity	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)
Observations	53057	53057
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.234	1.234

*Notes:* This table presents the robustness results on the impact of voluntary sterilization intensity on births. The unit of observation is the household. District controls include literacy rates, workers' share, farmers' share, household industry, middle school achievements, scheduled casts and tribes. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A12: Impact of sterilization on number of births

	Poisson	OLS
	(1)	(2)
Sterilization 1976-77 (%)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
1 child pre 1976 $\times$ Sterilization	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.01)
2 children pre 76 $\times$ Sterilization	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
3 children pre 76 $\times$ Sterilization	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)
4 children or more pre 76 $\times$ Sterilization	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Observations	58,928	58,928
Household Controls	Yes	Yes
District Controls	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Mean of dep. var.	1.190	1.190

*Notes:* This table presents the results on the impact of sterilization intensity on the number of kids born post-1976. The unit of observation is the household. The specifications in col. (1) is estimated using Poisson & col. (2) using OLS. Household controls include the share of educated females in households, the share of educated males in households, and caste and urban sector dummies. District-level controls include the share of SC pop., ST pop., and literate pop. & urban pop. in 1971. Robust standard errors, clustered by district. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A13: Domestic violence and acceptance: Correlations

	(1) IPV	(2) Unfaithfull	(3) Disrespect	(4) Goes out	(5) Neglects	(6) does not cook
Forced Vasectomies	0.031*** (0.0085)	0.074*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.0093)	0.0529*** (0.0091)	0.022** (0.00890)	0.043*** (0.00835)
Observations	5844	27448	27443	27444	27448	27445
Mean	0.909	0.492	0.479	0.504	0.541	0.372

Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of a static difference specification stated in equation 5 of coercion intensity on variables related to gender norms, using the 1999 Demographic and Health Survey. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A14: Decision-making and work: Correlations

(7)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Cook	Health	Jewelry	Family	Market	Visit
Forced Vasectomies	0.0011 (0.0035)	-0.054*** (0.0067)	-0.037*** (0.0067)	-0.0319*** (0.0067)	0.015*** (0.0030)	0.0024* (0.0014)
Observations	27449	27449	27449	27449	27449	27449
Mean	0.931	0.515	0.554	0.489	0.0499	0.106

Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of a static difference specification stated in equation 5 of coercion intensity on variables related to gender norms, using the 1999 Demographic and Health Survey. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.

Table A15: Sterilization and fertility: Correlations


	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Sterilized	Discussed Vasectomies	Husband desire fertility
Forced Vasectomies	-0.0137** (0.00649)	-0.0115*** (0.00318)	0.0352* (0.0207)
Observations	27449	27439	13379
Mean	0.453	0.036	1.831

Standard errors in parentheses

*Notes:* This table presents the results of a static difference specification stated in equation 5 of coercion intensity on variables related to gender norms, using the 1999 Demographic and Health Survey. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.



## Placebo Intensity Index



Source: Jolly, KG, Family Planning in India, 1969-1984: A District Level Study

Figure A1: Placebo Intensity Index: 1973