Who Gains from Self-Promotion? Evaluator Gender and Attribution Processes

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Abstract

How audiences evaluate self-promotion, and whether responses vary by gender, remains poorly understood. I examine this using a randomized trial in MBA classrooms, where students saw a professor's self-promotion via a slide before completing evaluations. Overall, self-promotion raised ratings for both male and female faculty on average. Yet responses depended systematically on evaluator identity and beliefs: male students rewarded self-promoting professors regardless of gender, whereas female students penalized self-promoting male professors but not female professors. Attribution-process analyses show backlash is strongest when male professors are seen as structurally advantaged, succeeding with less effort, or highly competent, and when self-promotion is interpreted as informative rather than boastful. Similar beliefs about female professors elicited only limited penalties. By integrating role-congruity, statistical discrimination, and attribution-process perspectives, the findings show that self-promotion's effectiveness depends on the interaction between the self-promoter's identity, the evaluator's identity, and evaluators' causal attributions. Organizational practices encouraging selfpromotion may thus inadvertently produce unequal rewards and reinforce career inequities.

Keywords: Teaching evaluation, Teaching effectiveness, Gender bias, Discrimination, India, Field experiment

JEL Codes: C93, I20, I23, J08, J16

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1 Introduction

Recognition, promotion, and career advancement often depend not only on performance but also on how effectively individuals make their accomplishments visible to others, a process that occurs across job interviews, performance evaluations, leadership applications, and academic tenure reviews. Yet visibility is a double-edged sword: while self-promotion can enhance perceived competence, it also risks being judged as boastful or inappropriate. Self-promotion, the strategic disclosure of achievements under conditions of incomplete information (Bolino et al., 2008; Turnley and Bolino, 2001), is thus a pervasive but socially delicate feature of professional life.

Despite its ubiquity, research consistently documents gender differences in self-promotional behavior: men engage in self-promotion more frequently and assertively than women (Lerchenmueller et al., 2019; Exley and Kessler, 2022; Abraham, 2023). While some studies suggest task dependence, with men self-promoting more in male-typed domains and women in female-typed contexts (Chaudhuri, 2025), the general pattern of male advantage in self-promotional frequency remains robust across settings. These disparities can produce unequal outcomes even when men and women perform equivalently, potentially reinforcing gender gaps in career advancement (Exley and Kessler, 2022; Mavisakalyan et al., 2025).

Prior research largely emphasizes the supply side: understanding barriers to women's self-promotion and designing interventions to narrow this behavioral gap (Moss-Racusin and Rudman, 2010; Smith and Huntoon, 2014; Lindeman et al., 2019; Chang et al., 2025; Tradenta et al., 2025). Far less is known about the demand side: how evaluators respond to self-promotion, and whether their reactions systematically vary with evaluators identity or beliefs. Understanding these dynamics is critical for comprehending how self-promotional behaviors translate into organizational outcomes and for identifying potential sources of bias in evaluation processes.

Academic settings offer a natural field context for studying evaluative bias. Professors routinely highlight credentials and achievements to establish competence (Farreras and

Boyle, 2012), while Student Evaluations of Teaching (SETs) provide high-stakes, consequential feedback influencing tenure, promotion, and contract decisions (Boring et al., 2017; Mengel et al., 2019). If male professors disproportionately benefit from self-promotion while female professors do not, such dynamics may exacerbate the academic "leaky pipeline," perpetuating gender disparities in career progression (Buckles, 2019).

To examine these questions, I conducted a randomized controlled trial with 493 MBA students at a leading private business school in India. Students evaluated one of their current professors under one of two randomly assigned conditions. In the *Control* condition, students saw only the professor's name. In the *Info* treatment, they additionally viewed a standardized slide containing the professor's photograph, doctoral institution, and a brief first-person summary of academic and professional accomplishments. The evaluated courses were in the management domain (e.g., organizational behavior, economics, finance, and marketing), a historically male-dominated field where gender dynamics are particularly salient (Heilman, 2012; Koenig and Eagly, 2011).

The study further explores how evaluators' beliefs shape these reactions through four interrelated inferences: perceived structural privilege, effort attribution, competence judgments, and whether self-promotion is viewed as informative versus boastful. These belief-based mechanisms help explain when self-promotion is rewarded, penalized, or ignored, moving beyond broad gender-based differences in ratings.

The implications of this study extend beyond academia. In many organizations, advancement relies on performance evaluations, promotion decisions, and other assessments in which strategic self-presentation plays a central role. Limited managerial attention and imperfect information can further amplify the role of self-promotion, increasing the risk that high performers are undervalued if their achievements remain less visible (Hanna et al., 2014). Understanding how evaluators' beliefs and social identities shape responses to self-promotion can therefore guide organizational policies aimed at reducing bias and promoting fairness. Moreover, the participating students represent the top tier of the country's talent,

selected through a highly competitive process and subsequently placed in leading organizations both domestically and internationally. Their responses to self-promotion may thus provide insights into how similar behaviors are evaluated in broader professional contexts, as the underlying cognitive and social processes are likely comparable across settings.

This research contributes to three strands of literature. First, it tests role congruity theory in a natural field setting, explicitly integrating the role of evaluators' own identity and beliefs. Second, it extends models of statistical discrimination by showing how comparable self-promoting information elicits heterogeneous inferences depending on the evaluator's identity. Third, it advances signaling and impression-management theories by conceptualizing self-promotion as a dynamic interaction between signaler and audience identities (Connelly et al., 2011; Bolino et al., 2008).

2 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

Self-promotion is essential for professional advancement, yet its social reception remains deeply gendered. Women risk backlash for violating prescriptive norms of modesty, while men may face penalties when their self-presentation is perceived as arrogance or unearned confidence. To explain these asymmetric reactions, we integrate role congruity theory, statistical discrimination, and signaling perspectives to build a unified account of how gender and evaluator beliefs jointly shape responses to self-promotion.

2.1 Role Congruity Theory and Its Limitations

Role congruity theory predicts that behavior incongruent with gender stereotypes invites penalties (Eagly and Karau, 2002). For women, self-promotion conflicts with expectations of modesty, generating risk of backlash (Rudman and Goodwin, 1998; Phelan et al., 2008). For men, self-promotion aligns with stereotypes of competence and agency, potentially boosting evaluations (Heilman, 2012; Koenig and Eagly, 2011).

Yet empirical results are mixed: in some studies, women benefit from self-promotion (Smith et al., 2013; Moss-Racusin and Rudman, 2010), while in others, men face penalties for appearing arrogant or oblivious to privilege (Grijalva et al., 2015; Scopelliti et al., 2015). These mixed results highlight that role congruity alone cannot account for systematic variation in responses to self-promotion; evaluator's identity and beliefs must also be considered.

H1. Self-promotion will generally enhance evaluations, but the magnitude of its effect will differ by professor gender, reflecting deviations from uniform role-congruity predictions.

2.2 Statistical Discrimination and Evaluator Heterogeneity

Classic models of statistical discrimination assume evaluators rely on group membership under uncertainty (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). In self-promotion contexts, this implies that women's claims may be discounted relative to men's, reflecting stereotypes about competence and ambition (Biernat et al., 2003; Foschi, 2000). However, evaluators differ systematically in their fairness beliefs and awareness of privilege. For example, female students, on average, may hold stronger beliefs about structural inequality and privilege (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Bohren et al., 2019) and thus interpret male self-promotion less favorably than male students.

H2. Female students will respond less favorably to self-promoting male professors than to female professors, whereas male students will show relatively uniform positive responses across professor gender.

2.3 Signaling, Attribution, and the Mechanisms of Interpretation

From a signaling perspective, self-promotion conveys information about underlying competence and effort (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011). Yet such signals are ambiguous: what appears as justified pride to one evaluator may appear as boastfulness or entitlement to another (Bolino et al., 2008; Turnley and Bolino, 2001). Attribution theory helps clarify these

interpretive processes: whether self-promotion is received positively depends on beliefs about why success occurred and how it should be communicated (Weiner, 1985; Martinko et al., 2011). We outline four attributional processes that shape how self-promotion is evaluated, particularly in gendered contexts.

Privilege Attribution: A first attributional process concerns how evaluators perceive the role of structural advantage in shaping success. Inequality research emphasizes that career success remains embedded in gendered and institutional privilege (Acker, 2006). Students aware of these dynamics may interpret the same achievement differently depending on whether they believe it reflects individual merit or systemic advantage. For male professors, who are more likely to be perceived as beneficiaries of structural privilege, especially by female students, self-promotion may be discounted or even penalized as tone-deaf or arrogant (Scopelliti et al., 2015). By contrast, equivalent behavior by female professors may be interpreted as legitimate attempts to counteract under-recognition.

H3a. Self-promotion will be less effective when evaluators attribute professors' success to structural privilege rather than individual merit.

Effort Attribution: The second attributional process centers on the attribution of success to effort. Attribution theory suggests that behaviors are evaluated more positively when outcomes are seen as the product of controllable, effortful actions rather than uncontrollable factors such as luck, innate talent, or external advantages (Weiner, 1985; Martinko et al., 2011). In academic contexts, success perceived as stemming from perseverance, hard work, and sacrifice is likely to legitimize self-promotional claims. In contrast, if achievements are attributed to talent, connections, or institutional reputation, identical self-promotional statements may appear presumptuous or undeserved (Fiske et al., 2018).

H3b. Self-promotion will be more effective when evaluators attribute professors' success to high personal effort.

Competence Saturation: A paradox emerges when competence is already perceived to be very high. While self-promotion is designed to signal competence, additional signaling may backfire when evaluators consider the claim unnecessary, redundant, or inconsistent with professional norms (von Baeyer et al., 1987). Colloquial wisdom, "if you have to say you're great, you're probably not", captures this logic. Prior work shows that highly competent individuals may be penalized for engaging in overt self-promotion when such claims violate expectations of modesty or authenticity (Scopelliti et al., 2015).

H3c. High perceived competence will diminish the effectiveness of self-promotion.

Framing and Intent: Finally, evaluators' interpretations of intent critically shape the reception of self-promotion. Self-promotional content that appears factual, relevant, and educational may be perceived as informative transparency, helping students understand the professor's expertise and qualifications (Bolino et al., 2008). In contrast, when the same information is framed or delivered in ways that appear self-aggrandizing, it may be judged as boastful, undermining credibility and warmth. The divergence underscores that self-promotion is not only about content but also about framing and perceived intent. These attributions mirror broader patterns in impression management: when self-disclosure aligns with contextual relevance and sincerity, it strengthens credibility; when perceived as self-serving, it undermines warmth and trustworthiness (Leary and Kowalski, 1990).

H3d. Self-promotion framed as informative and matter-of-fact will be more effective than self-promotion framed as boastful or self-aggrandizing.

Together, these attributional processes illustrate why self-promotion elicits variable reactions in gendered contexts. Rather than producing uniform penalties or rewards, evaluations of self-promoting individuals reflect a complex interplay of gender stereotypes, attributional beliefs, and interpretive frames that jointly shape how identical information is perceived.

3 Method

3.1 Setting

This study was conducted as a natural field experiment at one of India's leading business schools during Term 1 of the 2025 academic year (July–September). The academic year is organized into three trimesters (terms). The experiment was implemented in core courses covering foundational management disciplines (Economics, Finance, Information Systems, Marketing, and Organizational Behavior). These courses are mandatory for all first-year MBA students, who later specialize in fields such as General Management, Human Resources, International Business, or Business Analytics. Across sections, the student body comprised 610 individuals, of whom 493 completed the survey. Faculty at the institution are gender-balanced, and instructors voluntarily opt to teach these core courses.

Approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board (IRB), along with prior written consent from participating instructors.¹ At this institution, official student evaluations of teaching (SETs) are systematically administered immediately before the midterm and end-term examinations of each course, serving as the primary measure of instructional quality.

In addition to these official evaluations, the experiment introduced a supplemental SET survey administered mid-course, between the 8th and 10th lectures of a standard 20-lecture sequence in Term 1. This timing ensured that students had sufficient exposure to an instruc-

¹Some instructors declined to participate, which reduced coverage but did not compromise internal validity.

tor's teaching style while still preceding the official midterm (administered after 10th lecture) and end-term SETs (administered after 20th lecture). To reduce recency bias, experimental SETs were never administered on days when the evaluated instructor had taught, and only one instructor per cohort-section was assessed to avoid contamination effects.

To further minimize spillovers into the official SETs, the experimental SET survey was deliberately designed with distinct wording and framing. While both instruments captured perceptions of teaching effectiveness, the experimental version employed different language to prevent overlap with the upcoming institutional evaluations. Because the intervention was embedded in routine classroom evaluation procedures without deception or role-playing, the study constitutes a natural field experiment, preserving both realism and experimental control.

3.2 Procedure

The experimental SET surveys were administered in person, either at the start of the lunch break or immediately after the final lecture of the day for a given cohort-section, so as not to disrupt the regular class schedule. On the morning of the survey, students received an email inviting them to participate in a voluntary research study. The message instructed interested students to remain in the classroom at the designated time and noted that participants would receive a Nescafé voucher, redeemable for a coffee and sandwich at the campus café.

At the scheduled time, the researcher and an assistant entered the classroom immediately after the prior lecture ended and introduced the study to the students who had remained seated. Participation was voluntary: students were informed that the survey would take approximately 5–8 minutes, and those wishing to participate should stay, while others were free to leave. For logistical efficiency, the Qualtrics survey link was shared via the cohort's group email rather than through individual addresses.

The survey consisted of six sequential modules: (1) an information sheet, (2) a consent form, (3) a treatment-specific slide about the professor, (4) a 13-item SET questionnaire

modeled on prior studies (Boring, 2017; MacNell et al., 2015; Arora and Roy, 2025), (5) a post-experimental module capturing manipulation checks, beliefs about the professor's competence, perceived status advantages, effort required to achieve accomplishments, gaps between expected and actual teaching, perceptions of self-promotion (informative vs. boastful), as well as students' own academic motivations, and (6) a demographic questionnaire. The full survey instrument is available in the Supplementary Materials.

To maintain experimental control, the survey link was active for only 10–12 minutes, during which the research team remained in the classroom until the last student had submitted the survey. Participation was carefully monitored, and the number of completed surveys always matched the number of students physically present. Although technically possible, off-site access was highly unlikely due to the short activation window and in-class verification.²

Students were informed verbally and through the survey interface that the study was part of an academic project on teaching evaluations and that informed consent was required. After consenting, students were randomly assigned at the individual level to one of two experimental conditions using Qualtrics' randomization function. While students in both conditions completed the survey in the same classroom and sat next to one another, they were explicitly instructed not to communicate or view each other's screens; non-compliance would result in disqualification and loss of the participation reward. Most students completed the survey within 5-7 minutes. Upon finishing, they raised their hands and were given their vouchers. Sessions lasted no more than 10-12 minutes in total, and students could not leave until all participants had submitted their responses.

3.3 Treatments and Randomization

The experiment examined how self-promotional framing by professors influences student evaluations, and whether these effects differ by professor gender and student gender. The

²No discrepancies were observed between classroom attendance and recorded responses.

design broadly had two treatment arms: Control and Info. In the Control condition, students were shown only the professor's name before completing the SET questionnaire. In the Info condition, the slide also included the professor's photograph, doctoral institution, and a standardized first-person narrative describing their academic and professional accomplishments. The narratives were drawn from official faculty webpages, standardized in structure to simulate professional self-promotion, and pre-approved by the respective instructors.³

Students were randomly assigned within each professor's section to either the *Info* or *Control* condition using Qualtrics' built-in randomization tool. Upon clicking the survey link sent via the cohort email, the software automatically allocated them to one of the two conditions, without revealing that multiple versions of the survey existed. This student-level, within-instructor randomization ensured internal validity by enabling treatment comparisons for the same instructor. Because each student accessed the survey individually on their own device, and both versions were visually indistinguishable in layout, cross-contamination between treatments was effectively prevented.

The design allows us not only to identify the effect of self-promotion on SETs but also to examine how this effect systematically varies with professor gender. Since instructors differ in credentials, teaching quality, and course content, cross-instructor comparisons would confound gender effects with these factors. Instead, by comparing shifts in student ratings between *Info* and *Control* within the same course and instructor, analogous to a within-instructor comparison framework, we can causally assess how self-promotional framing influences SET ratings across genders. The design further enables us to isolate the role of student gender in shaping evaluations under both conditions.

³Self-promotional narratives can be crafted in varying tones, from modest to overtly boastful. To minimize this variation, we employed a "plain vanilla" format that presented accomplishments in a neutral, factual manner, neither excessively modest nor overtly self-aggrandizing. While this ensured comparability across faculty, further studies could examine how the impact varies with different tones of self-promotion.

3.4 Sample Characteristics

Of the 610 students enrolled across cohort-sections, 496 completed the experimental SET survey. Demographic information was collected from all respondents, though 14 students chose not to disclose their gender. Table 1 reports their summary statistics.

Column 1 presents overall means and standard deviations. On average, 26% of students were female, a figure consistent with the gender composition of the first-year MBA cohort at this institution. The mean age was 24.1 years, and 93% held undergraduate degrees in STEM fields. With respect to program enrollment, 59% were in MBA (General), 23% in MBA-Human Resources, 12% in MBA-International Business, and 5% in MBA-Business Analytics. The participating students had an average Grade 12 exam score of 88.8% and a mean CAT (Common Admission Test for MBA admissions in India) percentile of 96.9. Additionally, 61% of students expected to receive an A-range grade (A+/A/A-). Regarding parental education, 87% reported that their mother and 89% reported that their father held a bachelor's degree or higher. In terms of household income, 3% of students reported annual earnings below INR 0.5 million, while 40% reported income exceeding INR 2 million.

Columns 2 and 3 present these summary statistics by treatment assignment (Control vs. Info). An F-test for joint significance yields a p-value of 0.42, confirming that baseline characteristics are balanced across conditions, validating the success of randomization. These balance checks confirm that treatment assignment was orthogonal to all observable characteristics, strengthening internal validity. Nevertheless, all main empirical specifications control for baseline covariates to account for any residual variation and enhance robustness. Results estimated without controls are qualitatively similar and presented in the appendix.

3.5 Manipulation Checks

Next, I examine whether students in the *Info* treatment engaged with the self-promotional content. Specifically, I conduct three validation tests. First, I compare the time taken to complete the survey (measured in seconds) between students in the *Info* and *Control* groups.

Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance Test

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Class 12 Score (%) 88.78 88.47 89.11 CAT Percentile 96.86 96.80 96.91 Expected Grade A+/A/A- 0.61 0.63 0.59 (0.489) (0.485) (0.493) Mother's education 0.04 0.02 0.05 Secondary (or lower) 0.04 0.02 0.05 Higher secondary 0.10 0.12 0.07 Higher secondary 0.04 0.02 0.05 Bachelor's 0.42 0.42 0.42 Master's (or higher) 0.45 0.43 0.46 Master's (or higher) 0.45 0.43 0.46 Master's education 0.03 0.03 0.03 Secondary (or lower) 0.03 0.03 0.03 Master's education 0.03 0.03 0.03 Secondary (or lower) 0.08 0.09 0.07 Higher secondary 0.08 0.09 0.07 Master's (or higher) 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.53 <td></td> <td>(0.227)</td> <td>(0.222)</td> <td>(0.233)</td>		(0.227)	(0.222)	(0.233)
CAT Percentile 96.86 96.80 96.91 (1.474) (1.529) (1.416) Expected Grade A+/A/A- 0.61 0.63 0.59 (0.489) (0.485) (0.493) Mother's education Secondary (or lower) 0.04 0.02 0.05 (0.187) (0.153) (0.216) Higher secondary 0.10 0.12 0.07 (0.296) (0.330) (0.255) Bachelor's 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 (0.494) (0.494) (0.495) Master's (or higher) 0.45 0.43 0.46 (0.498) (0.497) (0.178) Father's education Secondary (or lower) 0.03 0.03 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) Higher secondary 0.003 0.03 0.03 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) Higher secondary 0.08 0.09 0.07 (0.269) (0.289) (0.248) Bachelor's 0.49 0.45 0.53 (0.500) (0.499) (0.500) Master's (or higher) 0.40 0.43 0.38 (0.491) (0.496) (0.485) HI Income Less than INR 0.5 mn 0.03 0.04 0.03 (0.182) (0.186) (0.178) Between INR 0.5-1 mn 0.19 0.17 0.20 (0.389) (0.378) (0.401) Between INR 1-1.5 mn 0.21 0.21 0.20 (0.404) Between INR 1.5-2 mn 0.18 0.20 0.15 Above INR 2 mn 0.40 0.38 0.41 (0.489) (0.489) (0.489) (0.489) Obs. 496 251 245				
CAT Percentile 96.86 (1.474) (1.529) (1.416) Expected Grade A+/A/A- (0.61 (0.489) (0.485) (0.493) Mother's education Secondary (or lower) 0.04 (0.187) (0.153) (0.216) Higher secondary 0.10 (0.296) (0.330) (0.255) Bachelor's 0.42 (0.494) (0.494) (0.495) Master's (or higher) 0.45 (0.494) (0.494) (0.499) Master's education 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) Secondary (or lower) 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) Higher secondary 0.08 (0.497) (0.499) Father's education Secondary (0.1077) (0.176) (0.178) Secondary (or lower) 0.03 (0.33) (0.03) (0.33) Go.177 (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) Higher secondary 0.08 (0.99) (0.289) (0.248) Bachelor's 0.49 (0.269) (0.289) (0.248) (0.498) Bachelor's 0.49 (0.49) (0.496) (0.496) Master's (or higher) 0.40 (0.490) (0.499) (0.500) Master's (or higher) 0.03 (0.390) (0.398) (0.398) (0.398) Between INR 0.5 mn 0.03 (0.490) (0.496) (0.485) HH Income 0.03 (0.380) (0.378) (0.401) Less than INR 0.5 mn 0.01 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0	Class 12 Score (%)			
(1.474		(6.681)	(6.659)	(6.701)
Expected Grade A+/A/A- 0.61 (0.489) (0.485) (0.489) 0.59 (0.493) Mother's education Secondary (or lower) 0.04 (0.187) (0.153) (0.216) Higher secondary 0.10 (0.296) (0.330) (0.255) Bachelor's 0.42 (0.494) (0.494) (0.495) Master's (or higher) 0.45 (0.494) (0.497) (0.499) Father's education 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) Secondary (or lower) 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.178) Higher secondary 0.08 (0.269) (0.289) (0.248) Bachelor's 0.49 (0.490) (0.289) (0.248) Bachelor's 0.49 (0.490) (0.490) (0.500) Master's (or higher) 0.40 (0.491) (0.496) (0.485) HH Income 10.00 (0.491) (0.496) (0.485) Less than INR 0.5 mn 0.03 (0.182) (0.186) (0.178) Between INR 0.5-1 mn 0.01 (0.182) (0.186) (0.178) Between INR 1-1.5 mn 0.21 (0.21) (0.20) (0.404) Between INR 1-5-2 mn 0.18 (0.406) (0.409) (0.404) Above INR 2 mn 0.49 (0.486) (0.483) (0.483) Obs. 496 (251) (245) (0.486) (0.493)	CAT Percentile	96.86	96.80	96.91
Mother's education (0.489) (0.485) (0.493) Secondary (or lower) 0.04 0.02 0.05 Higher secondary 0.10 0.12 0.07 Higher secondary 0.10 0.12 0.07 (0.296) (0.330) (0.255) Bachelor's 0.42 0.42 0.42 Master's (or higher) 0.45 0.43 0.46 Master's (or higher) 0.04 0.49 (0.499) Father's education 0.03 0.03 0.03 Secondary (or lower) 0.03 0.03 0.03 Higher secondary 0.08 0.09 0.07 (0.269) (0.289) (0.248) Bachelor's 0.49 0.45 0.53 Master's (or higher) 0.40 0.43 0.38 Master's (or higher) 0.40 0.43 0.38 Master's (or higher) 0.40 0.43 0.38 Master's (or higher) 0.03 0.04 0.03 Master is (or		(1.474)	(1.529)	(1.416)
Mother's education Secondary (or lower) 0.04 (0.187) 0.02 (0.153) 0.0216 Higher secondary 0.10 (0.296) 0.330) (0.255) Bachelor's 0.42 (0.494) 0.42 (0.494) 0.42 (0.494) Master's (or higher) 0.45 (0.498) 0.43 (0.497) 0.499) Father's education 0.03 (0.33 (0.03 (0.33)) 0.03 0.03 Secondary (or lower) 0.03 (0.177) (0.176) (0.176) (0.178) Higher secondary 0.08 (0.299) (0.289) (0.248) 0.09 0.07 Higher secondary 0.08 (0.269) (0.289) (0.248) 0.53 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.248) 0.049 0.048) 0.049 0.0248) 0.09 0.07 0.040 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04	Expected Grade A+/A/A-	0.61	0.63	0.59
Secondary (or lower) 0.04 0.02 0.016 Higher secondary 0.10 0.12 0.07 Bachelor's 0.42 0.42 0.42 Bachelor's (or higher) 0.45 0.43 0.46 Master's (or higher) 0.45 0.43 0.46 Master's education 0.03 0.03 0.03 Secondary (or lower) 0.03 0.03 0.03 Higher secondary 0.08 0.09 0.07 Higher secondary 0.08 0.09 0.07 Higher secondary 0.08 0.09 0.07 Master's (or higher) 0.08 0.09 0.07 Master's (or higher) 0.49 0.45 0.53 Master's (or higher) 0.40 0.43 0.38 Master's (or higher) 0.40 0.43 0.38 Master's (or higher) 0.04 0.43 0.38 Master's (or higher) 0.04 0.04 0.03 Master's (or higher) 0.03 0.04 <t< td=""><td></td><td>(0.489)</td><td>(0.485)</td><td>(0.493)</td></t<>		(0.489)	(0.485)	(0.493)
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Between INR 0.5-1 mn 0.19 (0.389) 0.17 (0.378) 0.20 (0.401) Between INR 1-1.5 mn 0.21 (0.406) 0.21 (0.409) 0.404) Between INR 1.5-2 mn 0.18 (0.382) 0.20 (0.45) 0.15 (0.382) Above INR 2 mn 0.40 (0.489) 0.40 (0.493) 0.493 Obs. 496 (251) 245		(0.182)	(0.186)	(0.178)
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Between INR 1-1.5 mn 0.21 0.21 0.20 (0.406) (0.409) (0.404) (0.406) (0.409) (0.404) Between INR 1.5-2 mn 0.18 0.20 0.15 (0.382) (0.403) (0.359) Above INR 2 mn 0.40 0.38 0.41 (0.489) (0.486) (0.493) Obs. 496 251 245				
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(0.489) (0.486) (0.493) Obs. 496 251 245	Above INR 2 mn	` /	` /	` ,
Obs. 496 251 245				
	Obs		,	
(r .wwo)		100		
	(P .ca.c)		0	

Note: Column 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of various baseline characteristics of students in the overall sample. Column 2-3 provide the descriptive statistics for Control and Info treatments. 14 of these 496 students did not reveal their gender. The Joint F-test reports the p-value from a regression of the treatment indicator on all other demographic variables in the table, to assess their joint significance. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Second, I examine differences in students' ratings of the professor's accomplishments (on a 1-5 scale, with 5 indicating "most accomplished"), which were collected after the SET responses. Third, I assess whether students could correctly identify the professor's PhD institution from three provided options, a detail that was shown only in the *Info* treatment.

Table 2 presents the results of the manipulation checks (Columns 1–3). The manipulation was effective across all three outcomes: students in the *Info* group spent more time on the survey (an increase of 19 seconds, or 6.3%), rated the professor as more accomplished (0.3 points higher, or 8.1%), and were more likely to correctly identify the professor's PhD institution (a 20 percentage point increase, or 31%). All effects are statistically significant at the 1% level. Together, these results confirm that students attended to and processed the self-promotional information as intended.

Table 2: Manipulation Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Time taken	Rate faculty's	Identify faculty's
	in seconds	accomplishments (1-5)	PhD Institution
Info	18.74***	0.303***	0.199***
	(6.825)	(0.0748)	(0.0383)
Control Mean	297.7	3.72	0.64
Obs.	496	496	496

Note: The table reports results from regressions of three dependent variables: time taken to complete the survey in seconds (Column 1), rating of the faculty's accomplishments on a 1–5 scale (Column 2), and correct identification of the professor's PhD-granting institution (Column 3), on the *Info* treatment dummy (equal to 1 if assigned to *Info*, 0 if *Control*). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Control Mean reports the average values of the dependent variables for the *Control* group. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

3.6 Empirical Strategy

I exploit the randomized assignment of students to *Info* and *Control* groups within each professor to causally identify the effect of professor self-promotion on student evaluations of teaching (SETs). To quantify the causal effect of self-promotional framing on student evaluations, I estimate the following linear model at the student level:

$$Y_{is} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Inf o_{is} + \alpha_2 X_{is} + \mu_s^0 + \epsilon_{is}^0 \tag{1}$$

where Y_{is} denotes the SET score given by student i in cohort-section s for a given teaching dimension. Specifically, I focus on seven outcomes: the average SET score (an equally weighted mean of the 13 survey items) and six aggregated teaching dimensions: "quality of instructional material", "preparation and organization of class", "teaching effectiveness", "clarity of evaluation criteria", "overall interest of the lecture", and "overall evaluation of the instructor". These dimensions are constructed from the 13 SET survey items, with Appendix Table A1 reporting the detailed mapping.

Of these seven measures, institutions, including the one where this experiment was conducted, typically emphasize the "Average SET score" as the main metric for evaluating faculty teaching quality. Accordingly, we focus primarily on the overall average SET, while also examining the six individual teaching dimensions to gain a deeper understanding of which aspects of teaching were most affected and how these changes contributed to shifts in the average SET score.

Further, the binary variable $Info_{is}$ in Equation (1) indicates treatment status, taking the value 1 if the student was assigned to the Info condition, where they viewed a detailed slide containing the professor's name and photograph, PhD institution, and accomplishments, and 0 if assigned to the Control condition which just presented the professor's name. X_{is} is a vector of student-level covariates listed in Table 1.4 μ_s^0 accounts for unobserved cohort-section level heterogeneity, and implicitly also controls for instructor fixed effects, as only one instructor was evaluated per cohort-section. ϵ_{is}^0 is the heteroskedasticity-robust error term.

Our parameter of interest is α_1 , which captures the average effect of professor's self-promotion on SET scores. A positive and significant α_1 would suggest that students rated professors more favorably when self-promotional information was presented, holding all else constant. I first estimate this effect for the pooled sample, and then separately for male and

⁴We have two indicators of ability: CAT score and Class 12 score. In our control variables, we include only the Class 12 score since that is available for all 496 participants while CAT score is missing for 3 students; however, the results remain qualitatively similar if we instead use the CAT score or include both measures.

female professors to examine heterogeneity by instructor gender.

Next, I investigate whether gender congruence between the professor and the student moderates the impact of self-promotion on SET scores. Specifically, I examine whether the treatment effect is strengthened when the professor and student share the same gender (ingroup) and weakened when they differ (out-group). To test this, I estimate the following model separately for female and male professors:

$$Y_{is} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Info_{is} + \beta_2 X_{is} + \beta_3 Info_{is} \cdot Female_{is} + \mu_s^1 + \epsilon_{is}^1$$
 (2)

In this specification (2), $Female_{is}$ is a binary indicator equal to 1 if student i in cohort-section s is female, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Equation 1. The coefficient β_1 captures the effect of self-promotion on SET scores for male students, while β_3 captures whether female students react differently than male students to the same self-promotional cue. I estimate Equation 2 separately for female and male professors to assess how in-group versus out-group dynamics shape student reactions to self-promotion.

I estimate both Equation 1 and Equation 2 using three approaches: (1) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with controls, (2) OLS without controls, and (3) an Ordered Logit model. For clarity of interpretation, the main text reports OLS estimates with controls, while results from the other two specifications (OLS without controls and the Ordered Logit) are presented in the Appendix. Findings are qualitatively consistent across all specifications.

Throughout the analysis, asterisks indicate statistical significance at conventional levels based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In addition to conventional inference, I report randomization inference p-values for robustness, following the approach of Fujiwara and Wantchekon (2013). This involves repeatedly reassigning treatment status at random (1,000 iterations) and estimating the coefficient of interest under each placebo assignment. The resulting distribution is then used to compute two-sided p-values for the actual treatment effect, which are presented in square brackets.

Overall, the design combines the realism of a natural classroom environment with the

precision of randomized individual-level assignment. The within-instructor design ensures that observed differences in SET scores reflect students' interpretations of self-promotional information rather than variation in instructor quality or course content.

4 Results

This section presents the empirical results. I first examine the overall impact of self-promotional information on student evaluations of teaching (SETs), followed by gender-specific effects for male and female professors. I then analyze how student gender moderates these responses, testing for potential in-group (same-gender) and out-group (different-gender) dynamics.

4.1 Self-promotion

Table 3 reports the estimated impact of professor self-promotional information on SET scores, both for the overall average and across six teaching dimensions. All regressions include student-level covariates and cohort-section fixed effects, with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, as specified in Equation 1. Appendix Table A2 presents the corresponding estimates using standardized SET scores.

Average Effect of Self-promotion: Panel A of Table 3 reports the pooled treatment effect across all professors. For the Average SET score (Column 7), self-promotion increases scores by 0.16 points, equivalent to 0.22 standard deviations (p<0.01), a statistically significant effect. Columns 1–6 break down the effects by teaching dimension. Students in the Info condition rated professors significantly higher on four of the six dimensions: quality of instructional material (0.18 points), preparation and organization (0.30 points), teaching effectiveness (0.14 points), and overall instructor evaluation (0.16 points). The effect on overall lecture interest is positive (0.16 points) but not statistically significant, while clarity of evaluation criteria remains essentially unchanged, consistent with the expectation that

perceptions of assessment standards are not easily shifted by background information alone. These results suggest that self-promotion meaningfully improves students' evaluations across several key teaching dimensions, even though the underlying course content and delivery remain unchanged.

Table 3: Treatment Effect on SETs

	Panel A: All Profs									
	i and it. iii i i iis									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)			
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average			
							1			
Info	0.181**	0.299***	0.141**	0.0560	0.142	0.163*	0.164***			
	(0.0873)	(0.0756)	(0.0597)	(0.0864)	(0.0923)	(0.0943)	(0.0587)			
Control Mean	3.58	3.52	3.99	3.98	3.49	3.53	3.81			
Obs. N	496	496	496	496	496	496	496			
]	Panel B:	Female F	Profs						
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average			
Info	0.193	0.273***	0.132	-0.0497	0.220*	0.221*	0.158**			
	(0.118)	(0.0995)	(0.0810)	(0.0986)	(0.123)	(0.126)	(0.0789)			
Control Mean	3.79	3.66	4.10	4.37	3.73	3.68	3.97			
Obs.	276	276	276	276	276	276	276			
		Panel C	: Male P	rof						
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average			
Info	0.177	0.331***	0.111	0.217	0.0237	0.0600	0.147*			
	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.0895)	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.145)	(0.0888)			

Note: The table reports the estimated effect of the *Info* treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control) on six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7), based on Equation 1. All models are estimated using OLS regressions, controlling for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects, with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Control Mean shows the average SET scores for students in the *Control* group. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

3.85

220

3.48

220

3.18

220

3.34

220

3.61

220

Control Mean

Obs.

3.30

220

3.33

220

Effect of Self-promotion on Female Professors: Panel B examines the impact of self-promotional information specifically for female professors. The results are broadly consistent with the pooled sample: female professors in the *Info* group see an increase of 0.16 points, equivalent to 0.21 standard deviations, in their *Average SET score*, indicating that self-promotion is equally effective for female faculty in enhancing student evaluations. At the dimension level, self-promotion increases SET scores for five of the six teaching dimension

sions, mirroring the overall sample. The largest and statistically significant effects occur for preparation and organization (0.27 points), overall lecture interest (0.22 points), and overall instructor evaluation (0.22 points), while the effects on quality of instructional material (0.19 points) and teaching effectiveness (0.13 points) are positive but not statistically significant. As expected, the effect on clarity of evaluation criteria remains minimal and non-significant.

Effect of Self-promotion on Male Professors: Panel C presents the results for male professors. The Average SET score increases by 0.15 points, equivalent to 0.20 standard deviations, with self-promotion, significant at the 10% level. At the dimension level, only preparation and organization shows a statistically significant increase of 0.33 points. Other dimensions, including quality of instructional material (0.18), teaching effectiveness (0.11), and clarity of evaluation criteria (0.22), show positive but statistically insignificant effects. Effects on overall lecture and overall instructor are minimal and non-significant. These findings suggest that self-promotion benefits male professors across fewer dimensions than female professors.

Robustness checks further confirm these patterns. Appendix Table A3 reports naive OLS estimates without controls, and Appendix Table A4 presents Ordered Logit results; both yield similar conclusions.⁵ Overall, consistent with *Hypothesis 1*, the evidence shows that self-promotional information meaningfully improves student evaluations. While the average effects are similar for male and female professors, the underlying dimensions driving these gains differ by gender, suggesting that the effectiveness of self-promotion may depend not only on its use but also on the promoter's identity.

4.2 Gender Congruence and Evaluator Responses to Self-Promotion

I next examine whether gender-based in-group (same-gender) or out-group (different-gender) dynamics influence students' responses to professor self-promotion. Table 4 presents esti-

⁵Appendix Table A5 tests whether treatment effects differ by professor gender and finds no statistically significant difference. However, because baseline SET scores differ by professor gender (Panel B vs. Panel C, Table 3), cross-gender comparisons may conflate pre-existing evaluation gaps rather than causal reactions to self-promotion. Therefore, I focus on within-gender contrasts.

mates from Equation (2) separately for female professors (Panel A) and male professors (Panel B), allowing us to examine gender-congruence effects.

Female Professors: Panel A focuses on female professors. Row 1 reports the average treatment effect of self-promotion among male students. The results show a positive but statistically insignificant effect on the *average SET score*, suggesting that male students do not significantly reward self-promoting female professors. Among the six teaching dimensions, only *preparation and organization* (0.28 points) shows a significant positive effect.

Row 2 compares baseline ratings (i.e., evaluations of non-self-promoting female professors) between male and female students in the *Control* condition. Across the average SET score and all six dimensions, no significant differences emerge, indicating that male and female students evaluate female professors similarly in the absence of self-promotion.

Row 3 examines whether female students respond differently to the self-promotion provided in the *Info* treatment compared with male students. Results show null effect on the average SET score or on any individual dimension, providing no evidence of additional ingroup favoritism or penalty. In other words, female students do not give an extra boost to self-promoting female professors beyond the effect observed among male students. These findings suggest that self-promotion benefits female faculty broadly, without generating differential responses based on student gender.

Male Professors: Panel B turns to male professors. Row 1 shows the treatment effects of self-promotion among male students. The estimates reveal a strong and consistent pattern of positive responses: male students significantly increase their evaluations of self-promoting male professors on the average SET score by 0.28 points, with teaching dimensions such as quality (0.32 points), preparation and organization (0.44 points), teaching effectiveness (0.23 points), overall instructor evaluation (0.41 points) showing the strongest effects. Other teaching dimensions also show positive but statistically insignificant effects. These results suggest clear in-group appreciation of self-promotion, whereby male students reward self-promoting professors who share their gender.

Table 4: Role of Student Gender in Treatment Effect on SETs

Panel A: Female Prof									
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average		
Info	$0.205 \\ (0.137)$	0.283** (0.118)	0.0634 (0.0928)	-0.0411 (0.120)	0.192 (0.141)	0.191 (0.139)	0.120 (0.0911)		
Female Student	0.229 (0.212)	0.157 (0.185)	-0.0843 (0.157)	0.235 (0.151)	-0.202 (0.253)	-0.0686 (0.252)	-0.00647 (0.155)		
Info# Female Student	-0.260 (0.277)	-0.108 (0.240)	0.117 (0.185)	-0.172 (0.220)	-0.0565 (0.319)	0.00252 (0.318)	0.00901 (0.184)		
Control Mean Obs.	3.86 276	3.72 276	4.21 276	4.35 276	3.87 276	3.76 276	4.05 276		

Panel B: Male Prof

	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	0.293* (0.149)	0.426*** (0.136)	0.209* (0.110)	0.166 (0.178)	0.209 (0.168)	0.345** (0.167)	0.256** (0.106)
Female Student	-0.259	-0.191	-0.0352	-0.153	0.0351	0.148	-0.0659
Info#	(0.223)	(0.239)	(0.152)	(0.257) 0.202	(0.238)	(0.240)	(0.157)
Female Student	(0.287)	(0.283)	(0.208)	(0.374)	(0.321)	(0.324)	(0.207)
Control Mean Obs.	3.35 220	3.36 220	3.84 220	3.52 220	3.14 220	3.25 220	3.60 220

Note: The table reports how student gender moderates the effect of the Info treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control) on six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the overall average SET score (Column 7), as estimated from Equation 2. Panel A presents results for female professors, while Panel B presents results for male professors. The variable Female Student is coded as 1 for female students, 0 for male students, and 999 for students who did not disclose their gender. All models are estimated using OLS regressions with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects, and standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Control Mean reports the average SET scores of male students in the Control group. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Row 2 compares baseline evaluations in the *Control* condition, where no self-promotional information was shown. Across all teaching dimensions, ratings by male and female students are statistically indistinguishable, indicating that in the absence of self-promotion, both groups assess male professors similarly.

Row 3, however, uncovers an asymmetry in female students' responses. While the interaction effect on the average SET score is negative but statistically insignificant, there are statistically significant declines for overall lecture (-0.61 points) and overall instructor evaluation (-0.92 points). Combined with the baseline evidence from Row 2, this pattern suggests that female students do not penalize male professors generally, but react unfavorably, along some specific dimensions, when male professors engage in self-promotion.

Overall, these findings from Table 4 reveal an asymmetric gender dynamic in responses to self-promotion. Consistent with *Hypothesis 2*, male students responded positively to self-promoting professors regardless of gender. In contrast, female students penalized self-promoting male professors, but not female professors, revealing asymmetric in-group versus out-group responses. Self-promotion thus benefits female faculty without backlash, but its returns for male faculty are attenuated by out-group penalties from female students.

4.3 Power analysis.

The experiment included 496 total ratings (approximately 248 per condition). Assuming two-tailed tests at $\alpha = 0.05$, this sample provides 80% power to detect standardized mean differences of about d = 0.25 (i.e., one quarter of a standard deviation). This corresponds to differences of roughly 0.25 rating points on the 1–5 scale. Thus, the design had sufficient power to detect small-to-moderate treatment effects of the self-promoting information but limited power for effects smaller than about 0.10 rating points.

Specifically, given N=496 observations (248 per condition), the study was powered (80%) to detect standardized effects of about d=0.25. Observed treatment effects ranged from d=0.04 (Clarity) to d=0.25 (Preparation). Consequently, significant effects on

Quality, Preparation, Effectiveness, and Average ratings fall within the detectable range, whereas smaller nonsignificant coefficients likely reflect effects below the study's detection threshold.

We also report analyses split by professor gender. The female-professor subsample includes 276 ratings (138 per condition) and the male-professor subsample includes 220 ratings (110 per condition). Under a conservative independent-samples assumption (two-tailed tests, = 0.05), these subsamples have minimum detectable standardized effects of approximately d = 0.34 (female panel) and d = 0.38 (male panel) at 80% power. Thus, the split-sample analyses are substantially less well powered than the pooled sample: detectable effects must be roughly one-third to two-fifths of a standard deviation to be reliably observed.

In the female-professor subsample (N=276; 138 per condition) observed effects correspond to d0.04–0.23; only the Preparation effect (d0.23) approaches conventional power (78%). The female panel requires d0.34 for 80% power, so many nonsignificant outcomes are underpowered.

In the male-professor subsample (N=220; 110 per condition) observed effects correspond to d0.02–0.27; the Preparation effect (d0.27) again is close to adequate power (79%). The male panel requires d0.38 for 80% power, and most other outcomes are therefore underpowered.

5 Attribution Mechanisms

The preceding results reveal a clear gender asymmetry: female students penalize self-promoting male professors along key teaching dimensions, whereas male students do not. To understand why, we examine whether these reactions are shaped by students' attribution processes. Specifically, the survey elicited students' interpretation along four dimensions: First, *Perceived Advantage* captures whether students think male faculty have an easier path than female faculty to securing positions at top business schools, reflecting perceptions of structural

privilege. Second, *Perceived Effort* measures the extent of effort students believe the professor has invested in achieving their accomplishments, reflecting whether success is viewed as earned or unearned. Although these two dimensions may be correlated, they are analyzed separately: a male professor may be seen as structurally advantaged, yet individually recognized for high effort. Third, *Perceived Competence* assesses students' perceptions of the professor's ability to meet teaching standards at a top-tier institution. Finally, *Interpretation of Self-Promotion* captures whether students perceive the professor's references to accomplishments as genuinely informative, boastful, or somewhere in between, shaping how self-promotion is received.

All responses were recorded on a 1-5 scale. Descriptive statistics on these beliefs are reported in Appendix Table A6, which compares responses between female and male students. The core analyses focus on how female students' beliefs condition their evaluations of male professors, presented in Table 5, with detailed results in Appendix Tables A8-A11.

5.1 Perceived Structural Advantage of Male Professors

I first test whether female students' backlash is linked to attributions of structural privilege. Table 5 reports the interaction between the female student indicator and the *Info* treatment, stratified by students' beliefs about whether professors are relatively advantaged, using the median rating as the cutoff. Among students who perceive male professors as structurally advantaged, female students impose substantial penalties on self-promoting male professors relative to male students, reducing the *average SET score* by -0.81 points. The negative effects are consistent across teaching dimensions, with statistically significant declines in teaching effectiveness (-0.73), clarity of evaluation (-1.27), and overall instructor rating (-2.10). By contrast, female students who do not view male professors as particularly advantaged show mostly statistically insignificant penalties, except for a modest negative effect on overall lecture (-0.81).

These patterns support Hypothesis 4a, indicating that female students' backlash is stronger

when male professors are attributed systemic advantage, consistent with the view that selfpromotion by an advantaged group is interpreted as asserting unwarranted entitlement.

Table 5: Female Students' Beliefs and Male Professor's Ratings

Beliefs	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Advantaged	-0.436 (0.581)	-0.295 (0.528)	-0.734* (0.401)	-1.265* (0.694)	-1.026 (0.639)	-2.098*** (0.537)	-0.812** (0.372)
	66	66	66	66	66	66	66
Not Advantaged	-0.658	-0.383	-0.151	0.739	-0.808*	-0.505	-0.235
O .	(0.423)	(0.387)	(0.295)	(0.544)	(0.434)	(0.462)	(0.305)
	154	154	154	154	154	154	154
High Effort	-0.672	-0.249	-0.0667	0.462	0.219	-0.539	-0.115
8	(0.742)	(0.605)	(0.422)	(0.702)	(0.673)	(0.706)	(0.456)
	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
Low Effort	-0.459	-0.452	-0.386	0.0306	-0.930**	-1.280***	-0.480*
	(0.342)	(0.365)	(0.259)	(0.483)	(0.428)	(0.395)	(0.256)
	147	147	147	147	147	147	147
	0.704	0.040	0.045	0.145	0.050	l 0.0 5 0	0.000
Competent	-0.794 (0.478)	-0.642 (0.504)	-0.245 (0.204)	0.147 (0.522)	-0.656 (0.606)	-0.679 (0.417)	-0.383 (0.268)
	(0.478)	(0.304)	(0.204)	(0.322)	(0.606) 99	99	99
	33	33	33	33	33	33	33
Not Competent	0.120	0.180	0.0932	0.601	-0.140	-0.604*	0.0761
	(0.326)	(0.344)	(0.282)	(0.530)	(0.399)	(0.355)	(0.247)
	121	121	121	121	121	121	121
Brags	-0.376	-0.0978	-0.214	0.185	-0.109	-0.414	-0.185
	(0.534)	(0.468)	(0.389)	(0.553)	(0.561)	(0.530)	(0.381)
	97	97	97	97	97	97	97
Informative	-0.613*	-0.505	-0.403*	0.217	-1.000**	-1.334***	-0.505**
	(0.336)	(0.390)	(0.240)	(0.499)	(0.410)	(0.379)	(0.234)
	123	123	123	123	123	123	123

Note: The table reports coefficients on the interaction term between Female Student and the Info treatment dummy, capturing whether female students respond differently than male students to self-promotional information when evaluating male professors. These coefficients come from separate models that partition students by their beliefs, using a split at the 50th percentile. For instance, students are classified as perceiving male professors as either advantaged or not advantaged in securing top academic positions. Because the 50th percentile value (e.g., 3 on a 1–5 scale) is shared by many observations, the split does not always yield an exact 50–50 distribution. The same procedure applies to other belief measures: whether professors are seen as achieving success through high versus low effort, whether their teaching competence is appropriate for a top-tier institution, and whether their self-promotion is interpreted as informative versus boastful. In each case, the division is based on the median, though clustering at the median value means the groups are not always perfectly balanced. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

5.2 Perceived Effort Behind Accomplishments

Next, I examine whether female students' evaluations reflect attributions to effort. Table 5 presents results stratified by whether students view male professors as achieving success through high or low effort, rated on a 1-5 scale and split along the median. Among students who attribute professor's success to high effort, there is little evidence of backlash, with interaction terms statistically insignificant. By contrast, female students who perceive male professors as exerting relatively low effort impose substantially larger penalties on average SETs (-0.48), with significant declines for overall lecture (-0.93) and overall instructor (-1.28). These results indicate that self-promotion perceived as unearned elicits stronger negative reactions, especially from female students evaluating male professors. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4b, indicating that negative responses arise when achievements are perceived as unearned, suggesting that female students' backlash is driven by causal attributions that the professor's success is not the result of effort.

5.3 Perceived Teaching Competence

I next explore whether female students' responses vary with attributions of teaching competence. Among students who consider their male professors highly competent, female students consistently impose penalties on average SETs and five of the six teaching dimensions, though the effects are statistically insignificant. In contrast, when professors are perceived as less competent, self-promotion has minimal impact on average SETs and most dimensions, except for overall instructor (-0.60). These patterns partially support Hypothesis 4c, suggesting that self-promotion by competent male professors may be interpreted as assertive or overreaching, eliciting stronger negative reactions, whereas less competent professors are largely exempt from backlash.

5.4 Interpretation of Self-Promotion

Finally, I consider female students' attributions regarding the nature of self-promotion. Surprisingly, Table 5 shows that penalties are small and insignificant when self-promotion is perceived as bragging. By contrast, when self-promotion is interpreted as informative, female students impose substantial penalties on average SET score (-0.55) and on quality of instructional material (-0.61), teaching effectiveness (-0.40), overall lecture (-1.00), and overall instructor (-1.33).

This finding is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4d, which predicted stronger backlash against blatant bragging. Instead, it suggests an attributional interpretation whereby informative self-promotion may signal authority or entitlement, triggering stronger negative reactions, particularly among female students attuned to hierarchical assertiveness. By contrast, boastful or exaggerated self-promotion may be more easily dismissed, eliciting weaker reactions.

5.5 Belief Effects on Evaluations of Female Professors

As a robustness check, I examine whether these attribution processes also shape evaluations of female professors (Appendix Table A7). Female students' perceptions of male advantage, effort, competence, or self-promotion largely do not affect their evaluations relative to male students on average SETs.

Some noteworthy patterns emerge, however, at the dimension level. For instance, female students lower the ratings of self-promoting female professors on Quality (-0.53) when these professors are perceived as competent. Conversely, female professors whose self-promotion is seen as boastful receive higher ratings than from male students on five of the six teaching dimensions (except Clarity), with the effect statistically significant only for $Overall\ Instructor$ (+1.20). Similar to the pattern for male professors, female students penalize self-promoting female professors when the promotion is interpreted as informative, particularly on Quality (-0.64) and $Overall\ Instructor\ (<math>-0.64$), though effects on other dimensions are negative but insignificant.

These results suggest that female students respond differently to female professors' self-promotion than male students do, particularly when the professors are perceived as competent or when their self-promotion is viewed as informative, both of which lower ratings. By contrast, when self-promotion is perceived as bragging, female students appear to reward it, perhaps because it signals a stereotypically male trait exhibited by female faculty. Interestingly, this contrasts with their evaluations of male professors, where bragging drew a negative (though statistically insignificant) reaction (see Table 5). Overall, these patterns highlight that reactions to self-promotion are shaped by the interaction of causal attributions, faculty identity, and the student identity, rather than by any single factor alone.

6 Heterogeneous Effects

I next explore whether the impact of self-promotion on SETs varies with students' ability and ambition.⁶ Ability is proxied by Class 12 percentage scores (median split), while ambition is measured by expected course grades (students anticipating at least an A– are classified as ambitious). Table 6 reports the results.

Panel A shows that students below the median ability respond positively to self-promotion, awarding 0.19 points higher on the average SET score. High-ability students do not differ in their evaluations, nor do they respond differently to self-promotion. Panel B shows that non-ambitious students also respond favorably to self-promotion, increasing average SETs by 0.23 points. Ambitious students assign higher baseline ratings but, like ability, their responses to self-promotion do not differ.

These findings suggest that students' prior ability and ambition do not moderate the effect of self-promotion on evaluations, indicating that the gendered backlash and attribution effects documented earlier operate broadly across students with varying abilities and aspirations.

⁶Students were also asked whether gender affects teaching quality as a measure of stereotype; as most responses were neutral, this analysis is not pursued.

Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
		F	Panel A: R	ole of Stud	dent Abilit	y	
Info	0.195	0.327***	0.160*	0.0988	0.199	0.190	0.189**
IIIIO	(0.190)	(0.110)	(0.0881)	(0.125)	(0.141)	(0.135)	(0.0870)
	(0.120)	(0.110)	(0.0001)	(0.123)	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.0010)
High-ability Student	0.0660	0.0246	0.0530	0.157	0.191	-0.0238	0.0623
· ·	(0.174)	(0.147)	(0.123)	(0.163)	(0.190)	(0.196)	(0.121)
Info#	-0.0297	-0.0549	-0.0379	-0.0893	-0.119	-0.0493	-0.0510
High-ability Student	(0.175)	(0.151)	(0.123)	(0.176)	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.120)
01	100	100	100	10.0	10.0	100	100
Obs.	496	496	496	496	496	496	496
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
		Pa	anel B: Ro	le of Stude	ent Ambiti	on	
Info	0.283*	0.384***	0.193*	0.130	0.221	0.221	0.229**
11110	(0.160)	(0.128)	(0.193)	(0.156)	(0.159)	(0.168)	(0.107)
	(0.100)	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.150)	(0.159)	(0.108)	(0.107)
Ambitious Student	0.726***	0.383***	0.377***	0.352***	0.628***	0.564***	0.436***
	(0.138)	(0.117)	(0.0939)	(0.133)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.0942)
	, ,	, ,		, ,	. ,		
Info#	-0.167	-0.141	-0.0859	-0.122	-0.130	-0.0955	-0.108
Ambitious Student	(0.189)	(0.157)	(0.131)	(0.186)	(0.196)	(0.203)	(0.128)
Oha	496	496	496	496	406	496	496
Obs.	490	490	490	490	496	490	490

Note: Table presents the treatment effect estimates based on students' pre-intervention ability (Panel A) and ambition (Panel B). High ability is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a student scored above the median Class 12 score, 0 otherwise. Ambitious is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a student stated that s/he expected to receive an A+/A/A- grade in the course by the end of the term, 0 otherwise. All results are estimated using an Ordinary Least Squares model with controls and cohort-section fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

7 Concluding Discussion

Self-promotion is a pervasive feature of professional life, from job interviews and performance reviews to tenure dossiers, team evaluations, and client-facing roles. While it is often necessary for visibility and advancement, its effectiveness depends not only on who engages in it but also on who evaluates it and the beliefs evaluators bring to the interaction. Prior research documents that men self-promote more frequently and assertively than women, yet much less is known about the evaluative side—how audiences respond, and how these responses are shaped by evaluator identity, social expectations, and attribution processes.

This study provides rare field-experimental evidence on these dynamics. By randomly varying whether students read a brief first-person narrative of a professor's accomplishments before completing SETs, I show that self-promotion generally raises evaluations, but not uniformly. Male students consistently reward self-promoting professors of both genders, with male professors benefiting across a wider set of dimensions. Female students, by contrast, evaluate self-promoting female professors similarly to male students, but show backlash when assessing self-promoting male professors, effectively imposing an out-group penalty. Mechanism analyses suggest that this backlash is strongest when male professors are perceived as structurally advantaged or as succeeding with less effort, and even when they are competent and their self-promotion is framed as informative rather than boastful. Female students also show some backlash when self-promoting female professors are viewed as competent or informative, yet they suggestively reward female professors whose self-promotion appears boastful. These patterns reflect evaluators' attribution processes, showing that the causal interpretation of effort, legitimacy of success, and perceived entitlement systematically condition responses.

The findings advance several theoretical perspectives. First, they refine signaling and impression-management theories by showing that identical signals are filtered through evaluators' social identities and beliefs, making backlash contingent rather than automatic. Second, they extend role-congruity and statistical discrimination frameworks by demonstrating

that audience heterogeneity systematically shapes responses, with penalties emerging when signals are interpreted as amplifying structural advantage or asserting unwarranted entitlement. Third, they highlight the importance of attribution processes in evaluative contexts, showing that beliefs about effort, competence, and the nature of self-promotion mediate audience reactions, revealing overlooked mechanisms of audience heterogeneity. Within the SET literature, these results underscore that evaluations reflect not only teaching quality but also judgments about legitimacy, effort, and fairness.

Practically, the study suggests that self-promotion is not universally beneficial or harmful. For underrepresented groups, including women, self-promotion can help close informational gaps and improve evaluations. For those perceived as structurally privileged, however, identical behaviors can provoke penalties. Organizations aiming to reduce bias should recognize this double-edged nature. Strategies include standardizing information about employee accomplishments, designing evaluation and promotion systems that emphasize substantive contributions over impression management, and implementing bias-awareness interventions to make evaluators reflect on how their beliefs, rather than observable performance alone, shape assessments.

While this study is situated in a single business school in India, the mechanisms are likely to generalize to other organizational contexts. Performance reviews, promotion decisions, and team evaluations in workplaces involve similar dynamics: evaluators interpret signals under bounded attention, influenced by social identity, perceived privilege, and causal attributions regarding effort and competence. Variations in delivery mode, frequency of self-promotion, hierarchical relationships, or cultural context may influence the magnitude of reactions, but the underlying pattern of gendered and attribution-driven evaluation is expected to persist. Future research could examine verbal, stylistic, and situational variations, as well as implicit biases and affective responses, to further unpack how self-promotion interacts with evaluator beliefs across organizational settings.

Overall, the study demonstrates that self-promotion is neither universally effective nor

harmful; its impact depends on the interaction between the sender, the evaluator, and the evaluator's beliefs about structural advantage, effort, competence, and the nature of the signal. By integrating signaling, role-congruity, statistical discrimination, and attribution-process perspectives, these findings offer both theoretical insights and practical guidance for designing more equitable evaluation systems in diverse and hierarchical organizations.

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Table A1: SET Questions and Categorization into Teaching Dimensions

SET Questions	Teaching Dimensions
S1 The lecture was well designed and got me interested in the sub-	Quality of instructional ma-
ject.	terials
S2 The instructor conducted himself/herself in a professional man-	Teaching effectiveness
ner.	
S3 The instructor was knowledgeable about the subject matter of	Teaching effectiveness
the lecture	
S4 The instructor has used appropriate technology to support	Preparation and organiza-
teaching and learning.	tion of class
S5 The teaching methodology was innovative.	Preparation and organiza-
	tion of class
S6 The instructor has shown enthusiasm in teaching.	Teaching effectiveness
S7 The instructor was able to explain concepts well.	Teaching effectiveness
S8 The instructor encouraged me to practice critical thinking.	Teaching effectiveness
S9 The instructor was able to communicate well.	Teaching effectiveness
S10 The instructor was able to contribute well to my intellectual	Teaching effectiveness
development.	
S11 The instructor clearly explained the assessment criteria of the	Clarity of Evaluation Crite-
lecture.	ria
S12 Overall, this was an interesting lecture, and I learned a lot from	Overall an interesting lec-
this course.	ture
S13 Overall, I enjoyed learning from this instructor.	Overall evaluation of in-
	structor

Note: Each of the 13 SET questions (S1-S13) is rated on 1 to 5 scale, with 1 representing "Strongly disagree" to 5 representing "Strongly agree". We find scores on a teaching dimension by taking the average of the scores on all SET questions corresponding to that teaching dimension. Classification of 13 SET questions into different teaching dimensions follows from Boring (2017), MacNell et al. (2015) and Arora and Roy (2025).

Table A2: Treatment Effect on Standardized Scores SETs

Panel A: All Profs									
	(1) Quality	(2) Prep	(3) Effective	(4) Clarity	(5) Lecture	(6) Overall	(7) Average		
Info	0.166** (0.0797)	0.320*** (0.0810)	0.188** (0.0795)	0.0531 (0.0818)	0.122 (0.0797)	0.146* (0.0842)	0.217*** (0.0778)		
Control Mean Obs.	-0.07 496	-0.15 496	-0.09 496	-0.01 496	-0.05 496	-0.06 496	-0.10 496		
	Panel B: Female Profs								
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average		
Info	0.177 (0.108)	0.292*** (0.107)	0.175 (0.108)	-0.0470 (0.0934)	0.190* (0.106)	0.197* (0.113)	0.209** (0.105)		
Control Mean Obs.	0.12 276	0.00 276	0.06 276	0.36 276	0.16 276	0.07 276	0.11 276		
		Panel C	: Male P	rof					
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average		

0.1480.195*0.354*** 0.206 0.02050.0535Info 0.161(0.117)(0.127)(0.119)(0.142)(0.121)(0.129)(0.118)Control Mean -0.31 -0.23 -0.32 -0.35 -0.28-0.49 -0.37 Obs. 220 220 220 220 220 220 220

Note: The dependent variables are standardized SET scores. The table presents the estimated effects of the Info treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control) on six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7), as defined in Equation 1. Estimates are obtained from OLS regressions including student-level covariates and cohort-section fixed effects, with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The Control Mean reports the average standardized SET score for students in the Control group. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A3: Treatment Effect on SETs - OLS without controls

Panel A: All Profs							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	0.157 (0.0982)	0.282*** (0.0829)	0.134** (0.0671)	0.0159 (0.0948)	0.110 (0.104)	0.144 (0.100)	0.149** (0.0674)
Control Mean	3.58	3.52	3.99	3.98	3.49	3.53	3.81
Obs.	496	496	496	496	496	496	496

Panel B: Female Profs

	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	-	0.263**			0.193		
	(0.123)	(0.104)	(0.0868)	(0.103)	(0.129)		(0.0839)
Control Mean	3.79	3.66	4.10	4.37	3.73	3.68	3.97
Obs.	276	276	276	276	276	276	276

Panel C: Male Prof

	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	0.112	0.318**	0.122	0.172	0.0327	0.0389	0.142
	(0.149)	(0.132)	(0.102)	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.103)
Control Mean	3.30	3.33	3.85	3.48	3.18	3.34	3.61
Obs.	220	220	220	220	220	220	220

Note: The table reports the estimated effect of the Info treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control) on six teaching dimensions (Column 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7), as specified in Equation 1. Estimates are based on naive OLS regressions without controls for student characteristics or cohort-section fixed effects, but with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. Control Mean reports average SET scores for students in the Control group. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A4: Treatment Effect on SETs - Ordered Logit with controls

Panel A: All Profs											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)				
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average				
Info	0.380**	0.687***	0.379**	0.0140	0.218	0.267	0.422**				
	(0.176)	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.174)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.164)				
Control Mean	3.58	3.52	3.99	3.98	3.49	3.53	3.81				
Obs.	496	496	496	496	496	496	496				
Panel B: Female Profs											

Panel B: Female Profs

	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	0.405^{*}	0.656***	0.313	-0.242	0.337	0.358	0.380*
	(0.240)	(0.239)	(0.231)	(0.255)	(0.235)	(0.244)	(0.226)
Control Mean	3.79	3.66	4.10	4.37	3.73	3.68	3.97
Obs.	276	276	276	276	276	276	276

Panel C: Male Prof

	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	0.386	0.764***	0.309	0.344	0.0397	0.0699	0.426*
	(0.270)	(0.274)	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.261)	(0.266)	(0.253)
Control Mean	3.30	3.33	3.85	3.48	3.18	3.34	3.61
Obs.	220	220	220	220	220	220	220

Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the Info treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control) on six teaching dimensions (Columns 1-6) and the average SET score (Column 7), as specified in Equation 1. Estimates, not converted to marginal effects, are obtained from an Ordered Logit model with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects, using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The Control Mean indicates average SET scores for students in the Control group. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A5: Role of Professor's Gender in Treatment Effect on SET

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Info	0.142	0.331***	0.125	0.195	0.0290	0.0661	0.152*
	(0.130)	(0.117)	(0.0908)	(0.149)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.0896)
Female Prof	0.513** (0.208)	0.540*** (0.199)	0.176 (0.139)	0.812*** (0.205)	0.395* (0.231)	0.106 (0.239)	0.319** (0.135)
Info# Female Prof	0.0716 (0.174)	-0.0574 (0.152)	0.0282 (0.120)	-0.252 (0.180)	0.203 (0.187)	0.176 (0.191)	0.0216 (0.118)
Control Mean	3.30	3.33	3.85	3.48	3.18	3.34	3.61
Obs.	496	496	496	496	496	496	496

Note: The table reports estimated effects from regressions of six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7) on the *Info* treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control), including its interaction with professor gender (Female Prof dummy = 1 for female professors, 0 for male professors). All models are estimated using OLS with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. Control Mean refers to the average SET scores assigned to male professors in the *Control* group. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A6: Descriptive Statistics on Student Beliefs

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Students	Female Students	Male Students
Male Students	2.43	3.16	2.18
are advantaged	(1.293)	(1.339)	(1.176)
Male Professors	2.88	3.22	2.76
are advantaged	(1.131)	(1.149)	(1.110)
Effort	4.18	4.25	4.17
	(0.731)	(0.742)	(0.728)
Expectation	4.59	4.67	4.55
1	(0.636)	(0.553)	(0.666)
Reality	3.53	3.41	3.61
	(0.984)	(0.965)	(0.968)
Brag	2.18	2.07	2.20
0	(1.045)	(0.921)	(1.077)
Obs.	496	123	359

Note: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of student beliefs across several dimensions, each measured on a 1–5 scale. 'Male students are advantaged' and 'Male professors are advantaged': 1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree. 'Effort exerted for accomplishments': 1 = Low Effort, 5 = High Effort. 'Expectations in teaching' and 'Competence in teaching': 1 = Low Quality, 5 = High Quality. 'Nature of self-promotion': 1 = Highly Informative, 5 = Flaunting/Bragging. Exact survey questions are provided in the Supplementary Material. Column 1 shows beliefs aggregated across all students; Columns 2–3 report results separately for female and male students. These beliefs are averaged across evaluations of both male and female professors in the experiment.

Table A7: Students' Beliefs and Female Professor's Ratings

Beliefs	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Male Prof Advantaged	0.264 (0.443) 92	-0.404 (0.458) 92	0.0254 (0.279) 92	-0.176 (0.290) 92	-0.0502 (0.604) 92	-0.140 (0.546) 92	-0.0563 (0.311) 92
Male Prof Not Advantaged	-0.487 (0.384) 184	-0.00217 (0.317) 184	0.325 (0.275) 184	-0.172 (0.354) 184	-0.110 (0.441) 184	0.156 (0.429) 184	0.128 (0.263) 184
High Effort	-0.326 (0.363) 99	-0.195 (0.354) 99	0.0776 (0.234) 99	0.143 (0.287) 99	-0.114 (0.481) 99	-0.265 (0.494) 99	-0.0315 (0.245) 99
Low Effort	-0.132 (0.424) 177	-0.0876 (0.329) 177	0.206 (0.263) 177	-0.343 (0.338) 177	-0.0171 (0.449) 177	0.299 (0.431) 177	0.0829 (0.256) 177
Competent	-0.529* (0.272) 181	-0.289 (0.259) 181	-0.00442 (0.184) 181	-0.183 (0.272) 181	-0.122 (0.328) 181	0.0287 (0.327) 181	-0.109 (0.176) 181
Not Competent	0.334 (0.550) 95	0.443 (0.426) 95	0.363 (0.329) 95	-0.300 (0.430) 95	-0.163 (0.611) 95	-0.106 (0.537) 95	0.246 (0.322) 95
Brags	0.641 (0.584)	0.381 (0.440)	0.667 (0.433)	-0.577 (0.400)	0.889 (0.563)	1.167** (0.581)	0.581 (0.414)
Informative	97 -0.639** (0.310) 179	97 -0.335 (0.306) 179	97 -0.117 (0.194) 179	97 -0.0772 (0.262) 179	97 -0.504 (0.365) 179	97 -0.638* (0.363) 179	97 -0.257 (0.203) 179

Note: The table reports coefficients on the interaction term between Female Student and the *Info* treatment dummy, capturing whether female students respond differently than male students to self-promotional information when evaluating female professors. These coefficients come from separate models that partition students by their beliefs, using a split at the 50th percentile. For instance, students are classified as perceiving male professors as either advantaged or not advantaged in securing top academic positions. Because the 50th percentile value (e.g., 3 on a 1–5 scale) is shared by many observations, the split does not always yield an exact 50–50 distribution. The same procedure applies to other belief measures: whether professors are seen as achieving success through high versus low effort, whether their teaching competence is appropriate for a top-tier institution, and whether their self-promotion is interpreted as informative versus boastful. In each case, the division is based on the median, though clustering at the median value means the groups are not always perfectly balanced. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A8: Male Profs Perceived as Advantaged and Male Prof Ratings

	H	Panel A: A	Advantage	d			
Beliefs	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Treatment	0.452 (0.385)	0.682** (0.321)	0.426* (0.233)	1.180*** (0.373)	0.831* (0.445)	1.142*** (0.368)	0.612*** (0.220)
Female	-0.0196 (0.448)	-0.354 (0.500)	0.0860 (0.357)	0.678 (0.618)	0.488 (0.450)	0.936** (0.443)	0.152 (0.335)
${\bf Treatment \# Female}$	-0.436	-0.295	-0.734*	-1.265*	-1.026	-2.098***	-0.812**
Obs.	$(0.581) \\ 66$	(0.528) 66	$(0.401) \\ 66$	(0.694) 66	(0.639) 66	$(0.537) \\ 66$	(0.372) 66
	Pai	nel B: No	t Advantas	zed			
Treatment	0.284*	0.328*	0.165	-0.116	0.0492	0.0844	0.162
	(0.170)	(0.170)	(0.136)	(0.208)	(0.200)	(0.201)	(0.130)
Female	-0.000391	0.0457	0.0619	-0.351	0.319	0.0349	0.0405
	(0.329)	(0.314)	(0.208)	(0.366)	(0.348)	(0.324)	(0.224)
Treatment #Female	-0.658	-0.383	-0.151	0.739	-0.808*	-0.505	-0.235
	(0.423)	(0.387)	(0.295)	(0.544)	(0.434)	(0.462)	(0.305)
Obs.	154	154	154	154	154	154	154

Note: The table reports regression estimates for six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7) on the Info treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control), along with its interaction with student gender (Female = 1, Male = 0). Coefficients are estimated separately for students above and below the 50th percentile in their beliefs about whether men have an easier path than women in Indian higher education to becoming faculty at top business schools, rated on a 1–5 scale (higher values = greater agreement). Because many students cluster at the median, the split is not always an exact 50–50 division. All models use OLS with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A9: Professor's Perceived Effort and Male Prof Ratings

	Pa	nel A: Hig	h Compete	ence			
Beliefs	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
Treatment	0.229	0.243	0.176	-0.206	-0.0386	0.0580	0.136
Treatment	(0.279)	(0.263)	(0.203)	(0.354)	(0.314)	(0.342)	(0.203)
Female	-0.0609	0.364	0.123	-0.0666	-0.318	0.222	0.105
	(0.617)	(0.554)	(0.348)	(0.504)	(0.618)	(0.617)	(0.393)
Treatment#Female	-0.672	-0.249	-0.0667	0.462	0.219	-0.539	-0.115
	(0.742)	(0.605)	(0.422)	(0.702)	(0.673)	(0.706)	(0.456)
Obs.	73	73	73	73	73	73	73
		Panel B:	Low Effort	-			
Treatment	0.245	0.469***	0.145	0.195	0.211	0.389*	0.230*
	(0.189)	(0.169)	(0.137)	(0.213)	(0.221)	(0.204)	(0.132)
Female	-0.279	-0.284	-0.147	-0.0996	0.174	0.174	-0.125
	(0.244)	(0.275)	(0.172)	(0.319)	(0.282)	(0.277)	(0.177)
Treatment#Female	-0.459	-0.452	-0.386	0.0306	-0.930**	-1.280***	-0.480*
	(0.342)	(0.365)	(0.259)	(0.483)	(0.428)	(0.395)	(0.256)
Obs.	146	146	146	146	146	146	146

Note: The table reports regression estimates for six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7) on the Info treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control), along with its interaction with student gender (Female = 1, Male = 0). Coefficients are estimated separately for students above and below the 50th percentile in their beliefs about the effort professors invested to reach their current level of accomplishment, rated on a 1–5 scale (higher values = greater effort). Because many students cluster at the median, the split is not always an exact 50–50 division. All models use OLS with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table A10: Professor's Perceived Competence and Male Prof Ratings

	Pane	el A: High	1 Compete	nce			
Beliefs	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average
T	0.000	0.00=*	0.00=*	0.00	0.104	0.000	1 0 050*
Treatment	0.303	0.387*	0.207*	0.335	0.104	0.289	0.250*
	(0.207)	(0.205)	(0.119)	(0.282)	(0.245)	(0.247)	(0.138)
Female	0.0106	0.0915	0.00301	0.367	0.273	0.307	0.0894
	(0.294)	(0.435)	(0.158)	(0.404)	(0.354)	(0.275)	(0.200)
Treatment#Female	-0.794	-0.642	-0.245	0.147	-0.656	-0.679	-0.383
	(0.478)	(0.504)	(0.204)	(0.522)	(0.606)	(0.417)	(0.268)
Obs.	99	99	99	99	99	99	99
	Don	ol D. Low	Competer	200			
m			-		0.0100	0.000	1 0 0001
Treatment	0.0199	0.378**	0.0202	-0.120	0.0182	0.226	0.0801
	(0.220)	(0.171)	(0.165)	(0.269)	(0.254)	(0.192)	(0.142)
Female	-0.365	-0.316	-0.0763	-0.464	-0.178	0.240	-0.149
1 ciriaic	(0.248)	(0.281)	(0.214)	(0.376)	(0.293)	(0.290)	(0.181)
	(-/	(-)	` /	()	(/	(/	
Treatment #Female	0.120	0.180	0.0932	0.601	-0.140	-0.604*	0.0761
	(0.326)	(0.344)	(0.282)	(0.530)	(0.399)	(0.355)	(0.247)
Obs.	121	121	121	121	121	121	121

Note: The table reports regression estimates for six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7) on the *Info* treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control), along with its interaction with student gender (Female = 1, Male = 0). Coefficients are estimated separately for students above and below the 50th percentile in their beliefs about professors' teaching competence, rated on a 1–5 scale in terms of suitability for a top business school. Because many students cluster at the median, the split is not always an exact 50–50 division. All models use OLS with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. * p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05, **** p < 0.01

Table A11: Perceived Nature of Self-promotion and Male Prof Ratings

Panel A: Brags a lot											
Beliefs	Quality	Prep	Effective	Clarity	Lecture	Overall	Average				
Treatment	-0.0131	0.337	-0.0711	-0.318	-0.309	0.0507	-0.0318				
	(0.246)	(0.203)	(0.193)	(0.279)	(0.271)	(0.269)	(0.177)				
Female	-0.164	-0.165	-0.0557	-0.174	0.0523	-0.0405	-0.0804				
	(0.396)	(0.415)	(0.319)	(0.423)	(0.454)	(0.460)	(0.318)				
Treatment#Female	-0.376	-0.0978	-0.214	0.185	-0.109	-0.414	-0.185				
	(0.534)	(0.468)	(0.389)	(0.553)	(0.561)	(0.530)	(0.381)				
Obs.	97	97	97	97	97	97	97				
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			ite Informa								
Treatment	0.537**	0.536***	0.393***	0.522**	0.612***	0.585***	0.468***				
	(0.209)	(0.193)	(0.133)	(0.247)	(0.227)	(0.223)	(0.135)				
Female	-0.221	-0.230	-0.00127	0.0159	0.163	0.350	-0.0125				
1 cmaic	(0.273)	(0.337)	(0.187)	(0.380)	(0.310)	(0.277)	(0.196)				
	(3.2.3)	(3.331)	(3.201)	(3.300)	(5.510)	(5.211)	(3.200)				
${\bf Treatment \# Female}$	-0.613*	-0.505	-0.403*	0.217	-1.000**	-1.334***	-0.505**				
	(0.336)	(0.390)	(0.240)	(0.499)	(0.410)	(0.379)	(0.234)				
Obs.	123	123	123	123	123	123	123				

Note: The table reports regression estimates for six teaching dimensions (Columns 1–6) and the average SET score (Column 7) on the *Info* treatment dummy (1 = Info, 0 = Control), along with its interaction with student gender (Female = 1, Male = 0). Coefficients are estimated separately for students above and below the 50th percentile in beliefs about whether self-promotion is interpreted as informative versus boastful. Because many students cluster at the median, the split is not always an exact 50–50 division. All models use OLS with controls for student characteristics and cohort-section fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01