The Impact of Early Exposure to Discriminatory Institutions on Mortality and Later Life Outcomes in Afghanistan

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Abstract

We study the impact of exposure to gender-based discriminatory institutions on child mortality, women's attitude to domestic violence, their autonomy and labour market participation as well as men's attitude to domestic violence in Afghanistan. In particular, we use the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a natural experiment to understand the effect of the laws and regulations which aimed to severely curtail the rights and mobility of women and girls on the aforementioned outcomes. We find that women who were adolescents during the Taliban regime in Taliban administered provinces show greater acceptability to wife-beating relative to their counterparts in provinces governed by the Northern Alliance, the chief opponent alliance against the Talibans. The likelihood of facing spousal violence also appears to be higher among these women in some situations. However, we do not find any significant effect of the Taliban regime on current decision-making ability and labour market participation of women. In general, the attitude of men who were adolescents during the Taliban rule to wife-beating does not appear to be affected by the regime. However, we find that once we account for the heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance, men who were exposed to the Taliban regime during adolescence are more likely to justify wife-beating relative to their counterparts who grew up in provinces governed by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the most well-known and powerful commander of the Northern Alliance. We also find that under-five mortality rate is higher for children in Taliban administered provinces who were born during the years the Taliban governed and especially for male children. These results do not appear to be driven by pre-existing trends in attitudes towards domestic violence or child mortality. These results indicate the importance of institutions in shaping gender attitudes and how restrictions of rights and mobility of women can also have detrimental effect on the survival of children.

Keywords: Wife-beating; child mortality; autonomy; women; Afghanistan
JEL Codes: J12, J13, J16

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1 Introduction

Afghanistan has been categorized as one of the most fragile conflict affected states (World Bank, 2016). The country has been in constant conflict starting with the Soviet invasion in 1979. Wars fought by local warlords called *mujahideen* against the Soviets resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. However, the period after the withdrawal of the Soviets was marked by factional fighting between the different warlords and the interim governments were often short-lived. The emergence of the *Taliban* as an important faction in the Afghan Civil War took place in 1994 with the attack and capture of the southern city of Kandahar. The word Taliban is the plural of the word *Talib* which means student in Pashto. Most of the supporters and members of the Taliban were students educated in religious schools of Afghanistan and neighbouring countries. The Taliban successfully took control of Kabul in 1996 and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. A totalitarian government was established based on the strict interpretation of the *Sharia* law ("Afghan Taliban", 2018). The Taliban governed Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 and during this period controlled roughly 75% of the country's territory, consisting of largely the western, central and southern parts of the country. The remaining parts of the country were controlled by warlords who were opposed to the Taliban. Together, they formed a unified military front against the Taliban called United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, also called the Northern Alliance.

One of the prominent characteristics of the Taliban regime were the laws governing the status of women. Girls older than eight years were prohibited from being in contact with males who were not their relatives (Griffin, 2001). Some of the restrictions imposed on women include prohibition on travelling outside the home without a male relative and without wearing a *burqa*; working outside the home; seeking education in schools and universities; being treated by male doctors; participating in sports; gathering for festivals; appearing on media outlets; riding bicycles even with male relatives; standing on balconies and even laughing and talking loudly. Failure to comply with the dress-codes and appearing outside the home without a male relative were punishable offenses. Restrictions were also imposed on men's dress code and conduct. However, they appear to be less restrictive in curtailing men's rights and mobility relative to women. The Talibans who were largely Pashtuns and Sunni also continued discrimination against other Afghan ethnic groups, predominantly the Hazaras who were Shi'a Muslims (Chiovenda, 2014).

In this paper we study the effect of the Taliban regime on a number of outcomes. These outcomes include child mortality, women's attitudes to domestic violence, experience of domestic violence as well as their autonomy in terms of intra-household decision

making and labour market participation. We also examine whether the Taliban regime impacted men's attitude to domestic violence. We use the Taliban regime as a natural experiment in a difference-in-difference estimation framework to examine the effect that highly discriminatory governmental institutions can have on women, men as well as children. We use data from the Afghanistan Demographic and Health Surveys (AfDHS) 2015 for our analysis.

For child mortality outcomes, we consider the children born during the years the Taliban governed in Taliban administered provinces as the treatment group; children born in provinces dominated by the Northern Alliance or in provinces that were dominated by the Taliban but not when the Talibans were in power are considered the control group. We find that the probability of dying within the age of five (indicator of under-five mortality) is higher for children in our treatment group relative to the control group. That is, the risk of dying within five years of life is higher for children born during the years the Taliban governed in Taliban administered provinces relative to those administered by the Northern Alliance. However, we do not find any significant effect of the Taliban regime on the probability of deaths within the first month of life (indicator of neonatal mortality) and first year of life (infant mortality). These results also appear to be driven by male children. We investigate whether Taliban governed provinces had higher mortality rates for children relative to provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. We find no such evidence through a falsification exercise when we falsely attribute years before the Taliban established their government to Taliban governance.

Some studies have documented the impact of conflict and genocide on domestic violence and women's bargaining power (La Mattina, 2017) as well as the effect of exposure to conflict in childhood on attitudes to domestic violence later in life (La Mattina and Shemyakina, 2017). Other studies find that exposure to gender-sensitive curriculum in school among adolescents results in support for greater gender equality (Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran, 2018). These studies, therefore, indicate that exposure to gender-inclusive or discriminatory interventions can have impact on gender attitudes later in life. In this paper, we examine whether women and men who were exposed to the Taliban regime during their adolescence show any effect on their attitude to spousal violence, that is wife-beating. Following Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran (2018) we have taken adolescence (twelve to sixteen years) as the period when one's moral attitudes are more likely to form, are still malleable; but when one is old enough to reason/understand one's environment, relative to when one is younger. Here, the treatment group are men and women who were between twelve and sixteen years of age during 1996 to 2001 and were subjected to the laws and regulations of the Taliban government and the control group consists of those

who were younger than twelve when the Taliban governed, or lived in provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. We find that women who were adolescents during the Taliban rule are more likely to justify wife-beating, especially if the wife is found to neglect children, she goes out without asking permission and burns food relative to those who had not yet attained adolescence at that time in Taliban administered provinces relative to Northern Alliance governed provinces. A concern could be that provinces that came to be governed by the Taliban had higher acceptability to wife-beating than provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. To address this concern, we compare the likelihood of justifying wife-beating among individuals who were older than sixteen years when the Taliban first established their government in 1996 to those who were younger than twelve (our control group) between Taliban and Northern Alliance governed provinces. The assumption is that if it is the Taliban regime that had caused a change in attitude towards spousal violence during one's adolescence, then we should not be able to find any significant difference between individuals who were older (their attitudes towards domestic violence is likely to have already formed) with those who were younger during the years the Taliban governed between these two types of provinces. We find that it is indeed the case. Therefore, pre-exiting attitudes towards wife-beating is unlikely to be driving these results. However, we do not find any significant effect of the Taliban rule on men's attitudes to wife-beating. Labour market participation and autonomy is found to be low for women belonging to our treatment group. However, we find that labour market participation and autonomy of women in terms of intra-household decision making already appears to be low in Taliban governed provinces for cohorts of individuals who were old enough to be influenced by the Taliban's policies regarding the status of women. Therefore, it is difficult to attribute the Taliban regime as the cause of these outcomes for women.

Two of the prominent leaders of the Northern Alliance were Abdul Rashid Dostum and Ahmad Shah Massoud. We account for differences in the leadership of the Northern Alliance by comparing the Taliban administered provinces with those governed by Massoud in our estimations, in place of all provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. This is because, unlike Dostum who frequently had to flee the country on account of Taliban invasion of the regions controlled by him, Massoud never left the country. Now, there were no legal barriers to women's participation in the labour market, seeking education and government-imposed dress codes for women in the provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. Therefore, it is possible that provinces governed by Massoud faced greater continuity in policies (in particular, those concerning the status of women) relative to the provinces governed by Dostum. We find that although our results on under-five mortality

among children continue to remain unchanged despite accounting for heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance; we now find that neonatal mortality among male children is found to be higher among those who were born when the Taliban governed in Taliban administered provinces relative to those governed by Massoud. We also find that our results on the attitudes of women to wife-beating are somewhat strengthened if one compares women who were adolescents during the Taliban rule to those who were adolescents in the provinces administered by Massoud (in place of all provinces governed by the Northern Alliance). Interestingly, men who were adolescents during the Taliban rule in Taliban administered provinces are found to be more supportive of wife-beating if the wife goes out without seeking permission when they are compared to those in the provinces administered by Massoud. Lastly, labour market participation of women are also found to be lower among women who were adolescents during the Taliban rule in Taliban administered provinces when one compares them to those in Massoud's provinces rather than when one compares them to those in all provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. Therefore, accounting for heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance can strengthen or reveal important impacts of the Taliban rule.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the related literature and the contribution of this paper in the context of the existing literature; Section 3 describes the data source and provides the summary statistics; Section 4 describes the estimation framework; Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 concludes.

2 Related Literature

There is now a growing body of literature in economics on Afghanistan. However, relative to many other developing countries, it still continues to be understudied. Most of the studies on Afghanistan examine the impact of conflict and the impact of aid on poverty, standard of living, attitude to government, future violence using survey data or field experiments (Floreani et. al, 2016; Beath et. al, 2012; Bove and Gavrilova, 2014; Lyall, Zhou and Imai, 2019). Other studies have investigated the impact of violence on firm operations (Blumenstock et. al, 2019) and individual financial decision making (Blumenstock et. al, 2019, 2015). Some studies have also examined how community monitoring can improve infrastructure building (Berman et. al, 2017) and how default assignment affect saving behaviour in Afghanistan using field experiments (Blumenstock et. al, 2018). On the other hand, the World Bank (2016) notes large costs due to the exclusion of women from economic activities. Therefore, some anti-poverty programmes have attempted to raise the economic participation and decision-making power of women

in Afghanistan. Beath et. al (2013) conducts a randomized field experiment in Afghan villages and finds that mandating female participation in development programme is likely to raise women's income generating capabilities and mobility; although it does not appear to raise intra-household decision making or attitude to women in general in society. Bedoya et. al (2019) find that randomly assigning households to treatment under the anti-poverty programme Targeting the Ultra Poor Programme increased women's empowerment (among other outcomes) in the treatment households relative to control households.

However, it is to be noted that all of the aforementioned studies, including the studies that specifically examine women's well-being are for the period after 2001, that is, after the fall of the Taliban government owing to the US invasion of Afghanistan. Further, few studies specifically examine the well-being of Afghan women. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by studying how extreme forms of gender discrimination aimed at restricting the rights and mobility of women through law can influence well-being of individuals years after such laws and governance structure have been abolished. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that aims to understand how exposure to the Taliban regime during the early years of one's life, such as, infancy and adolescence can affect mortality and attitudes to spousal violence among adults respectively. Also, this paper adds to the growing literature on Afghanistan in economics.

3 Data

The data for this study comes from the Afghanistan Demographic and Health Surveys (AfDHS) conducted between June 2015 and February 2016. Ever married women and men who were 15 and 49 years old at the time of the survey have been included. The survey provides information on demographic characteristics such as an individual's age, ethnicity, province of residence, whether the one is residing in rural or urban area, asset ownership by the respondent's household, years of education, current marital status, whether the women respondent's father ever beat her mother, birth history (for women) as well as attitudes to wife-beating, actual experience of domestic violence (for women). While collecting information on domestic violence, surveyors note the presence of others apart from the female respondent while these questions have been asked. This is because answers to these questions may be biased when others are present. However, this concern primarily lies when these questions are asked to female respondents. The survey also collects information on whether a woman respondent was working and has been working during the last 12 months and who decides whether she can seek healthcare, make large

household purchases and visit her friends/relatives. The retrospective birth histories contain information on births to the woman respondent, whether it was a single birth, the sex of the child, the year of birth, whether the child is alive and if dead, then the age of death is recorded as well.

3.1 Outcome Variables

Retrospective birth histories help us to compute the probability of death within the first month, first year and first five years of life. We consider the probability of death within the first month, first year and five years of life as indicators for neonatal, infant and under-five mortality among children respectively. In our analysis, we consider all births upto the year 2000. Therefore, we include all children born between 1977 and 2000 in our estimation sample for analysis. We include births only upto the year 2000 because the Taliban government was removed from power by US invasion in 2001 and an interim government was set up under the leadership of Hamid Karzai with significant military assistance from the US. Subsequently a new constitution was adopted and a democratically elected government was sworn in in 2004. Limiting the sample to births upto 2000 enables us to include to children who have been exposed to atleast a year of Taliban governance and at the same time prevents us from taking into account the impact of a democratic government and a new constitution on mortality outcomes in erstwhile Taliban provinces.

The outcome variables for child mortality are dummy variables that assume the value 1 if the child has died within the first month, year or five years of life; and is 0 otherwise. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for these outcomes for all children. We find that, on an average, 4% children have died within the first month, 9% children within the first year and 11% children within five years of life in the sample. In particular, with respect to under-five mortality, this implies that 1 in 9 children have died within the age of five years in the estimation sample[1].

We also consider attitudes to wife-beating among both women and men as outcome variables. These variables can capture women's empowerment and attitudes to women, in general, in a society. The survey presents female and male respondents with several

[1]This figure is close to, but lower than the figure for under-five mortality among children in Afghanistan provided by the United Nations Population Division which is 1 in 6-7 children have died by the age of five years between 1990-2000 (United Nations Population Division, 2019). As child mortality estimates from the DHS data rely on mother's retrospective birth history, it is assumed that female adult mortality is not high or is uncorrelated with children's mortality in order for accurate measurement of mortality among children. However, as Afghanistan records high rates of female adult mortality, the resultant child mortality rates could be understated (Afghanistan Demographic and Health Survey Report, 2015).

circumstances under which they might feel that wife-beating is justified. They are all dummy variables that assume the value 1 if the individual feels that wife-beating is justified under a particular circumstance and is 0 otherwise. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for these variables. We find that 67% women feel that wife-beating is justified if the wife goes out without seeking permission of the husband; 49% if the wife neglects the children; 61% if the wife argues with the husband; 35% if she refuses sex and 20% if she burns food. On the other hand, 62% men feel that wife-beating is justified if the wife goes out without seeking permission of the husband; 31% if the wife neglects the children; 44% if the wife argues with the husband; 20% if she refuses sex and 8% if she burns food. Table 2 shows that although, on an average, there is large support for wife-beating under different circumstances; a greater proportion of women appear to justify wife-beating relative to men for any given circumstance. In addition to attitudes to wife-beating, we consider actual experience of spousal violence among ever-married women a outcome variables as well. These variables are dummy variables that assume the value 1 if the woman has experienced a particular form of spousal violence and is 0 otherwise. We find that 36% women report that their husbands have pushed them; 3% report being strangled; 3% report that their husbands have used weapons against them and 15% report being hurt by their husbands while pregnant (Table 2). For both attitudes to wife-beating and actual experience of spousal violence for women respondents, we restrict the sample to include only those women for whom no adult (that is, husband, other adult males and females) from the household were present when these questions were asked. This is to ensure that respondents are likely to provide their true opinions and answers to these questions, which can otherwise be influenced by the presence of other adults. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for different autonomy variables for women as well as their labour market participation. The autonomy variables are dummy variable that take the value 1 if the woman respondent can alone decide to seek healthcare for herself, make large household purchases and to meet her friends/relatives and is 0 otherwise. The labour market participation variable takes the value 1 if the woman has participated in the labour market during the past 12 months of the survey and is 0 otherwise. We find that around 44% women can decide on their own whether to seek healthcare for themselves; 42% can decide on their own if they have to make large household purchases and 52% can themselves decide whether to meet their friends/relatives (Table 2). However, only 13% women are found to have worked in the 12 months preceding the survey (Table 2).

3.2 Explanatory Variables

We first consider the explanatory variables for child mortality outcomes. Here, we are interested in comparing the probability of dying within the first month, year and five years of life between children born during the years the Taliban governed and those born before that between the provinces governed by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Therefore, the key explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between whether a child was born during the years the Taliban governed and whether the province was governed by the Taliban. Figure 1 shows the distribution of provinces between the Taliban administration and those under the Northern Alliance [2]. Now, mortality outcomes are also influenced by other factors - such as rural or urban residence, household wealth, sex of the child, mother's age at the birth of the child, whether the birth is a singleton, birth order, parental education and ethnicity. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these variables. We find that 28% births took place during the years that the Taliban governed in Taliban dominated provinces. 75% births happened in rural households; 65% households belong to the middle to poorest wealth quintiles. 46% births are found to be female; 98% births were singleton and the average birth order is 2.8. The average age of the mother at birth is 22.67 years; the average number of years of education for the mother is 0.5 years and that of the father is 3.8 years. The Pashtuns comprise the largest ethnic group followed by the Tajiks. We find that 37% of the children were Pashtuns, 36% were Tajiks, 10% were Hazara and 8% were Uzbek.

We now consider the explanatory variables for attitudes to wife-beating, experience of spousal violence, autonomy and labour market participation of women. Here, we are interested in comparing these outcomes between those who were adolescents vis-a-vis those who were too young during the years the Taliban governed between Taliban and Northern Alliance dominated provinces. Following Dhar, Jain and Jayachandran (2018) we have taken adolescence (twelve to sixteen years) as the period when one's moral attitudes are more likely to form relative to when one is younger. Individuals who were twelve to sixteen years old during 1996-2001 are twenty-six to thirty-five year old during the time of the survey in 2015. Hence, we are interested in comparing the aforementioned outcomes between those who are 26-35 years old at present vis-a-vis those who are younger than 26 years between Taliban and Northern Alliance dominated provinces. In addition to exposure to the Taliban rule, other factors are also likely to shape an individual's

[2] We consider a province to be Taliban administered based on the political status of the province in the Fall of 1996. In reality, the Talibans engaged in large-scale incursion of the provinces administered by the Northern Alliance; thereby capturing territories and bringing them under their direct control. However, we focus on those provinces that the Taliban initially captured to set up their government in 1996 as the Taliban provinces as they are likely to have the largest exposure to the Taliban administration.

attitude to wife-beating, experience of spousal violence, autonomy and labour market participation. Table 2 provides the summary statistics of these variables as well. We find that 22% women are between 26-35 year old at present and are from erstwhile Taliban dominated provinces. 76% households are in rural area; 64% households belong to the middle to poorest wealth quintiles. The average number of years of education of the women is 1.2 years and that of their husbands is 4.8 years. 94% women currently live with their husbands. In general, the average age of the women and that of their husbands in the sample is 30 and 36 years respectively. 26% women report that their father had beaten their mother. We find that the distribution of different ethnicities in Table 2 is largely similar to that in Table 1.

4 Estimation Framework

Here we outline our estimation framework.

4.1 Child Mortality Outcomes

The estimation equation for child mortality is as follows:

$$y_{ipt} = \alpha + \beta_o TalibP_{ip} + \beta_1 TalibY_{it} + \beta_2 TalibP_{ip} * TalibY_{it} + \gamma X_{ipt} + YOB_{it} + \delta_{ip} + \epsilon_{ipt} \quad .....(1)$$

Here, the outcome variable of interest is y_{ipt} which assumes the value 1 if the child i born in province p in year t is dead within the first month, year of five years of life and 0 otherwise in alternative specifications. $TalibP_{ip}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if child i is born in a province p that was administered by the Taliban; $TalibY_{it}$ is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if child i is born in a year t which was during the time the Taliban governed (1996-2001). The variable of interest is the interaction term $TalibP_{ip} * TalibY_{it}$. The coefficient of interest is, thus, β_2 which captures the difference in the probability of dying within the first month, year and five years of life between children born during the years the Taliban governed and those born before that between the provinces governed by the Taliban and the those by the Northern Alliance.X_{ipt} includes time variant and invariant controls that can also affect mortality outcomes. These include whether the household is in rural area, dummies for household wealth quintile, years of education of the mother and father, mother's age at the birth of the child, dummy for whether the child is female, dummy for whether the birth is a singleton, child's birth order, dummy for ethnic groups. YOB_{it} represent year of birth fixed effects for child i born in year t. We include these to control for overall macroeconomic trends that could

affect all children and their survival in a given year. δ_{ip} are province fixed effects which are included to control for time-invariant socio-cultural differences across provinces that can affect child mortality, independent of whether the province was administered by the Taliban or not. ϵ_{ipt} are regression disturbance terms which we cluster at the PSU level.

Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that in the absence of the Taliban governance, child mortality outcomes would evolve similarly between provinces that were governed by the Taliban and those by the Northern Alliance. One way that we could possibly check whether this is likely to be the case, is by comparing the mortality outcomes of children between the Taliban administered provinces and those by the Northern Alliance by assuming that the Taliban started governing during the years when they actually did not govern. In other words, we can expose children to "false" years of Taliban governance and see whether Taliban administered provinces had different mortality rates relative to Northern Alliance province even before the Taliban started governing. In particular, if we find that mortality rates among children born during the Taliban governance are higher relative to those born before between the Taliban and Northern Alliance provinces and if we also find that children already were at the risk of dying in Taliban provinces even during the "false" years of Taliban rule; then it would be impossible to conclude that the Taliban rule has caused higher mortality rate among children.

4.2 Women's and Men's Outcomes

The estimation equation for women's and men's outcomes is as follows:

$y_{ip} = \alpha + \beta_o TalibP_p + \beta_1(26-35Yrs)_i + \beta_2 TalibP_p * (26-35Yrs)_i + \beta_3(Above35Yrs)_i + \beta_4 TalibP_p * (Above35Yrs)_i + \gamma X_{ip} + \delta_p + \epsilon_{ip}$ .....(2)

Here, y_{ip} indicates the outcome variable for individual i in province p. The outcome variables are attitudes to wife-beating (for both women and men), experience of spousal violence, autonomy and labour market participation of women in alternative specifications. $TalibP_p$ is a dummy variable which assumes the value 1 if the individual i belongs to a province p which was a Taliban administered province and is 0 otherwise. $(26-35Yrs)_i$ is also a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the individual i is 26-35 years old at the time of the survey (that is, 12-16 years old between 1996-2001 when the Taliban governed) and is 0 otherwise. We are interested in the interaction term $TalibP_p * (26-35Yrs)_i$ as it captures the difference between individuals who are between 26-35 years and those younger than 26 years (so had not attained adolescence during the Taliban rule) between the Taliban and Northern Alliance administered provinces. Therefore, β_2 is the coefficient of interest. We also include additional controls that are likely

to influence our outcome variables of interest and this is denoted by X_{ip}. The vector of controls include whether the respondent resides in rural area, dummies for ethnicity as different ethnic groups may have different cultural norms regarding our outcome variables, dummies for household wealth quintiles, the woman's and her partner's years of education, whether the woman is currently living with her husband, current ages of the woman and her husband and whether the woman's father ever beat her mother as prior exposure to wife-beating may alter an individual's attitude to wife-beating irrespective of whether she was exposed to the Taliban administration. δ_p are province fixed effects to capture time-invariant differences across provinces independent of exposure to the Taliban governance. Lastly, ϵ_{ip} are regression disturbance terms that we cluster at the PSU level.

Once again, our identification of the impact of the Taliban regime on the aforementioned outcomes lies on the assumption that in the absence of the Taliban regime, our outcome variables would evolve similarly between provinces that were governed by the Taliban and those by the Northern Alliance. One possible way to examine if this is likely to be the case, we can compare these outcomes for individuals who were too old for their attitudes and schooling to be affected by the Taliban government's laws and regulations with individuals who were too young during the Taliban regime between the Taliban and Northern Alliance provinces and see if there are any systematic differences between these groups. The hypothesis is that if the Taliban regime had caused any change in our outcome variables, then individuals who were too old and those who were too young during the Taliban regime between the Taliban and Northern Alliance should not have any systematic difference in these outcomes. Therefore, in our regression specification we include the variables $(Above35Yrs)_i$ and $TalibP_p * (Above35Yrs)_i$ where the former is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual i in our sample is older than 35 years at present and 0 otherwise. We would be interested to see whether β_4 is statistically insignificant. It can then provide us with some suggestive evidence about the validity of our identification strategy.

5 Results

Here we discuss the results for our various outcomes.

5.1 Child Mortality Outcomes

Table 3 presents the results for child mortality outcomes. Panel A reports the results for all children whereas Panels B and C report the results for male and female children respectively. From Panel A of Table 3 we see that children born during the years of Taliban rule have a higher probability of dying by the age of 5 relative to those born earlier between Taliban and Northern Alliance administered provinces. In particular, the probability of dying by the age of five is 1.6% higher for children born during the Taliban rule in provinces administered by the Taliban. However, we do not find any significant impact of Taliban rule on the probability of dying by the first month and year of life. Panels B and C show that the results reported in Panel A are largely driven by male children.

We also conduct a falsification exercise where we assign children born during 1991-1995 as children born during the Taliban rule. In other words, these are "false" years of Taliban rule. We report these findings in Panel D of Table 3. We find that the probability of dying does not appear to be significantly different for children born during the "false" Taliban years in the Taliban administered provinces relative to those administered by the Northern Alliance in terms of all of the indicators of neonatal, infant and under-five mortality.

5.2 Women's and Men's Outcomes

Tables 4 and 5 report the findings for women's outcomes. In particular, Table 4 reports the results on attitudes to wife-beating among women. The first row of Table 4 reports our coefficient of interest. We find that women who were adolescents during the Taliban rule are more likely to justify wife-beating relative to women who were too young during the Taliban rule in Taliban administered provinces relative to Northern Alliance governed provinces in some circumstances. In particular, women exposed to the Taliban governance during their adolescence are more likely to think that wife-beating is justified if the wife goes out without seeking permission from the husband by nearly 3 percentage points, neglects the child by nearly 5 percentage points and burns food by 2 percentage points. Relative to their respective means, this represents an increase in justification of wife-beating by 4% for the situation of wife going out without seeking permission, 10% each for the situations where the wife neglects the children and she burns food. The second row of Table 4 shows that there appears to be no significant difference between women who were past their adolescence and those who were too young during the Taliban rule in the Taliban administered province relative to provinces administered by the Northern

Alliance. This provides some suggestive evidence that Taliban administered provinces are unlikely to have higher acceptability to wife-beating in the first place.

Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for experience of spousal violence among women. The first row provides the coefficient of interest and the second row provides suggestive evidence of whether women in Taliban administered provinces are more likely to face spousal violence relative to provinces governed by the Northern Alliance in the first place. From the second row in Panel A of Table 5, we do not find that there are any significant differences between women who were past their adolescence and those who were too young during the Taliban rule in the Taliban administered province relative to provinces administered by the Northern Alliance in terms of various indicators of spousal violence. The first row shows that women exposed to the Taliban rule during their adolescence are more likely to report that they had been strangled by their husband by 1.4 percentage points, their husband had used a weapon by 1.4 percentage points and they have been hurt by their husbands while pregnant by nearly 3 percentage points.

Panel B of Table 5 reports the results on autonomy and labour market participation of women. Our coefficient of interest are reported in the first row. The second row here shows that women who were past their adolescence during the Taliban rule are less likely to be able seek healthcare for themselves, to decide to make large household purchases, to visit friends/relatives and they are also less likely to be working during the 12 months preceding the survey; relative to women who were too young during the Taliban rule between the Taliban and Northern Alliance administered provinces. In other words, it is possible that women in Taliban administered provinces had lower decision-making power and were also less likely to be working in the first place. Therefore, it is not possible for us to conclude that the Taliban governance has an impact on these outcome variables for women.

Table 6 reports the results for justification of wife-beating among men. The first row of Table 6 reports our coefficient of interest. The second row shows us that men who were already past adolescence during the Taliban rule are unlikely to be significantly different from men who were too young in Taliban provinces relative to provinces administered by the Northern Alliance in terms of justification of wife-beating under various circumstances (except for the case of when the wife burns the food). The first row shows us that there appears to be no significant impact of the Taliban rule on men who were exposed to the regime during their adolescence on their attitude to wife-beating for most circumstances and we are unable to conclude that the Taliban rule had an impact on the attitude to wife-beating in the circumstance of when the wife burns food among these men.

5.3 Heterogeneity among Northern Alliance Leadership

We also study the effect of heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance. In particular, we are interested in examining whether differences in the leadership of Dostum and Massoud, two prominent leaders of the Northern Alliance can influence our outcome variables. The reason we analyse any possible heterogeneity is because provinces governed by Dostum were frequently attacked by the Taliban; as a result of which he had to leave the country on several occasions. On the other hand, Massoud provided a stronger resistance to Taliban attacks and never left Afghanistan during the years the Taliban governed much of the country. Therefore, it is possible that there was relatively greater continuity in policies concerning women's access to paid work, education, healthcare and mobility in general relative to provinces governed by Dostum. Therefore, we seek to compare our outcome variables between Taliban and Massoud administered provinces and Dostum and Massoud administered provinces to take into account the possible heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance.

Table 7 reports the results on mortality among children. For ease of exposition, we report the results on mortality separately for male and female children here; instead of all children together. Panel A reports the results for male children; while Panel B for female children. The first row in each of the panels report our coefficients of interest here. From Panel A of Table 7 we find that the probability of dying within the first month of life is higher for children born during the years the Taliban governed (relative to those born earlier) in Taliban administered provinces relative to provinces administered by Massoud for male children. Comparing this result with the findings for male children in Panel B of Table 3, we see that accounting for heterogeneity in the provinces administered by different Northern Alliance leaders and comparing our outcomes relative to Massoud administered provinces rather than Northern Alliance administered provinces is possibly the reason why we see significant effects on indicators of neonatal mortality for male children in Table 7 relative to Table 3. However, taking into account the heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance does not appear to have any significant impact on under-five mortality for male children. Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of female children. We see that for all indicators of mortality among female children, our results continue to be similar to those in Panel C of Table 3.

Table 8 reports the effect of the Taliban regime on wife-beating attitudes among women (in Panel A) and men (Panel B). The first row in each of the panels are the coefficients of interest. Comparing the coefficients in the first row of Panel A of Table 8 with that of Table 4, we see that when we compare women in the Taliban administered provinces to those in provinces governed by Massoud (as opposed to all provinces governed

by the Northern Alliance), our results on women's attitude to wife-beating not only continue to hold; but the coefficients are slightly larger in magnitude as well. Interestingly, when we now compare men in the Taliban administered provinces to those in provinces governed by Massoud (as opposed to all provinces governed by the Northern Alliance), we see that men who were exposed to the Taliban rule during their adolescence (relative to men who were too young) are more likely to justify wife-beating if the wife goes out without seeking permission relative their counterparts in Massoud administered provinces by nearly 5 percentage points (Panel B of Table 8). This is in contrast to our findings in Table 6. Further, we don't find that men in Taliban administered provinces are likely to have greater acceptability to wife-beating in the first place relative to their counterparts in Massoud administered provinces (second row of Panel B of Table 8). Therefore, it is possible that taking into account the heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance has led to these findings.

Table 9 reports the effect of the Taliban regime on experience of spousal violence (Panel A), autonomy and labour market participation of women (Panel B). The first row in each of the panels are the coefficients of interest. From Panel A, we see that except for the situation that the wife reports of being hurt by her husband while pregnant, other coefficients on experience of spousal violence continue to be similar to our findings in Panel A of Table 5. Also, from Panel B, we see that except for the situation that the women was working during the 12 months preceding the survey, other coefficients on indicators of autonomy continue to be similar to our findings in Panel B of Table 5. However interestingly, we see that now women who were adolescents during the Taliban regime (relative to those who were younger at that time) are less likely to be working in the 12 months preceding the survey in provinces that were administered by the Taliban than in those administered by Massoud. Further, we don't find that women in Taliban administered provinces are less likely to be working in the 12 months before the survey in the first place relative to their counterparts in Massoud administered provinces (second row of Panel B of Table 9 for labour market participation outcome). Therefore, it is possible that taking into account the heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance has led to these findings.

6 Conclusion

This paper has studied the impact of the gender-based discriminatory institutions on child mortality, attitudes to wife-beating among women and men as well as experience of autonomy and labour market participation among women in Afghanistan. In particular, the

Taliban administration has been used a natural experiment in a difference-in-difference estimation framework. We find that under-five mortality is higher among children and particularly male children who were born during the years the Taliban ruled in provinces administered by the Taliban relative to those governed by the Northern Alliance. Further, we do not find that the Taliban administered provinces had higher mortality rates for children before the Taliban established their government. Also, taking into account the heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance reveals that neonatal mortality among male children appears to be higher for children born when the Taliban governed in Taliban administered provinces relative to those administered by Massoud of the Northern Alliance. We also find greater justification of wife-beating under various circumstances and greater likelihood of experiencing some forms of spousal violence among women who were exposed to the Taliban rule during their adolescence relative to those in provinces governed by the Northern Alliance. These results do not appear to be driven by pre-existing greater acceptability of wife-beating or spousal violence among women in Taliban administered provinces. However, we do not find significant effect of the Taliban rule on women's autonomy, labour market participation and men's attitude to wife-beating. However, once we take into account heterogeneity in the leadership of the Northern Alliance, women's labour market participation appears to be lower and men's justification of wife-beating in the event that a wife goes out without seeking permission appears to be higher among individuals exposed to the Taliban rule during their adolescence in Taliban relative to Massoud administered provinces. These findigings suggest the importance of institutions in shaping gender attitudes and how restrictions of rights and mobility of women can also have detrimental effect on the survival of children.

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Figures and Tables



Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Map of the situation in Afghanistan in late 1996; Massoud (red), Dostum (green) and Taliban (yellow) territories.

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan in 1996; Source: Wikimedia Commons and CNN

Table 1: Summary Statistics: Child Mortality Outcomes

Variable	Mean	SD	Obs
Proportion of children dead within:			
First Month of Life	0.04	0.20	34,007
First Year of Life	0.09	0.28	34,007
First Five Years of Life	0.11	0.31	34,007
Explanatory Variables:			
Born in Taliban Province	0.55	0.50	34,007
Born during Taliban Years	0.50	0.50	34,007
Born in Taliban Province * Taliban Years	0.28	0.45	34,007
Rural	0.75	0.43	34,007
Household in Poorest Wealth Quintile	0.22	0.41	34,007
Household in Poorer Wealth Quintile	0.23	0.42	34,007
Household in Middle Wealth Quintile	0.20	0.40	34,007
Household in Richer Wealth Quintile	0.19	0.39	34,007
Household in Richest Wealth Quintile	0.15	0.36	34,007
Child is Female	0.46	0.50	34,007
Mother's Age at Birth (years)	22.67	4.60	34,007
Birth is Singleton	0.98	0.13	34,007
Birth Order	2.82	1.82	34,007
Mother's Years of Education	0.51	2.08	34,007
Father's Years of Education	3.83	9.97	34,007
Pashtun	0.37	0.48	34,007
Tajik	0.36	0.48	34,007
Hazara	0.10	0.29	34,007
Uzbek	0.08	0.27	34,007
Turkmen	0.02	0.14	34,007
Nuristani	0.03	0.16	34,007
Baloch	0.01	0.10	34,007
Pashai	0.02	0.13	34,007
Other Ethnicity	0.02	0.13	34,007

Note: Data source is AfDHS (2015)."SD" refers to standard deviation; "Obs" refers to the number of observations. Births restricted upto the year 2000.

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Women's & Men's Outcomes

Variable	Mean	SD	Obs
Women:			
Wife Beating Justified if She:			
Goes Out Without Asking	0.67	0.47	23,588
Neglects Children	0.49	0.50	23,588
Argues	0.61	0.49	23,588
Refuses Sex	0.35	0.48	23,588
Burns Food	0.20	0.40	23,588
Husband Had Pushed	0.36	0.48	17,539
Husband Had Strangled	0.03	0.18	17,524
Husband Used a Weapon	0.03	0.17	17,521
Husband Hurt During Pregnancy	0.15	0.36	16,666
Woman Herself Decides To:			
Seek healthcare for herself	0.44	0.50	29,461
Make large household purchases	0.42	0.49	29,461
Meet her friends/relatives	0.52	0.50	29,461
Was Working in the Last 12 Months	0.13	0.34	29,461
Men:			
Wife Beating Justified if She:			
Goes Out Without Asking	0.62	0.48	10,760
Neglects Children	0.31	0.46	10,760
Argues	0.44	0.50	10,760
Refuses Sex	0.20	0.40	10,760
Burns Food	0.08	0.28	10,760
Explanatory Variables (women's sample):			
26-35 years old	0.36	0.48	29,461
Above 35 years old	0.31	0.46	29,461
Taliban Province	0.60	0.49	29,461
26-35 Years old * Taliban Province	0.22	0.41	29,461
Above 35 Years old * Taliban Province	0.17	0.38	29,461
Rural	0.76	0.43	29,461
Household in Poorest Wealth Quintile	0.19	0.39	29,461
Household in Poorer Wealth Quintile	0.23	0.42	29,461
Household in Middle Wealth Quintile	0.22	0.41	29,461
Household in Richer Wealth Quintile	0.21	0.41	29,461
Household in Richest Wealth Quintile	0.15	0.36	29,461
Woman's Years of Education	1.20	3.01	29,461
Husband's Years of Education	4.85	11.10	29,461
Currently Living with Husband	0.94	0.24	29,461
Woman's Father Beat Her Mother	0.26	0.44	29,461
Current Age (years)	30.98	8.71	29,461
Husband's Current Age (years)	36.12	10.84	29,461
Pashtun	0.42	0.49	29,461
Tajik	0.30	0.46	29,461
Hazara	0.09	0.29	29,461
Uzbek	0.07	0.25	29,461
Turkmen	0.02	0.14	29,461
Nuristani	0.04	0.20	29,461
Baloch	0.01	0.11	29,461
Pashai	0.02	0.13	29,461

Note: Data source is AfDHS (2015)."SD" refers to standard deviation; "Obs" refers to the number of observations. For wife-beating questions (both perceptions and actual violence faced) in the women's sample, the sample is restricted to include only those respondents for whom husband, other males and females from the household were not present when these questions were asked.

Table 3: Results: Child Mortality Outcomes

Outcome Variable:	Dead First Month of Life	Dead First Year of Life	Dead Within 5 years Of Life
Panel A:			
Born in Taliban Province * Taliban Years	0.006	0.009	0.016**
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Born during Taliban Years	-0.016*	-0.021*	-0.034**
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Born in Taliban Province	-0.020	-0.054***	-0.062***
	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Observations	33,840	33,840	33,840
Panel B: Male Children			
Born in Taliban Province * Taliban Years	0.006	0.013	0.016*
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Born during Taliban Years	-0.005	-0.008	-0.025
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Born in Taliban Province	-0.024	-0.061**	-0.064**
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Observations	18,362	18,362	18,362
Panel C: Female Children			
Born in Taliban Province * Taliban Years	0.005	0.002	0.0142
	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Born during Taliban Years	-0.028**	-0.036**	-0.044**
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Born in Taliban Province	-0.013	-0.044*	-0.056*
	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Observations	15,478	15,478	15,478
Panel D: Falsification Exercise- All Children			
Born in Taliban Province * False Taliban Years	-0.003	0.001	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Born during False Taliban Years	0.016**	0.038***	0.048***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Born in Taliban Province	-0.016	-0.050***	-0.053**
	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Observations	33,840	33,840	33,840
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Outcomes are dummy variables that assume value 1 if the variable description is true and is 0 otherwise. Data source is AfDHS (2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the PSU level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Births up to the year 2000 are included. "Other Controls" include dummies for household wealth quintile; whether the household is in rural area; the mother and father's years of education; birth order; whether the birth was a singleton; the sex of the child; the mother's age at birth. False years of Taliban government imply the years 1991-1995.

Table 4: Results: Justification of Wife-Beating among Women

Wife-Beating is Justified if:	Goes Out Without Asking	Neglects Child	Argues	Refuses Sex	Burns Food
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.027*	0.047***	0.017	0.010	0.021*
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.019	0.016	-0.008	0.011	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.013)
26-35 Yrs Old	-0.016	-0.015	-0.006	0.010	-0.005
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Above 35 Yrs Old	-0.008	-0.014	0.001	0.021	-0.001
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Taliban Province	-0.195***	0.200***	-0.179***	0.189***	0.112***
	(0.064)	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.035)
Observations	22,776	22,776	22,776	22,776	22,776
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Outcomes are dummy variables that assume value 1 if the variable description is true and is 0 otherwise. Omitted category are individuals aged below 26 years or in Northern Alliance dominated provinces or both. Data source is AfDHS (2015). Robust standard errors clustered at the PSU level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% , 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. "Other Controls" include dummies for household wealth quintile; whether the household is in rural area; the woman and her husband's years of education; whether the woman's father ever beat her mother; whether the respondent is currently living with her husband; the current ages of the respondent and her husband. For wife-beating questions (both perceptions and actual violence faced) where respondents are women, the sample is restricted to include only those respondents for whom husband, other males and females from the household were not present when these questions were asked.

Table 5: Results: Woman's Experience of Spousal Violence, Autonomy, Labour Market Participation

Panel A:				
Woman's Husband Has:	Pushed Her	Strangled Her	Used Weapon	Hurt Her During Pregnancy
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.006	0.014**	0.014**	0.027**
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.012)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	-0.028	0.010	0.008	0.003
	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.014)
26-35 Yrs Old	0.055***	0.003	-0.003	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.010)
Above 35 Yrs Old	0.030	0.010	0.004	0.020
	(0.023)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Taliban Province	0.034	-0.020	0.005	-0.010
	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.022)
Observations	17,029	17,014	17,011	16,177
Panel B:	Can Decide To Seek Healthcare	Can Make HH Purchases	Can Decide To Visit Friends	Worked During Last 12 Months
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	-0.012	-0.006	0.007	-0.036***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	-0.039**	-0.031**	-0.015	-0.034***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.010)
26-35 Yrs Old	0.023*	0.023*	0.036***	0.044***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Above 35 Yrs Old	0.036*	0.022	0.030	0.053***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Taliban Province	-0.218***	0.014	-0.119***	-0.083**
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.040)
Observations	28,436	28,436	28,436	28,436
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: See table notes of Table 4.

Table 6: Results: Justification of Wife-Beating among Men

Wife-Beating is Justified if:	Goes Out Without Asking	Neglects Child	Argues	Refuses Sex	Burns Food
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.026	0.005	-0.021	-0.001	-0.026*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.015)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	-0.007	0.025	-0.021	0.013	-0.039**
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.015)
26-35 Yrs Old	-0.021	0.026	0.012	-0.004	0.034***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.013)
Above 35 Yrs Old	-0.018	0.012	0.020	-0.002	0.052***
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.019)
Taliban Province	-0.22***	0.081	0.074	0.0721*	0.066***
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.039)	(0.023)
Observations	10,743	10,743	10,743	10,743	10,743
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: See table notes of Table 4.

Table 7: Heterogeneity Results by the Leadership of Northern Alliance: Child Mortality Outcomes

Outcome Variable:	Dead First Month of Life	Dead First Year of Life	Dead Within 5 years Of Life
Panel A: Male Children			
Born in Taliban Province * Taliban Years	0.012*	0.016	0.016
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Born in Dostum Province * Taliban Years	0.015*	0.007	0.0001
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Born during Taliban Years	-0.011	-0.010	-0.025
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Born in Taliban Province	-0.025*	-0.061***	-0.060**
	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Born in Dostum Province	-0.006	-0.002	0.005
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Observations	18,362	18,362	18,362
Panel B: Female Children			
Born in Taliban Province * Taliban Years	0.006	0.003	0.018
	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Born in Dostum Province * Taliban Years	0.003	0.002	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Born during Taliban Years	-0.029**	-0.037**	-0.048**
	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Born in Taliban Province	-0.015	-0.048*	-0.056*
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Born in Dostum Province	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.034)
Observations	15,478	15,478	15,478
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Here the omitted category are those who were born before the Taliban government was set up or in provinces governed by Ahmad Shah Massoud or both. For all other details, see table notes of Table 3.

Table 8: Heterogeneity Results by the Leadership of Northern Alliance: Justification of Wife-Beating among Women & Men

Wife-Beating is Justified if:	Goes Out Without Asking	Neglects Child	Argues	Refuses Sex	Burns Food
Panel A: Women					
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.034*	0.052***	0.006	0.016	0.024*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.027	0.022	-0.013	0.013	0.022
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.015)
26-35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.021	0.016	-0.032	0.016	0.009
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.018)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.024	0.017	-0.016	0.007	0.010
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.019)
26-35 Yrs Old	-0.023	-0.020	0.004	0.005	-0.008
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Above 35 Yrs Old	-0.015	-0.020	0.005	0.019	-0.004
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Taliban Province	-0.200***	0.197***	-0.174***	0.187***	0.110***
	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.035)
Dostum Province	-0.025	0.272***	-0.147**	0.205***	0.113***
	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.033)
Observations	22,776	22,776	22,776	22,776	22,776
Panel B: Men					
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.053*	0.007	-0.011	-0.005	-0.053***
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.031	0.015	-0.002	0.004	-0.060***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.018)
26-35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.065	0.004	0.024	-0.009	-0.062***
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.022)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.090**	-0.022	0.045	-0.022	-0.050**
	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.023)
26-35 Yrs Old	-0.048*	0.024	0.001	-0.0004	0.060***
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Above 35 Yrs Old	-0.056	0.021	0.001	0.007	0.073***
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.022)
Taliban Province	-0.070	0.058	0.047	-0.084*	-0.178***
	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.045)	(0.036)
Dostum Province	0.117**	-0.019	-0.042	-0.149***	-0.219***
	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.035)
Observations	10,743	10,743	10,743	10,743	10,743
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Omitted category are individuals aged below 26 years or in provinces governed by Ahmad Shah Massoud. For all other details, see table notes of Table 4.

Table 9: Heterogeneity Results by the Leadership of Northern Alliance: Woman's Experience of Spousal Violence, Autonomy, Labour Market Participation

Panel A:				
Woman's Husband Has:	Pushed Her	Strangled Her	Used Weapon	Hurt Her During Pregnancy
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.016	0.015**	0.016**	0.023
	(0.019)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.015)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.007	0.011	0.012*	0.0002
	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.016)
26-35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.031	0.002	0.003	-0.013
	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.017)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.103***	0.003	0.011	-0.008
	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.019)
26-35 Yrs Old	0.045***	0.002	-0.004	0.021
	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.013)
Above 35 Yrs Old	-0.005	0.009	0.0002	0.023
	(0.025)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.020)
Taliban Province	0.023	-0.021	0.022**	0.083***
	(0.056)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.020)
Dostum Province	-0.157***	-0.042**	-0.002	0.097***
	(0.049)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.019)
Observations	17,029	17,014	17,011	16,177
Panel B:	Can Decide To Seek Healthcare	Can Make HH Purchases	Can Decide To Visit Friends	Worked During Last 12 Months
26-35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	0.002	-0.002	0.025	-0.023***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Taliban Province	-0.038**	-0.029	0.015	-0.017
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.010)
26-35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.041*	0.010	0.054**	0.039***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Above 35 Yrs Old * Dostum Province	0.004	0.007	0.090***	0.049**
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.019)
26-35 Yrs Old	0.009	0.019	0.018	0.032***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.008)
Above 35 Yrs Old	0.036	0.020	-0.0003	0.037***
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Taliban Province	-0.287***	-0.362***	-0.370***	0.091***
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.022)
Dostum Province	-0.266***	-0.282***	-0.234***	-0.035*
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.018)
Observations	28,436	28,436	28,436	28,436
Other Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Omitted category are individuals aged below 26 years or in provinces governed by Ahmad Shah Massoud. For all other details, see table notes of Table 4.