Politicians and their promises in an uncertain world: Evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in India

Prasenjit Banerjee,[1] Vegard Iversen,[2] Sandip Mitra,[3] Antonio Nicolò,[1,4] and Kunal Sen[1,5]

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[1] University of Manchester, Manchester UK; [2] University of Greenwich, London, UK; [3] Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India; [4] University of Padova, Padova, Italy; [5] UNU-WIDER, Helsinki, Finland. Corresponding author: Prasenjit.banerjee@manchester.ac.uk.

Abstract: In emerging economies, pro-social policy outcomes may be prevented by bureaucratic inefficiency, capture by elected or non-elected office holders, or by other hurdles. For local citizens, uncertainty about the true cause of such failures often prevails. We study the pro-sociality of politicians' decision-making in a modified dictator game with real politician participants in rural India. In our game, a recipient citizen does not know whether dictator politician capture or bad luck is to blame when receiving zero. Using a 2×2 design, we investigate how the combination of two non-monetary instruments affect politician behaviour in this hard to govern environment. The first instrument, a (non-binding) promise, is a commitment device; the second introduces a minimal relational lever between the politician and the recipient. We find that politician-dictator giving becomes dramatically more pro-social, from zero- to 50:50-giving, when these two instruments are combined. Our results provide new insights about the scope for norm-based, low-cost mechanisms to tackle governance-related asymmetric information challenges in developing-country settings.

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JEL classification: H11, D64, O12

Figures and tables: at the end of the paper. All authors' own work.

1 Introduction

Politicians are the same all over. They promise to build bridges even when there are no rivers. (Nikita Khrushchev)

While elected representatives fundamentally affect the welfare of citizens in a democracy, holding politicians to account is not always straightforward. In emerging economies, a pro-social policy may be held up by bureaucratic inefficiency, by the strategic conduct of elected or non-elected office holders, or by other institutional hurdles. In such settings, citizen monitoring of politician promises and behaviour (checks and balances) is made harder by the lack of information about what politicians and others are up to: even if a citizen knows what a representative has promised, it is difficult to ascertain whether a politician's actions or an institutional weakness is to blame if a pro-social policy fails. Uncertainty about the true cause—with a hard-to-mitigate asymmetric information challenge at its core—will therefore often prevail.

The textbook solution to such a dilemma in a hard-to-govern environment is to introduce an incentive mechanism that seeks to align the interests of the politician and the electorate. In emerging economies, public purse constraints make such standard—and often costly—incentive schemes much less attractive. Viable alternatives should therefore be considered.

In this paper, we use a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural India to investigate the impacts of two norm-based (e.g. Krupka & Weber, 2013) and low-cost instruments on politicians' pro-social behaviour in the presence of asymmetric information that it is easy for politicians to strategically exploit. In line with the experimental literature, we think of the first instrument as a commitment device, a (non-binding) promise (Vanberg 2008); the second introduces a minimalist relationship between the politician-dictator and the recipient by giving the recipient a face (dictator politicians briefly greet their respective recipients before decision-making). Evidence from lab and field experiments shows how removing recipient anonymity affects generosity in dictator games (see Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996).

In our modified dictator game, we retain the hard-to-mitigate asymmetric information challenge as a core feature of our design by making it easy for a politician-dictator to blame a self-serving decision on factors outside their control (extending Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009). In the game, nature plays with a high probability ($p = 0.8$) and randomly assigns the endowment to the dictator or the recipient. A politician dictator plays with complementary probability (and knows, when making a decision, that this choice will be implemented): in contrast, a recipient who gets zero (or the full endowment), does not know whether the dictator or nature is responsible. In our 2×2 design, we keep p constant across treatments while varying our promise and minimalist relationship instruments to investigate their effect on politician response.

Our findings may be summarized as follows: (1) politicians keep their promises, and (2) the welfare effects for recipients are strongest when promise making and non-anonymity are combined. In our benchmark treatment—a standard dictator game with an anonymous recipient—we observe high capture: politician-dictators allocate almost the entire endowment to themselves (average giving represents around 1% of the endowment, and 87% of politician-dictators give zero). When we remove anonymity and give the recipient a face, politicians become dramatically more generous: average giving rises to 33% of the endowment while zero-giving decreases to 27%. This minimalist relationship makes it costlier for politicians to behave greedily, in spite of the ease with which selfish behaviour can be concealed.

A non-binding promise significantly augments the pro-social decision-making of politician-dictators: in the anonymous setting, they promise a positive but small (i.e. 8% of the endowment on average) amount and keep their word. Crucially, politician behaviour changes dramatically from zero-giving in the anonymous, no-promise setting towards equal-sharing in the non-anonymous setting with promise (where politician-dictators greet their respective recipients and are forced to make a promise in front of them). Specifically, we observe that the proportion of equal sharing increases from 0% to 45%, while the frequency of zero-giving drops from 37% to 14%. Ninety per cent of politicians promise to distribute a positive amount and 81% keep their promise.

These findings are striking, first, because of the strong, pro-social politician response to simple experimental stimuli. This response occurs in an environment where it remains easy for politicians to blame selfish behaviour on factors outside their control. Given that laboratory experiments demon-

strate that minor contextual features of a choice environment may lead to substantially different choices and outcomes (Krupka & Weber, 2013), our findings are consistent with a stable preference for complying with social norms. The findings are also notable because our politician participants are matched with ordinary citizen residents of villages at sufficient distance from their constituencies to ensure no contact in the past, and prior to the experiment, and no contact after the experiment is over.

Our research also improves the external validity of behavioural experiments (which often involve student participants) by examining the behaviour of hard-to-recruit real-world politicians. We recruit bottom-tier politicians (i.e. village council elected representatives) who have lower opportunity costs of time and serve relatively small number of constituents (approximately 3,100 persons, on average, per council, as reported by Anukriti and Chakravarty (2019)) for two Indian states—West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. These politicians are elected through a conventional democratic process and are responsible for implementing a variety of government-funded development programmes and for decisions about investment in local infrastructure, such as sanitation, drinking water, and roads (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004).

A simple model provides a theoretical grounding for our results. We assume that (some) dictators suffer a cost when breaking a promise and experience a moral reward when a promise is kept. All dictators enjoy a positive utility when they meet their recipients and give a generous amount (this can be loosely defined as social image), but differ in the extent that utility loss matters. Since such utility loss only arises in non-anonymous interactions, dictators offer zero in the anonymous game without a promise. When forced to make a promise in the anonymous setting, politician-dictators promise to distribute a small positive amount and keep this promise. The most interesting feature of the model arises for the non-anonymous interactions where image concerns enter the frame. With no promise, dictators with major image concerns distribute a fair amount, while dictators who are less concerned about their image can opt to distribute zero and hide their greediness behind nature. However, the prospect for hiding greediness behind nature is overridden when politicians are forced to make a promise. In this case, they will either be untruthful or disclose their greediness, by promising zero or a small amount. Dictators with a sufficiently high aversion to not keeping their word and a high concern for their image will therefore be forced to behave generously.

To provide an external validity check of our results, we test for social

norms of equal-sharing and/or promise-keeping among politicians, which our model assumes. Since survey data are vulnerable to social desirability bias concerns, we adapt Krupka and Weber's (2013) incentivized norm elicitation procedure using a simple coordination game. Politician respondents were asked to rank different allocations between the dictator and the recipient in a hypothetical dictator game scenario, and a combination of promise and give in a promise-game scenario (the dictator game with a prior non-binding promise) from 'very socially inappropriate' to 'very socially appropriate' on a four-point Likert scale. Respondents received monetary incentives to match the modal response of others in the same choice environment. The results are consistent with the findings of the experiment in that politicians believe (1) a distribution of between 40% and 50% of the endowment is socially acceptable, and (2) promise-breaking is socially unacceptable.

Our work provides a first attempt to investigate whether self-selected politicians have preferences for promise-keeping in a non-strategic environment (i.e. without electoral competition) and whether a minimal relational layer affects their behaviour. In our theory-grounded experimental design, a politician may break a promise and capture the entire endowment (a) because of factors genuinely outside the politician's control or (b) by exploiting uncertainty about the true state of the world. The novel feature of (b) is that the politician is well placed to blame (a) when a promise is not kept.

The combination of non-anonymity and a promise induce fair behaviour in politicians, even in the presence of private information about the true state of the world. These findings provide new insights to debates about the design of cost-effective mechanisms to prevent politician and other capture in environments where it is difficult to distinguish capture from other hurdles to pro-social outcomes: this is of special relevance in developing-country settings with decentralized systems of governance, where the use of incentive-based disciplining mechanisms is constrained by the higher opportunity costs of public funds.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the background and related literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and spells out our main hypotheses. Section 4 presents the research design, including the game and experimental procedures. Section 5 presents the analysis and main findings from the experiment, Section 6 presents the design and main findings from the survey, and Section 7 concludes.

2 Related literature and motivation

Politicians are, perhaps, more familiar with promises than most others and the fulfilment of election promises features centrally both in the mandate theory of democracy and in the responsible party model (Besley & Coate 1997; Downs 1957; Osborne & Slivinski 1996). While stereotypes suggest that promise-breaking belongs to the fine art of political practice (e.g. ISSP Research Group 2008; Thomson 2011), it is also consistent with traditional choice theory,[1] which forms the backbone of the political economy literature (e.g. Besley & Coate 1997; Osborne & Slivinski, 1996). In contrast, recent experimental studies (using student subjects) suggest that people, in general, have social preferences for promise keeping (Ellingsen & Johannesson 2004; Vanberg 2008), while promise-breaking imposes an intrinsic psychological cost (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006; Charness & Gneezy 2008; Gneezy 2005; Hao & Houser 2010).[2] The two predominant views suggest that promises either induce emotional commitments to fulfil contractual obligations based on a norm of promise-keeping (Ellingsen & Johannesson 2004) or will be kept because of guilt from letting down the payoff expectations attributed to others (e.g. guilt aversion) (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006). Vanberg (2008) investigated whether promise-keeping is due to commitment preferences or guilt aversion, and found support for the former. Following Vanberg's (2008) argument, we test whether politicians have social preferences for keeping their promises and whether such commitment could help improve citizen welfare (i.e. higher giving by politician-dictators) in the presence of asymmetric information about the true state of the world.

Evidence from lab and field experiments document the importance of anonymity in explaining generosity in dictator games. For example, Hoff-

[1] In the absence of a mechanism or contract, an agent should always break a promise and extract rents from office if this is consistent with material self-interest (e.g. contract theory (e.g. Akerlof 1978), mechanism design theory (e.g. Holmstrom 1979)).

[2] A recent economics literature that draws on the social psychology theory of commitment suggests that non-binding promises and oath-taking significantly affect behaviour by increasing cooperation and coordination in social dilemmas and contributions to public goods (Carlsson et al. 2013; Jacquemet et al. 2013). Everyday instances of promise-making include a truth-telling oath as part of court protocol and physicians being required to take the Hippocratic Oath before they start practising medicine. According to the social psychology of commitment, the oath or promise works as a 'preparatory act' (Burger 1999): compliance with an initial oath (or promise) requires changes in behaviour in subsequent decision-making situations.

man et al. (1996) find that reducing the dictator's anonymity results in more generous offers, and conjecture that a less anonymous experimental design evokes levels of strategic reciprocity common to everyday repeated social interactions. Bohnet and Frey (1999), however, argue that dictator generosity is driven not by reciprocity but by the ability to identify with the recipients, whether by knowing something about them or seeing their faces.[3] Charness and Gneezy (2008) find similar evidence: recipients (located in a different city) identified by their family names receive significantly larger amounts. In the political economy literature, Barton, Castillo, and Petrie (2014) show that candidates' personal contact with voters in door-to-door canvassing is a more effective tool to persuade voters and increase the vote-share (see also Pons 2018). Also, according to the theories of spatial competition, direct information transmission of policy positions could alone influence voters' position (see Dewan & Shepsle 2011 for a review). Our paper explores the interaction between degrees of anonymity and a non-binding promise on politicians' pro-social behaviour in a controlled setting in rural India.

While the role of social preferences among politicians has been studied for several decades by political scientists and psychologists (see, e.g. Calvert 1985; Wittman 1983), the political economy literature has recently started exploring political competition with non-standard preferences of political actors and/or voters. For example, candidates can have heterogeneous motives, that is, along two dimensions: policy preferences and aversion to lying (Callander & Wilkie 2007), or may have a different 'character' (Kartik and McAfee 2007) or skills (Buisseret & Prato 2016). Alternatively, heterogeneity may stem from public spirit motives (altruism) or honesty (incorruptibility) (Bernheim & Kartik 2014). Moreover, candidates lacking such intrinsic motives can signal such unobservable characteristics strategically to voters to improve their reputation, which eventually helps them achieve ulterior self-interested motives (Ariely et al. 2009; Béenabou & Tirole 2006; Callander 2008; Dana et al. 2007).

Substantial knowledge gaps remain about the respective importance of so-

[3]Extending this view, some recent literature has investigated the effect of social networks on giving in the dictator game. In particular, Leider et al. (2009) found that dictators give more to 'friends', i.e. recipients with social distance equal to 1, by combining network elicitation among college students followed by a controlled experiment. Goeree et al. (2010) concluded that dictators' giving is strongly dependent social distance: 'giving follows a simple inverse distance law'.

cial and moral motivations for political selection and politicians' behaviour since the extant literature is not well equipped to provide persuasive empirical support to efforts to tackle the disentangling of motivational factors. Put differently, it is hard to isolate one type of politician motivation from another, and observed politician behaviour is unlikely to accurately guide such research efforts. While empirical research is well positioned to successfully document politician competence (e.g. their education or legislative efforts) (e.g. see Dal Bó et al. 2017; Ferraz & Finan 2011), the empirical study of politician motivation involves tougher identification challenges.

In response, and aided by incentive-compatible mechanisms, economists step back to the lab to disentangle motivations within controlled settings. In lab experiments with student subjects, Corazzini et al. (2014) allowed candidates to make promises to voters about how they will divide the pie that the election winner receives between themselves and the voters, and found that campaign promises may not be purely cheap talk (also see Corazzini et al. 2007; Geng et al. 2011).

For the present inquiry, standard lab experiments with student participants are of limited value since selection into politics and academic studies are incomparable. Some recent studies therefore conduct controlled experiments with real politician participants. Using experiments and regression discontinuity with elected and non-elected real politicians in Zambia, Enemark et al. (2016) investigate whether reciprocity, clientelism politics, or corrupt exchange are inherent characteristics of self-selected politicians, or acquired while in office. They find a moral-hazard rather than adverse-selection explanation, as holding office increases reciprocal behaviour. Kosfeld and Rustagi (2015) explore the existence and impact of social preferences among self-selected leaders on common-pool resource management by combining results from a controlled experiment with data on leader performance. In their social dilemma experiment in which leaders could punish group members for anti-social behaviour, altruistic leaders (who care about equity and efficiency in the controlled setting) promote better common forest management outcomes (also see Jack & Recalde 2015). No existing study explores politicians' pro-social decision-making in the type of hard-to-govern environment that we attempt to mimic here.

Our work also contributes to the growing literature on social preferences and self-selection into jobs. There is ample recent evidence in the empirical and experimental literature that individuals self-select into occupations and organizations that better match their needs and aspirations (e.g. Banuri &

Keefer 2016; Besley & Ghatak 2005; Delfgaauw & Dur 2007; Hanna & Wang 2017). Politics is a highly unusual occupation and those who enter it may do so not only because they expect to extract a rent from their time in office, but also because they are motivated by a sense of public duty, altruism, or by status and prestige. Politicians' motivations vary across societies, cultures, times, and places, and change with institutional settings (Beniers & Dur 2007; Besley 2005; Braendle 2016; Fedele & Naticchioni 2016; Gavoille & Verschelde 2017).

3 A theoretical framework

We analyze four different versions of a simple dictator game in which a dictator (D) and a recipient (R) split a prize normalized to have a unit value. Let $x \in [0,1]$ denote the transfer R receives; D consumes $1-x$. The timing of the game is as follows. Nature plays first: with probability $1-\pi$ the prize is randomly assigned either to R or to D, and with probability $\pi > 0$, D decides how to split the prize and the game ends. The probability $\pi \in (0,1)$ is common knowledge, but R cannot observe whether nature intervened. The variation among games consists in whether D makes a non-binding promise to R before nature plays or not, and whether the interaction among D and R is anonymous or they meet each other before playing the game. We assume the the dictators are heterogeneous in their motivations, and hence such variations in the games may affect dictators' behaviour. A dictator i's utility function can be represented as

$$U_i(x,p) = 1 - x + \mathcal{I}^p \phi_i(p,x) + \mathcal{I}^a \tau_i(\widehat{x}^R(x|p), \overline{x}_i, \pi). \tag{1}$$

The first component is the material utility in consuming $1-x$; the second component, the function $\phi_i(p,x)$, reflects both the costs and benefits of, respectively, breaking and fulfilling a promise, and is multiplied by an indicator function $\mathcal{I}^p \in \{0,1\}$ that takes the value of 1 if the dictator makes a (non-binding) promise before splitting the prize, and 0 otherwise. The third component, the function $\tau_i(\hat{x}^R(x|p), \overline{x}_i, \pi)$, reflects image-concern; where $\hat{x}^R(x|p)$ denotes R's beliefs about the amount offered by D when he receives x: a dictator i cares about her image, judged by the extent to which the amount offered, according to R's beliefs, departs from a reference point $\overline{x}_i$. In the case that the recipient receives either the full prize or zero, R forms beliefs

about the amount that the dictator has offered, which depends on π (the probability according to which nature intervenes), and the promise made by the dictator. Concerns for image only arise in a non-anonymous interaction between a dictator and a recipient, and therefore also this component is multiplied by an indicator function $\mathcal{I}^a \in \{0, 1\}$ that takes value 0 if the interaction is anonymous and 1 otherwise.

We make a series of restrictive assumptions that allow us to identify a simple but meaningful setup. Dictators are of three types: (1) h-type dictators, who feel a utility loss if receivers believe that they have not distributed the prize fairly and suffer a utility loss from breaking a promise (and a utility gain in fulfilling it); (2) ls-type dictators, who feel a utility loss if receivers believe that they are greedy, but their reference split is lower, equal to $x - t$ with $t > 0$,[4] and they also are 'sincere', that is they suffer a utility loss from breaking a promise; and (3) ld-type dictators, who also have a reference split equal to $x - t$, but they are 'deceitful', in the sense that they do not suffer any utility loss from breaking a promise. Formally, a h-type dictator has ex-post utility

$$U_i^h(x, p) = 1 - x + \mathcal{I}^p \alpha \sqrt{p} - \mathcal{I}^a L \max\left\{(\frac{1}{2} - \widehat{x}^R(x|p)), 0\right\}; \tag{2}$$
$$p \leq x 1 - x - \mathcal{I}^a L \max\left\{(\frac{1}{2} - \widehat{x}^R(x|p)), 0\right\} - C; p > x$$

with $L > 1$ and $C > 1$. The parameter $\alpha \in (0, 1]$ captures the intrinsic benefit of a sincere dictator for fulfilling a promise which is increasing and concave in the amount promised. Note that a sincere dictator's cost and benefit of fulfilling or breaking a promise depend on his own intrinsic preferences and not on R's opinion about D's behaviour and therefore they are relevant also in anonymous games.

An ls-type dictator has an ex-post utility equal to

[4]Here we assume that the 'reference' split for h-type dictators is equal to $\frac{1}{2}$, but more in general we could have assumed that is equal to $\frac{1}{2} - t^h$ with $t^h \geq 0$ and $t^h < t^l$. Results would change accordingly.

$$U_i^{ls}(x,p) = 1 - x + \mathcal{I}^p \alpha \sqrt{p} - \mathcal{I}^a L \max\left\{\left(\frac{1}{2} - t - \widehat{x}^R(x|p)\right), 0\right\}; \qquad (3)$$

$$p \leq x1 - x - \mathcal{I}^a L \max\left\{\left(\frac{1}{2} - t - \widehat{x}^R(x|p)\right), 0\right\} - C; p > x$$

where the parameter t determines a reference split, departing from which an ls-type dictator suffers a constant marginal loss of utility equal to $L > 1$ if he is considered a greedy individual. We assume that $\frac{1}{2} > t > 0$. Finally, an ld-type dictator has an ex-post utility equal to

$$U_i^{ld}(x,p) = 1 - x - \mathcal{I}^a L \max\left\{\left(\frac{1}{2} - t - \widehat{x}^R(x|p)\right), 0\right\} \qquad (4)$$

Notice that a h-type dictator suffers a utility loss when R believes he has not split the prize equally. The other types of dictators suffer a loss when R believes they have distributed less than $\frac{1}{2} - t$.

We aim to predict how much dictators distribute in each of the following games:

1. an NPA (no promise, anonymous) game in which the interaction is anonymous and D cannot make any promise ($\mathcal{I}^p = \mathcal{I}^a = 0$);

2. a PA (promise, anonymous) game in which the interaction is anonymous and D has to make a promise at the beginning of the game, before knowing whether nature intervenes ($\mathcal{I}^p = 1;\ \mathcal{I}^a = 0$);

3. an NPNA (no promise, non-anonymous) game in which the interaction is non-anonymous and D cannot make any promise ($\mathcal{I}^p = 0; \mathcal{I}^a = 1$);

4. a PNA (promise, non-anomymous) game in which the interaction is non-anonymous and D has to make a promise at the beginning of the game, before knowing whether nature intervenes ($\mathcal{I}^a = \mathcal{I}^p = 1$).

In PA and PNA games, dictators play sequentially, making a promise before nature intervenes and then splitting the prize if they have to make the decision. For this reason, we use the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept and we refer to it simply as 'an equilibrium' of a game. Recipients are not players, but since their beliefs affect dictators' payoff, they are relevant in

determining dictators' equilibrium strategies. We impose standard requirements on recipients' beliefs: if D distributes $x \in (0,1)$, R's beliefs about how much D has distributed are trivially equal to x. When observing $x = 0$, R's beliefs should be consistent, that is, they are computed according to equilibrium strategies and Bayes' rule whenever is possible. As usual, arbitrary beliefs out-of-equilibrium path may induce a multiplicity of equilibria. For this reason, we impose a very mild behavioural assumption, that is beliefs satisfy a weak monotonic requirement: if $\widehat{x}^R(x|p) = x$ then for all $p' > p$, $\widehat{x}^R(x|p') \geq x$ and $\widehat{x}^R(x|p > \frac{1}{2}) = \widehat{x}^R(x|p = \frac{1}{2})$. It is important to point out that we do not impose that a larger promise strictly increases R's beliefs, but that a larger promise cannot worsen R's beliefs. We first analyse anonymous games (games 1 and 2 above), in which $\mathcal{I}^a = 0$ and therefore dictators' image concerns do not play any role. In PA and NPA games dictators do not make a promise before splitting the prize, and therefore we simplify the notation of R's beliefs and we write $\widehat{x}^R(x)$, where x is the amount distributed.

The following proposition illustrates dictators' equilibrium strategies in these games.

Proposition 1 *Consider an NPA game. In equilibrium every dictator distributes an amount equal to zero. Consider a PA game. In equilibrium sincere dictators fulfill their promise, and promise an amount equal to $\frac{1}{4}\alpha^2$; deceitful dictators distribute zero.*

Proof: see the Appendix.

In an NPA game, dictators behave selfishly: when $\mathcal{I}^p = \mathcal{I}^a = 0$, dictators maximize their material utility. In PA games, sincere dictators are motivated by the intrinsic moral benefit of fulfilling a promise. Since deceitful dictators do not suffer any cost from breaking a promise, they do not get any benefits in fulfilling it—they distribute zero. Any promise by a deceitful dictator can be part of an equilibrium.

We focus now on non-anonymous games in which dictators care about R's beliefs about the amount they offer. We first analyze the NPNA game in which dictators do not make any promise. We refer to l-type dictators when referring to ls-type and ld-type because their behaviours coincide in games without promises.

Proposition 2 *Consider an NPNA game. In equilibrium, h-type dictators distribute a positive amount equal to $\frac{1}{2}$; l-type dictators distribute zero if*

1. $t \geq \frac{1}{2}(1 - \frac{\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}{(1-\gamma)(\pi+\frac{1}{2}(1-\pi))+\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}})$*, or*
2. $t < \frac{1}{2}(1 - \frac{\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}{(1-\gamma)(\pi+\frac{1}{2}(1-\pi))+\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}})$ *and* $L \leq \frac{\frac{1}{2}-t}{\frac{1}{2}-t-\hat{x}_0}$*;*
l-type dictators play a mixed strategy offering zero with some positive probability and $\frac{1}{2} - t$ *with complementary probability.*

The intuition of this result is the following. If a dictator offers a positive amount, she offers her reference split: $\frac{1}{2}$ for a h-type and $\frac{1}{2} - t$ for an l-type. If all dictators offer zero then $\widehat{x}^R(0) = 0$, but this cannot be an equilibrium because, in this case, a h-type D would profitably deviate offering $\frac{1}{2}$. It follows that in every equilibrium h-type dictators offer $\frac{1}{2}$. Consider a strategy profile such that h-type dictators offer $\frac{1}{2}$ and l-type dictators offer zero. If $\widehat{x}^R(0) \geq \frac{1}{2} - t$, because there are many h-type dictators and nature plays with sufficiently high probability, then this strategy profile is an equilibrium. Offering zero is clearly a best response for l-type dictators because they do not suffer any utility loss due to a bad image. If $\widehat{x}^R(0) < \frac{1}{2} - t$, offering zero is a best response only if the utility loss due to a bad image is not too large, that is, only if $1 - L(\frac{1}{2} - t - \widehat{x}^R(x)) \geq \frac{1}{2} + t$. If the previous condition does not hold, then in equilibrium l-type dictators play a mixed strategy that makes them indifferent between offering $\frac{1}{2} - t$ and offering zero.
Consider finally a PNA game. Now the behaviour of ls-type and ld-type dictators may differ because the former suffer a utility loss if they break a promise.

Proposition 3 *Consider a PNA game. In equilibrium, h-type dictators promise and distribute a positive amount equal to* $\frac{1}{2}$*; ls-type dictators promise and distribute a positive amount equal to* $\frac{1}{2} - t$*; ld-type dictators promise* $\frac{1}{2}$*, and offer zero if either* $\widehat{x}^R(0|p = \frac{1}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2} - t$ *or* $1 - L(\frac{1}{2} - t - \widehat{x}^R(0|p = \frac{1}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2} - t$*, otherwise they offer* $\frac{1}{2} - t$*.*

Proof: see the Appendix.
When dictators have to make a promise before splitting, ls-type dictators cannot hide behind nature. If they promise a positive amount, then they are forced to fulfill it. If they promise zero, they suffer a utility loss due to a very bad image. Since h-type dictators promise what they offer, that is $\frac{1}{2}$, ls-type dictators are forced to promise and distribute $\frac{1}{2} - t$; ld-type dictators mimic the promise of h-type dictators and offer zero if recipients' beliefs are large enough, that is, if the number of h-type dictators and the probability that

nature moves are sufficiently large, otherwise they offer their reference split. The previous analysis can be summarized in the following simple predictions on dictators' behaviour in the four games.

Prediction 1: In an NPA game dictators distribute zero.

Prediction 2: In a PA game, sincere dictators distribute a (small) amount equal to $\frac{1}{4}\alpha^2$.

Prediction 3: In an NPNA game dictators with high concern for their image offer $\frac{1}{2}$. Dictators with lower concern offer zero if recipients who get zero believe with sufficiently large probability that nature has intervened.

Prediction 4: In a PNA game dictators with high concern for their image promise and offer $\frac{1}{2}$. Dictators with lower concern who suffers a disutility in breaking their promise will promise and offer $\frac{1}{2} - t$; deceitful dictators promise a positive amount but offer zero if recipients who get zero believe with sufficiently large probability that nature has intervened.

4 Recruitment and experimental design

We envisaged two main organizational challenges in recruitment: (1) recruiting real politicians as subjects; and (2) creating a neutral field-lab environment.

For recruitment, we take advantage of India's decentralized and democratic local governance structure, the Panchayat system. This system has three tiers: Gram Panchayat (village-level councils), Panchayat Samiti (block-level councils), and Zila Parishad (district-level councils). A Gram Panchayat is divided into Samsads (wards). Citizens elect representatives for each tier, starting from Samsads, and elections are held at regular, five-year intervals.[5] Village-level elected representatives generally do not have a role in the higher tiers (e.g. block or district level) unless they are the village council head.

Through the 73rd Constitutional Amendment (1993), village councils were given responsibility for implementation of a variety of government-funded development programmes and decisions about investments in local

[5]The politicians at the bottom tier of this system (Samsad or ward leader) represent around 500–800 voters (around 200–300 households) and are members of a village council or GP. GPs usually serve around 3,000–5,000 voters, although size varies widely. The second tier (i.e. block level) consists of 10–12 GPs and the final tier is the district council (i.e. Zila Parishad), which consists of 15–20 (on average) blocks.

infrastructure, such as sanitation, drinking water, and roads (Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004). The elected representatives of interest here can thus exercise considerable power in their constituencies.

Our definition of a politician is a person who has either recently fought or recently won (in the last 10 years) an election for a village council (Gram Panchayat or GP) seat as a ward member.[6] These self-selected politicians' preferences—whether selfish or social—have not been studied in depth. Monetary incentives for holding office are limited (the official salary of the village head is about USD 50/month; ward leaders are paid even less), but there are potential private returns from political rents and corrupt practices.[7]

Hooghly district in West Bengal and Varanasi district in Uttar Pradesh were selected because of prior experience working there. From among the administrative blocks in each district, we randomly selected two blocks following a stratified random sampling based on geographical location. For example, from among Hooghly's 18 administrative blocks, we randomly selected Singur and Dhaniakhali. In Uttar Pradesh, Badagaon and Sevapuri blocks were selected using a similar procedure. GPs were then randomly selected from each block. For each GP, we prepared a list of individuals who had contested or been elected during the two most recent elections and invited politicians to participate with an invitation letter prepared by the research team following a blinded, random protocol. The letter neutrally framed the purpose of the study (e.g. we want to study the challenges of rural development) and explained the random selection of the village/GP and participants (see letter text in the supplementary Appendix). Participants knew that they could change their decision to participate any time without giving any explanation. We made sure that politicians and other participants from one GP should not have any prior knowledge about their matched counterparts

[6]We purposely avoided recruiting village council heads (pradhans) because of their typically greater and more visible role in their party's political machinery, and their higher likelihood of being known to more villagers within a district, including among those from distant locations. The opportunity cost of time for village council heads would also be higher than for ward members.

[7]Some evidence suggests that an average candidate spends USD 400–800 during a village council election (see: www.ndtv.com/india-news/the-rs-81-500-crore-lie-565175). The average declared wealth of re-contesting candidates to Parliament and state legislative assemblies in 2004 was 134% higher than during the first election (Sastry 2014), suggesting high rents. Fisman et al. (2014) also show that the annual asset growth of winners in state elections is 3–5 percentage points higher than for runners up. Although similar statistics are not available for village council candidates, the returns are likely to be non-trivial.

from another GP. We also chose the timing of the experiment carefully to avoid any overlap with election-related or other political campaigning (we conducted our experiments from December 2016 to April 2017).

From each village and based on the household census, we also invited randomly selected ordinary citizens (non-politicians) to participate in the experiment. The presence of non-politicians aimed to reduce experimental demand effects, since a sample comprising only of politicians could intensify the feeling of being under experimental scrutiny.

Our research assistants recruited local enumerators to collect participant information. They prepared a list (census) of households, which was always kept with them only, containing basic demographic information (name of household head, sex, education, occupation). Following a blinded, random protocol, the enumerators selected potential participants and invited them, following the same procedure described above (i.e. there were no differences in the recruitment/invitation procedure (e.g. same draft letter used in both cases) used for politicians and non-politicians). Participants knew they had to travel 25 km on average to participate in the study and play a game, but they had no prior information about where they were going and with whom they would play the game. As participants had to travel long distances to participate and there was no well-connected public transport available, we arranged free transport for them, as well as refreshments.

4.1 Design

We use a 2×2 design described in the table below.

	Anonymous	Non-anonymous
No promise	T1 **(NPA)**	T2 **(NPNA)**
Promise	T3 **(PA)**	T4 **(PNA)**

We carefully explain the procedure followed in each treatment in the Appendix. Here, we provide a summary of the most relevant features of the design.

Forty subjects from two different villages participated in each session, one in the home-village (where the venue was located) and one in the visitor-village (a distant location): 10 politicians and 10 non-politicians participated from each village. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of dictator (D) or receiver (R) and kept their role during the entire session. Each subject was randomly matched with a subject from a different village. As noted,

the distance between the home-village and the visitor-village is sufficient to ensure that subjects from home- and visitor-villages are likely to have never met before the experiment and will not meet again after.

In the 'anonymous' treatments T1 and T3, there were 20 participants: 10 politicians and 10 villagers in each room, all from the same village. They were matched with participants from a distant village sitting in a different room. In the 'non-anonymous' treatments (T2 and T4), 10 participants from the home-village and 10 participants from the visitor-village (randomly chosen) were seated in the same room. Each pair D and R (from different villages) were asked to stand up and greet each other. In anonymous treatments matched group members do not meet each other. In the non-anonymous treatments, each group member stands up and greets the other before the game starts.

Each pair received a fixed and known endowment—1000 INR (approx. USD15.50)—for each round and D had to decide how to allocate the endowment between him/herself and his/her partner (i.e. R).

Each D received a random (and confidential) private number between 1 and 10—no other person in the room, not even the experimenter, would know this number. At the start of each round, the experimenter announced two randomly chosen numbers between 1 and 10. Each D received a decision sheet. They filled in their decision sheets in an enclosed area one by one. Only Ds whose private numbers were announced could choose and record a distribution on the decision sheet in private, others would just tick a box which stated that nature would give zero to either D or R (see the decision sheet example in the Appendix). All Ds who made a decision or who ticked a box folded the decision sheets and put them in an envelope, named, for example, Round 1-Decisions, themselves. The Rs, other Ds, and the experimenter knew the probability (i.e. 0.8), but did not know whether nature or D made the decision when the outcome was either zero or 1000 INR (this can only be true if D chooses the same division as nature).

In the promise treatments (i.e. treatment T3 and T4), all Ds wrote how they would allocate INR 1000 between him/herself and R on a 'promise slip', before the two numbers were announced, and therefore before knowing whether D or nature would decide how to divide the endowment. Each D went to an enclosed area and wrote this in private; then they put the folded promise slip into an envelope and returned it to the experimenter. The experimenter passed it (without looking at it) onto the respective R (sitting in the same room in T4 or sitting in another room in T3, in which

the experimenter carried the promise slip to the corresponding Rs). Each R observed what his/her partner promised to give him/her in private and then put them in an envelope named, for example, Round 1-Promise. Then we followed the dictator game in the anonymous and non-anonymous settings described above.

We repeated each treatment five times. At the end, one of the five rounds was randomly selected to determine the payments. The envelope of decision sheets for the selected round was handed to a person outside the venue (external person) who had no information about the game or the subjects. He checked the decision sheets in a separate room and put the payment in a separate envelope for each dictator. He also decided whether D or R got INR 1000 when nature intervened by flipping a coin. The external person gave a result sheet to the experimenter, who then published the results. Each participant left the room one by one and received their envelopes with their payments (their earnings from the game plus a fixed participation fee of INR 300) from the external person, based on the decisions they or their partners or nature made. They left the venue one by one. Participants from the visitor-village left the venue first.

5 Analysis

Our lab-in-the-field experiment sample contains 175 politicians and 133 non-politicians. Table A1 presents the summary statistics of the observable characteristics of politicians, by gender, educational level, age, caste, and occupation. We note the following: (1) 34% of politicians are female; (2) politicians have 9.6 years of education (on average); (3) their average age is 40.5 years; (4) 44% of politicians are from a forward caste background; and (5) about 50% of politicians are farmers.

We find that: (1) politicians keep their promises, and (2) the welfare effects are strongest when promise-making and non-anonymity are combined. Our politicians behave selfishly (i.e. mostly give nothing) in the anonymous dictator game but behave pro-socially (i.e. giving 33% of the endowment on average) in the non-anonymous treatment in which they meet and greet their respective recipients before making a decision. In the anonymous setting, politicians promise a positive, but small (i.e. 8% of the endowment on average), amount and keep their promises. Most importantly, politicians' behaviour changes drastically from almost zero-giving in the anonymous no-

promise setting to equal-sharing (and hence citizens' welfare is maximized) in the non-anonymous with promise setting (when they meet and are forced to make a promise in front of the recipients). Among our politicians, there is a social norm of (1) equal-sharing; and (2) promise-keeping.

We report the detailed results below.

> *Result 1: Politicians give significantly more in the non-anonymous dictator game (T2) compared to the anonymous dictator game (T1). There is a significant decrease in the proportion of zero-giving and a significant increase in the proportion of 50:50 giving in T2 compared to T1.*

Following the first prediction of the model, in the first treatment (T1), politicians mostly give nothing: 87% of them give zero and average giving is Rs.13.33, or about 1% of the endowment. This suggests that our politicians are guided by self-interested preferences. When a minimalist relationship is introduced and politicians meet and greet their respective recipients before making a choice, we observe significant changes in politicians' behaviour—they become more pro-social, as shown in Table 1. Compared to T1, in T2, average giving increases (from 1% to 35% of the endowment (i.e. from Rs.13 to Rs.356)), zero-giving falls (from 87% to 26.4% of cases), and equal-sharing increases (from 0% to 32% of cases): each one of these changes is statistically significant (see Tables 1 and 2). This pro-social behaviour is also evident from Figure 1(a), which shows a kernel density of the amount given by politician-dictators in T1 and T2 (also see Figure 2, which displays the frequency of amount given across different treatments). As our theoretical framework predicts (Proposition 2 and Prediction 3), there are h-type, who give 50:50, and l-type, who give either zero or a positive amount less than 50:50, dictators in our sample. This suggests that adding a face acts as a catalyst to promote pro-social behaviour (as argued by Bohnet and Frey 1999) among politicians even when (1) uncertainty of the true state of nature prevails; and (2) politicians will not meet the 'unknown' recipients in the future.

> *Result 2: Politicians keep their promise.*

Politicians are highly likely to keep their promise, both in the anonymous (T3) and non-anonymous (T4) setting. In T3, they keep their promises in

96% of cases. On average they promise Rs.87.33 and give Rs.80 in T3. In T4, they keep their promises in 81% of cases and, on average, they promise Rs.519 and give Rs.460. Our politicians are mostly sincere. The amounts promised and given in T4, however, are significantly larger than those in T3. Table 3 presents the amount promised and the difference between amounts given and promised, by the level of the amount promised, in T3 and T4. In T3, only 1 out of 30 politicians breaks her promise—she promises to give Rs.300 but actually gives nothing. In T4: (1) 53.2% of politicians promise exactly half of the endowment; (2) they keep their promise with the mean difference between amount given and amount promised being Rs.–20.9 for the whole T4 sample and Rs.6.1 for those who promised 50% of the endowment. Finally, 81% of politicians give the amount promised and 8% actually give more than they promise (Table 4). This promise-keeping behaviour is also shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows kernel densities of promise and amount given by politicians in T3 and T4. In Figure 4, we plot the amount promised against the amount given in T3 and T4. If dictators keep their promises, observations would be along the 45-degree line. For politicians it is evident that the line of best fit is very close to the 45-degree line (exact 45-degree line with one outlier in T3).[8]

A non-binding promise significantly affects politicians' behaviour: they become more pro-social and give more to recipients. However, recipient welfare does not improve as much as for the first mechanism (i.e. T2). In T3, politicians start promising non-zero amounts and keep their promise, but they give small amounts. This supports the Prediction 2 in our theoretical framework. The proportion of zero-giving drops significantly from 87% to 37% (see Tables 1, 2, and 3, and Figure 2). However, average giving is small and increases from 1% (in T1) to 8% (in T3) of the endowment (i.e. Rs.13 in T1 to Rs.80 in T3): recipient welfare does therefore not improve as much as for the first mechanism (Rs.356 in T2 vs Rs.80 in T3) (see Figures 1(d) and 3(a)). Figure 3(b), which is a kernel density plot of giving in T1 and T3, also supports this.

Result 3: Introducing a non-binding promise in the non-anonymous

[8]A regression of give on promise, controlling for other characteristics, shows a coefficient estimate being 0.82 (significant) and 0.89 (significant) and intercept being 66.19 (insignificant) and 20.72 (insignificant) in T3 and T4 respectively. A joint hypothesis that the slope $= 1$ and the intercept $= 0$ cannot be rejected in both the cases. This suggests the fitted lines between promise and give in T3 and T4 are not significantly different from a 45-degree line.

setting (T4) makes politicians promise and give a fair allocation, 50% of the endowment.

The most striking results are observed in T4, when our two instruments, the minimalist relationship and promise, interact—politicians move from zero-giving to 50:50-giving. Promise has greater impact on politicians' pro-social behaviour when they are forced to make a promise in front of their respective recipient (they could still hide their actions by exploiting private information about the true state of nature). Results support Prediction 4 that compared to T3, we observe significant changes in behaviour in T4—average giving increases (from 8% (Rs.80) to 46% (Rs.460) of the endowment), the proportion of equal sharing increases (from 0% to 45% of cases), and the frequency of zero-giving drops (from 37% to 14% of cases) (see Tables 1 and 2, and Figure 2). Figure 1(f) shows the kernel density of giving in T3 and T4, which supports this observation. Following Prediction 4, our results suggest that most of the politicians in our sample are h-type (at least 45%), although we have ls-type and ld-type (around 15% each) politicians too.

Comparing results in T2 and T4, politicians are significantly more generous in T4 than in T2, with a shift to a 50:50 split. Results show a 31% increase in the mean amount given—with mean giving increasing from Rs.356.60 to Rs.459.67: this change is statistically significant (see Figure 2 and Tables 3 and 4). In T4, the proportion of politicians giving zero also drops notably from 26.4% to 14.5%. Ninety per cent of politicians promise to distribute a positive amount and 81% keep their promise (see Figures 3(b), and 4(b)). The kernel density plot for the amount given in T4 as compared to T2 shows a spike at the 50:50 split, suggesting more politicians move to a 50:50 sharing norm in the promise treatment with non-anonymity (Figure 1(e))—32% of politicians give 50:50 in T2 as compared to 45% in T4. Even if politicians could take the entire endowment without ruining their social image (as they can still hide their actions), they choose to be fair. These effects are striking, since we have taken care to ensure that local politicians are matched with recipients from distant villages that they are highly unlikely to have had any past or will have any future interaction with once the experiment is over.

We next investigate whether this difference in behaviour across treatments remains evident after controlling for observable politician characteristics. In separate regressions, reported in columns (1)–(3) of Table 5, we regress the amount given, and a dummy for zero-giving on the treatment dummy (equals

1 if promise treatment, 0 if no-promise treatment; similarly other treatment dummies) and politician characteristics (gender, age, and educational level along with dummies for occupation, caste, and the states where politicians were recruited from).

We find that the coefficients on the non-anonymous treatment (T2) and promise–non-anonymous treatment (T4) are significant at the 5% level when the dependent variable is the amount given, and with the right sign (controlling for their observable characteristics) politicians give significantly more in T2 and T4. However, while the sign of the coefficient for the promise–anonymous treatment (i.e. T3) is positive, as hypothesized, it is not statistically significant. We also find that zero-giving drops significantly in all treatments (column (2)). We also run separate regressions (ordinary least square or OLS) comparing two treatments at a time (see Table 6), with the results supporting the observation that the amount given is significantly higher across the treatments and zero-giving decreases significantly across the treatments, except when we compare T2 with T4.

Comparing the non-anonymous treatments without and with promise (i.e. comparing T2 and T4), the number of politicians who distribute zero decreases, but this number does not turn out to be significant. Our experimental results suggest that the fraction of politicians who respond to non-anonymity is high (and the fraction of intrinsically inequity-averse politicians is low) and that the welfare effect from removing anonymity is significant. The non-binding promise significantly improves citizens' welfare when implemented in the non-anonymous setting: politicians start to promise a fair distribution since they cannot hide and are forced to make a promise in front of the respective recipient. They keep this promise because of their preference for keeping their word.

Using the data on non-politician-dictators we can also make preliminary inferences about the behaviour of non-politicians.

> *Result 4a: Removing anonymity has an impact on non-politicians' behaviour: non-politicians are significantly more generous in T2 than T1.*
>
> *Result 4b: Compared to politicians, non-politicians are less likely to keep their promise.*
>
> *Result 4c: Compared to politicians, a non-binding promise is less likely to affect non-politicians' behaviour.*

Non-politicians respond to non-anonymity and behave significantly more pro-socially in T2 than T1: (1) average giving increases from Rs.5 to Rs.335; (2) the proportion of zero-giving drops from 95% to 19.35% of cases; (3) the proportion of equal-sharing increases from 0% to 35.48% (these changes are all statistically significant, see Tables 9, A2, and A3). We also find that non-politicians are less likely to promise a positive amount and to keep their promises, compared to politicians, in the anonymous dictator game with promise (i.e. T3)—see Figure A2 and Tables 9, A4, and A5. In T3, they keep their promises, but the average amount given is almost zero (Rs.41). When they are forced to make promises in front of their respective recipient (i.e. T4), they start promising and giving significantly more. While 54.8% of non-politicians in T4 keep their promises, this is a significantly lower proportion of promise-keeping than among politicians, which is reflected in a line of best fit significantly different from the 45-degree line (Figure A2). We also find that there is very little difference in the allocation decisions of non-politicians in T2 and T4 (when promise is introduced in the non-anonymous setting) (Tables 9, A3, and A2)—35.48% of non-politicians gave Rs.500 in the no-promise treatment, which actually increased slightly to 35.7% in the promise treatment (with the mean amount given in the no-promise (T2) and promise treatments (T4) being Rs.335 and Rs.402, respectively). Further, the test statistics on differences in amount given, zero-giving, and 50:50-giving across T2 and T4 lack statistical significance (Table A2).[9]

Following the similar procedure used for the politician sample, we investigate whether this difference in behaviour across treatments remains evident after controlling for observable non-politician characteristics. We find that the coefficients on T2 and T4 are significant at the 5% level when the dependent variable is the amount given, and with the right sign—controlling for their observable characteristics—non-politicians give significantly more in T2 and T4 (see Table A6). We also find that zero-giving drops significantly in all treatments (column (2)).

We also test whether politicians and non-politicians differ in their promise-keeping, controlling for observable characteristics of politicians and non-politicians. We confine the sample only to the non-anonymous–promise (i.e. T4), and construct a dummy for promise-keeping, where the dummy is 1 when the amount given equals the amount promised, and 0 otherwise. We

[9]This is not a robust finding but simply a reflection of a small sample size and lack of statistical power.

estimate a probit regression where the explanatory variable of interest is a dummy for politicians, after pooling the politician and non-politician samples while controlling for the dictator's caste, gender, age, education, income, and location. We present the results in column (3) of Table 5. We find the coefficient on the politician dummy to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This supports the idea that politicians are more likely to keep their promise than are non-politicians.

Thus, the patterns in the data suggest that there is no evidence of promises playing a similar commitment role for non-politicians. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions: ordinary citizens in our sample are either selfish or inequity-averse individuals, and only among politicians is there a non-negligible number of reputation-concerned individuals.[10]

6 Survey

We assume in our model and in the analysis that promise-keeping preferences are intrinsic (in other words, promise-breaking imposes a pure moral/ psychological fixed cost) and not driven by social-image concerns (i.e. shame or reputational costs from promise-breaking; see Cohen et al. (2011, 2012) for some psychological studies on shame and guilt).[11] This argument is consistent with the existing literature suggesting that people have social preferences to fulfil contractual obligations based on the norm of promise-keeping (Ellingsen & Johannesson 2004; Vanberg 2008). To test whether self-selected politicians obey norms of equal-sharing and promise-keeping, we adapt Krupka and Weber's incentivized survey using simple coordination games to elicit social norms. In the survey, politician respondents were asked to rank different allocations between the dictator and the recipient in the dictator game scenario and a combination of promise–give in the promise game scenario from 'very socially inappropriate' to 'very socially appropriate' on a quantified scale of one to four. Respondents received monetary incentives to match the modal response provided by others in the same choice environment

[10]The reason why only among politicians there is a sizeable proportion of reputation-concerned individuals could be either due to self-selection into politics by those types or due to an attitude induced by their status: the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper.

[11]Future research could explore this issue by explicitly testing whether people care more their reputation of being sincere or they have true intrinsic preferences to keep their words.

(see the Appendix for a detailed description of the design). Here we present the main results from the incentivized survey.

> *There is a social norm of giving between 40% and 50% of the endowment and a social norm of promise-keeping among politicians.*

We find politicians believe a distribution between 40% and 50% of the endowment is socially acceptable in the standard (anonymous) dictator game scenario (see Table 7). In the (anonymous) promise game scenario, promise-breaking is seen as socially unacceptable among politician respondents—even promising a lesser amount than a 50:50 split (e.g. between Rs.200 and Rs.400) and keeping that promise is seen as more acceptable than giving the same amount by breaking a promise (i.e. promising Rs.500 and then giving between Rs.200 and Rs.400) (see Table 8).[12] Seventy-five per cent of the politician respondents express that promising a 50:50 split and keeping that promise is socially acceptable (with a mean of 3.51). This suggests that there is a norm of equal-sharing among politicians.

In the incentivized survey, non-politician respondents reveal that (1) equal sharing is socially acceptable (see Table A6); and (2) promising and giving zero is socially unacceptable (see Table A8). However, when asked whether promising an equal-split and giving less than that is socially acceptable or not, on average more politicians believe it is socially unacceptable than do non-politicians, and this difference is statistically significant (Table A8). Given the opportunity to choose a promised amount and actual-giving of a hypothetical dictator, our politicians, on average, chose a promised amount of Rs.565 and a giving of Rs.416 (and the average difference was Rs.147.50). Non-politician respondents, on average, chose a similar promised amount (Rs.570) but their chosen giving was significantly lower than that of politicians (Rs.306). Hence, promise-breaking of the hypothetical dictator perceived by politicians and non-politicians is significantly different (with t-statistic equal to –3.300; see Table A8). These findings suggest that non-politicians feel less obligated to keep their promises and behave less generously than do politicians.

[12]The magnitude of the difference between promised amount and the actual giving also matters here. For example, promising 50:50 and then giving zero is seen as 'very socially inappropriate' (with a mean of 1.4) whereas promising 50:50 and giving a little less than that is seen as 'somewhat socially inappropriate' (mean is 2.4). Our politician respondents think that making a zero promise, and keeping that promise, is not socially acceptable too (64% of them express that with a mean value of 1.82).

7 Concluding remarks

Evidence from behavioural economics suggests that an institution that nurtures and upholds social preferences can achieve socially desirable outcomes cost-effectively that might be unattainable by incentives that appeal only to self-interest (Bowles 2008; Cooter 1998; Frey 1997; Ostrom 2000). Herein we investigate whether self-selected politicians' social preferences for keeping their promises and others' well-being help attain fair outcomes in an environment in which it is easy for them to serve their private interests. We show how the combination of two non-monetary routes change politicians' behaviour from zero- to 50:50-giving, bolstering pro-social decisions in this hard-to-govern environment. The first one is a commitment device, a (non-binding) promise, while the second adds a relational lever between the politician-dictator and the recipient.

Despite negative perceptions about politicians and promise-keeping among voters, the political science literature argues that politicians tend to fulfil election pledges. In Thomson et al.'s (2017) study of 57 electoral campaigns in 12 countries, 60–80% of election pledges were kept, with a higher fulfilment for single-party governments than for coalitions. Our lab-in-the-field experiments provide additional and direct evidence of the pro-social effect that non-binding promises and a relational lever have on the behaviour of real politicians. Our paper shows that even in the absence of material incentives induced by repeated interactions with voters and electoral competition and campaigns, it is possible to improve citizens' welfare in the presence of asymmetric information due to the virtue of politicians' social preferences. This suggests that the mechanisms that may stimulate pro-social politician behaviour—even in settings where deciding not to comply with commitments would appear to carry few consequences—are richer than what is typically assumed in the governance literature. Our study suggests that more transparent and informative communication between politicians and their constituencies, not only during electoral campaigns but also when they are in office, could help to provide incentives to politicians to act in favour of their citizens.

One possible concern is whether the promise results (i.e. politicians' promise-keeping and pro-social giving) are caused by an experimenter demand effect (EDE). There are two possible channels through which an EDE could occur. First, politicians could feel under 'special' scrutiny when they received the invitation to participate in the experiment. Second, in the lab

a politician-dictator could respond to the explicit presence of the 'audience', including the experimenters (this was a deliberate feature of our design and intended to heighten the social-image effect (as in Andreoni & Bernheim 2009)). On the first point, we are confident that this was not the case, first, because of the emphasis throughout that participation was voluntary. A politician concerned about 'special scrutiny' could simply opt out. Second, and more importantly, our results in T2, where one-third of the dictators gave zero, suggest that scrutiny did not interfere with and discourage selfish behaviour. Since EDEs would be expected to be consistent across the treatments, their limited impacts on behaviour in T2 suggest limited impacts on behaviour in the promise treatment as well. Adding to this, the promised amount could only be observed by the corresponding recipient and never by the experimenters or the other participants. A politician-dictator could also hide his/her distributed amount by choosing zero-giving, which no-one, including the experimenters, would be able to identify. Finally, our supplementary evidence from the incentivized norm elicitation survey helps mitigate the experimenter effect and external validity concerns.

We recognize the following limitations of our study that future research could explore. First, one may question how representative our village-level politicians are. We argue, however, that they become politicians by following a standard election process and exercise substantial power—financial and decision making—in their decentralized everyday setting. Second, our sample size is small. However, it is very challenging to recruit politicians for lab experiments, even at the village level. Future research should investigate politicians' motivations and promise-keeping behaviour with a larger data set and at different levels (e.g. block-/district-level leaders, municipal council leaders) and in different countries.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1. Kernel density of amount given by politicians in different treatments



Figure 1(a): K-density of give in T1 and T2



Figure 1(b): K-density of give in T1 and T3



Figure 1(c): K-density of give in T1 and T4



Figure 1(d): K-density of give in T2 and T3



Figure 1(e): K-density of give in T2 and T4



Figure 1(f): K-density of give in T3 and T4

Figure 2. Frequency of amount given by politicians across treatments



Figure 3. Kernel density of promise and amount given by politicians in T3 and T4



Figure 3(a): K-density of promise and give in T3 Figure 3(b): K-density of promise and give in T4

Figure 4. Promise and amount given by politicians in T3 and T4



Figure 4(a): Promise and give in T3



Figure 4(b): Promise and give in T4

Table 1. Summary statistics of average giving, zero-giving, and 50:50-giving across treatments and pair wise comparisons across treatments (*ttest*) for politicians

	Average giving (Rs)	Zero-giving (# of times, %)	50:50-giving (# of times, %)	Average promised amount (Rs)
T1	13.33 (34.57*)	87	0	___
T2	356.60 (291.88)	27	32	___
T3	80.33 (86.40)	37	0	87.00 (95.23)
T4	459.67 (302.69)	14	45	480.64 (263.54)

*SD in parenthesis

ttest

T1 vs T2	6.39* (0.00)	–6.39* (0.00)	3.71* (0.00)	__
T1 vs T3	3.94* (0.00)	–4.56* (0.00)	___	__
T2 vs T4	1.85*(0.06)	–1.59 (0.11)	1.43 (0.15)	__
T3 vs T4	6.71* (0.00)	–2.46* (0.01)	4.91* (0.00)	7.91* (0.00)
T1 vs T4	8.02* (0.00)	–9.21* (0.00)	4.91* (0.00)	__
T2 vs T3	–5.04* (0.00)	–0.97 (0.33)	3.71* (0.00)	__

*represents significant at 5% level (*p*-values are in parenthesis). Note that two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests show the similar findings.

Table 2. Amount given by politicians in four treatments

Amount Given (x)	T1			T2			T3			T4		
	#	%	Cum.	#	%	Cum.	#	%	Cum.	#	%	Cum.
$x = 0$	26	86.67	86.67	14	26.42	26.42	11	36.67	36.67	9	14.52	14.52
$100 \geq x > 0$	4	13.33	100	1	1.89	28.30	11	36.66	73.33	6	9.68	24.19
$200 \geq x > 100$	--	--	--	3	5.66	33.96	6	20.00	93.33	2	3.23	27.42
$300 \geq x > 200$	--	--	--	9	16.98	50.94	2	6.67	100	1	1.61	29.03
$400 \geq x > 300$	--	--	--	2	3.77	54.72	--	--	--	1	1.61	30.65
$500 > x > 400$	--	--	--	0	0.0	54.72	--	--	--	0	0	30.65
$x = 500$	--	--	--	17	32.08	86.79	--	--	--	28	45.16	75.81
$600 \geq x > 500$	--	--	--	1	1.89	88.68	--	--	--	3	4.84	80.65
$700 \geq x > 600$	--	--	--	1	1.89	90.57	--	--	--	1	1.61	82.26
$800 \geq x > 700$	--	--	--	0	0.0	90.57	--	--	--	3	4.84	87.10
$900 \geq x > 800$	--	--	--	1	1.89	92.45	--	--	--	1	1.61	88.71
$1000 \geq x > 900$	--	--	--	4	7.55	100.0	--	--	--	7	11.29	100
# of Observations	30			53			30			62		

Table 3. Amount promised and mean amount given versus amount promised, politicians

Amount promised	T3				T4			
	Amount promised			Amount given—amount promised	Amount promised			Amount given—amount promised
	Number	%	Cum.	Mean	Number	%	Cum.	Mean
0	11	37	37	0	6	9.68	9.68	33.33
10	1	3	40	0	--	--	--	--
50	3	10	50	0	--	--	--	--
100	6	20	70	0	6	9.68	19.35	0
150	5	17	87	0	--	--	--	--
200	1	3	90	0	--	--	--	--
300	3	10	100	–200	1	1.61	20.97	–100
400	--	--	--	--	1	1.61	22.58	0
500	--	--	--	--	33	53.23	75.81	6.06
600	--	--	--	--	4	6.45	82.26	–150
700	--	--	--	--	3	4.84	87.10	–33.33
800	--	--	--	--	2	3.23	90.32	0
900	--	--	--	--	1	1.61	91.94	–900
1000	--	--	--	--	5	8.06	100	0
Total	30				62			

Table 4. Promise-keeping, politicians

	T3			T4		
Give – promise	**Number**	**Percent**	**Cum. percentage**	**Number**	**Percent**	**Cum. percentage**
–900	0	0	0	1	1.61	1.61
–600	0	0	0	1	1.61	3.23
–500	0	0	0	2	3.23	6.45
–200	1	3	3	2	3.23	9.68
– 100	0	0	3	1	1.61	11.29
0	29	97	100	50	80.65	91.94
100	0	0	100	1	1.61	93.55
200	0	0	100	1	1.61	95.16
400	0	0	100	1	1.61	96.77
500	0	0	100	2	3.23	100
Observation	30			62		

Table 5. Regression results (politicians)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
T2	422.91* (std error: 62.77; t-stat: 6.74; p-value: 0.00)	– 1.86* (std error: 0.38; z-stat: – 4.79; p-value: 0.00)	--
T3	62.22 (std error: 66.64; t-stat: 0.93; p-value: 0.35)	– 1.25* (std error: 0.39; z-stat: – 3.19; p-value: 0.00)	
T4	448.19* (std error: 56.52; t-stat: 7.93; p-value: 0.00)	– 2.11* (std error: 0.36; z-stat: – 5.84; p-value: 0.00)	
Politician	--	--	0.91* (0.29)
Controls?	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-square/Pseudo-R-square	0.36	0.22	0.36
No. of observations	172	166	103

Notes: controls: caste and occupation dummies, years of education, age, gender, state dummy; Col (1): dependent variable: amount given, Col (2): Dependent variable: Dummy if give=0, 0 otherwise; Col (3): Dependent variable: dummy if (give – promise) is 0, 0 otherwise. For col. (1), the estimator is OLS; for cols. (2) and (3), the estimator is probit.

Table 6. Summary of regression results, pair wise comparison of treatments

	Give	Adj. R^2	Zero-giving	Pseudo R^2	Controls	Observation
T1 vs T2						
T2	367.40* (58.80)	0.61	–1.69* (0.35)	0.27	Yes	83
T2 vs T4						
T4	143.48* (55.65)	0.63	–0.37 (0.39)	0.05	Yes	114
T1 vs T3						
T3	61.29* (16.48)	0.50	–1.82* (0.49)	0.41	Yes	60
T3 vs T4						
T4	381.04* (56.02)	0.70	–0.73* (0.33)	0.09	Yes	92

Table 7. Elicited norm of equal-sharing for politicians

Give	Mean	--	-	+	++
"Give 0"	1.88 (1.22)	0.60	0.10	0.10	0.20
"Give 100"	2.71 (0.97)	0.13	0.28	0.35	0.24
"Give 200"	2.89 (0.93)	0.11	0.19	0.42	0.28
"Give 300"	2.46 (1.09)	0.26	0.23	0.31	0.20
"Give 400"	3.00 (1.04)	0.14	0.15	0.30	0.41
"Give 500"	2.82 (1.15)	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.41
"Give 600"	2.45 (1.13)	0.28	0.24	0.25	0.23
"Give 700"	1.81 (1.08)	0.56	0.20	0.10	0.14
"Give 800"	2.24 (1.20)	0.40	0.19	0.18	0.23
"Give 900"	2.28 (1.13)	0.31	0.34	0.12	0.23
"Give 1000"	1.91 (1.25)	0.58	0.17	0.01	0.24
# of observations	120				

**$p<0.05$, all one-tailed

Responses are: "very socially inappropriate" (- -), "somewhat socially inappropriate" (-), "somewhat socially appropriate" (+), "very socially appropriate" (+ +). To construct the mean ratings, we converted responses into numerical scores ("very socially inappropriate" (- -) = 1, "somewhat socially inappropriate" (-) = 2, "somewhat socially appropriate"(+) = 3, "very socially appropriate" (+ +) = 4).

Table 8. Elicited norm of promise-keeping for politicians

Action	Mean	--	-	+	++
Promise Rs.0 and give Rs.0	1.90	63.33	9.17	0.83	26.67
Promise Rs.0 and give more than Rs.0	2.65	13.33	27.50	40.00	19.17
Promise Rs.500 and give Rs.500	3.51	9.17	5.83	9.17	75.83
Promise Rs.500 and give Rs.0	1.42	74.17	14.17	6.67	5.00
Promise Rs.500 and give more than Rs.500	3.12	6.72	16.81	33.61	42.86
Promise Rs.500 and give any amount in between Rs.200 and Rs.400	2.4	23.33	33.33	23.33	20.00
Promise Rs.1000 and give Rs.1000	3.39	15.83	3.33	6.67	74.17
Promise Rs.1000 and give Rs.0	1.39	77.50	10.83	6.67	5.00
Promise Rs.1000 and give Rs.500	2.14	30.00	34.17	27.50	8.33
Promise Rs.1000 and give less than Rs.1000	2.12	31.09	32.77	28.57	7.56
Promise more than Rs.500 and give the promised amount	3.4	9.17	8.33	15.83	66.67
Promise in between Rs.200 and Rs.400 and give the promised amount	3.15	14.29	11.76	18.49	55.46
Promise in between Rs.200 and Rs.400 and give less than the promised amount	2.03	41.67	27.50	16.67	14.17

--, socially inappropriate; -, somewhat socially inappropriate; +, somewhat socially appropriate; ++, socially appropriate

Table 9. Comparisons between politicians and non-politicians across treatments

	Promise-keeping (%)		Average giving (Rs.)		Average promise (Rs.)		50:50 (%)		Zero-giving (%)	
	Pol	Non-pol	Pol	Non-pol	Pol	Non-pol	Pol	Non-pol	Pol	Non-pol
T1	x	x	13.33	5	x	x	0	0	87	93
T2	x	x	356	335	x	x	32.08	35.48	26.42	19.35
T3	96	100	80	41.33	87.33	41.33	0	0	37	43
T4	81	55	460	402	519	467	45.16	35.71	14.52	19.05

Appendix

Table A1. Summary statistics, politicians and non-politicians characteristics

	Lab-in-the-Field	
	Politicians – Means	Non-Politicians – Means
Female	0.34 (0.47)	0.50 (0.50)
Years of Education	9.64 (3.93)	8.71 (3.88)
Age	40.52 (11.14)	38.01 (12.09)
Forward Caste (per cent)	44%	50%
Other Caste (per cent)	50%	44%
Farmer (per cent)	50%	48%
Number - West Bengal	149	119
Number -Uttar Pradesh	26	14
Total Number	175	133

Note: Standard deviations in brackets.

Table A2. Summary statistics of average giving, zero-giving, and 50:50-giving across treatments and pair wise comparisons across treatments (*ttest*) for non-politicians

	Average giving (Rs)	Zero-giving (%)	50:50-giving (%)	Average promised amount (Rs)
T1	5.00 (20.12)	93	0	__
T2	335.48 (256.31)	19	35	__
T3	41.33 (50.63)	43	0	41.33 (9.24)
T4	402.38 (281.53)	19	35	466.66 (230.23)

* SD in parenthesis

Ttest: pairwise ttest of average giving, zero-giving, 50:50 giving, and promised amount among non-politicians (two-way ttest, p-values in parenthesis)

T1 vs T2	7.03*(0.00)	—8.56* (0.00)	3.99* (0.00)	__
T1 vs T3	3.65* (0.00)	—4.85* (0.00)	___	__
T2 vs T4	1.04 (0.30)	—0.03 (0.97)	0.02 (0.98)	__
T3 vs T4	6.93* (0.00)	—2.28* (0.02)	4.02* (0.00)	9.92* (0.00)
T1 vs T4	7.70* (0.00)	—9.00* (0.00)	4.02* (0.00)	__
T2 vs T3	—6.16* (0.00)	—2.05* (0.04)	3.99* (0.00)	__

Table A3. Amount given by non-politicians in four treatments

Amount Given (x)	T1			T2			T3			T4		
	#	%	Cum.	#	%	Cum.	#	%	Cum.	#	%	Cum.
$x = 0$	28	93.33	93.33	6	19.35	19.35	13	43.33	43.33	8	19.05	19.05
$100 \geq x > 0$	2	6.67	100	4	12.90	32.26	14	46.67	90.00	1	2.28	21.43
$200 \geq x > 100$				2	6.45	38.71	3	10.00	100	6	14.29	35.71
$300 \geq x > 200$				3	9.68	48.39				1	2.38	38.10
$400 \geq x > 300$				2	6.45	54.84				2	4.76	42.86
$500 > x > 400$				0	0.0	54.84				0	0	42.86
$x = 500$				11	35.48	90.32				15	35.71	78.57
$600 \geq x > 500$				1	3.23	93.55				2	4.76	83.33
$700 \geq x > 600$				0	0.0	93.55				3	7.14	90.48
$800 \geq x > 700$				1	3.23	96.77				1	2.38	92.86
$900 \geq x > 800$				0	0.0	96.77				1	2.38	95.24
$1000 \geq x > 900$				1	3.23	100.0				2	4.76	100
# of Observations	30			31			30			42		

Table A4. Amount promised and mean amount given-amount promised, non-politicians

Amount Promised	Amount Promised			Amount Given-Amount Promised
	Number	%	Cum.	Mean
0	3	7.14	7.14	0
100	2	4.76	11.90	400
200	4	9.52	21.43	0
300	1	2.38	23.81	0
400	1	2.38	26.19	-200
500	21	50.00	76.19	-71.42
600	3	7.14	83.33	33.33
700	3	7.14	90.48	-100
800	2	4.76	95.24	-150
900	1	2.38	97.62	-300
1000	1	2.38	100	-1000
Total Number	42			

Table A5. Promise-keeping, non-politicians

	T3			T4		
Give-Promise	**Number**	**Per cent**	**Cum. Percentage**	**Number**	**Per cent**	**Cum. Percentage**
-1000	0	0	0	1	2.38	2.38
-500	0	0	0	4	9.52	11.90
-300	0	0	0	3	7.14	19.05
-200	0	0	0	2	4.76	23.81
-100	0	0	0	4	9.52	33.33
0	30	100	100	23	54.76	88.10
100	0	0	100	2	4.76	92.86
500	0	0	100	2	4.76	97.62
800	0	0	100	1	2.38	100
Observation	30			42		

Table A6. Regression results for non-politicians

	(1)	(2)
T2	342.30* (std error: 64.57; t-stat: 5.30; p-value: 0.00)	-1.78* (std error: 0.50; z-stat: -3.52; p-value: 0.00)
T3	57.44 (std error: 57.13; t-stat: 1.01; p-value: 0.31)	-1.44* (std error: 0.45; z-stat: -3.09; p-value: 0.00)
T4	407.16* (std error: 61.63; t-stat: 6.61; p-value: 0.00)	-2.02* (std error: 0.35; z-stat: -4.08; p-value: 0.00)
Controls?	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-square/Pseudo-R-square	0.46	0.42
No of Observations	131	131

Notes: controls: caste and occupation dummies, years of education, age, gender, state dummy; Col (1): dependent variable: amount given, Col (2): dependent variable: dummy if give=0, 0 otherwise; For col. (1), the estimator is OLS, and for cols. (2), the estimator is probit.

Table A7. Elicited norm of equal-sharing for politicians and non-politicians

Action	Respondents	Mean	--	-	+	++	t-statistic
"Give 0"	Politician	1.88 (1.22)	0.60	0.10	0.10	0.20	2.17*
	Non-Politician	1.56 (1.02)	0.72	0.10	0.08	0.10	
"Give 100"	Politician	2.71 (0.97)	0.13	0.28	0.35	0.24	1.88*
	Non-Politician	2.48 (1.02)	0.20	0.30	0.31	0.19	
"Give 200"	Politician	2.89 (0.93)	0.11	0.19	0.42	0.28	1.95*
	Non-Politician	2.66 (0.89)	0.15	0.16	0.55	0.14	
"Give 300"	Politician	2.46 (1.09)	0.26	0.23	0.31	0.20	0.35
	Non-Politician	2.41 (1.07)	0.27	0.21	0.34	0.18	
"Give 400"	Politician	3.00 (1.04)	0.14	0.15	0.30	0.41	0.70
	Non-Politician	2.91 (0.97)	0.12	0.17	0.40	0.31	
"Give 500"	Politician	2.82 (1.15)	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.41	-0.22
	Non-Politician	2.85 (1.15)	0.16	0.24	0.17	0.43	
"Give 600"	Politician	2.45 (1.13)	0.28	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.22
	Non-Politician	2.42 (1.17)	0.30	0.23	0.21	0.26	
"Give 700"	Politician	1.81 (1.08)	0.56	0.20	0.10	0.14	-0.45
	Non-Politician	1.88 (1.17)	0.58	0.11	0.14	0.17	
"Give 800"	Politician	2.24 (1.20)	0.40	0.19	0.18	0.23	0.26
	Non-Politician	2.2 (1.24)	0.44	0.17	0.14	0.25	
"Give 900"	Politician	2.28 (1.13)	0.31	0.34	0.12	0.23	0.65
	Non-Politician	2.18 (1.21)	0.42	0.20	0.14	0.24	
"Give 1000"	Politician	1.91 (1.25)	0.58	0.17	0.01	0.24	0.05
	Non-Politician	1.90 (1.30)	0.63	0.09	0.02	0.26	

**p<0.05, all one-tailed
Responses are: "very socially inappropriate" (- -), "somewhat socially inappropriate" (-), "somewhat socially appropriate" (+), "very socially appropriate" (+ +). To construct the mean ratings, we converted responses into numerical scores ("very socially inappropriate" (- -) = 1, "somewhat socially inappropriate" (-) = 2, "somewhat socially appropriate"(+) = 3, "very socially appropriate" (+ +) = 4).

Table A8. Elicited norm of promise-keeping for politicians and non-politicians

(--) => Socially Inappropriate; (-) => Somewhat Socially Inappropriate;; (+) => Somewhat Socially Appropriate; (++) => Socially

Action	Respondents	Mean	--	-	+	++	t-statistic
Promise Rs. 0 and Give Rs 0	Politician	1.90	63.33	9.17	0.83	26.67	0.60
	Non-Politician	1.80	66.67	9.17	0.83	23.33	
Promise Rs. 0 and Give more than Rs 0	Politician	2.65	13.33	27.50	40.00	19.17	-1.81*
	Non-Politician	2.85	6.67	22.50	49.17	21.67	
Promise Rs 500 and Give Rs 500	Politician	3.51	9.17	5.83	9.17	75.83	0.49
	Non-Politician	3.45	6.67	5.83	22.50	65.00	
Promise Rs 500 and Give Rs 0	Politician	1.42	74.17	14.17	6.67	5.00	0.15
	Non-Politician	1.40	77.50	9.17	8.33	5.00	
Promise Rs 500 and more than Rs 500	Politician	3.12	6.72	16.81	33.61	42.86	2.00*
	Non-Politician	2.86	14.41	22.03	26.27	37.29	
Promise Rs 500 and give any amount in between Rs 200 and Rs 400	Politician	2.4	23.33	33.33	23.33	20.00	-3.30*
	Non-Politician	2.85	13.33	23.33	28.33	35.00	
Promise Rs. 1000 and Give Rs 1000	Politician	3.39	15.83	3.33	6.67	74.17	0.89
	Non-Politician	3.25	17.50	6.67	8.33	67.50	
Promise Rs. 1000 and Give Rs 0	Politician	1.39	77.50	10.83	6.67	5.00	0.72
	Non-Politician	1.31	82.50	8.33	4.17	5.00	
Promise Rs 1000 and Give Rs 500	Politician	2.14	30.00	34.17	27.50	8.33	-2.31*
	Non-Politician	2.42	19.17	32.50	35.00	13.33	
Promise Rs 1000 and Give less than Rs 1000	Politician	2.12	31.09	32.77	28.57	7.56	-2.63*
	Non-Politician	2.46	25.00	20.83	36.67	17.50	
Promise more than Rs 500 and give the promised amount	Politician	3.4	9.17	8.33	15.83	66.67	0.04
	Non-Politician	3.39	6.72	9.24	21.85	62.18	
Promise in between Rs 200 and Rs 400 and give the promised amount	Politician	3.15	14.29	11.76	18.49	55.46	-0.06
	Non-Politician	3.15	9.24	17.65	21.01	52.10	
Promise in between Rs 200 and Rs 400 and give less than the promised amount	Politician	2.03	41.67	27.50	16.67	14.17	-1.76*
	Non-Politician	2.29	34.17	27.50	13.33	25.00	

Appropriate. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of observation is 240.

Figure A1. Promise versus amount given (give), non-politicians



Figure A2. Amount given, no promise and promise treatments, non-politicians



1 Appendix

1.1 Theoretical Framework : Proofs of propositions

Proof of Proposition 1. *i*) NPA-games: In a NPA-game, every dictator behaves as a selfish individual because $\mathcal{I}^p = \mathcal{I}^a = 0$ and offers zero *ii*)PA-games: consider any subgame starting at the information set in which a dictator has to split the prize, after having made a promise: in the unique Nash equilibrium a sincere dictator fulfills the promise that he has made. It follows that in every SPNE a sincere dictator makes the promise that maximizes her ex-post utility in case he has to decide how to split the prize, $p^* = \frac{1}{4}\alpha^2$. Deceitful dictators do not receive any utility from fulfilling a promise and therefore distribute zero.

Proof of Proposition 2. First we prove that that there are no equilibria in which both h and l types dictators distribute a positive amount. It is straightforward to observe that if a h-type or l-type dictator distributes a positives amount, then she distributes her reference split ,$\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{2} - t$, respectively, because all other strategies with $x > 0$ are dominated. Suppose, then, that in equilibrium h-type dictators offer $\frac{1}{2}$, l-type dictators offer $\frac{1}{2} - t > 0$. Since no dictator distributes zero amount, if R observes that he has received zero , then his beliefs are such that Nature has intervened with probability 1 and $\widehat{x}^R(0) = \gamma\frac{1}{2} + (1-\gamma)(\frac{1}{2} - t) \geq \frac{1}{2} - t$, and a l-type dictator can profitably deviate offering zero. It follows that in every equilibrium $l - type$ dictators offer zero with positive probability. If both types offer zero in equilibrium, then $\widehat{x}^R(0) = 0$, contradicting that offering zero is a best response for an $h - type$. Suppose both $h - type$ and $l - type$ play a mixed strategy in equilibrium. Since offering any $x > 0$ different than $\frac{1}{2} - t^k$ is a dominated strategy for type k, then dictators can only mix offering zero with some positive probability and $\frac{1}{2} - t^k$ with complementary probability. But then it must be that for $h-type$, $\frac{1}{2} = 1 - L(\frac{1}{2} - \widehat{x}^R(0))$ therefore $\frac{\frac{1}{2}(L-1)}{L} = \widehat{x}^R(0)$ and for an $l - type$, $\frac{1}{2} + t = 1 - L(\frac{1}{2} - t - \widehat{x}^R(0))$ or $\widehat{x}^R(0) = \frac{\frac{1}{2}(L-1)+t(1-L)}{L}$, which is not possible. Suppose then that only $h - type$ dictators play a mix strategy offering zero and $\frac{1}{2}$ with some positive probability and $l - type$ offer $\frac{1}{2} - t$, then offering zero would be a profitable deviation for a $l - type$ dictator because $\hat{x}^R(0) > \frac{1}{2} - t$. Finally, suppose that $h - type$ dictators offer $\frac{1}{2}$ and $l - type$ dictators offer 0. If an $l - type$ dictator distributes zero, he gets a payoff equal to $1 - L(\frac{1}{2} - t - \hat{x}^R(0))$ if $\frac{1}{2} - t > \hat{x}^R(0)$ and 1 if $\frac{1}{2} - t \leq \hat{x}^R(0)$, where R's beliefs about the amount offered by D when receiving $x = 0$ are equal to $\hat{x}^R(0) = \frac{\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}{(1-\gamma)(\pi+\frac{1}{2}(1-\pi))+\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}\frac{1}{2} \equiv \hat{x}_0$, where γ is the probability that a dictator is h-type.

If $\frac{1}{2} - t \leq \widehat{x}_0$ that is if $t \geq \frac{1}{2}(1 - \frac{\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}{(1-\gamma)(\pi+\frac{1}{2}(1-\pi))+\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}) \equiv \hat{t}_0$, then offering zero is clearly a best response. An l-type dictator does not suffer any utility loss in offering zero because respondents' beliefs are such that when observing zero they believe that the dictators is offering more than $\frac{1}{2} - t$. If $t < \hat{t}_0$ then an l-type dictator prefers offering zero if $L(\frac{1}{2} - t - \hat{x}_0) \geq \frac{1}{2} - t$, or $L \leq \frac{\frac{1}{2}-t}{\frac{1}{2}-t-\hat{x}_0}$. If $\frac{1}{2} - t > \hat{x_0}$

and $L > \frac{\frac{1}{2}-t}{\frac{1}{2}-t-\hat{x}_0}$, then it exists an equilibrium in which a $l-type$ plays a mixed strategy offering zero with probability ζ such that $1-L(\frac{1}{2}-t-{x_\zeta}^R(0)) = \frac{1}{2}-t$, where ${x_\zeta}^R(0)$ denote R's beliefs when observing zero, according to this equilibrium in mixed strategy.

Proof. Consider a PNA game. For all dictators who are sincere, that is for h-type and for ls-type, to fulfill the promise in case the promise is higher or equal to the reference split is the best response. In case the promise is positive but lower than the reference split for sincere dictator the best response is to offer the reference split. We then focus on the case in which some sincere dictators promise zero. Receiver' beliefs in a PNA game depend on the promise made by the dictator. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which all dictators promise zero and offer zero. It follows that $\hat{x}^R(0|p=0)=0$, and therefore to deviate and offer $\frac{1}{2}$ would be a profitable deviation for h-type dictators. Suppose that in equilibrium every dictator promises zero but some dictators offer a positive amount. It follows that $\widehat{x}^R(x|p=0)=\overline{x}$, where $\overline{x}$ is the average amount distributed by dictators. If some dictator in this hypothesized equilibrium offers a positive amount, then h-type dictators offer a positive amount, because are those who care more about their image. If a h-type dictator offers a positive amount, she offers $\frac{1}{2}$. By weak monotonicity of beliefs $\hat{x}^R(0|p=0) \leq \hat{x}^R(0|p=\frac{1}{2})$. Since for a h-type dictator the utility promising $p \leq \frac{1}{2}$ is larger than promising any $p' < p$, it follows that there is not an equilibrium in which every dictator promises zero but some dictators offer a positive amount. It follows that in every equilibrium h-type dictators promise a positive amount and distribute an amount at least equal to the promise. By weak monotonicity of beliefs and the fact that sincere dictators directly benefit from a more generous promise, it follows that in every equilibrium h-type dictators promise and offer $\frac{1}{2}$. Consider now ls-dictators. Since they also suffer a disutility loss if they do not fulfill their own promise, then in equilibrium they offer an amount at least equal to the promise. Suppose first that both ls and ld dictators promise zero and offer zero. It follows that $\hat{x}^R(0|p=0)=0$ and to offer $\frac{1}{2}-t$ is a profitable deviation. Suppose that both ls and ld dictators promise zero and then offer a positive amount, but for ls-dictators to deviate and promise $\frac{1}{2}-t$ would be a profitable deviation (due to weak monotonicity of beliefs). Following a similar argument made for h-type dictators, ls-type dictators in equilibrium promise and offer an amount equal to $\frac{1}{2}-t$. Finally ld-dictators promise $\frac{1}{2}$ (or play a mixed strategy promising $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{2}-t$ such that the beliefs associated to this two promises are the same) and offer zero if either $\widehat{x}^R(0|p=\frac{1}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2}-t$ or $\widehat{x}^R(0|p=\frac{1}{2}) < \frac{1}{2}-t$ and $1-L(\frac{1}{2}-t-\widehat{x}^R(0|p=\frac{1}{2}) \geq \frac{1}{2}-t$, where in this equilibrium $\widehat{x}^R(0|p=\frac{1}{2}) = \frac{\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}{\beta(1-\frac{1}{2}(1-\pi))+\gamma(1-\pi)\frac{1}{2}}$ and β is the probability that a dictator is ld-type; otherwise they offer $\frac{1}{2}-t$.

1.2 Experimental design in details

Our implementation of the design is described in the following steps.

1.2.1 No promise, anonymous (i.e., NPA) treatment (T1)

(1) Participants from the home-village (where the venue was located) and the visitor-village (i.e., from distant locations)–10 politicians and 10 non-politicians from each village–arrived separately at the experimental venue and seated in two different rooms. Participants from home-village did not meet participants from visitor-village before entering the lab, during the experiment, or after the experiment. In each room, there were 20 participants–10 politicians and 10 common villagers–and they were from the same village. (3) The experimenter read out and explained the instructions of the game aloud and answered questions from participants. Each participant was then asked to solve a short quiz. Those who could not answer the quiz properly were given an extra explanation from the experimenter. The experimenter made clear that participant names would not be recorded. No communication between subjects was allowed (verbal or any other type). Two practice-rounds of the game were played. (4) Participants in each room were divided into two sections (e.g., A and B) randomly. Each participant in each section in each room was randomly matched with another participant from the same section sitting in other room (e.g., participant x in Section A in Room 1 was randomly matched with participant y from Section A in Room 2) and formed a pair. (5) Participants were told that they would never meet their partners. (6) In each pair, their roles in the game (dictator (D) or recipient (R)) were determined randomly and both politicians and non-politicians could be assigned the role of dictator. We did not change their roles in each round—a randomly chosen dictator remained dictator for the entire session. (7) Each pair received a fixed and known endowment—1000 INR (approx 15.50 USD) —for each round and the dictator had to decide how to allocate the endowment between him/herself and his/her partner (recipient, R) sitting in the next room.

(8) Each D received a random (and confidential) private number between 1 and 10—no other person in the room, not even the experimenter–would know this number. Each D was asked to come in the front desk one by one where each of them picked a chit randomly from an urn containing 10 chits and each chit had a number between 1 and 10. Only a D could see his/her private number, on one else (not even the experimenter). They wrote the number on their decision sheet in private. (9) At the start of each round, the experimenter announced two numbers randomly chosen between 1 and 10 and only those Ds with the corresponding numbers made a decision, other Ds could not. (10) Each D received a decision sheet. They filled in their decision sheets (e.g., their group number, private number, and round number) in an enclosed area one by one. Only Ds whose private numbers were announced could choose and record a distribution on the decision sheet in private, others would just tick a box which stated the nature would give zero to either D or R (see the example of

decision sheet below). (11) All Ds, who made a decision or who ticked a box, folded the decision sheets and put them in an envelope, named, e.g., Round 1-Decisions (Section A or B), themselves. No one (including the experimenter) should be able to identify, during and after the experiment, which individual made a decision and what his or her decision was. The Rs sitting next room, other Ds, and the experimenter knew the probability (i.e., 0.8), but did not know whether nature or D made the decision when the outcome was either zero or the entire endowment of 1000 INR (this can only be true if D chooses the same division as nature).

(12) We repeated steps (9) to (11) four times more and each time the experimenter announced different private numbers (i.e., they played 5 rounds). (13) At the end, one of the five rounds was selected randomly to determine the payments. (14) The envelope of decision sheets for that round was given to an external person waiting outside the venue. The external had no information about the game or about the participants. He observed the decision-sheets of different dictators in a separate room and put the payment in a separate envelope for each dictator and recipient. He also decided whether D or R got INR 1000 when nature intervened by flipping a coin. (15) No one in any of the rooms would know D's actual decision, not even the experimenter. (16) Meanwhile, participants filled in a short questionnaire that covered education, occupation and other demographic and related questions. (17) The external person gave a result sheet (see below) for each Section to the experimenter who then showed the results to each Ds of a Section (A or B) and their corresponding Rs of the same Section sitting in the other room. (18) Each participant left the room one-by-one and received their envelopes from the external with their payments (their earning from the game plus a fixed participation fee of Rs. 300), based on the decisions they or their partners or the nature made, outside the room in a separate enclosed area and left the venue one by one. Participants from the visitor village left the venue first.

1.2.2 No-promise, non-anonymous (i.e., NPNA) treatment (T2)

We followed the following steps. (i) Participants from the home-village and the visitor-village–10 politicians and 10 non-politicians from each village–arrived separately at the experimental venue. Out of 20 participants from the visitor village, 10 participants were randomly chosen to be seated in one room and the others seated in the next room (e.g., each participant from the village randomly picked a chit which showed their room and seat numbers). Similar procedure was followed for home-village participants. Participants from these two different locations did not meet each other before entering the lab. (ii) Following a random matching protocol, a subject from the visitor-village formed a pair/group with a subject from the home-village in each session. (iii) Same as (3) in T1. (iv) Pair members were asked to stand up and greet each other. This was done to increase the moral costs of selfish behaviour (as in AB 2009). (v) Then we followed steps (6), (7), and (8) as in T1. (vi) The Steps (9), (10) and (11) as in T1 . (vii) We repeated Step (vi) four times more (i.e., five rounds were

played) and each time the experimenter announced different private numbers. (viii) See (13), (14), and (16) in T1. (ix) The experimenters received the result and envelopes with cash payments for each subject (each subject's individual id number, same as their seat numbers, written on each envelope) from the external. The experimenters published the result (wrote each pair's earning on a board). Note that if a D chose to give 0 (or 1000), no one in the room could identify whether the D or nature made the decision. But, for any other chosen amount, everybody could understand that the D chose the amount. (x) Each participant received their envelopes with payments and left the venue one by one. The subjects from the visitor-village exited before the local participants .

1.2.3 Promise, anonymous (i.e., PA) Treatment (T3)

We followed step (1) to (8) as in T1. Then all Ds wrote (their pair number, not their private number, and) how they would allocate INR 1000 between him/herself and the R on a 'Promise Slip'. Each D went to an enclosed area and wrote this in private: the D then put the folded the promise-slip into an enclosed envelope and returned it to the experimenter. The experimenter then carried the promise-slip and passed it (without seeing it) on to the respective R sitting next room. Each R observed what his/her partner promised to give him/her in private. The slip was then folded and put in an envelope called Round 1 which is a general envelope specific to a Round. No one in the room except the respective R, not even the experimenter, could observe the promise. The dictator game described in T1 (i.e., Step (9) to (11)) was then played. After that, we repeated the promise-making stage, as described above, and then Step (9) to (11) again four times more and for a total of five rounds. Steps (13) to (18) were then followed.

1.2.4 Promise, non-anonymous (i.e., PNA) Treatment (T4)

We followed step (i) to (v) as in T2. Then all Ds wrote (their pair number, not their private number, and round) how they would allocate INR 1000 between him/herself and the R on a 'Promise Slip'. Each D went to an enclosed area and wrote this in private: the D then folded the promise-slip and returned it to the experimenter who passed it (without seeing it) on to the respective R. Each R observed what his/her partner promised to give him/her in private. The slip was then folded and put in an envelope called Round 1 which is a general envelope specific to a Round. No one in the room except the respective R, not even the experimenter, could observe the promise. The dictator game described in T2 (i.e., Step (vi) to (vii)) was then played. After that, we repeated the promise-making stage, as described above, and then Step (vi) to (vii) again four times more. Steps (viii) to (x) were then followed.

It is important to emphasise that (i) a D can hide his/her actual decision about allocation with a probability of 0.8 (i.e, in each round 2 of 10 dictators would make allocation decisions) and that this probability is fixed and common knowledge; (ii) a D's promise is only seen by the respective R. If a D wants keep

everything for her/himself without losing his/her image in front of the respective R, he could simply make a generous promise to R and then give 0. Then nobody—except the D in question—would know whether nature intervened or the D decided. Accordingly and to reiterate , the D can behave selfishly without being 'found out' by the 'audience'. Notice that any other distribution would reveal the identity of the D who made the decision.

1.3 Innstructions of the experiment

1.3.1 Instructions (Treatment 1)

GROUP NUMBER: _ _ _ _ _

Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce PB, SM, and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today's programme.

Thank you again for participating. Just for agreeing to participate you will automatically be given Rs 300 as a "thank you" payment. Anything else you earn today will be in addition to this.

Your Group Number

Your name will never be recorded in this study, or revealed to anyone. In particular, the researchers will not have any access to your identities (if you have given your names/address etc to your local surveyor, this information will remain with them). Instead, you will be known by your Group Number. You have drawn this number randomly when you have entered the room (also, the number is shown above).

Your Partner

You will be paired with another person sitting in different room in this venue. We'll call this person your partner. In your group number, the first letter indicates your Section (A or B) and next number indicates your Room (1 or 2). Suppose your group number is A1x. You will be matched with A2x, that is someone who is in Section A in Room 2 with a number x. You will never meet (or know the identity) of your partner. Your partner sitting in a different room will noy meet you (or know your identity) too. The decisions made today will concern how much money you and your partner earn.

Your Task

Your group has been given Rs 1000 to divide between the two of you. Although you and your partner are in the same group, only one of the two partners will have responsibility for deciding for how to divide the Rs 1000.

Even though only one of you makes decisions, it is very important for everyone to understand how decisions will be made, so please pay attention to all of the instructions.

Decision making partner

We will randomly select one person from each pair as Decision Making partner (or D). The decision making partner could be selected from this room or from the other room. We will ask each person on the right/left side of the room to pick a chit from an urn. In each chit, it is written either D or R (recipient

partner). If you pick D, then you will make decision how to allocate Rs 100 between you and your partner. We will explain below the procedure of choosing your decision.

Private number

Each D should please come in the front desk one by one. Each of you will pick a chit randomly from an urn containing 10 chits and each chit has a number between 1 and 10. We call it as 'private number'—it is private and confidential. Only a D can see his/her private number, on one else (not even the experimenter). Please write the number on your decision sheet in private and do not show this to anybody in the room.

Then one of the following two things will happen:

EITHER...

We'll let the decision making partner chose a division of the Rs 1000 by filling in a line like the following (see the example of Decision Sheet):

"Distribute Rs 1000: I allocate _____ to myself, and _____ to my partner."

Notice that the amounts in the two blank spaces must sum to Rs 1000.

No one here will see what this person writes – not even his/her partner.

In 2 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will choose.

OR...

We will automatically allocate Rs 1000 to one partner and Rs 0 to the other partner. Someone in another room will flip a coin to determine which partner gets Rs 1000 and which get Rs 0.

In 8 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will be forced to choose.

We will announce at the beginning of each round who can make a decision. For example, we may say those who have private numbers 3 and 8 will choose the distribution. Others, will tick the box where it shows he/she has no control over decision making.

Everyone in this room will know how the Rs 1000 was divided between the two partners in each group. But no one will be able to understand, even the experimenter, whether the decision making partner made this choice, or whether nature made it automatically. No one will be able to understand what private number the deciding partner received, not even the experimenter, or whether the coin flip came up heads or tails.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the decision maker:

- If your division is Rs 1000 for yourself and Rs 0 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- Likewise, if your division is Rs 0 for yourself and Rs 1000 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- However, if you choose any other division – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 for yourself and the rest for your partner – everyone will be able to figure out that you are responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the other partner:

- If you are allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you are allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it
- However, if you are allocated any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that your partner is responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of everyone else (including the experimenter) in the room:

- If you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- However, if any partner receives any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that the decision making partner is responsible for this choice.

The Decision Sheets

The decision maker will actually receive five sheets, and need to make five different decisions. All of the decisions have the same form as the one we've just described. See the example below.

Only one of these decisions will count. After all decisions are made we will randomly select one of the five decision sheets and use only that one decision sheet to determine payments. It makes good sense, therefore, to make each decision as if it will actually be carried out.

We're going to start the random draw of private number. One by one, each decision maker will come to the front of the room, carrying the envelope containing the blank decision sheets. There he/will pick a chit and a number from 1 to 10 comes up. The number on the chit will be his private number. To make sure he doesn't forget this number, he'll write it on each decision sheet before returning to his station. No one else will see this number.

At the end, we will publish the result as described above to each participant of each member, i.e., all the decision making partners in Section A of this room and all the recipients in Section A in other room will see the Results Sheet (see an example (see 'Result Sheet') below).

1.3.2 Instructions (Treatment 2)

GROUP NUMBER: _ _ _ _ _

Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce PB, SM, and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today's programme.

Thank you again for participating. Just for agreeing to participate you will automatically be given Rs 300 as a "thank you" payment. Anything else you earn today will be in addition to this.

Your Group Number

Your name will never be recorded in this study, or revealed to anyone. In particular, the researchers will not have any access to your identities (if you have given your names/address etc to your local surveyor, this information will remain with them). Instead, you will be known by your Group Number. You have drawn this number randomly when you have entered the room (also, the number is shown above).

Your Partner

You will be paired with another person in the room today. We'll call this person your partner. The decisions made today will concern how much money you and your partner earn.

Before we tell you about the decisions, we will take a minute to introduce you to your partner. You and your partner have the same Group Number, but are sitting on opposite sides of the room.

We'll start at the front of the room. We will first ask the two in Group Number 1 to stand and face each other. Then each should say to their partner, "Hello (or wave their hands to each other)." We'll then ask Group 2 to do the same, and will repeat this for all groups.

Your Task

Your group has been given Rs 1000 to divide between the two of you. Although you and your partner are in the same group, only one of the two partners will have responsibility for deciding for how to divide the Rs 1000.

Even though only one of you makes decisions, it is very important for everyone to understand how decisions will be made, so please pay attention to all of the instructions.

Decision making partner

We will randomly select one person from each pair as Decision Making partner (or D). We will ask each person on the right/left side of the room to pick a chit from an urn. In each chit, it is written either D or R (recipient partner). If you pick D, they you will make decision how to allocate Rs 100 between you and your partner. We will explain below the procedure of choosing your decision.

Private number

Each D should please come in the front desk one by one. Each of you will pick a chit randomly from an urn containing 10 chits and each chit has a number between 1 and 10. We call it as 'private number'—it is private and confidential. Only a D can see his/her private number, on one else (not even the experimenter). Please write the number on your decision sheet in private and do not show this to anybody in the room.

Then one of the following two things will happen:

EITHER...

We'll let the decision making partner chose a division of the Rs 1000 by filling in a line like the following (see the example of Decision Sheet):

"Distribute Rs 1000: I allocate _____ to myself, and _____ to my partner."

Notice that the amounts in the two blank spaces must sum to Rs 1000.

No one here will see what this person writes – not even his/her partner.

In 2 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will choose.

OR...

We will automatically allocate Rs 1000 to one partner and Rs 0 to the other partner. Someone in another room will flip a coin to determine which partner gets Rs 1000 and which get Rs 0.

In 8 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will be forced to choose.

We will announce at the beginning of each round who can make a decision. For example, we may say those who have private numbers 3 and 8 will choose the distribution. Others, will tick the box where it shows he/she has no control over decision making.

Everyone in this room will know how the Rs 1000 was divided between the two partners in each group. But no one will be able to understand, even the experimenter, whether the decision making partner made this choice, or whether nature made it automatically. No one will be able to understand what private number the deciding partner received, not even the experimenter, or whether the coin flip came up heads or tails.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the decision maker:

- If your division is Rs 1000 for yourself and Rs 0 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- Likewise, if your division is Rs 0 for yourself and Rs 1000 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- However, if you choose any other division – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 for yourself and the rest for your partner – everyone will be able to figure out that you are responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the other partner:

- If you are allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you are allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it
- However, if you are allocated any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that your partner is responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of everyone else (including the experimenter) in the room:

- If you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.

- However, if any partner receives any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that the decision making partner is responsible for this choice.

The Decision Sheets

The decision maker will actually receive five sheets, and need to make five different decisions. All of the decisions have the same form as the one we've just described. See the example below.

Only one of these decisions will count. After all decisions are made we will randomly select one of the five decision sheets and use only that one decision sheet to determine payments. It makes good sense, therefore, to make each decision as if it will actually be carried out.

We're going to start the random draw of private number. One by one, each decision maker will come to the front of the room, carrying the envelope containing the blank decision sheets. There he/will pick a chit and a number from 1 to 10 comes up. The number on the chit will be his private number. To make sure he doesn't forget this number, he'll write it on each decision sheet before returning to his station. No one else will see this number.

At the end, we will publish the result as described above. See an example (see 'Result Sheet') below how we publish the results.

1.3.3 Instructions (Treatment 3)

GROUP NUMBER: _____

Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce PB, SM, and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today's programme.

Thank you again for participating. Just for agreeing to participate you will automatically be given Rs 300 as a "thank you" payment. Anything else you earn today will be in addition to this.

Your Group Number

Your name will never be recorded in this study, or revealed to anyone. In particular, the researchers will not have any access to your identities (if you have given your names/address etc to your local surveyor, this information will remain with them). Instead, you will be known by your Group Number. You have drawn this number randomly when you have entered the room (also, the number is shown above).

Your Partner

You will be paired with another person sitting in different room in this venue. We'll call this person your partner. In your group number, the first letter indicates your Section (A or B) and next number indicates your Room (1 or 2). Suppose your group number is A1x. You will be matched with A2x, that is someone who is in Section A in Room 2 with a number x. You will never meet (or know the identity) of your partner. Your partner sitting in a different room will not meet you (or know your identity) too. The decisions made today will concern how much money you and your partner earn.

Your Task

Your group has been given Rs 1000 to divide between the two of you. Although you and your partner are in the same group, only one of the two partners will have responsibility for deciding for how to divide the Rs 1000.

Even though only one of you makes decisions, it is very important for everyone to understand how decisions will be made, so please pay attention to all of the instructions.

Decision making partner

We will randomly select one person from each pair as Decision Making partner (or D). The decision making partner could be selected from this room or from the other room. We will ask each person on the right/left side of the room to pick a chit from an urn. In each chit, it is written either D or R (recipient partner). If you pick D, then you will make decision how to allocate Rs 100 between you and your partner. We will explain below the procedure of choosing your decision.

Private number

Each D should please come in the front desk one by one. Each of you will pick a chit randomly from an urn containing 10 chits and each chit has a number between 1 and 10. We call it as 'private number'—it is private and confidential. Only a D can see his/her private number, on one else (not even the experimenter). Please write the number on your decision sheet in private and do not show this to anybody in the room.

Then one of the following two things will happen:

EITHER...

We'll let the decision making partner chose a division of the Rs 1000 by filling in a line like the following (see the example of Decision Sheet):

"Distribute Rs 1000: I allocate _____ to myself, and _____ to my partner."

Notice that the amounts in the two blank spaces must sum to Rs 1000.

No one here will see what this person writes – not even his/her partner.

In 2 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will choose.

OR...

We will automatically allocate Rs 1000 to one partner and Rs 0 to the other partner. Someone in another room will flip a coin to determine which partner gets Rs 1000 and which get Rs 0.

In 8 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will be forced to choose.

We will announce at the beginning of each round who can make a decision. For example, we may say those who have private numbers 3 and 8 will choose the distribution. Others, will tick the box where it shows he/she has no control over decision making.

Everyone in this room will know how the Rs 1000 was divided between the two partners in each group. But no one will be able to understand, even the experimenter, whether the decision making partner made this choice, or whether nature made it automatically. No one will be able to understand what private number the deciding partner received, not even the experimenter, or whether the coin flip came up heads or tails.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the decision maker:

- If your division is Rs 1000 for yourself and Rs 0 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- Likewise, if your division is Rs 0 for yourself and Rs 1000 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- However, if you choose any other division – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 for yourself and the rest for your partner – everyone will be able to figure out that you are responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the other partner:

- If you are allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you are allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it
- However, if you are allocated any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that your partner is responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of everyone else (including the experimenter) in the room:

- If you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- However, if any partner receives any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that the decision making partner is responsible for this choice.

Promise making

Before the experimenter announces two private numbers who can make decision, the decision making partner will make a promise. He will write in a promise slip how he/she will want to distribute the Rs 1000 between him/herself and his/her partner (see the example of a Promise Slip) sitting in other room.

Then he/she will fold it and give it to the experimenter and the experimenter will carry the slip to his/her partner in the group who is sitting in the other room. After seeing the promise, the receiver will fold the slip and give it back to the experimenter. No one else, not even the experimenter, will see this.

Then the experimenter will announce which two private numbers can choose an allocation and the decision making partner will actually decide how to distribute the money. We will follow the procedure described above.

You will play five rounds and each round, before knowing whether you can choose a decision or not, you will fill in the Promise Slip as described above.

The Decision Sheets

The decision maker will actually receive five sheets, and need to make five different decisions. All of the decisions have the same form as the one we've just described. See the example below.

Only one of these decisions will count. After all decisions are made we will randomly select one of the five decision sheets and use only that one decision sheet to determine payments. It makes good sense, therefore, to make each decision as if it will actually be carried out.

We're going to start the random draw of private number. One by one, each decision maker will come to the front of the room, carrying the envelope containing the blank decision sheets. There he/will pick a chit and a number from 1 to 10 comes up. The number on the chit will be his private number. To make sure he doesn't forget this number, he'll write it on each decision sheet before returning to his station. No one else will see this number.

At the end, we will publish the result as described above to each participant of each member, i.e., all the decision making partners in Section A of this room and all the recipients in Section A in other room will see the Results Sheet (see an example (see 'Result Sheet') below).

1.3.4 Instructions (Treatment 4)

GROUP NUMBER: _____

Welcome. Thank you for taking the time to come today. [Introduce PB, SM, and the assistants.] You can ask any of us questions during today's programme.

Thank you again for participating. Just for agreeing to participate you will automatically be given Rs 300 as a "thank you" payment. Anything else you earn today will be in addition to this.

Your Group Number

Your name will never be recorded in this study, or revealed to anyone. In particular, the researchers will not have any access to your identities (if you have given your names/address etc to your local surveyor, this information will remain with them). Instead, you will be known by your Group Number. You have drawn this number randomly when you have entered the room (also, the number is shown above).

Your Partner

You will be paired with another person in the room today. We'll call this person your partner. The decisions made today will concern how much money you and your partner earn.

Before we tell you about the decisions, we will take a minute to introduce you to your partner. You and your partner have the same Group Number, but are sitting on opposite sides of the room.

We'll start at the front of the room. We will first ask the two in Group Number 1 to stand and face each other. Then each should say to their partner, "Hello (or wave their hands to each other)." We'll then ask Group 2 to do the same, and will repeat this for all groups.

Your Task

Your group has been given Rs 1000 to divide between the two of you. Although you and your partner are in the same group, only one of the two partners will have responsibility for deciding for how to divide the Rs 1000.

Even though only one of you makes decisions, it is very important for everyone to understand how decisions will be made, so please pay attention to all of the instructions.

Decision making partner

We will randomly select one person from each pair as Decision Making partner (or D). We will ask each person on the right/left side of the room to pick a chit from an urn. In each chit, it is written either D or R (recipient partner). If you pick D, they you will make decision how to allocate Rs 100 between you and your partner. We will explain below the procedure of choosing your decision.

Private number

Each D should please come in the front desk one by one. Each of you will pick a chit randomly from an urn containing 10 chits and each chit has a number between 1 and 10. We call it as 'private number'—it is private and confidential. Only a D can see his/her private number, on one else (not even the experimenter). Please write the number on your decision sheet in private and do not show this to anybody in the room.

Then one of the following two things will happen:

EITHER...

We'll let the decision making partner chose a division of the Rs 1000 by filling in a line like the following (see the example of Decision Sheet):

"Distribute Rs 1000: I allocate _____ to myself, and _____ to my partner."

Notice that the amounts in the two blank spaces must sum to Rs 1000.

No one here will see what this person writes – not even his/her partner.

In 2 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will choose.

OR...

We will automatically allocate Rs 1000 to one partner and Rs 0 to the other partner. Someone in another room will flip a coin to determine which partner gets Rs 1000 and which get Rs 0.

In 8 out of 10 cases, the decision making partner will be forced to choose.

We will announce at the beginning of each round who can make a decision. For example, we may say those who have private numbers 3 and 8 will choose the distribution. Others, will tick the box where it shows he/she has no control over decision making.

Everyone in this room will know how the Rs 1000 was divided between the two partners in each group. But no one will be able to understand, even the experimenter, whether the decision making partner made this choice, or whether nature made it automatically. No one will be able to understand what private number the deciding partner received, not even the experimenter, or whether the coin flip came up heads or tails.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the decision maker:

- If your division is Rs 1000 for yourself and Rs 0 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- Likewise, if your division is Rs 0 for yourself and Rs 1000 for your partner, no one will know whether this was your choice, or our choice.
- However, if you choose any other division – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 for yourself and the rest for your partner – everyone will be able to figure out that you are responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of the other partner:

- If you are allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you are allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether your partner made this choice, or whether we made it
- However, if you are allocated any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that your partner is responsible for this choice.

Thinking about this from the point of view of everyone else (including the experimenter) in the room:

- If you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 0, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- Likewise, if you see that a decision maker is allocated Rs 1000, you won't know whether he/she made this choice, or whether we made it.
- However, if any partner receives any other amount – say Rs 50, Rs 200, Rs 500 or Rs 700 – you'll know that the decision making partner is responsible for this choice.

Promise making

Before the experimenter announces two private numbers who can make decision, the decision making partner will make a promise. He will write in a promise slip how he/she will want to distribute the Rs 1000 between him/herself and his/her partner (see the example of a Promise Slip).

Then he/she will fold it and give it to the experimenter and the experimenter will deliver the slip to his/her partner in the group. After seeing the promise, the receiver will fold the slip and give it back to the experimenter. No one else, not even the experimenter, will see this.

Then the decision making partner will actually decide how to distribute the money. Here's the basic procedure you'll use to distribute the Rs 1000.

You will play five rounds and each round, before knowing whether you can choose a decision or not, you will fill in the Promise Slip as described above.

The Decision Sheets



The decision maker will actually receive five sheets, and need to make five different decisions (and of course five Promise Slip). All of the decisions have the same form as the one we've just described. See the example below.

Only one of these decisions will count. After all decisions are made we will randomly select one of the five decision sheets and use only that one decision sheet to determine payments. It makes good sense, therefore, to make each decision as if it will actually be carried out.

We're going to start the random draw of private number. One by one, each decision maker will come to the front of the room, carrying the envelope containing the blank decision sheets. There he/will pick a chit and a number from 1 to 10 comes up. The number on the chit will be his private number. To make sure he doesn't forget this number, he'll write it on each decision sheet before returning to his station. No one else will see this number.

At the end, we will publish the result as described above. See an example (see 'Result Sheet') below how we publish the results.

Promise Slip

My group number is _____
Round _____

If I get the opportunity to decide, I will divide the group's fund (i.e, Rs 1000) between myself and my partner in the following way:

To me

Rs _____

To my partner

Rs _____

RESULT SHEET

Chosen Decision Sheet: ____

Who made the allocation:

In _____ out of 10 cases, dictator has made the decision

In _____out of 10 cases, the decision has been forced

Group 1 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 2 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 3 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 4 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 5 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 6 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 7 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 8 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 9 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Group 10 Decision maker: Rs. _____; Partner: Rs. _____

Invitation Letter

Name..... Address———————

Respected Sir/ Madam,

Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) and Manchester University (MU) in order to understand the perception of people at various layers of society regarding rural development has selected some villages in the state of West Bengal based on a public lottery. To facilitate such a research study, meetings have been planned at the nearest Community Hall or Gram Panchayat office (GP) of the respective villages very soon. We are happy to inform you that your name has been selected based on a random draw. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary at any stage and would be deeply appreciated.

The villagers who agree to participate in the study would receive a token honorarium of Rs 300 as a mark of gratitude. In addition, there is a scope to earn up to Rs 1000 in a single day depending upon performance of the participant. A certificate of participation will also be issued by Manchester University and ISI as recognition of your valued presence. The study will take place during December 2016 to March 2017 for one day in each and every selected GP for 2 hour (approx.) duration. For the convenience of travel, pick- up and drop facilities from convenient locations will be arranged for you. A refreshment packet would be provided to all the participants after the end of each session.

You will not be asked any sensitive question in the sessions. An interesting game will be conducted in each session with you as a participant. The researchers would explain to you clearly the rules of the game. The final result of the game and the data collected in the course of time would be kept confidential and would be used for research purpose only. As an additional precaution, your name and identity will not be disclosed to any one before, during and after any of the sessions. The Professors associated with this work are Sandip Mitra(ISI),Prasenjit Banerjee(MU),Vegard Iversen (MU),Antonio Nicolo(MU) and Kunal Sen(MU).

We firmly believe that you would give your consent to be part of this interesting study and enjoy working with academicians of internationally reputed research organisations. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question.

Regards,

(Sandip Mitra)

Co-PI (MU-ISI Project) ,Contact no : 9830194031

Consent Form

Respected Sir/Madam,

Please fill up the relevant places if you agree to participate in the research study as a subject :

1. I have read the invitation letter and got adequate chance to discuss on the study to be undertaken and the roles to be performed by me : .....(yes/no)

2. I understand that my participation in the research is purely voluntary and I can refrain from participation at any stage without stating any reason and causing any harm to myself. .....(yes/no)

3. I am convinced that the information provided by me and my identity will be kept completely secret: . .....(yes/no)

I hereby give my consent to be part of the study .

(Name of Participant)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Name of the Researcher in Charge)

(Signature)

(Date)