How women mobilise women into politics: A natural experiment in India

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Abstract

A vast literature suggests that female representation is positively associated with women's political knowledge and participation and that direct demonstration effects underpin these improvements. Seeing women in politics breaks down psychological barriers and inspires women to get into politics. This paper contributes with a new explanation that female representation has mobilisation effects. In constituencies with female politicians, female campaign workers are more likely to be recruited, and therefore women are more likely to be contacted during door-to-door campaigns. This personalised contact contributes to women's political involvement. The paper provides evidence using the natural experiment of gender quota reservations in Delhi and original survey and qualitative data. The findings highlight a new pathway through which female representation can reduce political gender gaps. The results imply that female representation opens up a historically male-dominated career path for women to enter politics and by doing so can diversify future female candidacy.

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Introduction

Around the world, women are under-represented in political office and continue to know less and participate less in politics relative to men.¹ These gender gaps in political involvement persist even when women gain access to economic or educational opportunities,² and the most substantial gender disparity today is on access to political office.³ A burgeoning literature in comparative politics contends that female visibility at the elite level in politics is associated with increases in women's political involvement at the citizen level (Atkeson and Carrillo, 2007; Barnes and Burchard, 2013; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Pande and Ford, 2012). Women's presence in politics, therefore, presents an important means to reduce political gender gaps.

The literature posits that this relationship is mainly a result of "direct demonstration effects". Seeing women contest elections breaks down psychological barriers to women's participation and creates an ability to rule amongst women. Overcoming these barriers makes women feel more connected to the political system and encourages their participation. Women in politics act as role models to women at large which also encourages women to enter politics. Moreover, seeing women contest elections signals to women that their issues will be taken seriously and enhances the value of their participation. Altogether, the visibility of women in politics encourages, inspires and raises the value of women's political involvement.

The main contribution of this paper is to shed light on a novel "mobilisation" mechanism that adds a micro-foundation to this relationship and intensifies the effects of female visibility on women's political involvement. Mobilisation mechanism means that female politicians are more likely to recruit female staff in their political organisation, and relevant to this paper, specifically in intermediary roles such as, campaign and party workers, activists and volunteers, that are responsible for conducting door-to-door campaign drives. These female recruits increase the likelihood of women being contacted during mobilisation drives; and receiving this in-person interaction has positive effects on women's political knowledge and participation. This claim is underscored by a rich field experimental literature which provides

¹A wide body of work has demonstrated gender gaps in politics at the citizen level. Specifically, women are less politically knowledgeable than men (Dassonneville and McAllister, 2018; Fraile and Gomez, 2017), less likely to have political ambition or run for office (Lawless, 2015; Chhibber, 2002), less likely to assert political preferences (Khan, 2017), less likely to contribute to campaigns or join a political organization or persuade others to vote (Desposato and Norrander, 2009; Inglehart and Norris, 2003), and less likely to engage in claim-making activities in rural contexts, such as attend or speak in local meetings or contact government officials (Prillaman, 2018; Kruks-Wisner, 2018).

²See the review by Campbell (2013).

³See, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018, world Economic Forum.

strong evidence that personalised door-to-door contact strongly encourages political involvement (Gerber and Green, 2017).⁴ Mobilisation effects can, therefore, directly contribute to improving women's political involvement.

Additionally, these mobilisation campaigns, at least theoretically, can become the vehicle through which second-order demonstration effects accrue to women at large. Seeing a multitude of women, who come from common backgrounds, campaign in politics can demonstrate to women that politics is truly welcoming of women at every level; and that those who lack political or elite backgrounds can contribute to politics too. The existence of a mobilisation mechanism also addresses the reality that not many women know their female representatives in a meaningful way to experience the benefits of direct demonstration. This problem is highly acute in low-information developing contexts where hardly a few women even know the name of their representative. For example, only 11.2% women interviewed in this study could name their female representative. However, in contrast, many women, more than 50%, do interact with and see these ground-level workers, who bring politics to their doorstep.

This paper uses the context of the municipal council of India's capital city, New Delhi, one of the world's largest civic bodies, to substantiate the theoretical argument. Most crucially, the municipal context of Delhi enables to use the as-if random assignment of electoral gender quotas, known as "reservations", which exclusively reserve electoral seats for only women to contest. This opportunity enables to identify the effect of being reserved for a woman in a system with reservations on citizen's political knowledge and participation. In every municipal election, an as-if random protocol that is exogenous to social, political, economic, or geographic considerations determines the reservation order.⁵ Through the quota policy, women, who would not be in politics otherwise, are brought into politics in an exogenous shock to the male-dominated political equilibrium that often prevails ahead of these reforms. This quota assignment, therefore, approximates the ideal experiment to causally examine the effect of assigning female political presence which is otherwise prone to selection bias.

The paper uses original data which is collected within this natural experiment. The survey uses in-person interviews with 1664 randomly sampled Delhi citizens, spread over 17 municipal constituencies called "wards", 51 localities (neighbourhoods) and 273 polling stations that were randomly selected.⁶ The survey introduces a new measure that taps into

⁴While this literature is mainly focused on electoral participation, the mechanisms that link mobilisation to turnout suggest improvements in knowledge of local politics and policy as well as solve collective action problems inherent to other forms of political participation (de Rooij, Green and Gerber, 2009).

⁵The design section describes this protocol in detail and provides further evidence to substantiate the exogeneity of this protocol.

⁶Budget constraints limited the sample to only 17 wards or "clusters". To deal with the problem that

not only whether an individual was contacted during door-to-door campaigns, but also the gender of the campaign worker. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first survey that introduces this measure. No Indian electoral survey or reputed national surveys such as Asia or African Barometer have used this measure.

This paper focuses on the effect of being reserved for women over three electoral cycles, 2007, 2012 and 2017. The wards and survey sites for randomly sampling respondents were selected as per newly redistricted 2017 ward boundaries blocked on reservation status, that is, reserved or non-reserved for women. However, availability of the 2012 polling station list at a later stage made it possible to match polling status across the three electoral years to assign reservation histories to each survey respondent enables to examine the effects of persistence and continued exposure to quotas. The paper also draws on qualitative evidence from interviews with councillors, politicians, party officials, and party workers and several years of field research on party organisation that was conducted in Delhi from 2015 till 2019 to inform outcome measurement and survey design.⁷

To my knowledge, this paper is the first to document stark gender gaps in door-to-door campaign contact in India. Women are substantively less likely to be contacted than men in door-to-door mobilisation drives that are conducted during elections. More crucially, and in line with the mobilisation effects argument, the paper finds that female constituents in constituencies that were "ever" reserved for women in either 2007 or 2012 or 2017, are more likely than men to be targeted with door-to-door campaign contact during the 2017 elections. That is, female representation reverses the gender gap in door-to-door mobilisation. These effects are substantive and strongly significant. I find that both men and women in ever reserved constituencies, report much higher contact by female campaign workers and mixedgender groups of party workers. This implies that more female party campaigners are hired in ever-reserved wards relative to never-reserved wards.

The paper breaks down the ever reserved treatment variable to provide evidence, which reinforces findings from other studies, that mobilisation effects persist once reservations are lifted in 2017 (Bhavnani, 2009), and strengthen with continued exposure (Beaman et al., 2009). These effects are the strongest in the regions which remain always reserved for women

small number of clusters can cause standard error estimates to to be biased, I follow three strategies: (a) in addition to clustering standard errors according to ward boundaries in different years, (b) estimate wild-boot strap (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008), and (c) randomisation inference.

⁷For instance, existing Indian electoral surveys, such as from Lokniti organisation, measure contact at the household level. While women may report contact, this does not always mean that the woman was the recipient of the personalised interaction. Moreover, no electoral survey in India, to the best of my knowledge, has measured the gender of the party worker or mobiliser.

in 2007, 2012 and 2017. The paper also confirms that women show substantive improvements in knowledge and political participation in reserved wards. These causal effects are present across several outcome measures that tap into distinct aspects of political knowledge and participation. While it is not possible to causally delineate between the direct demonstration or mobilisation mechanisms, the paper uses localised fixed-effects to provide preliminary evidence that receiving campaign contact is positively correlated with political knowledge and participation measures.⁸

This paper advances the political economy of gender by showing how female politicians by incorporating women as political agents fundamentally reshape the contours of the democratic state. Theoretically, the argument draws attention to how female representation rewires the process of recruitment and mobilisation, the two central functions that political actors render in a democratic society. In doing so, this paper contributes to the political recruitment literature by showing that the gendered practice of political recruitment hinders women's entry in politics beyond the legislature (Lawless, 2015), and to the literature on strategic theories of mobilisation. Standard models of political mobilisation focus primarily on how mobilising effort varies with formal electoral institutions (Cox, 2015), or more recently how electoral institutions may alter incentives to mobilise women in particular (Skorge, 2018). In contrast, this paper contributes by sketching how candidate gender by changing who is recruited to mobilise affects who eventually gets mobilised.

Empirically, this study provides the first such examination of the effect of female representation through gender quotas on citizen's mobilisation. The findings connect the vast literature on female representation with the field experimental literature on mobilisation and turnout (Gerber and Green, 2017). Moreover, while the link between mobilisation and electoral participation is well-established, recent evidence suggests that when women are mobilised, it improves their substantive representation too (Teele, 2018). In doing so, the findings contribute to the scholarship that examines the consequences of quota reforms for citizen welfare (Brule, 2018; Chauchard, 2014; Clayton and Zetterberg, 2018; Jensenius, 2015; Gulzar, Haas and Pasquale, 2019), and imply that women's presence in politics reduces inefficiencies in democratic processes because the talent, networks, and competition women bring to politics are utilised.

The findings also contribute to a nascent body of work that identifies the conditions

⁸Mobilisation is not randomly assigned and because demonstration effects might effect both the likelihood of receiving campaign contact and participation, sequential ignorability assumptions cannot be justified in this case. This means ACME and ADE cannot be identified using the approach in Imai et al. (2011) or other meditation analysis. The paper discusses this further.

through which citizens enter politics (Gulzar and Khan, 2018), and suggests that female representation at a higher level draws women into intermediary roles in politics. More crucially, starting out as a campaign or party worker is a well-known pathway to a political career for aspirants that do not come from dynastic or wealthy families. This route has been historically male-dominated in India, and in other developing countries too (Szwarcberg, 2013); while female politicians overwhelmingly have had family members precede them in politics (Chandra, 2016). However, by recruiting women as campaign workers, female representatives open this male-dominated pathway to enter politics to women. This change, therefore, has the potential to diversify female future candidacy. Because women who enter politics through this route are more likely to act independently this has implications to improve the quality of representation too.

The findings also add to a growing literature that recognises the positive role intermediaries such as, party workers, slum brokers and volunteers, play in mobilising, problem solving, and information provision and therefore enabling politicians to respond to citizens (Chhibber and Ostermann, 2014; Auerbach and Thachil, 2018; Cheema and Liaqat, 2017; Liaqat, 2019). This paper contributes to this literature by bringing to notice that men dominate these roles and that women's participation in these roles is crucial in ensuring that these services benefit women.

1 Female representation and mobilisation effects

I construct a theory linking female representation at the candidate level to improvements in women's numbers in intermediary roles that have direct consequences for women's political involvement. I argue that female representation has mobilisation effects - in areas with female candidates and politicians, female volunteers or party workers are more likely to canvass and female constituents are more likely to be contacted - and these changes in mobilisation contribute to improving women's political involvement.

The first part of this argument sheds light on how women in their roles as political candidates influence the process of recruitment to improve women's numbers at lower-levels in politics. The second part describes how women who are included in these lower-level roles influence the process of grassroots mobilisation to mobilise female constituents into politics.

Scholars theorising why women remain absent in politics have concluded that the gendered nature of the process of political recruitment plays a key role in sustaining gender disparity (for a review, see Lawless (2015)). This line of enquiry shows how the existence of male networks of "electoral gatekeepers", who identify and recruit candidates from their male networks, play a role in suppressing women's inclusion in the legislature (Fox and Lawless, 2010; Sanbonmatsu, 2006). Yet women are not only absent from parliaments, but they are also, and more strongly so, absent at various levels of party structures and political activities (Kittilson, 2006; Shamika and Rohan, 2014); and political parties continue to remain enclaves of male dominance (Childs and Webb, 2012; Freeman, 2000; Kishwar, 1996).

Building on this literature, I argue that a similar gendered process of political recruitment followed by political candidates sustains women's absence in intermediary roles too. Relevant to this paper, I focus on intermediary roles such as, door-to-door canvassers, often called volunteers or campaign workers or party workers, as well as campaign managers. These individuals have a direct interface with constituents both during and after elections are over. In India, where illiteracy limits the range of media that voters can access, volunteers and party workers are numerous in numbers and play an influential role in connecting candidates with voters both during and after elections. While numerous numbers of these volunteers and workers are active in politics during elections, a much smaller minority continues to work with the winning candidate once elections are over. These more permanent workers mobilise citizens to participate in ongoing civic and political events and also render constituency services in between elections.

The dominance of men in intermediary roles in politics is perhaps the most strongly visible but relatively under-studied feature of Indian campaign politics in particular, and the literature on intermediary politics in general (Stokes et al., 2013). In India, mens' presence is ubiquitous in all forms of political campaigns ranging from door-to-door drives to jeep and bike political rallies that underscore the masculinity of political campaign.⁹ While quantitative data on exact numbers of those in intermediary roles such as volunteers or party workers is often poor quality or inaccessible (Chauchard, 2018),¹⁰ available evidence strongly suggests that men dominate these roles. For example, using an estimate which is based on the percent of respondents that self-report conducting door-to-door in electoral surveys, Chhibber and Ostermann (2014) find that women are substantively less likely to conduct door-to-door

⁹For examples, see Lok Sabha elections 2019: BJP flags off motorcycle rally, Hindustan Times, 03 Mar 2019. or Delhi CM Kejriwal to launch door-to-door 2019 Lok Sabha elections campaign on Sunday, India Today, 20 Oct 2018.

¹⁰For instance, in the context of Mumbai municipal elections, Chauchard (2018) notes that politicians and candidates tend to over-report party worker numbers in their organisation to signal strength. Interviews with senior party executive members also suggest that because of the fluid nature of temporary staffers, who often switch parties or candidates, it is difficult for political parties to maintain an up-to-date database. Parties also refrain from sharing such a database as they fear it might fall into wrong hands or leaked.

canvassing in national-level elections. Using state-level post-poll electoral surveys from three state elections, I find that while approximately 18.5% (West Bengal 2016), 17% (Bihar 2015), 17% (Uttar Pradesh 2012) male respondents report conducting door-to-door canvassing, the corresponding figure for female respondents are 4.5%, 7.7%, 10%. In the context of a particular type of intermediary role, such as slum brokers, Auerbach and Thachil (2018) find that over 88% of these positions are occupied by men.

I find that political candidates act as electoral gatekeepers and play a vital role in selecting and on-boarding individuals to these roles. The process through which these gate keepers onboard individuals for intermediary roles sustains this gender imbalance. Candidates directly on-board individuals as volunteers and campaign manager from amongst their friends, family and from their social networks in the local community. This core group of individuals plays a large role in organising and assisting the candidate during mobilisation drives. Loyalty and trust are a key reason many candidates prefer to have their own people. In the case the candidate contests on a party nomination, which is common, they also (selectively) onboard volunteers through the political party's networks or pre-existing organisational base in their region.¹¹

When these electoral gatekeepers are men, the channels and networks from which campaign workers are contacted to join the candidate are also male-dominated. Several councillors, especially first-timers, reported using their friends, colleagues and family networks to share information with and attract volunteers to join them. When women are present as these electoral gatekeepers, this process of social diffusion enables women at large to learn about and access these political opportunities. That is female candidates fix this male-dominance in information and networks. In fieldwork interviews, both male and female politicians, unequivocally, noted ob-boarding and having a higher number of same-gender volunteer or party workers. A quick browse at images from the campaign trail confirms the gendered nature of the door-to-door campaign. Male party workers surround male candidates, and female campaign workers likewise surround female candidates.¹² This gendered nature of

¹¹Every political party has or at least claims to have their own organisational base of volunteers or party workers who are territorially organised. These volunteers are hired by party functionaries and are in principle supposed to work in their regions on the tasks that are assigned to them by the party. In reality, and as noted by others, only a small minority of these individuals strongly identify with the party (Chhibber and Ostermann, 2014). A vast majority switches parties every election depending on whether their preferred candidate is nominated or not. That is candidate again and not party drives these decisions. In fact, volunteers or workers whose preferred candidates fail to get party nominations are well-known to publicly abandon the party or stage protests against the party. Such incidences make headlines each elections.

¹²For example, see The Hindustan Times, *MCD election: Women candidates say they are no pushovers*, April 14 2017. See a broader collection of images at https://www.gettyimages.in which is searchable with the keyword - "candidates campaign for MCD election Delhi".

door-to-door campaigns has been observed in other cities too. For instance, in the case of the Calcutta Municipal Council, Tawa Lama-Rewal (2001, p. 43) notes,

"Reserved wards provided a greater visibility not only to women candidates, but also to women party workers, who were more numerous and more prominent in the entourage of women candidates than in that of male candidates; and most importantly, perhaps, for women voters, who obviously found it easier to speak freely with a female rather than with a male candidate. The door-to-door phase of the campaigning is an opportunity many voters seize, to voice their needs, their grievances."

In addition to pointing out to their gendered networks in shaping their campaign organisation, both male and female councillor reported having preferences to work with same gender workers. These preferences reflected deep rooted bias about the type of roles women can undertake, and also concerns about sexual violence and women's purity limit men in hiring women and women in working under male authority, that dominate patriarchal societies (Jayachandran, 2015).

When women are absent as gate-keepers, male bias to work with other men strongly disadvantages women's recruitment into these roles. Male and female politicians find that it hurts their careers if they are "seen" with too many party workers from the opposite gender, and this operates vice-versa. Patriarchal norms severely limit opposite gender interactions with members outside the family. Being seen regularly with the opposite gender often accrues social harassment and opens up the possibility of incurring substantial reputation costs.¹³ Many councillors self reported these sanctions as the reasons they lack gender diversity in their campaign staff. Male councillors also suggested that women might have family and safety concerns and find door-to-door campaigns to be extremely challenging and hard-work. Male candidates do have strategic interests in hiring female campaign workers to mobilise women voters, and did claim to have some female workers. However, their views, preferences, and networks in reaching out to women makes their organisation male dominant.

Women's absence at higher levels in politics not only sustains their absence at other political levels in a vicious cycle that reinforces itself but also has consequences for other functions that political actors fulfil in a democratic society. Relevant to this paper, one

¹³Several news articles highlight numerous stories of female harassment candidates, and party workers face. For example, see The Times of India, *Women politicians face sexist slurs, pawing; seek safety in cars*, Mar 30 2014.

crucial function that political parties render is mobilising citizens in the political process. When a campaign worker knocks on a citizens door or calls them on the phone to invite them to a political event, they make an effort to provide information that will influence the political behaviour of another individual.

Campaign workers provide voters with information about the candidate's socio-political background, policy platform, party affiliation as well as information about the political process, such as who is responsible for particular public services, who are the key politicians in the state and how they relate with the candidate. Fieldwork interviews suggest that a door-to-door conversation can last from 5-10 minutes to even a full hour.

In such conversations, party workers try to glean the likelihood of the citizen supporting their candidate. Very often, party workers try to get hold of personal information such as mobile or Watsapp number or digital groups to remain in touch. These are then used to send targeted information in the run-up to the election, to send reminders to turn out to vote and to invite constituents to political events. Given that there are roughly 60,000 constituents in a municipal ward, party workers are very selective in whom they target.

How do politicians decide whom to mobilise with such a time-intensive resource? A vast literature on elite mobilisation concludes that political actors mobilise citizens who are cheaper to mobilise (Cox, 2015; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). In Delhi too, and like elsewhere in India, parties target their door-to-door activities at those who are more likely to support them. To do so, they derive neighbourhood or *locality* level estimates to understand which areas are worth conducting campaigns. Party officials maintain a detailed locality level database of prior voting patterns, caste/ religious, migration background and crude markers of the neighbourhood's income levels. This way of organising a door-to-door campaign is standard practice across regions in India. Tawa Lama-Rewal (2005, p. 8) notes, "*Everywhere the campaign is organised along with a series of pre-defined steps. The first half of the three-week-long campaign usually consists in going from door-to-door, starting with those areas where the candidate has more supporters, relative to areas with fewer supporters."*

When candidates and party workers arrive at public spots in a chosen locality, they try to speak with as many constituents as they can. Here the gender of the candidate and the party workers plays a significant role in determining whom they can talk to and how much effort it takes for them even to strike a conversation. Naturally, male party workers face lower communication barriers in initiating a conversation with and in reaching out to male constituents. Most male politicians and party workers openly stated, in a matter of fact fashion, that they talked mainly to other male members of the household and rarely to the women. They also made use of the social and digital networks of the male constituents they engage with to expand their reach. In contrast, male workers find it challenging to ask women for their mobile or Watsapp number, which they find otherwise easy to access when men are involved.

The physical organisation of space combined with social norms that restrict opposite sex-interaction also heighten the effort involved in seeking out female constituents. For instance, public spaces, such as parks, neighbourhood tea, or "pan" (tobacco) shops in Delhi are dominated mainly by men. These are also the sites where political campaigns take place. These spots provide male party workers with easy access to talk to a large group of men. In contrast, women are unlikely to spend time in such public spaces, which also reduces their likelihood of being contacted when mobilisers are men.

Even when male workers try to seek out female constituents at their homes, they are often unsuccessful. Both male candidates and party workers underscored how women often shut doors on them and refused to talk to them altogether if the group is mostly male (Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2001). In such cases, women often suggest that male party workers speak to male relatives instead. In complete contrast, when female campaign workers visit households, they are often encouraged to speak with women, and they are able to talk to men too. To summarise, when female campaign workers are absent from mobilising roles, women end up being overlooked in mobilising drives.

The amount of effort inherent in reaching out to female constituents often leads male party workers to either shirk or end up reaching out to a sub-optimal number of women. Both of these contribute to a gender gap in mobilisation. Because a reasonable extent of door-to-door mobilising is un-monitored, such shirking behaviour often goes unnoticed.¹⁴ Monitoring party workers does not ensure that male party workers will end up mobilising in a gender-neutral fashion. Ongoing research by Liaqat (2019) finds that monitoring the overall effort of political workers brings about an increase in contact with male voters, but does not affect contact with female voters. Therefore, merely having an overwhelming number of male party workers sustains a cost calculus that favours mobilising men. This equilibrium that favours mobilisation of men sustains even though men's and women's participation counts as equal. Moreover, this equilibrium persists, even when one assumes that male party workers

¹⁴For one example see The Hindustan Times, *MCD election: Women candidates say they are no pushovers*, April 14 2017.

do not hold norms that favour men.

Like their male counterparts, female campaign workers also face a gender-specific set of challenges which increase the difficulty of the task at hand. Female campaign workers face barriers such as safety concerns and sexual harassment in conducting door-to-door campaigns. However, the challenges they face in mobilising men are relatively lower in magnitude as compared to the other way round. Female councillors often campaign with a large group of female campaign workers. Using their strength-in-numbers to their advantage, they can credibly *demonstrate* to women the value of being involved in politics. In this way, the door-to-door campaign becomes a crucial site where women get exposed to other women in politics.

Gender gaps in mobilisation, which is one of the most effective means of involving citizens into politics, have consequences for the political gender gaps in knowledge and participation. An extensive literature in mobilisation suggests that in-person mobilisation raises the salience of norms that induce participation and provides knowledge to citizens about local politics (Gerber and Green, 2017). These mechanisms solve collective action problems inherent to any form of political participation, such as electoral or civic.¹⁵ Female politicians use female campaign workers to lower these gender gaps in mobilisation and this, in turn, improves women's political involvement.

Moreover, through the female campaign workers that are activated into politics, female politicians will also leave a footprint that lasts longer than their own time in office. Because grassroots party workers are territorial, once they enter politics, some are likely to remain active in their constituencies even though the candidate they were attached to no longer remains in office or electoral politics. Therefore, these effects are likely to persist in the short to medium run but may diminish once women have remained absent from the electoral area for a long time and politics reverts to status-quo.

Women's entry as candidates and as activists has downstream effects on the effectiveness of mobilisation. Women's entry into party worker roles, from which they were previously absent, could lead to *competition* or *learning* effects. First, because party worker roles are key entry points for a political career, these are highly coveted positions and there is evidence that competition for these roles is high (Auerbach and Thachil, 2018). Women's

¹⁵In low salience or local elections, in-person mobilisation may itself be the key source through which citizens gain information about local politicians and parties (Blydenburgh, 1971). Finally, mobilising effort itself provides a signal of candidate type (Shachar and Nalebuff, 1999). Potential voters can infer whether the candidate is a "good type" based on her mobilising effort.

entry in these roles, by raising the competition for these roles (Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012), and by threatening pre-existing male activist networks that are in place, can raise the overall quality of the pool of workers (Besley et al., 2017). Second, it is plausible that men and women learn to cope with the diverse gender barriers they face while door-to-door campaigning and these mix-gender groups can contribute to improving the learning for both men and women which makes them effective.

A straightforward implication of this dynamic is that mobilisation would be more effective in boosting political involvement in areas that ever received a female politician versus those areas where women remain absent. That is, not only women, but both men and women can benefit from mobilisation effects that result from female representation.

2 Research Design

Assessing the effect of women's political entry on citizen's political involvement presents at least two challenges: (1) female politicians might choose to contest in electoral areas where women are already more politically involved (2) there is no publicly available election study that collects data on citizen's political involvement in Delhi (or India). With regards to electoral participation, gender-wise turnout data at either the polling station or the ward level is currently unavailable. I dealt with these issues by exploiting the natural experiment of quota assignment in Delhi and collecting survey data embedded within this natural experiment.

2.1 As-if random reservation of wards for women in Delhi's Municipal Corporation

The 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in India mandated the reservation of onethird of the seats in local civic bodies for women. The policy mandated that only female candidates can contest elections in wards "reserved" for women. The wards that are notreserved are known as *general* wards, and are open to both men and women. This policy of reservation was also implemented in Delhi's local civic body, called the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the MCD. The MCD is amongst the largest civic bodies in the world and has several responsibilities, including the provision of small dispensaries and primary healthcare, primary educational facilities, sanitation, garbage and waste disposal, collection of property taxes. Most crucially, this paper analyses the natural experiment of the reservation policy of the MCD, in which wards that were reserved for women were intently chosen through a as-if random process to ensure that while the selection of wards is free and fair from economic or political bias, it can be replicated and verified. Comparisons of wards that were reserved and not reserved therefore does not suffer from selection or other endogenous effects that would be endemic to such comparisons.

The first MCD elections with a reservation policy were held in 1997, and in this election, 33% seats were reserved for women. Therefore, while the starting point of this paper is 2007, there are two prior electoral periods that is, 1997 and 2002, that have had women councillors.¹⁶ However, due to complete lack of data availability in these two periods combined with the massive overhaul of MCD in 2007 where MCD was redistricted, and the number of wards were doubled from 136 to 272, this paper takes 2007 as its starting point.¹⁷

The process of reservation that I describe below is derived from reservation orders that are publicly available online on the website of the State Election Commission. I re-verified the details of the actual process through interviews with the bureaucrats at the Delhi State Election Commission. From them I learnt that this process was consciously chosen to ensure objectivity and verifiability, to minimise concerns of partiality, and to distribute reserved wards evenly across state-level constituencies. The same reservation process was followed every electoral year.

In 2007, MCD was re-districted to have 272 municipal wards (from 134 wards), and wards were serially ordered according to the historic pre-determined standardised process of the delimitation commission of the state election office. This historic process allocates serial numbers to wards in a clockwise manner starting from the northernmost point within the serially ordered state-level constituencies. The state-level constituencies, in turn, are numbered by the National Election Commission using a similar process. The reservation process uses this serial ordered list of wards and is as follows.

The reservation process first determines the reservation of wards for the scheduled castes (SC). The number of SC wards and which wards are to be reserved for SCs is determined on the basis of SC population. Generally, two wards within every state-level constituency that have the highest scheduled caste (SC) population are reserved for the SCs. The remaining

¹⁶The process in 1997 and 2002 was the same as adopted in subsequent years, which is detailed below, was also random, and the same wards were reserved for women in 1997 and 2002. For more details on these particular years, see John (2007, p. 3987).

¹⁷Because I compare never-reserved areas with ever/ always-reserved areas if effects from 1997 and 2002 persist, the causal estimates I present may mask this persistence and could be underestimated.

SC wards in the entire MCD are then arranged in the ascending order of their serial number, and every 3rd ward is then reserved for women. The reservation of the remained wards is then completed after reserving SC wards and SC women wards. To do so, the remainder of non-SC or general wards are again arranged in the ascending order of the serial number and every 3rd ward is reserved for women. Sitting councillors and party activists who lost their wards to reservation in 2012 took the process to Delhi High court and this process was verified in court to be free and fair from any tampering, irregularities or political bias.¹⁸

In 2012, MCD was trifurcated into three groups and wards were renumbered and reserved using the same reservation process as outlined above, but the process was followed within each of these groups instead of the MCD as a whole. Additionally, quotas were expanded from 33% to 50% a few weeks before the elections. As a result, every other ward, starting from 1st, 3rd, 5th was reserved for women. On matching the 2012 serial number of the wards with the 2007 serial number one can see that the serial numbering of wards in 2012 follows the same logic as in 2007. This confirms that indeed there was no tampering with the allocation of the serial number. Further probity comes from the test that reservation status in 2007 does not predict the reservation status in 2012.¹⁹

In 2017, MCD wards were re-districted (the fact that this would happen was well known in 2011 with Census announcement) and renumbered again, but the wards remained 272 in numbers, and the 1st, 3rd, 5th wards were reserved for women using the same process. Furthermore, qualitative evidence for the probity of the randomisation process comes from the fact that the each of these elections saw the reservation of the seats of several male and female senior councillors, which made headlines each electoral cycle.²⁰

Moreover, while ward boundaries change, a vast majority of the polling stations (the smallest unit at which elections are organised) remain the same and can be merged over the years. Identifying the respondent's polling station enables to assign reservation histories to each respondent.

Examining reservation, over the years, since 2007 to 2017, yields 8 possibilities and enables to identify the effect of being "ever-reserved" in reference to "never-reserved". It is also

¹⁸See "HC upholds reservation of municipal seats by EC", The Hindustan Times Mar 01 2012.

¹⁹This was verified by regressing the reservation status in 2012 on the reservation status in 2017. The coefficient is .02 and p-value is 0.736. Other covariates such as geography also have no relationship with the reservation status in either year.

²⁰See "Reservation in MCD makes councillors uneasy", Deccan Herald Jan 28 2012 and "Delhi MCD polls: Many senior municipal councillors lose seats post delimitation of wards, rejig of seats reserved for SC, women", The Hindustan Times Mar 06 2017.

possible to identify the effect of being "always-reserved" in reference to "never-reserved" to estimate the effect of continued exposure to women's reservation. This latter comparison is no longer possible in most rural contexts: as quotas are not reset but rotated across geographic areas, which makes a comparison of over more than two electoral cycles impossible. To examine persistence and contemporaneous effects, I can compare wards that were previously reserved in 2007 or 2012 and wards that were only reserved for the first time in 2017, with never-reserved respectively.

2.2 Sampling wards and respondents

I randomly selected 17 municipal wards (as per 2017 ward boundaries) in Delhi, blocked on reservation status, such that 9 of the wards selected were reserved for women and the rest 8 were general wards in 2017. To select municipal wards, I started with purposively selecting three geographically and politically distinct regions in Delhi. These are the national level constituencies of North West, North East and South Delhi.

To avoid oversampling wealthy and high-income areas, I restricted the sample to 21 statelevel constituencies within these national level units. I then randomly selected wards such that each ward is selected from a different state-level constituency. The sampling procedure to arrive at the list of wards is described in detail in the Appendix.

To select the survey sites within the selected wards, I obtained the most recent voter list of the Municipal elections conducted in 2017. To maximise within ward variation, I sampled three geographically dispersed neighbourhoods (referred to as *localities* in Delhi) in the ward. Figure 1 shows the three distinct areas visited in one of the sampled wards, called *Holambi Khurd*. Because neighbourhood level identifiers are unavailable systematically, I made use of the voter list and polling station numbers to divide the ward into enumeration blocks, and randomly selecting three such widely dispersed blocks.²¹ This process resulted in the selection of 51 blocks and 273 polling stations spread over 17 municipal wards and ACs.

Each day one ward was visited by the survey team in sub-teams of three to conduct

²¹Each ward was divided into blocks of 1500 households, and a block of 1500 HHs was randomly selected such that each household within the ward had an equal chance of being selected into the survey. That is, probability proportional to the size of the block as measured by the number of households in the block. On average, each ward was divided into 11 blocks and had approx. 18050 individual households as identified by unique house numbers. The next two blocks for two other teams were selected such that there was a gap of 3000 HHs between blocks to ensure geographical dispersion. For example, if a ward had ten blocks, and the first block was randomly selected. Then the fourth and seventh blocks were selected.





interviews in the three localities within the ward. Their respective field supervisor assigned each enumerator one polling station and the entire list of polling stations was attempted serial wise by the team until the end of the working day.²² Enumerators were instructed to attempt to knock at every 3rd household in the polling stations that their field supervisor allotted them. Every person who agreed to be interviewed was eligible to be interviewed, if they were at least 18 years of age, had a mobile phone, were in Delhi over next 3 weeks and had lived in Delhi for at least 3 years. To ensure good quality of data collection, I conducted enumerator training, was present at survey sites during the first week of the survey, conducted surprise visits and followed a daily audit and feedback process throughout the survey.

3 Empirical strategy

Because of the as-if random nature of the policy, the basic empirical strategy is straightforward. Often others using similar design estimate the reduced form effect of the reservation status by comparing the means of the outcomes of interest in reserved and unreserved areas (for example, see Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)). Because very few women tend to contest or win from unreserved areas, these effects are closer to the structural effects one would obtain by instrumenting for politician gender by the reservation status of the area. For instance, between 4 to 7 (that is, under 6%) women won from unreserved areas in Delhi

 $^{^{22}}$ In very few cases, one-off polling station that was far off from the other polling stations for the team was de-prioritised or not attempted for practical concerns.

every election.

Similarly, in the sample used in this study, the reduced form estimates are very close to the structural estimates. This is because in the study sample, all unreserved areas have had only male politicians previously and currently, and all reserved areas naturally have had only female politicians. Very few female candidates contest from non-reserved wards. Note that these estimates are not an estimate of the comparison between a system with reservation and a system without reservation. The estimate refers to the effect of being reserved for a woman in a system where there are reservations.

I then run the following regressions for male and female respondents, respectively. To test the proposition that female respondents receive more mobilising efforts than men in areas "ever" exposed to quotas, and both male and female respondents report more contact by female or mixed-gender groups of party workers in areas "ever" exposed to quotas.

$$Y_{fj} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 R_{fj} + \beta_2 C_{fj} + \alpha_1 N C_{w_{2017}} + \epsilon_1 \tag{1}$$

and,

$$Y_{mj} = \beta_3 + \beta_4 R_{mj} + \beta_5 C_{mj} + \alpha_2 N C_{w_{2017}} + \epsilon_2$$
(2)

where, Y_{fj} (Y_{mj}) refers to two outcomes: whether female (male) respondent in polling station j received campaign contact or not and whether they were contacted by male/female or mixed-gender group of party workers or were not contacted at all, R_{fj} (R_{mj}) refers to the reservation status of the female (male) respondent in polling station j. Note that the polling station is lowest level units that can be matched across municipal wards that are redistricted in 2017. This also means that respondents within a particular 2017 ward have different histories of reservation (that is for 2007 and 2012) within the ward as stated earlier and these vary with the locality or a geographic cluster of polling stations.

 C_{ij} refers to a vector of respondent level controls, these are: standardised age, standardised household items index (contains cycle, tv, washing machine, refrigerator and computer), caste and religion (Hindu upper caste, Hindu schedule caste/tribe, Muslim), education (illiterate, up to 8th, up to Matric, high school/diploma, Bachelors's degree and above), dummies for employment (employed or unemployed), born in Delhi or other state, and a dummy for enumerator's gender. $NC_{w_{2017}}$ is a fixed effect for the national level constituency the ward belongs. Note that all municipal wards are clustered in state-level constituencies which are in turn clustered in national level constituencies. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the 2017 ward: w_{2017} .

 β_1 and β_4 are causal estimates of interest for male and female respondents and refer to the effect of being "reserved" for a woman in reference to never being reserved for a woman and therefore not receiving female representation since 2007. The simple difference between β_1 and β_4 provides the coefficient of the "interaction" term and is the same as what would be obtained as estimating this in a single regression. I report estimates in male and female sub-samples to ease interpretation. In the analysis, I provide p-values from Wald equality test of whether this difference is statistically distinguishable from zero. I estimate the same equations to estimate the causal effect of being reserved for women on outcomes of political knowledge and political participation.

To attribute these effects of female identity I assume that these mobilisation effects occur because of the female identity that the quota policy assigns, and not due to the quota policy itself. While it is not possible to rule out this assumption by design, I conduct a placebo and two robustness checks to make the assertion that it is unlikely that these effects are purely a result of quota policy. To motivate the placebo test, I consider SC quota assignment which assigns a similar quota policy but not female identity. While the assignment of SC is non-random, examining whether these effects occur in an SC quota setting provides a preliminary test. To do this, I conduct an OLS regression that regresses contact on SC quota status of the ward. In support of my assertion, I find that the effect of SC quota on contact outcomes is neither substantive (very close to zero) nor significant.

The second possibility is that because this is a gender quota it makes female constituents a salient bloc. This is theoretically less plausible given that both male and female vote count as equal in reserved or non-reserved setting and this is arguably an external validity concern as quotas raise the salience of female constituents throughout the system. Nevertheless I consider this behavioral plausibility. This means that quota policy makes female constituents a salient bloc in reserved areas and regardless of whether there was a male or a female politician they both would have contacted women due to this assigned saliency. That is, the identity of the candidate plays no role. If this is indeed the case, these effects are unlikely to persist when the quota is withdrawn. However, the results show that these effects do persist. Additionally, I regress two outcomes that tap into saliency: (a) the % of respondents who report female security as a top issue in Delhi and (b) % of respondents who consider that female security is the top responsibility of their councillor on the current treatment status as per 2017. I find no differences in these measures of salience in reserved and nonreserved wards in 2017 (and also other treatment arms too). These tests lend credence to the assumption that female identity plays a strong role and it is less likely that quota as a policy is driving these results. However, it is important to recognise that without this assumption, that is, simply by design, these effects are not solely attributable to female identity.

Next, I estimate the relationship between campaign contact and outcomes of political knowledge and participation. Because campaign contact is not randomly assigned but is targeted at the locality level, I use locality level fixed effects to deal with endogeneity. Additionally, I control for individual-level variables such as, gender, and other observables that are listed in equation 1. To estimate whether receiving campaign contact is effective in mobilising constituents I estimate the following regression for respondents that are in areas that were "ever" reserved for women since 2007 and for respondents that are in areas that were "never" reserved for women since 2007 respectively.

$$Y_{il} = \beta_6 + \beta_7 P_{il} + \beta_8 C_{il} + \gamma_1 L_i + \epsilon_3 \tag{3}$$

$$Y_{il} = \beta_9 + \beta_{10} P_{il} + \beta_{11} C_{il} + \gamma_2 L_i + \epsilon_4 \tag{4}$$

Where, P_{il} is refers to whether respondent *i* received campaign contact in locality *l*, C_{il} refers to the same vector of controls as in equation 1 and L_i is the fixed effect for the neighbourhood or locality (geographic cluster of polling stations) to which the respondent I belongs to and matches the block level at which respondent sampling was done. This fixed effect controls for confounders that vary at the locality level at which party mobilisation is planned, such as partisan, caste/ religion affiliation data political parties collect, and this also controls for confounders that at the ward, assembly and national levels too (such as politician quality). β_7 is the causal estimate of interest, and the expectation is that it is > 0. I also expect that $\beta_7 \geq \beta_{10}$.

4 Data and measurement

A total of 1664 respondents, 860 men and 804 women were interviewed in the survey. The survey was conducted in-person in Hindi and took an average of 36 minutes. This survey was conducted as a baseline survey and was part of the pre-treatment survey of a field experiment conducted by the author in Delhi, which involved two waves of survey interviews. In the second wave, 1304 respondents, 617 (72%) men and 687 (85%) women, that is, 78% were successfully re-interviewed post-treatment. Most of the data used in this paper come from the baseline survey unless indicated.



Figure 2: Distribution of respondents across reserved and non-reserved areas

To assign the history of reservation to each respondent, I manually matched the 2017 polling stations in which the respondent were interviewed, with the list of 2012 polling stations to attach both 2007 and 2012 reservation status. Due to lack of availability of the 2012 polling station list before the start of the survey, this matching exercise was only done after the survey data was collected. This exercise yields in total 8 (2*2*2) treatment arms and the number of respondents in each treatment arm can be seen in Figure 2.²³

Following Beaman et al. (2009), I construct a binary treatment variable "ever-reserved", which is coded as 1 if the respondent was in a polling area that was ever-reserved for women between 2007 and 2017, and 0 for areas that were never-reserved for women. This variable provides a summary of "ever" receiving a female stimulus. I also construct a categorical

 $^{^{23}}$ Note that 80% of the respondents in the survey are home-owners, and have been living in Delhi for most of their life: 42% since birth and 40% for over 16 years. While the survey did not ask whether respondents moved between wards, very few would have moved houses. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that they moved houses systematically in response to reservations.

treatment variable with five categories: (a) never-reserved (b) (only) previously reserved (c) (only) currently reserved (d) once previously and currently reserved (e) always-reserved, of which the first three and always-reserved categories are meaningful to test the various implications of my theoretical argument.

4.1 Measuring mobilisation

The survey asked respondents whether: "In the last MCD elections in 2017, did any party worker visit you? If yes, do you remember whether the party worker was male or female or a group of male and female campaign workers?" In the second wave of the survey, the respondents were also asked: "Has your MCD councillor or their party workers ever contacted (in person/via phone/ pamphlet/ wall posters) you to participate in any political or social event?". The same question was repeated twice but concerning participation in women's issue and then concerning participation in environmental issue.





Notes: The graphs plot the mean of the variable indicated on the x-axis with 2 standard error bars grouped by gender. The data for the panel "during elections" comes from the first wave of the survey, while for the "between elections" panel comes from the second wave of the survey.

On an average 60% respondents report being contacted during elections, and 21% report being contacted in between elections. This is revealing of the high intensity of campaign contact both during and between elections in the Delhi context. The graph shows that women are less likely to be contacted than men during elections and that this gender gap is primarily due to the difference in the mobilising activity of male party workers. Similarly, women are less likely to be contacted by party workers between elections, and less likely to be contacted to participate in environmental issues, but there is little gender difference in campaign contact to invite constituents to participate on women's issues. A discussion of measurement issue specific to these questions is attached in the Appendix.

4.2 Measuring political knowledge

Numerous studies confirm the general pattern that men have higher levels of political knowledge than women (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001). However, recent research on the measurement of political knowledge has highlighted the role of two measurement factors that might exacerbate such gaps. First set of factors highlight the possibility of "gender relevant domains of knowledge" (Dolan, 2011). That is, women and men might know different things. The second set of factors concerns with how the characteristics of the survey instrument can cause women and men to answer questions differently. For instance, Mondak and Anderson (2004) show that there are gender differences in the "propensity to guess" and women are more likely than men to choose a "do not know the" response. Conscious of this discussion, the survey included questions on three distinct areas of knowledge and posed them in ways to minimise gendered measurement error. These are: (a) local politics (state and MCD level), (b) claim-making activities, and (c) gender-relevant knowledge. Additional details about the text and the relevance of these questions are available in the Appendix.

As seen in Figure 4 gender gaps on all measures of local politics are stark, and women scores on these are almost half of that of men. As expected in Delhi, citizens, in general, are more aware of state-level politics than municipal politics.

4.3 Measuring political participation

In their pioneering work, Verba and Nie (1972) suggested a fourfold categorisation centred on the extent of individual agency and resources required to participate as well as the extent of external elite contact and conflict the participation entailed. Based on this, I identify (a)



Figure 4: Gender gaps in political knowledge in Delhi

Notes: The graphs plot the mean of the variable indicated on the x-axis with 2 standard error bars grouped by gender. All questions are coded as 1 if respondent correctly answers the question, and 0 otherwise.

electoral forms of participation, that is voting and becoming a political party member; (b) claim-making acts, that is, registering a complaint with the MCD or having any meeting or interaction with the councillor; (c) public participation in any public political or social event, such as, neighbourhood meeting, demonstration, march, protest etc. Moreover, the more costly form of participation, that is, whether the respondent took any action, such as striking, writing a letter, taking a pledge, or abstain from acting such as hunger strike. Gender gaps in all these outcomes are seen in Figure 5.

Public protesting is the most crucial form of civic participation in Delhi, and is so inherent to Delhi culture that the city has designated permanent venues for protesting, such as Jantar Mantar and Ramlila Maidan, where some protest takes place almost everyday.²⁴ Having women's participation in these is crucial to include their voice in the social and policy changes that result from these protests. Three well-known issues have mobilised Delhi citizens in massive numbers over the last decade.

These three specific issues are: (a) women's rape and sexual violence: the 2012 bus rape

²⁴See The Daily Pioneer, Jantar Mantar protest may be capped at 1 day, 5k protesters, 25 July 2018.



Figure 5: Gender gaps in political participation in Delhi

Notes: The graphs plot the mean of the variable indicated on the x-axis with 2 standard error bars grouped by gender.

protests reduced social stigma and victim-shaming, changed how women's crime is reported in India and to legal changes with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, also called *Nirbhaya Act* named after the victim. I classify participation in any women's cause as *gender relevant participation*; (b) environmental protests: these have a historical base in Delhi since the 1970s, and have been instrumental in ensuring legal and criminal action for deforestation, cutting neighbourhood trees, banning black plastic bags, not using plastic etc. (c) anti-corruption protests in 2011/2012 that led to the formation of a new political party in Delhi that is in majority power since 2015 and has been the most successful political party in post-Indian National Congress India.

5 Results

5.1 Female representation and mobilisation effects

Table 1 displays results from two sets of OLS regression. The first panel tabulates the results of "ever" receiving a female politician, and the second panel displays the coefficient of the effect of "always" being reserved, while controlling for the other four categories of the reservation history treatment, on various aspects of mobilising. All effects are in reference to respondents in "never" reserved areas.

		Dı	uring election	ions	Bet	tween elect	ions
		Any activist (1)	Female activist (2)	Mixed group (3)	Any cause (4)	Women's cause (5)	Environ cause (6)
Panel A	Women	$0.070 \\ (0.140)$	0.109^{**} (0.010)	$0.176^{\dagger}_{(0.043)}$	0.020 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.007)	0.037^{*} (0.009)
ever-reserved	Men	-0.053 (0.098)	0.142^{*} (0.019)	-0.017 (0.006)	$0.087 \\ (0.073)$	$0.101^{\dagger}_{(0.029)}$	0.012 (0.018)
	Test-diff $p - value$	0.014*	0.212	0.000***	0.347	0.000***	0.349
Panel B	Women	$\begin{array}{c} 0.172\\ (0.145) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.294^{***} \\ (0.020) \end{array}$	0.079 (0.054)	$0.038 \\ (0.026)$	$0.020 \\ (0.014)$	$0.050\dagger$ (0.026)
always-reserved	Men	$-0.158^{\dagger}_{(0.082)}$	0.148^{***} (0.036)	-0.033 (0.057)	0.039 (0.067)	0.019 (0.035)	-0.053^{*} (0.024)
	Test-diff $p-value$	0.027*	0.005**	0.020*	0.995	0.984	0.010*
Panel C	Women	0.49	0.03	0.16	0.12	0.11	0.07
Control Mean	Men	0.70	0.00	0.34	0.24	0.07	0.18
Observations	Women Men	$762 \\ 816$	$762 \\ 816$	$762 \\ 816$	668 600	$675 \\ 600$	$675 \\ 603$

Table 1: Mobilisation in areas with female representation

Notes: Panel A and B display results from four distinct OLS specifications. Panel A displays the coefficient of ever-reserved, which is measured as 0 if the respondent belongs to a ward which was neverreserved, and 1 if the ward was reserved at least once for a women from 2007-2017. Panel B displays the coefficient for the always-reserved category of the treatment variable with four other categories that are: never-reserved (reference category), previously reserved, currently reserved, once previously and currently reserved. The full specification of panel B is reported in the Appendix. The bottom row of each panel reports p-values from Wald equality tests of whether the difference between coefficients of men and women in ever (always) reserved ward is zero. All outcomes are measured as 1 if respondent reports contact, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1) to (3) use data from the first wave of the survey, and (3) to (6) rest uses the second wave of the survey. All regressions include (i) parliamentary constituency fixed effect (ii) individual controls for standardised age, standardised household items index (contains cycle, tv, washing machine, refrigerator and computer), caste and religion (Hindu upper caste, Hindu schedule caste/tribe, Muslim), education (illiterate, up to 8th, up to Matric, high school/diploma, Bachelors's degree and above), dummies for employment (employed or unemployed), born in Delhi or other state, and enumerator's gender that are not displayed. Standard errors are clustered by 2017 wards. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 †<0.10

5.1.1 Female constituents are more likely to be contact in reserved areas

I start by providing evidence that supports the claim that women receive more mobilising effort than men in areas where women contest. Table 1 Panel A column (1) shows that being ever-reserved has a heterogeneous treatment effect on the likelihood of a man or a woman being contacted. While men are 5.3% less likely to be contacted, and women are 7% more likely to be contacted, these are statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, the p-value for the test of the difference (bottom row) between these coefficients suggests that women are 12.3% significantly more likely to be contacted than men in ever-reserved wards at 95% level. Long-term exposure to women politicians strengthens these effects (Table 1 panel B), and the effect of being always-reserved (in reference to never-reserved wards) are larger in effect size. For example, women are 32.9% significantly (95% level) more likely than men to be contacted by any party worker, and this constitutes a "cross-over interaction".

Figure 6: Female constituents more likely to be contacted



Notes: The coefficient plot of the interaction between ever, previously reserved, currently reserved and always reserved and gender are plotted for any campaign contact. The reference category is men in never reserved.

To examine whether these effects persist or are contemporaneous, Figure 6 visually plots the interaction effects between these various treatment arms and gender. While women do seem to receive more mobilising effort in reserved areas (and the reverse for men), the effect sizes are smaller in currently reserved wards than in always-reserved wards. However, continued exposure to female representative most strongly increases the likelihood of female constituents to be targeted with campaign contact. This finding is in line with other research that suggests that changes that the consequences of female representation take time to materialise (Bhavnani, 2009; Beaman et al., 2009).

5.1.2 Female campaign workers more likely to canvass in reserved areas

A stronger picture emerges when examining who conducts mobilising effort. Here across the board, respondents that were ever exposed to a female politician report much higher contact by female campaign workers regardless of gender. Table 1 Panel A shows that both men and women in ever-reserved wards report a substantively higher contact with female campaign workers; and that women report a higher contact with a mixed-gender group of party workers during elections. While the mean for a man or woman to be contacted by a female worker is 0 to 3%, the same is 14.2% higher for men and 10.9% higher for women in ever-reserved wards relative to never-reserved wards. Given that door-to-door campaign contact is the most dominant form of political campaign in India, this captures a substantive transformation in campaign contact.

Similarly, respondents that were ever exposed to a female politician report much higher contact by a mix-gender group of activists, regardless of gender. However, only in the case of previously and always-reserved wards, women report more contact with a mix-gender group of activists.

Figure 7 plots the OLS estimates of contact by female campaign worker regressed on treatment status for male and female respondents. The plot shows that while these effects do persist, they are more strongly either contemporaneous or require continued exposure to sustain. Previously reserved wards, although may retain some female workers, as expected, do also roll back to older patterns of mobilising. This suggests women's active presence is required to sustain the changes in how mobilisation effort is targeted. Finally, only in the case of respondents that are always exposed to female politicians, female campaign workers target more women relative to men providing additional support for the argument outlined in this paper. This suggests that women can strengthen their mobilisation capacity over time and increase women's numbers as activists in areas with continued presence much more effectively. Figure 8 plots the interaction effect of gender and visit by a mixed-gender group of activist, and the effects are very similar to that of a female visit.

5.1.3 The content of mobilisation between elections

Examining the nature of mobilisation between elections, I find that men in ever-reserved wards are 10% more likely to be contacted for women's issues than men in never-reserved wards, while there is no such difference for women. While women in ever-reserved wards



Figure 7: Female campaign workers mobilise in women wards

Figure 8: Mix-gender groups of activists mobilise in women wards



are 3.7% more likely to be contacted for environmental issues than women in ever-reserved wards, while there is no such difference for men. This result is in line with the theoretical expectation that women leaders pursue gender-specific strategies to mobilise constituents.²⁵



Figure 9: Women reverse the gender gap on the nature of political contact

Examining contact by issue type, women are very marginally more likely than men to be contacted for women's issues, while men are marginally more likely to be contacted to participate in environmental issues. Concerning party worker contact to participate in either women or environmental issue, women politician close the gender gap on type of contact in ever-reserved wards. However, in always-reserved areas, women are more likely to be contacted to participate than men, which reverses the gender gap on contacting. This result suggests that improvements in campaign contact for men to participate in women's issues primarily come from wards that experience change, while improvements in campaign contact for women to participate in environmental issues are mainly present in always-reserved wards. This suggests that with regards to the nature of mobilising contact, women gain most when they are continually exposed to the reservation policy, while men benefit more when they see a rotation in the reservation order.

²⁵In the survey, I also asked questions about NGO contact to participate in any/women/environmental causes between elections. These questions enable to examine whether politicians and non-governmental organisations seek out each other's support to mobilise citizens to participate in protests, and marches. However, there are no significant differences in NGO contact in ever-reserved wards relative to never-reserved wards. Perhaps, these ties take even longer to establish, and interruption of reservation status each electoral year may inhibit these ties from forming.

5.2 The causal effect of female representation on women's political involvement

The graphs below plot the coefficients of ever-reserved and always-reserved wards for women respondents for political knowledge and participation. Graph 10 shows that women gain knowledge on state-level politics, knowledge relevant for claim-making and on gender-relevant outcomes. Women are 19.5% more likely to remember their MLA's political party, which represents a 135% change compared to the control mean. Women are 7.8% more likely to remember the Chief Minister's (CM) name, which is an 18% change from the control mean, and 7.4% more likely to remember the Deputy-CM 's name, a 117% change from the control mean. While it is somewhat surprising that women do not gain knowledge on MCD politics itself, it is plausible that there is heterogeneity in treatment effect. Because knowledge about MCD is very localised, it is plausible that only those who are contacted by party workers are more likely to remember their councillor's name and party.



Figure 10: Women show improvements in political knowledge in women wards

With respect to claim-making activities, women in ever-reserved wards are 3.6% more likely to know that the MCD is responsible for cleaning streets, while there is no difference

in property tax knowledge for which in general is low and filing taxes in India a male chore in the household. More interesting, while women have a high propensity to give do not know responses than men, women are less likely to give do not know responses in ever-reserved wards, when asked about the top responsibility of their councillor or MLA. Women also improve on outcomes that measure gender-relevant knowledge. Women are 7.9% more likely to say that the central government is responsible for police in Delhi, and 3.6% more likely to correctly mention that the MCD has seat reservation for women. Women in always-reserved wards outperform women in never-reserved wards on most measures of political knowledge. However, long-term exposure does not seem to strengthen these effects, which is surprising. If demonstration effects are indeed leading to improvements in involvement, these effects should be the strongest.

The results overall suggest that women substantively improve political knowledge in the more relevant and less complicated aspects of politics, and having any exposure to female leadership is sufficient to lead to these gains.

Figure 11 shows that women's participation in ever-reserved wards improves on some measures of participation, but there is also considerable heterogeneity. Concerning electoral politics, there is no significant difference between women in ever/ always and never-reserved wards. Women in ever-reserved wards are 0.8% more likely to be party members, and this is not statistically distinguishable from zero given the small effect size. However, women in always-reserved wards are 2.7% significantly more likely to be party members. Compared to the never-reserved mean of 9% this is a 300% change. To summarise, there is considerable heterogeneity in the results, and especially continued exposure does not always lead to improvements in political involvement. This finding raises doubts about the demonstration effect hypothesis.

Concerning claim-making activities, women in ever-reserved wards are 5.9% significantly more likely to meet their councillor, while the coefficient is 2.6% for always-reserved wards. Compared to the mean of 11.8% in the never-reserved wards, both gains are substantive. However, women are 5.3% less likely to register a complaint, and the coefficient is 9% in always-reserved wards. While this is unexpected, it is plausible given that lodging a formal complaint is often the last resort, wards with women leaders might be better in grievance redressal and therefore in reducing the propensity of citizens to lodge complaints.

Concerning participation in protests, the results are mainly positive and substantive, and this is although the baseline probabilities for participation for women are very low. Women



Figure 11: Women show improvements in political participation in women wards

are 1.8% significantly more likely to participate in any political or social event, relative to a 4.5% participation in the control group; this is a substantive 40% change. There are no substantive differences in taking action for a political or social cause, which is again a much more costlier form of participation relative to turning up for a demonstration or neighbourhood event, as it does not require writing a letter or striking. While women do not differ on participation in women's cause, they are 1.5% more likely to participate in the 2017 anti-rape protest, relative to no participation in never-reserved wards, this is a substantive change. This suggests that female leaders are successful in getting women to participate on the most crucial issues that have stirred Delhi women recently. While women are 1.5% and 0.5% more likely to turnout to participate in 2012 rape protests, in ever and always-reserved wards, these differences are not significant, which suggests that it takes longer for reservation to affect change than one or two cycles.

Surprisingly, women in always-reserved wards are 7% significantly less likely to participate or take action concerning an environmental cause, relative to a 10.8% participation in neverreserved wards. This result is all the more surprising as I noted in the previous section that women in always-reserved wards are 5.2% more likely to be asked to participate in an environmental issue. It is plausible that there is within-sample heterogeneity, that is, the sub-group of women that receives campaign contact differs in participation relative to those women who do not receive campaign contact. The next section provides evidence that this is the case, indeed.

5.3 Mobilisation and citizens' political involvement

It is beyond the scope of this paper to adjudicate between demonstration effects and mobilisation effects, doing so requires evidence ideally from a factorial field experiment. However, I can provide a preliminary examination of whether recieving mobilising contact is positively associated with women's political involvement. Additionally, I can provide a preliminary test of the implication that mobilisation is more effective in constituencies that have been ever exposed to women. I can do so by contrasting constituencies that have been ever reserved for women with constituencies that have never been reserved for women. Here, I examine variation within constituencies which enables me to hold direct demonstration effects constant. While these results should be interpreted with caution, I take several steps to improve the robustness of these results.

The key challenge is that unlike the assignment of female politicians, mobilisation is not exogenous to citizens' political involvement. Based on interviews with councillors and party officials that are responsible for organising door-to-door campaigns, I find that mobilisation is targeted to those who are most likely to support the party. Party support is predicted at the within the ward, "locality" or neighbourhood level. This unit comprises of a collection of polling stations that display some geographical and class clustering (for example, low-income constituents next to a drainage pipe).

Political candidates and parties maintain a database of previous voting histories, class, caste and religious composition, historical voting patterns, and use their qualitative knowledge to judge political support at this level. These aggregates then inform their decisions to plan mobilisation drives and are likely to be endogenous to political involvement.

To deal with these potential sources of endogeneity, I begin by adding a fixed effect at the level of the locality. By doing so, I take into account various sources of endogeneity that correlate with both the type of councillor and the locality. The locality level neatly corresponds to the within ward team level, where the survey sampling was planned. In total, the respondents are spread across 51 unique localities. Second, all regressions, as the ones reported earlier, include controls for age, employment status, caste/ religion, education, whether a person is born in Delhi or not to account for factors that might lead people to be more likely to be contacted. While these strategies raise confidence about this relationship, these estimates are suggestive and remain correlational.

5.3.1 Does mobilisation matter for both male and female constituents?

To examine whether mobilisation improves political involvement, I restrict the outcome set to only those outcomes that are "post-treatment" to contact by party workers in 2017, that is all outcomes that become relevant after the 2017 elections. I compare respondents in ever and never-reserved wards, to examine whether contact affects outcomes of interests in the wards that "ever" received a female politicians. Unfortunately, the sample size is insufficient to interpret conclusive results about the effect in never reserved as well as other treatment categories. Table 2 shows the coefficient of party worker contact in the sub-sample of ever and never-reserved wards.

Campaign contact has a significantly and substantively positive effect for most of the outcomes of interest in ever-reserved wards. Citizen's that are contacted report much higher knowledge and participation. The effect is significantly larger than the total effect of women's political entry alone, suggesting that mobilisation is a possible means through which women's political entry affects citizen's political involvement. This result supports the argument that women's entry at the intermediary levels as a result of female representation has downstream effects. The same analysis replicated in sub-samples of men and women shows very similar results (see Table A.6 in the Appendix) supporting the theoretical expectations that there are no gender differences in the effects of mobilising on political involvement.

5.3.2 Do male and female campaign workers differ in affecting citizen's political involvement?

Finally, to examine whether women party workers in ever-reserved wards are more effective than male party workers, I plot the coefficient for the various categories of campaign contact, these categories are: none, male, female and mixed-gender group. Table 3 shows that the coefficients of these various categories (in reference to no campaign contact) are not very different from each other in effect size and all are substantive and significant.

	_	
Dependent	Ever	Never
Variable	reserved	reserved
Political knowledge		
Know councillor	0.138^{***}	-0.067
	(0.028)	(0.058)
Know councillor party	0.184^{***}	-0.073
	(0.028)	(0.059)
Political Participation		
	0 4 (0****	0.400
Voted MCD	0.148***	0.100
	(0.028)	(0.060)
Deater an each an	0.0174	0.000
Party member	0.017	-0.008
	(0.010)	(0.028)
Registered complaint	0.078**	0 089*
Registered complaint	(0.025)	(0.000)
	(0.025)	(0.021)
Met councillor	0.192^{***}	0.021
	(0.025)	(0.031)
	. ,	· /
Any political cause	0.024	0.083
	(0.018)	(0.046)
		· /
Any political action	0.030^{+}	0.000
	(0.016)	(0.031)
Women's cause	0.054^{**}	0.089
	(0.019)	(0.050)
_		
Rape protest 2017	0.016^{+}	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.004)
En in an a tal	0.002**	0.049
Environmental cause	0.063**	0.042
	(0.021)	(0.049)
Observations	1205	917
Observations	1290	211

Table 2: Campaign contact matters for citizen's political involvement in ever-reserved wards

Notes: Each row plots the coefficient of campaign contact for the dependent variable. All regressions have the same controls as listed in Table 1, a dummy for gender and a locality level fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at locality level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 \dagger <0.10

Two-sided t-test of the joint significance and the significance of the difference between male and female campaign workers and a male and mixed-gender group of party workers shows that all but one of the differences are statistically distinguishable from zero (p-values from Wald equality tests reported in the Appendix). Only with respect to getting out the vote, women party workers are substantively better than men. While respondents that report contact by a male party worker are 11.2% more to vote, the corresponding value is 19.2% by a female party worker, and the difference is statistically significant at 90% level (p-value 0.085). Table 3: All party workers are generally equally effective but women are more effective in getting out the vote

	Male	Female	Mixed
Dependent	visit	visit	visit
variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political knowledge			
Know councillor	0.161***	0.186***	0.113***
	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.031)
Know councillor party	0.219***	0.196***	0.169***
1 0	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.033)
Political Participation			
Voted MCD	0.112**	0.192***	0.150***
	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Party member	0.025	0.030†	0.008
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Registered complaint	0.086*	0.056	0.086**
· ·	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.032)
Met councillor	0.222***	0.223***	0.174***
	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.028)
Any political cause	0.068*	0.025	0.008
	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Any political action	0.035	0.016	0.037^{+}
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Women's cause	0.079*	0.081**	0.034
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Rape protest 2017	0.032^{+}	0.011	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Environmental cause	0.055	0.083*	0.063*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.027)

Notes: Each row plots the outcome of a single OLS on the ever-reserved sub-sample with coefficients of campaign contact (except for "Do not remember gender" category) displayed for each of the dependent variable in reference to no campaign contact. All regressions have the same specification as Table 2 and a dummy for gender. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 \dagger <0.10

6 Conclusion

Female representation is an essential means through which political gender gaps can be reduced. Yet our understanding of the relationship between female representation and its effects of citizen's political participation and knowledge remains obscure. Existing scholarship on the politics of presence has neglected how female representation shapes local politics in direct ways that involve citizens into politics. I argued that recognising the changes female representation brings to mobilisation, by changing the gender of the mobilised, improves not only women's but also men's political involvement. I provided a theoretical framework for understanding how women by changing the process of recruitment at lower-levels in politics affect the process of mobilisation. This argument connects a vast literature on female representation with the literature on mobilisation.

I provided evidence for this argument in the setting of India's capital city, a substantive case in itself for studying citizen's political involvement. Studying these outcomes in Delhi is crucial. Political participation in Delhi affects not only local policy or attitudes but has been instrumental in shaping national policy, in affecting nation wide-societal change in attitudes towards sexual harassment and sexual crime reporting, and in launching new political parties onto the Indian political scene. In this arena, the paper provided the first survey of gender gaps in mobilisation activities and of several measures of knowledge and participation and extends the comparative breadth of the literature on the consequences of gender quotas. I anticipate this argument to resonate in other contexts too. The scope condition of this theory are few - a large number of party workers routinely mobilise citizens in developing democracies where patriarchal norms and spatial organisation both limit opposite gender interaction. Such spaces need not be exclusively urban. As long as the grassroots level plays a party in local politics, we should observe these dynamics.

This emphasis on intermediaries speaks directly with a rich literature on intermediary politics that has paid attention the positive role intermediaries play as problem solvers (Chhibber and Ostermann, 2014; Auerbach and Thachil, 2018; Cheema and Liaqat, 2017; Liaqat, 2019). However, women's absence in these roles and the consequences that has on women's substantive representation have gone largely unnoticed and un-theorised. In my future research, I examine whether female intermediaries improve women's access to the state and increase women's substantive representation with respect to policy. In addition to problem solving services, the crucial role intermediaries play in conducting door-to-door canvassing during elections to mobilise millions to turn out to vote, providing party elites with information about citizens' preferences and in candidate nomination, has also received relatively less attention. Paying attention to these other services that intermediaries deliver and how candidate representation influences these roles is a fruitful area for future research.

Findings from this paper also spark further scholarship on how female representation beyond the candidate level can offer a pathway to improve women's numbers in the political candidate pipeline. In developing democracies, becoming a campaign worker is a stepping stone for political aspirants who lack a dynastic political background or family wealth. By ensuring women's access to these roles, female representation can also correct for imbalances in the type of women who enter politics in the future, and this has the potential to make politics more inclusive on other dimensions of representation beyond gender.

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A Appendix

A.1 Federal system in Delhi

India is a federal parliamentary democracy in which elections are held every five years for both the central government in New Delhi, and for the 29 states and 2 union territories that constitute the Indian Union. Delhi is a union territory which has both central and state-level governments. For the purpose of national level representation, Delhi is divided into 7 electoral units called the *parliamentary constituencies* (PCs) or *lok sabha shetras*, each of which selects a *Member of Parliament* (MP) to the National parliament. Unlike other Indian states, New Delhi does not have full statehood, which means some functions such as law and order and the police are under the control of the Central government.

For the purpose of state-level governance, Delhi has a state assembly, which is headed by a Chief Minister and political representatives called the *Members of Legislative Assembly* (MLAs) that are elected from 70 electoral units called *Assembly constituencies*. The chief minister is usually the leader of the party that wins a majority of seats in the state legislature (similar to the prime minister at the national level), and is supported by a deputy Chief Minister and council of ministers. The state-level government has several responsibilities for service provision, such as overseeing state finance, secondary and higher education, hospitals, water supply, land, housing, tourism, roads and public transport.

All electoral units in India across levels are single member districts and all elections use the first past the post system. ACs fit neatly into PCs, and each PC in Delhi is comprised fn 10 ACs. Elections are held every 5 years and state calendars differ from the National elections calendar. The last state-level elections in Delhi were in 2015, where the new party, that emerged from the anti-corruption movement, the *Aam Aadmi Party* (AAP, translated as the Common Man's Party) won with an overwhelming majority, winning 67 out of 70 seats. The rest of the 3 seats went to the *Bhartiya Janta Party* (BJP), while the Indian National Congress (INC) failed to secure even one seat ending its 15 years rule (since 1998) in Delhi state government.

A.2 Sampling wards and research sites

Municipal wards form the primary site where the survey was conducted. To arrive at the list of wards to include in the survey, I first purposely selected three parliamentary constituencies in Delhi. These are North West, North East and South Delhi. These are amongst the largest constituencies (by population) and have been selected to get a broad geographic and neighbourhood representation of Delhi. In this selected sample of 3 PCs there are 30 AC's from which I excluded 9 relatively wealthy ACs. This was done to avoid having an overrepresentation of wealthy population and neighbourhood, as only 1-3% citizens of Delhi live in such neighbourhoods. The only public, consistent and good quality indicator of wealth in Delhi comes from the Municipal tax category classification of neighbourhoods called localities within Municipal wards. In this classification, each locality is classified, as A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H. Using this classification, I excluded ACs that contain less than 80% of E,F,G and H localities. Majority of ACs in Delhi are comprised of at least 80% of E,F,G,H localities and wealthy population is segregated in select ACs. Given that finer data on income or wealth does not exist, excluding these AC's helps in avoiding oversampling wealthy populations or neighbourhoods in our survey. Qualitatively, this ensures I restrict the survey to poor to middle income neighbourhoods, which contain over 98% of Delhi's electorate. My survey is therefore representative for these poor-middle income populations that resides in such ACs, which is the predominant case in the context of Delhi as well as other Indian cities.

Each AC in Delhi is further subdivided into an average of 4.5 municipal wards. My sample of 21 ACs yields me with 95 municipal wards. Out of these 95 wards, 45 wards are general and 50 wards are reserved for women. From this sample of AC-Wards, I randomly select 17 AC-ward combination such that I first select 9 wards reserved for women and 8 for general. Selecting only one ward from each AC ensures considerable variation, and that the survey is representative also at the AC level.

A.3 Woman change grass-roots mobilisation

		D	uring elect	ions	Be	tween elect	ions
		Party worker (1)	Female worker (2)	Mixed group (3)	Any cause (4)	Women's cause (5)	Environ cause (6)
	Previously reserved	0.067	0.050**	0.209^{***}	0.009	-0.015	0.046*
Women	Currently reserved	(0.110) 0.008	(0.014) 0.142^{***}	(0.048) 0.136^{\dagger}	(0.029) 0.048	(0.019) - 0.024^*	(0.019) 0.017
Women	Previously [†] currently reserved	(0.122) 0.072	(0.027) 0.120^{***}	(0.071) 0.178^{**}	(0.035) 0.017	(0.011) -0.026	(0.025) 0.029
	Always	$(0.125) \\ 0.172$	(0.017) 0.294^{***}	$(0.054) \\ 0.079$	$(0.030) \\ 0.038$	$(0.016) \\ 0.020$	(0.024) 0.050^{\dagger}
	Observations	(0.145) 762	(0.020) 762	$(0.054) \\ 762$	$(0.026) \\ 668$	(0.014) 675	$(0.026) \\ 675$
	Previously reserved	-0.048	0.100**	-0.053	0.053	0.095*	0.029
Men	Currently reserved	(0.079) -0.061 (0.076)	(0.030) 0.181^{*} (0.065)	(0.039) 0.029 (0.042)	(0.056) 0.168^{*} (0.064)	(0.038) 0.109^{*}	(0.026) 0.014 (0.026)
	Previously [†] currently reserved	(0.070) -0.020 (0.005)	(0.003) 0.183^{***}	(0.042) 0.020 (0.044)	(0.004) 0.124^{\dagger}	(0.043) 0.138^{*}	(0.020) 0.010 (0.025)
	always-reserved	(0.065) -0.158^{\dagger}	(0.037) 0.148^{***}	(0.044) -0.033	(0.066) 0.039	(0.050) 0.019	(0.025) -0.053^{*}
	Observations	(0.082) 816	(0.036) 816	(0.057) 816	(0.067) 600	(0.035) 600	(0.024) 603
Test: Diff	p-value	0.027*	0.005**	0.020*	0.995	0.984	0.010*

Table A1: OLS results from the full specification

Notes: All regressions follow the same specification as in Table 1. The dependent variable is coded as 0 if the respondent belongs to a ward which was never-reserved from 2007-2017, 1 if ward was reserved for the first time in 2017, 2 if ward was ever-reserved from 2007 and 2017, 3 if ward was always-reserved for women. The outcome is measured as 1 if respondent answers yes, 0 otherwise. The table reports p-values from Wald equality tests of whether the difference between coefficients of men and women in always-reserved wards is zero. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 \dagger <0.10

A.4 Political involvement in ever-reserved wards

	MCD	Politics		State	Politics		(Claim-mak	ing	Gender-	relevant
	Councillor name (1)	Councillor party (2)	MLA name (3)	MLA party (4)	CM name (5)	Deputy CM name (6)	Clean streets (7)	Property tax (8)	DNK rep role (9)	Police (10)	women quota (11)
Women	-0.003 (0.041)	0.056 (0.069)	0.036 (0.078)	0.195^{**} (0.063)	$0.078\dagger$ (0.039)	0.074^{***} (0.016)	0.032^{*} (0.014)	-0.024 (0.031)	-0.079^{*} (0.030)	0.079^{**} (0.026)	0.036^{**} (0.010)
N Mean	$790 \\ 0.12$	791 0.20	$\begin{array}{c} 785 \\ 0.18 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 791 \\ 0.14 \end{array}$	$791 \\ 0.42$	$\begin{array}{c} 791 \\ 0.06 \end{array}$	$790 \\ 0.64$	$789 \\ 0.15$	$789 \\ 0.21$	$790 \\ 0.21$	$\begin{array}{c} 789 \\ 0.00 \end{array}$
Men	-0.096† (0.052)	-0.095 (0.063)	-0.183* (0.080)	0.255 (0.195)	-0.000 (0.021)	-0.080 (0.046)	-0.059 (0.035)	-0.041 (0.050)	0.035^{*} (0.012)	-0.087^{*} (0.034)	0.029 (0.026)
N Mean	848 0.47	848 0.70	843 0.69	848 0.46	848 0.90	848 0.61	848 0.88	848 0.31	842 0.03	846 0.69	846 0.07
Test-diff p-value	0.040*	0.000***	0.000***	0.746	0.022*	0.005**	0.018*	0.714	0.000***	0.001***	0.687

Table A2: Ever-reserved wards and political knowledge

Notes: All regressions follow the same specification as in Table 1. The bottom row reports p-values from Wald equality tests of whether the difference between coefficients of men and women in ever-reserved wards is zero. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * $p < 0.05 \dagger < 0.10$

	Elec	toral	Claim-	making	Any	cause	Gen	der-relev	ant	Delhi	specific
	Voted MCD (1)	Party member (2)	Reg. complaint (3)	Met councillor (4)	Any poli-sci cause (5)	Any poli-sci action (6)	Any women's cause (7)	Rape protest 2017 (8)	Rape protest 2012 (9)	Any environ. cause (10)	Anti corruption 2012 (11)
Women	0.008 (0.049)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.053 (0.053)	0.059^{*} (0.025)	$0.015^{\dagger}_{(0.007)}$	-0.008 (0.036)	0.005 (0.025)	0.013^{**} (0.004)	0.012 (0.010)	-0.040 (0.029)	0.001 (0.012)
Ν	776	791	791	769	788	788	790	786	786	790	790
Mean	0.66	0.01	0.23	0.12	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.11	0.03
Men	-0.111** (0.031)	-0.004 (0.012)	$-0.086\dagger$ (0.047)	-0.109^{**} (0.029)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.015)	0.022 (0.021)	0.015 (0.009)	-0.062† (0.031)	-0.011 (0.045)	-0.083^{**} (0.028)
Ν	840	848	848	836	847	847	846	840	840	847	848
Mean	0.76	0.06	0.32	0.48	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.01	0.20	0.26	0.23
Test-diff p-value	0.470	0.425	0.562	0.290	0.429	0.996	0.708	0.928	0.053†	0.786	0.001***

Table A3: Ever-reserved wards and political participation

Notes: All regressions follow the same specification as in Table 1. The bottom row reports p-values from Wald equality tests of whether the difference between coefficients of men and women in ever-reserved wards is zero. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 $\ddagger<0.10$

A.5 Intensity of exposure and political involvement

	MCD	Politics		State	Politics			<mark>Olaim-mak</mark>	ing	Gender-r	elevant
	Councillor name (1)	Councillor party (2)	MLA name (3)	MLA party (4)	CM name (5)	Deputy CM name (6)	Clean streets (7)	Property tax (8)	DNK rep role (9)	Police (10)	women quota (11)
Women First timers	-0.014	-0.049	0.066	0.227***	0.037	0.096**	0.029	-0.040	-0.022	0.018	0.023
Experience change	(0.052) 0.002 (0.041)	(0.074) 0.092 (0.068)	(0.080) 0.030 (0.086)	(0.052) 0.203^{*}	(0.037) 0.081† (0.045)	(0.032) 0.071** (0.018)	(0.047) 0.031	(0.032) -0.018 (0.033)	(0.043) -0.084* (0.030)	(0.045) 0.085^{**}	(0.018) 0.038^{**}
always-reserved	(0.045) -0.021 (0.045)	(0.000) -0.042 (0.057)	(0.030) (0.064)	(0.042)	(0.030) (0.118^{**}) (0.030)	0.060* 0.060* 0.022)	(0.031) (0.031)	(0.022) -0.043 (0.027)	-0.127^{***}	(0.027) (0.027)	(0.010) (0.018)
Observations	790	161	785	162	162	162	262	789	789	262	789
Men											
First timers	-0.075 (0.057)	-0.218 (0.130)	-0.235* (0.086)	0.188 (0.193)	0.005	-0.075 (0.045)	-0.110† (0.056)	-0.017 (0.043)	0.032	-0.164^{***}	0.061
Change	-0.093 -0.053)	-0.044 -0.056)	-0.159	(0.281)	(0.025)	-0.068 -0.068 (0.048)	-0.057	-0.048 -0.055)	(0.036^{*})	-0.072	(0.024)
always-reserved	-0.151^{*}	-0.292^{*}	-0.287^{***}	(0.180)	(0.023)	-0.174	-0.001 (0.041)	(0.035)	(0.032)	-0.090*	(0.026)
Observations	848	848	843	848	848	848	848	848	842	846	846
Test-diff always-res p-value	erved 0.646	0.642	0.581	0.815	0.665	0.610	0.651	0.910	0.609	0.618	0.928
<i>Notes:</i> All regres between coefficien	sions follow th ts of men and	he same specifi l women in alw	ication as in rays-reserved	Table 1. T wards is ze	he bottom ro. *** p<	row reports p 0.001, ** p<0.0	-values from $01, * p < 0.0$	m Wald equ 05 †<0.10	ality tests of	whether the	e difference

Table A4: Always-reserved wards and political knowledge

	Elec	toral	Claim-1	making	Any c	ause	Ger	nder-releve	ant	Delhi	specific
	Voted MCD (1)	Party member (2)	Reg. complaint (3)	Met councillor (4)	Any poli-sci cause (5)	Any poli-sci action (6)	Any women's cause (7)	Rape protest 2017 (8)	Rape protest 2012 (9)	Any environ. cause (10)	Anti corruption 2012 (11)
rst timers	0.029 (0.056)	0.001	0.012	0.088* (0.031)	0.006	-0.019 (0.039)	0.023	0.021*	0.021 (0.015)	-0.071† (0.034)	0.004 (0.013)
cperience change	0.003	0.011	-0.018	0.058*	-0.004	0.028	-0.041	0.027***	-0.009	0.026	-0.024
ways-reserved	(0.049)-0.047	(0.008) 0.027*	(0.045) -0.090 \ddagger	(0.023) 0.026	(0.006) 0.018^{*}	(0.029) -0.018	(0.023) 0.010	(0.002) 0.014	(0.014) 0.005	(0.029)-0.070**	(0.015) 0.006
2	(0.055)	(0.010)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.012)
servations	776	791	791	692	788	788	260	786	786	062	062
est timers	-0.069*	-0.001	-0.046	-0.139***	-0.043	-0.004	0.029	0.026	-0.039	-0.034	-0.085*
	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.033)
perience change	-0.060*	-0.016	-0.041	-0.117^{**}	-0.101^{***}	-0.011	-0.062**	0.023^{**}	-0.118^{**}	-0.032	-0.081
	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.055)
vays-reserved	-0.216^{**}	0.004	-0.148^{**}	-0.085*	0.024	-0.005	0.080^{***}	0.004	-0.089**	-0.010	-0.082^{*}
	(0.063)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.027)	(0.055)	(0.029)
servations	840	848	848	836	847	847	846	840	840	847	848
st-diff always-rese	rved										
/alue	0.405	0.503	0.554	0.446	0.958	0.872	0.586	0.779	0.001^{**}	0.671	0.000^{***}

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Mobilisation drives political involvement for all citizens A.6

Dependent Variable	Party visit	Gender	Party visit # Gender
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political knowledge			
Know councillor name	0.176***	-0.120***	-0.076*
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Know councillor party	0.204***	-0.228***	-0.039
1 0	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.057)
Political Participation	~ /	~ /	× ,
Voted MCD	0.168***	0.136**	-0.040
	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.046)
Party member	0.019	-0.028^{+}	-0.003
U U	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Registered complaint	0.076**	-0.002	0.004
_	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Met councillor	0.227***	-0.063*	-0.071†
	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.042)
Any political cause	0.034	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.038)
Any political action	0.048^{+}	-0.008	-0.036
	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.029)
Women's cause	0.046^{+}	-0.041	0.015
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)
Rape protest 2017	0.018	-0.022†	-0.004
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Environmental cause	0.091^{**}	-0.071*	-0.056
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.040)

Table A6: No gender differences in the effect of mobilisation on political involvement in ever-reserved wards

> Notes: Each row plots the coefficient of campaign contact (column 1), gender (column 2) and the interaction between campaign contact and gender (column 3) for the dependent variable. All regressions have the same controls as listed in Table 1 and a locality level fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at locality level. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 †<0.10

A.7 All party workers are equally effective

	Joint	Diff- male	Diff- male
Dependent	sig.	vs. female	vs. mix
variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Political knowledge			
Know councillor	0.000***	0.668	0.354
Know councillor party	0.000^{***}	0.670	0.285
Political Participation	0 000***	0.085†	0.365
Party member	0.213	0.826	0.300
Registered complaint	0.023*	0.550	0.999
Met councillor	0.000^{***}	0.978	0.236
Any political cause	0.107	0.168	0.066^{+}
Any political action	0.237	0.580	0.958
Women's cause	0.012^{*}	0.957	0.216
Rape protest 2017	0.291	0.292	0.137
Environmental cause	0.032^{*}	0.556	0.848

Table A7: No differences in effectiveness of party workers by gender

Notes: Each row gives the p-value of the Wald equality test of joint significance of all categories (column 1), the test for whether difference between male and female campaign workers is zero (column 2), and the test of whether the difference between male and mixed-gender group is zero (column 3) for the OLS specifications that correspond to Table 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 $\dagger<0.10$