Expected Benefits and Costs of Migration for Rural Youth: Experimental Evidence from India

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Abstract

This paper studies how disadvantaged young job seekers in rural India weigh up job location and salary in their decisions to join a training program with guaranteed placement in a formal salaried job. We show that prospective candidates are over-optimistic: they expect a job closer to home and a higher salary than the program offers. In a randomized experiment, we provide them with objective information on the distribution of job locations, on the salary distribution, or both. The intervention successfully corrects their beliefs, and affects their decision to join the program. Revealed preference estimates suggest that job seekers require a 24% higher salary to compensate for a 10% increase in the probability of being placed outside of their home state. Our results suggest that over-optimistic beliefs and high migration costs are important barriers to the inclusion of rural youth into urban labor markets of developing countries.

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1 Introduction

Misallocation of labor across space is an important factor behind differences in income per capita across countries (Restuccia et al., 2008; Gollin et al., 2014). Finding ways to encourage more rural to urban migration holds the potential to yield substantial productivity and welfare gains. Low migration rates could stem from higher skill requirements in urban jobs (Lagakos and Waugh, 2013; Young, 2013), a lack of information about urban jobs (Baseler, 2021), credit or insurance constraints (Bryan et al., 2014; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2016), or non-monetary costs of migration (Lagakos et al., 2018; Imbert and Papp, 2020a).

Across the developing world, vocational training hold the promise to equip rural workers with the required skills and facilitate their placement into urban jobs. However, the literature has shown that designing successful training programs is difficult (Blattman and Ralston, 2015; McKenzie, 2017). Many programs suffer from low take-up and high attrition rates, which plague the impact on employment, migration and job retention (Card et al., 2011; Cho et al., 2013; Hirshleifer et al., 2016). One reason could be that prospective trainees have incorrect labor market expectations due to others' migration experiences or incorrect inference on migrant income from remittances (McKenzie et al., 2013; Baseler, 2021).

In this paper, we study the role of labor market expectations on young rural job seekers' decision to enroll in the DDU-GKY (Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana) training and placement program in India. Since, its inception in 2014 it has trained over a million candidates, and placed about half a million in formal salaried job, most of which are located outside their home state. The program consists in three stages: mobilization of potential candidates, residential training and finally, the placement in jobs. We implement a survey and an experiment in the mobilization camps. The survey suggests that the average candidate holds overoptimistic expectations about placement opportunities: they expect 55% of jobs to be in their home state (the truth is 20%) and the average wage to be Rs. 9,800 (the truth is about Rs. 8,300).

We provide correct information on the distribution of wages, the distribution of job locations, or both, to randomly selected candidates. Our information intervention designed to correct their labor market beliefs is partially successful in aligning potential trainees' beliefs with observed averages. The posterior beliefs of treated individuals are closer to the truth and are significantly different from their own priors and posteriors of the control group. We find that the individuals with priors further away from the truth update their beliefs the most. Belief updating is persistent: treated individuals hold on to the updated beliefs up to four weeks after the intervention. We find that the intervention leads to a change in the labor market beliefs for all sub-groups whether defined by gender, by social category, or by education. In addition, we find that the information interventions also affect candidates' personal labor market expectations (location and salary one year after the training) and have no effect on their counterfactual situations (location and salary if they don't take part in the training). Finally, matching the survey sample with administrative data on training enrollment, we estimate the effect of salary and location expectations instrumented by the information treatment on the decision to enroll. We find that the treated respondents are less likely to take part in the program. The decrease in average salary expectations and the prospect of finding a job outside of the home state makes the candidates not take part in the training program. Revealed preference estimates suggest that rural job seekers require a 24% higher salary to compensate for a 10% increase in the probability to work out of state.

Our paper contributes to the literature studying costs and benefits of migration in developing countries. Previous literature studies how individuals access to services such as financial education, bank accounts, liquidity constraints, information on jobs affect individuals decision to migrate and to stick to the destination (Bryan et al., 2014; Ashraf et al., 2015; Beam et al., 2016; Batista and Narciso, 2018; Imbert and Papp, 2020a,b; Meghir et al., 2022). Our paper documents how correcting for misinformation on labor markets affects migration decisions and how individuals trade-off location vs salary in this decision. While existing literature documents an underestimation of wages (McKenzie et al., 2013; Baseler, 2021), in our context prospective migrants overestimate labor market earnings (similar to Shrestha (2017) in Nepal).

Our paper also contributes to the literature that uses experiments to learn about migration decisions (McKenzie, 2015; Baláž et al., 2016; Bah and Batista, 2018; Lagakos et al., 2018; Batista and McKenzie, 2021). In a similar vein, Batista and McKenzie (2021) use incentivized laboratory experiments to investigate how potential migrants decide between working in different destinations and use this to test competing migration theories. Our contribution is to study real migration decisions of rural youth in the context of admission to a training and placement program.

We also contribute to the literature studying the effectiveness of vocational training programs in developing countries. The literature finds mixed evidence on the effectiveness of programs in promoting employment (Blattman and Ralston, 2015; McKenzie, 2017; Maitra and Mani, 2017; Alfonsi et al., 2020). In the Indian context, Chakravorty and Bedi (2019) finds that employment rates are not significantly different between trainees and non-trainees 2-6 months after training completion. Similarly, Prillaman et al. (2017) finds low rate of employment among DDU-GKY trainees 9 months after training. We contribute to this literature by showing how misinformation on labor market opportunities contributes to the ineffectiveness of the program. Candidates are misinformed even before they reach the training center (at the mobilization stage itself) and how the underlying incentives of the government and private players at the entry stage contribute to the misinformation.

Our paper also adds to the literature studying barriers to youth unemployment in developing countries. The existing research has highlighted the importance of skills signalling (Bassi and Nansamba, 2022; Carranza et al., 2020; Abebe et al., 2021a,b), search costs (Abebe et al., 2017; Franklin, 2018), and information frictions (Hicks et al., 2011; Jensen, 2012; Banerjee and Chiplunkar, 2022; Chakravorty et al., 2021). In the context of DDU-GKY program, Banerjee and Chiplunkar (2022) informs placement officers about trainees preferences regarding their placement jobs and finds that it leads to a better match and retention in the program. Chakravorty et al. (2021) finds that informing trainees about placement jobs improves retention by inducing self-selection of trainees who are a better fit for the available jobs. Our contribution is to show that an information intervention at the mobilization stage makes candidates' update their labor market beliefs and affects their decision to enroll, thus improving the selection of trainees that enter the program.

2 Context and Experimental design

2.1 Context

India, like other developing countries, suffers from low productivity of labor (see the IGC Evidence paper by Bloom et al., 2014). On the one hand, the rapid development of urban areas has created a demand for jobs in various sectors, while, on the other hand, there are many under-employed and unemployed people in rural areas. A cross national comparison of internal migration by Bell et al. (2015) shows that India has among the lowest internal migration rate. In 2014, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) launched the "Deen Dayan Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushal Yojana" (DDU-GKY) to tackle this challenge. DDU-GKY program is a residential training and placement program that targets unemployed rural youth aged 15-35 years from poor families and places them in jobs outside the home state. The program focuses on rural youth (mandatory coverage of females and socially disadvantaged groups), shifts emphasis from training to training and placement (mandatory placement of at least 70% candidates to receive training funds), covers all the cost

for training including accommodation and food, and aims at retention (100% residential program) and career progression (monthly monetary incentives for job retention).

Within each state in India, the State Rural Livelihood Missions (SRLMs) are in-charge of implementation of the program along with private, social and other enterprises (called Project Implementing Agencies – PIAs). The PIAs provide the training and receive funds from SRLMs in a phased manner upon completion of the required targets (batch completion, training completion, on-the-job training, placement, 3-month job retention and 6-month job retention). Both SRLMs and PIAs are in-charge of mobilizing (or recruitment) the candidates from the villages. The mobilization of candidates are done mostly via group meetings and sometimes by door-to-door campaigning. Each district and sub-block has a job resource person (JRP) who is in-charge of connecting rural population with various labor market programs offered by the SRLMs. Each PIA also has a team of mobilizers to attract rural youth in their respective training centers. The JRP organizes mobilization camps at the village/panchayat/block level in collaboration with the PIAs by inviting candidates who might be interested in the skill training program. The PIAs send their mobilizers to each camps to provide information about the training center, trade and batch start date.

From qualitative interviews, we identified that potential trainees are misinformed about two important aspects of job opportunities: (i) the wages offered; (ii) location of job (inside or outside the state). These incorrect expectations could step from the PIA's mobilizer or the JRP or both. The mobilizer of the PIAs might be communicating incorrect information to enroll candidates and achieve personal targets. Often each mobilizer is given a salary bonus based on the number of candidates mobilized. The JRP in-charge of organizing mobilization camps might be misinforming candidates about training prospects and jobs to present a well functioning program with high demand and enrollment. Often, other community members, past candidates etc. might also be a source of false information outside of the mobilization camp. We hypothesize that the lack of truthful information about placement jobs, leads to mismatch between the trainees' expectations, and what the program offers even before the enrollment stage. This has a direct and long-term effect on the training completion, job retention from the placement job and migration outside of the state.

2.2 Intervention

We collaborated with the Bihar Rural Livelihood Promotion Society (BRLPS) for this study. BRLPS is the SRLM in-charge for the DDU-GKY program in the state of Bihar. We designed an information intervention to correct the labor market expectations of the potential trainees, in particular, the salary offered and the job location of the placement job. The intervention was carried out at the mobilization stage. The JRP organizes a number of mobilization camps (group meetings) every month. The camps usually begin with an introduction to the DDU-GKY program by the JRP. Next, the mobilizers share information about their training center. At the end of this process, each candidate is invited to take part in the survey. At the beginning of the survey we measure candidates' labor market priors as follows:

- Location: After the training if 10 people like you get a job. How many will get a job inside of Bihar and how many will get a job outside of Bihar? It is not necessary that each option will have some candidates.
- Salary: After the training if 10 people like you get job. How many will get a job in the with a monthly salary of less than Rs 6000? How many will get a job between Rs 6000 and Rs 8000? How many will get a job between Rs 8000 and Rs 10000? How many will get a job between Rs 10000 and Rs 12000 and how many will get a job above Rs 12000? It is not necessary that each option will have some candidates.

After measuring the priors, the respondents are assigned to one of the four intervention arms. The randomization was carried out at the individual level.

- Control: Candidate gets to see a basic informational video about DDU-GKY program. The video provides a glimpse of the training center, accommodation and food facilities, and classrooms. Two placed candidates happily describe improvement in their lives from the training. At no point the video provides any information on placement job location or the wages offered.
- Treatment Location: Candidate watches the basic information video and an additional video which provides information on the true distribution of job location for the past DDU-GKY candidates.
- Treatment Salary: Candidate watches the basic information video and an additional video which provides information on the true distribution of wages for the past DDU-GKY candidates.
- Treatment Salary + Location: Candidate watches the basic information video and two additional videos which shows the true distribution of wages and job location for the past DDU-GKY trainees.

The distribution of wages and location of the placement job has been obtained from the surveys of DDU-GKY trainees from a parallel project in the same state (Chakravorty et al., 2021).¹ Since the wages and job location differ across male and female candidates, the true distribution is tailored to the gender of the candidate. After the intervention, we ask the posterior beliefs of the candidates using the same questions as described above.

The intervention videos begin by displaying 10 candidates who are divided through the video into two bins for the location treatment (inside Bihar and outside Bihar) and five bins for the salary treatment (less than Rs 6000 per month, Rs 6000 - 8000 per month, Rs 8000 - 10000 per month, Rs 10000 - Rs 12000 per month and more than Rs 12000 per month). Appendix Figure A1 and A2 shows snippets of the location intervention videos for females and males respectively. Appendix Figure A3 and A4 shows snippets of the salary intervention videos for females and males respectively. A detailed transcript of the contents of each intervention video and the introduction video are available in Appendix Section A.

2.3 Data

Our research relies on primary data collected from three rounds of surveys of potential trainees who attended the mobilization camps conducted across multiple districts in Bihar. In addition, we also use administrative data (matched with the survey data) from the management information system (MIS) of BRLPS. The administrative data is compiled from reporting by PIAs to the state administration.

Surveys All surveys are administered on tablets. The randomization and the intervention videos are built into survey instrument. The baseline survey is administered in face-to-face interviews. The two followup surveys are administered using phone interviews. In addition, a camp activity survey for each mobilization camp is completed by the enumerator.

 Baseline survey: This survey is administered to all participants in the mobilization camps, after the trainees have received information from the JRP and/or the PIA mobilizer. Data collectors administer the baseline questionnaire in a face-to-face interview sessions with individual trainees. The baseline questionnaire is custom designed to collect information and disseminate the intervention according to the treatment assignment and gender of the candidate. The questionnaire captures probability of join-

¹The administrative data often has incomplete information on placement jobs of the candidates as PIAs don't focus on tracking of candidates once they have left the training center. Surveys by Chakravorty et al. (2021) follow a sample with similar socio-economic characteristics and has a below 5% attrition rate.

ing the training, prior and posterior distribution of wages and job location, expected and counterfactual earnings 1 year post training and socio-economic characteristics of the candidate.

• Followup surveys: This telephonic-survey interview is conducted with the trainees after one week and four weeks of the baseline survey. Qualitative interviews with JRPs and PIAs informed us that most candidates who want to enroll into the training program enroll within a week or 10 days of the mobilization camp. The objective of these surveys is to collect information about the posterior beliefs on wages and job location, expected and counterfactual earnings at the time when the candidates have to make a decision to join the program.

2.4 Summary statistics and balance tests

Our sample includes 876 candidates from 63 mobilization camps organized in Bihar.² The surveys were conducted between December 2019 and February 2020.³ Information from camp activity survey suggests that 74% of the camps were attended by the PIA mobilizer. All camps had presence of a JRP. In 9.5% of the camps (6 out of 63), neither the JRP nor the mobilizer provided any introduction to the program. In 30% of the camps (19 out of 63), both the JRP and mobilizer spoke about the DDU-GKY program.

The summary statistics of our baseline variables, and the results of the balance tests for randomization are provided in Appendix Table A1 and A2 respectively. The average age of candidates in our sample is 20 and almost 58% are females. In terms of social category, 30% of the candidates are Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and 55% are OBCs, which shows the pro-poor targeting of the DDU-GKY program. Appendix Table A1 Panel B and C shows the prior labor market beliefs by gender. Females expect a 3 out of 10 chance that they will get a job outside of Bihar after the training, while for males it is a 5 in 10 chance. The priors for females are in stark contrast to the signal or truth— 9 in 10 chance of a job outside Bihar. The location prior for males are not too far from the truth (7 in 10 chance).

The prior salary expectations for both males and females is about Rs 9800 per month. The truth is that an average female candidate receives Rs 7600 and an average male candidate receives Rs 9000 per month. The number of candidates in each bin shows that it is skewed

²Our total survey sample was 880. However, in 4 camps there was only 1 candidate each. We exclude these camps from our analysis.

³The COVID-19 lockdowns were introduced in India towards the end of March 2020 and are unlikely to have affected the mobilization camps and the candidates decision to enroll into the program.

towards higher salary bins. Appendix Figure A5 provides a density plot of the prior salary distributions by gender. The priors for females are far away from the truth as compared to males. One possible reason is that females don't migrate so much for jobs and their expectations are based on the labor market outcomes of males. Both females and males say that it would not be difficulty for their family if they join the training program and that there is almost 80% probability to join the program. This suggests JRPs targets the candidates well: candidates who fulfill the program targeting and those who are eager to take part in the training are present in the mobilization camps. Balancing tests suggest that there are no issues with the randomization (Appendix Table A2). The attrition rate in both follow up rounds are low (almost 6%) and similar across all treatment and control groups (Appendix Table A3).

3 Empirical Framework

3.1 Labor Market Beliefs

We estimate models using data on the candidates present at the baseline survey. An individual *i* present at the mobilization camp *c* is assigned to either Treatment Salary T_i^s or a Treatment Location T_i^l or both and has a vector of characteristics X_i (control variables). *Prior*^{*j*}_{*ic*} and *Posterior*^{*j*}_{*ic*} measures the respondent *i*'s prior and posterior distributions for salary (*j* = *s*) and location of job (*j* = *l*) respectively at the end of training program. Prior distributions are measured during the baseline before the interventions. Posterior distributions are measured during the baseline after the intervention and two followup surveys. We estimate coefficients for the following two specifications, including or not an interaction between the two treatments.

$$\begin{aligned} &Posterior_{ic}^{j} - Prior_{ic}^{j} = \gamma^{j}T_{ic}^{j} + X_{ic}^{\prime}\alpha + \delta_{c} + \varepsilon_{ic}, \quad j \in \{s, l\} \\ &Posterior_{ic}^{j} - Prior_{ic}^{j} = \gamma_{1}T_{ic}^{s} + \gamma_{2}T_{ic}^{l} + \gamma_{3}T_{ic}^{s} \times T_{ic}^{l} + X_{ic}^{\prime}\alpha + \delta_{c} + \varepsilon_{ic} \end{aligned}$$

For the location intervention, the labor market beliefs used as an outcome variable are the number of candidates (out of 10) who will get a job outside of Bihar. In case of the salary intervention, we use the average expected salary in the placement job as the the outcome variables on labor market beliefs. The average salary is computed as the summation of the mean salary in each bin times the share of candidates (out of 10) assigned to each bin.⁴ γ^{j}

⁴In case of the salary bin less than Rs 6000, we take a salary figure of Rs 5000 and in case of the salary bin above Rs 12000, we take a salary figure of Rs 13000.

is the intention-to-treat estimate, the quantity of interest in our setting measures an average treated individual updates their labor market beliefs are compared to the control group. The standard errors are clustered at the mobilization camp level. We use post-double-selection lasso for the control variable selection as in Belloni et al. (2014).

3.2 Personal Beliefs and Admission in Training Program

Our goal is to understand how labor market expectations affect the individuals decision to join the training program. We also estimate how individuals update their expected personal labor market beliefs one year later with and without the training. On both these outcome variables, studying their relationship with labor market beliefs might give us incorrect estimates due to omitted variable bias. For example, a negative association between beliefs and admission might be driven by self-selection into training, i.e. extroverted individuals might seek new information and decide not to join the program. Existing evidence from Carranza et al. (2020); Abebe et al. (2021a); Bassi and Nansamba (2022) suggests that noncognitive traits or soft skills affect rural youths' decision to the labor market.

We use 2SLS estimation procedure to overcome the omitted variable bias in the OLS estimation. The randomization of the information intervention provides an exogenous variation in the labor market beliefs of the individuals when they decide to take admission in the program. The randomized intervention acts as an external shock that affects all individuals irrespective of their unobserved characteristics. It directs affects the individuals posterior labor market beliefs and any observed differences in the outcome variables are mediated through its effects on the labor market beliefs. In the first stage, we regress the difference between the posterior and the prior about salary or location on the difference between the signal and the prior (interacted or not with the treatment dummy). T_i^j is an indicator variable if the candidate *i* received the intervention on salary (*j* = *s*) or location (*j* = *l*). Signal^j is the true information signal for salary (*j* = *s*) and location of job (*j* = *l*).

$$\begin{aligned} Posterior_{ic}^{j} - Prior_{ic}^{j} &= \beta_{1}^{j}T_{ic}^{j} + \beta_{2}^{j}(Signal^{j} - Prior_{ic}^{j}) + \beta_{3}^{j}(Signal^{j} - Prior_{ic}^{j}) \times T_{ic}^{j} \\ &+ X_{ic}^{\prime}\alpha + \delta_{c} + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad j \in \{s, l\} \end{aligned}$$

In the case of personal labor market beliefs, since we do not measure the prior we take the prior to be zero. The second stage consists in regressing the gap in personal beliefs about the labor market on the posteriors about salary and location. The gap in personal beliefs is measured as the gap between the labor market expectations with the training (expectation) and without the training (counterfactual). The followup surveys asks personal labor market expectations on salary as the average expected salary one year later and the expected location one year later as a multiple choice question (within the state or outside the state).

$$I(Admission)_{ic}^{Posterior} - P(Enrollment)_{ic}^{Prior} = \beta_l(Posterior_{ic}^l - Prior_{ic}^l) + \beta_s(Posterior_{ic}^s - Prior_{ic}^s) + X'_{ic}\alpha + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ic}$$

For the training admission, in the second stage we use the difference between the admission dummy and the prior on admission as the outcome variable. In our survey, we measure the prior of individuals about their probability to join the training program. The outcome variable $I(Admission)_{ic}$ is an indicator variable which measures if the candidate reported taking admission at the training center. We estimate the following equation:

4 Results

4.1 Labor Market Beliefs

Table 1 presents the effects of the information intervention on the change in the labor market beliefs of the respondents (posterior - prior) from the location treatment (Panel A) and the salary treatment (Panel B). Posterior beliefs measured are measured at three different time periods: baseline survey after the intervention (Columns 1 and 2), one week after the intervention (Columns 3 and 4: Followup 1w) and four weeks after the intervention (Columns 5 and 6: Followup 4w). The number of observations change across the columns due to attrition. Panel A presents the outcome variables on location beliefs, i.e. the number of candidates out of 10 who will get a job outside Bihar after the training. While, Panel B presents the salary beliefs, i.e. the mean of the earnings distribution.

In the control group, the respondents believe that there is a 44% chance (or almost 4 candidates out of 10) of getting a job outside Bihar (Panel A). There is a very marginal increase in this probability after watching the basic program video, the gap between the posterior and prior for the control group increases by 0.24 candidates. There is a large and significant effect of the treatment. The location treatment makes the respondents place 2.5 more candidates (a 56% increase) outside Bihar in the baseline survey (Columns 1 and 2). Figure 1 shows the same result graphically. The respondents have incorrect beliefs prior to the intervention, the truth is that there is a less than 20% chance of getting a job inside Bihar (Signal). Post-intervention only the treated sample updates their location beliefs towards the signal (almost 8 out of 10 candidates outside Bihar). Table 1 Panel B presents the results on how respondents update their salary distributions. All values are scaled by 1000. In the control group, the respondents believe that they will get an average salary of Rs 9770 after the training and the basic program video increases the amount very marginally. In the treated group, the salary intervention (basic program video + salary distribution) leads to a significant decrease in average salary expectations by about Rs 1400 (a 15% decrease) measured at the the baseline survey (Columns 1 and 2).

Figure 2 presents the above results graphically with the number of candidates in each salary bin. The respondents have higher salary expectations prior to the intervention, there are more number of candidates (out of 10) in the high salary bins and the priors are similar between the treatment and control group. The signal shows the true salary distributions (number of candidates in each bin) which has a bell-shaped curve. Post-intervention only the treatment group shifts their salary distribution in line with the signal. Note that there is a significant change in the number of candidates in each salary bin between the treatment and control group post intervention.

Columns 3 and 5 suggests that the treatment effect on belief updating (for both salary and location) stay with the respondents when measured one week and four weeks after the intervention. We find that there is an immediate drop in the beliefs between the baseline survey and one week later. There are two possible reasons for this: (a) beliefs drop possibly due to precise memory recall, and (b) interactions between the treated and control group respondents after the mobilization camp lead to further revision of beliefs. Investigating the second argument further, we find that the posterior beliefs for the control group do not change between the baseline posterior survey and the two followup surveys, while only the treatment group moves slightly back to their prior labor market beliefs. Also, we find no difference between treatment and control groups in the camps where majority (above 50%) of the respondents are treated, hinting at no SUTVA violation (Appendix Table A4). This suggests that the move towards prior labor market beliefs between the baseline and first followup survey is due to memory recall.

Columns 2, 4 and 6 present results from a specification that takes a dummy variable for the three interventions together, the results suggests that only the treatment leads to a change in beliefs. There is no significant effect of receiving both treatment location and treatment salary. Overall, we find that the information intervention leads to a change in labor market beliefs for all sub-groups: by gender, by social category, and by education (Appendix Figure A6). We test for cross-treatment effects and find null results (Appendix Table A5) in all surveys. The treatment location does not lead to the respondents revising their labor market beliefs on the salary distribution. Similarly, the treatment salary does not lead to a revision in the labor market beliefs on the job location. Lastly, we find that respondents whose priors are far away from the signal are more likely to update their labor market beliefs (Appendix Table A6). This suggests that the information intervention has the highest success rate for the respondents who have a higher misinformation.

4.2 Personal Beliefs

The surveys, so far, asked the respondents about their expectations of the average labor market beliefs from participating in the training program. A respondent might have personal beliefs that are different from the average trainee. Broadly, the potential trainees seek a job within Bihar and have a high salary expectations. It is possible that even after correcting the average labor market beliefs from participating in the program, their personal expectations might not shift. We test this hypothesis by asking what do the respondents believe their location would be one year after the training (inside Bihar or outside Bihar) and what salary do they expect to earn one year after the training. We also ask about their personal labor market situation one year later if they do not take part in the training (a counterfactual situation).

Table 2 reports the 2SLS estimation results on how the posterior beliefs affect the gap between personal expectations and counterfactual situations.⁵ We find that the information interventions also lead to a change in the respondents personal labor market beliefs (one year later). Again, these effects last one week and four weeks after the interventions (Columns 2 and 3). Importantly, the treatment only affects the personal expectations (Appendix Table A8). The information interventions have no effect on the counterfactual situation of the candidates, i.e. labor market beliefs if they don't take part in the training (Appendix Table A9).

Panel A presents the results on personal beliefs for the respondent's location. In the control group, the respondents think that there is about 34% to 40% chance that they would still be outside of the state in one year with the training. Without the training program, this probability is between 8% and 11%. The treatment leads to an increase in the probability of being outside of Bihar between 4.9 p.p. and 10 p.p. (22% to 33% increase). Importantly, the

⁵Appendix Table A7 provides the OLS estimation results. Broadly, we find that the OLS estimates are smaller than the 2SLS estimates for both location and salary posterior beliefs. An omitted variable, such as confidence, could explain this downward bias. Confident individuals might expect an average candidate to be placed inside Bihar and receive a lower salary as compared to their own expectations.

posteriors on the salary distribution have null effects on the personal probability of being outside of Bihar, i.e. no cross-treatment effects.

Similarly, Panel B reports the results on the gap between the expectation and counterfactual situation on the average salary the respondents expects to earn one year later (scaled by 1000). In the control group, the respondents think they would earn about Rs 13500 one year later (an almost 38% increase from the starting salary after training). Without the training program, this respondents expects to earn between Rs 6400 and Rs 7500. The treatment leads to a decrease in the average salary expectations by 13%. Note that the posterior beliefs on salary are lower due to the treatment, hence the decrease in salary expectations.

4.3 Admission in Training Program

Our findings, so far, suggests that the information interventions lead to an update in the personal and average labor market beliefs of the respondents from participating in the training program, while their beliefs on the outside options stay the same. Next, we examine how the information intervention affects the candidate's decision to join the program. Table 3 reports the 2SLS estimation results from the self-declared two followup surveys (Columns 1 and 2) and administrative data from BRLPS (Column 3- Admin).⁶ The Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments and Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions are reported at the bottom of the table. We find a strong first-stage relationship between the instruments and the independent variables. In Appendix Table A6 and A11 we report the first stage and reduced form regressions respectively.

Matching our sample with the administrative data, we found that 10.3% of the control group respondents had taken admission in the training program. While, the control group admission rate in the followup surveys was 18.7% (1 week later) and 23.8% (4 weeks later). We find a significant gap between the respondents probability to join the training program at the start of the mobilization camp (prior) and the admission rates. Also, there is a gap between the admission rate reported in the followup surveys and the administrative data. The former maybe due to: unsuitability of training start and end dates, unsuitability of trades offered by the PIA, length of the training program, limitations in batch size, unavailability of official documents to enroll, parents unwillingness, other personal circumstances

⁶Appendix Table A10 provides the OLS estimation results. Broadly, we find that the OLS estimates are smaller than the 2SLS estimates for both salary and it is the opposite case for location beliefs. An omitted variable, such as extroversion, could explain the differential selection bias. Extroverted individuals might seek additional information after the mobilization camp, this makes them revise the location beliefs upwards and salary beliefs downwards.

etc. While the gap between the self-declared admissions and actual admissions (in the administrative data) could stem from trainees dropping out of the program even before the start of the training due to unsuitability of the PIA.⁷

Using the administrative admissions from Column 3, we find that treated respondents are less likely to take admission in the program. A Rs 1000 decrease in average salary expectations leads to a 2.4 percentage points decrease in the probability that a respondent takes admission in the program. A decrease in admissions because the posterior beliefs are lower than the priors. Similarly, if 1 additional candidate (out of 10) gets a job outside of Bihar, it decreases the admission rate by 1.2 percentage points. For the location beliefs, the posteriors are higher than the prior. The coefficient on salary beliefs remains stable and significant in both followup surveys and administrative data. While, the point estimate on location beliefs increases with time and is only significant in the administrative data. One reason could be that there is a still measurement error in the self-declared admission rate in the followup surveys.

The average gap between the training batch start date and the date of mobilization (baseline survey) is 17 days in our sample, therefore, the Column 3 uses posterior labor market beliefs of respondents from the second followup survey to estimate the effect on admission. We also show robustness to this exercise by using labor market beliefs from the first followup survey and find similar results (Appendix Table A12). We also replicate the empirical specification on administrative training admission (Column 3) for different sub-samples: by gender, by social category, and by education. However, we fail to detect any effect due to lack of power (Appendix Table A13).

To understand how respondents trade-off salary and location, we interpret the ratio for the two coefficients (salary/location). We perform 200 replicates of the mobilization camps with replacement and report the mean of this ratio and the 95% confidence interval at the bottom of the table. We find that the ratio is 2 and is close to the bootstrapped ratio (2.14 in Column 3). This suggests that for one additional trainee (out of 10) who receives a job outside of Bihar, the average salary offered to the trainee should increase by Rs 2000. Or in other words, a 10% increase in the probability of being placed outside of Bihar requires a 24.4% increase in the average salary offered by the training program.

⁷Many PIAs make potential trainees reside in the training center few weeks in advance of the batch start date to retain the mobilized candidates.

5 Conclusion

This paper tries to understand the role played by labor market beliefs in the decision to join a training program with guaranteed placement in a formal salaried job for disadvantaged rural youth in India. We find that the prior labor market beliefs from participating in the program are far away from the truth: individuals expect a job closer to the home state and a high salary. We conducted a randomized evaluation to correct these labor market beliefs. The intervention provides objective information on distribution of location of jobs, salary offered at the end of the training program, or both. We find that the treatment makes the individuals update their labor market beliefs, they move closer to the truth and the treated respondents hold on to those updated beliefs up to four weeks after the intervention.

The updating of labor market beliefs makes the individuals less likely to participate in the program that would lead to a migration out of home state. Revealed preference estimates of the trade-off between location and salary suggests that a 10% increase in probability of migrating out of home state requires a 24% increase in the average salary offered by the training program. Our results suggests that providing correct information on labor market outcomes at the end of the training programs can change the pool of candidates who enroll into the program and set the correct job expectations from the beginning of the program. These findings have implications on the job retention, effectiveness of active labor market policies and migration decisions of rural youth.

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Tables

			Posterio	r – Prior		
	Baseline	Posterior	Follow	up 1w	Follow	up 4w
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Location (Candidates Outside Bihar)						
Treatment Location	2.495*** (0.223)	2.433*** (0.316)	1.276*** (0.221)	1.342*** (0.291)	1.228*** (0.254)	1.235*** (0.327)
Treatment Salary		-0.402 (0.284)		-0.240 (0.309)		-0.245 (0.272)
Treatment Location \times Treatment Salary		0.095 (0.436)		-0.142 (0.408)		-0.030 (0.427)
Mean DV [Control] Prior [Control]	0.246 4.452	0.246 4.452	0.684 4.403	0.684 4.403	0.632 4.478	0.632 4.478
Par	nel B: Sala	ry (Earning	s Distribu	tion Mean	.)	
T () ()	1 4/0***	1 200***		o	0 (00***	

Table 1: Effect of Treatment	on Labour Market Beliefs
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Treatment Salary	-1.463***	-1.380***	-0.655***	-0.442**	-0.633***	-0.509***
	(0.125)	(0.153)	(0.132)	(0.181)	(0.129)	(0.174)
Treatment Location		-0.059 (0.153)		0.055 (0.143)		0.080 (0.189)
Treatment Location \times Treatment Salary		-0.168 (0.223)		-0.417* (0.234)		-0.241 (0.253)
Mean DV [Control]	0.506	0.506	0.095	0.095	0.219	0.219
Prior [Control]	9.770	9.770	9.790	9.790	9.774	9.774
# of Camps	63	63	62	62	63	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	876	876	823	823	826	826

Notes: This table presents the effect of the location treatment (Panel A) and the salary treatment (Panel B) on how the respondents update their labor market beliefs (Posterior - Prior). Columns 1 and 2 measure the outcomes after the intervention during the baseline survey. Columns 3 to 6 measure the outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. The outcome variables in Panel A measure the number of candidates (out of 10) who will get a job outside Bihar. The outcome variables in the Panel B measure earnings distribution mean calculated using the number of candidates in each bin. All outcomes in Panel B are scaled by 1000. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Expectati	on – Counterfa	ctual			
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Baseline Posterior	Followup 1w	Followup 4w			
Panel A	A: Location – I(Out	side Bihar)				
Salary (Posterior)	0.003	-0.009	-0.030			
	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.039)			
Location (Posterior)	0.049***	0.080***	0.100***			
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)			
Mean DV [Control]	0.223	0.302	0.298			
Expectations [Control]	0.337	0.396	0.376			
Counterfactuals [Control]	0.113	0.093	0.077			
KP F Stat	30.5	12.21	9.35			
F Stat (Salary)	55.01	14.51	11.81			
F Stat (Location)	36.59	19.56	16.27			
1	Panel B: Average Sa	lary				
Salary (Posterior)	0.891***	0.940**	0.802^{*}			
	(0.193)	(0.398)	(0.421)			
Location (Posterior)	-0.243	-0.196	-0.495**			
	(0.146)	(0.242)	(0.236)			
Mean DV [Control]	6.814	6.489	6.314			
Expectations [Control]	13.173	13.959	13.442			
Counterfactuals [Control]	6.358	7.470	7.128			
KP F Stat	29.14	18.05	9.01			
F Stat (Salary)	74.23	29.16	13.58			
F Stat (Location)	37.4	19.2	11.29			
# of Camps	63	62	63			
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Observations	876	823	826			

Table 2: Effect of Treatment on Own Location and Earnings (1 year later)

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the respondents posterior beliefs on salary and location on beliefs of their own location and earnings one year later. The posterior beliefs are instrumented using the treatment status as described in the Section 3. Column 1 measure the outcomes after the intervention during the baseline survey. Columns 2 and 3 measure outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. The dependent variables in Panel A is an indicator variable for whether the respondent expects to be outside of Bihar one year later with training (expectation) and without training (counterfactual). The dependent variables in the Panel B measure average monthly salary one year later with training (expectation) and without training (counterfactual). All outcomes in Panel B are scaled by 1000. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Salary) and F-stat (Location) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post **20** uble-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Admis	sion – Prob Joir	n Prior
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Followup 1w	Followup 4w	Admin
Salary (Posterior – Prior)	0.021**	0.024**	0.024***
-	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Location (Posterior – Prior)	-0.007	-0.010	-0.012**
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Mean DV [Control]	-0.602	-0.544	-0.684
Prob Join Prior [Control]	0.787	0.787	0.787
Admission [Control]	0.187	0.238	0.103
KP F Stat	67.59	62.22	62.22
F Stat (Salary)	130.7	145.3	145.3
F Stat (Location)	70.54	112.37	112.37
Bootstrapped Ratio Mean	-2.81	-2.55	-2.14
Bootstrapped Ratio 95% CI	[-21.76, 10.99]	[-19.17, 17.40]	[-5.77, -0.50]
# of Camps	62	63	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	826	826

Table 3: Effect of Treatment on Training Admission

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the respondents updated beliefs on their updated probability to take admission into the training program. The updated beliefs are instrumented using the treatment status as described in the Section 3. Columns 1 and 2 measure outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. Column 3 measure the admission outcome from the administrative dataset. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Salary) and F-stat (Location) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figures



Figure 1: Labour Market Beliefs on Location

Notes: Survey Question: "After the training if 10 people like you get job. How many will get a job inside Bihar and how many will get a job outside of Bihar? (It is not necessary that each option will have some candidates.)" This figure shows the distribution of number of candidates from the baseline survey pre- and post-intervention. The error bars show the 95% CI on the coefficient of an indicator variable for the location treatment.



Figure 2: Labour Market Beliefs on Salary

Notes: Survey Question: "After the training if 10 people like you get job. How many will get a job in the with a monthly salary of less than Rs 6000. How many will get a job between Rs 6000 and Rs 8000. How many will get a job between Rs 10000 and Rs 12000 and how many will get a job above Rs 12000? (It is not necessary that each option will have some candidates.)" This figure shows the distribution of number of candidates from the baseline survey pre- and post-intervention in each of the 5 bins: less than Rs 6000 (< 6K), between Rs 6000 and Rs 10000 (8K-10K), between Rs 10000 and Rs 12000 (10K-12K) and above Rs 12000 (> 12K). The error bars show the 95% CI on the coefficient of an indicator variable for the salary treatment.

Online Appendix

Tables

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Signal
Panel A: Socio-Den	nograph	ics (Ful	l Sample)		
Female	0.575	0.495	0	1	
Age	20.42	3.366	17	35	
I(Education \geq Higher Secondary)	0.578	0.494	0	1	
Religion: Hindu	0.929	0.257	0	1	
Social Category: SC or ST	0.303	0.460	0	1	
Social Category: OBC	0.556	0.497	0	1	
Social Category: General	0.122	0.328	0	1	
Social Category: Prefer No Answer	0.0194	0.138	0	1	
Number of Observations			876		
Panel B: Prior Labor Market Beliefs (Females)					
Location (Candidates Outside Bihar)	3.762	2.774	0	10	9
Salary (monthly average - Rs)	9836	1679	5000	13000	7600
Less than Rs 6000 per month	1.050	1.542	0	10	2
Rs 6000 - Rs 8000 per month	1.597	1.814	0	10	3
Rs 8000 - Rs 10,000 per month	2.179	2.308	0	10	5
Rs 10,000 - Rs 12,000 per month	2.472	2.528	0	10	0
More than Rs 12,000 per month	2.702	2.967	0	10	0
Difficulty to family during training [0-10]	3.014	3.642	0	10	
Probability to Join	0.802	0.277	0	1	
Panel C: Prior Labo	or Marke	et Belie	fs (Males)		
Location (Candidates Outside Bihar)	5.215	2.557	0	10	7
Salary (monthly average - Rs)	9824	1708	5000	13000	9000
Less than Rs 6000 per month	1.097	1.622	0	10	0
Rs 6000 - Rs 8000 per month	1.527	1.632	0	10	2
Rs 8000 - Rs 10,000 per month	2.202	1.798	0	10	6
Rs 10,000 - Rs 12,000 per month	2.511	2.219	0	10	2
More than Rs 12,000 per month	2.664	2.825	0	10	0
Difficulty to family during training [0-10]	3.618	3.439	0	10	
Probability to Join	0.767	0.286	0	1	

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Notes: This table presents summary statistics on socio-demographic characteristics (Panel A) for the full sample and prior labour market beliefs for females (Panel B) and males (Panel C). The prior labour market beliefs are presented separately by gender due to differences in signal by gender.

Variable	Control Mean		Treatmer	ıt Mean		p-value	
	(1)	Salary (2)	Location (3)	$\frac{\text{Salary} \times \text{Location}}{(4)}$	(2) vs (1)	(3) vs (1)	(1) vs (1)
	(+)	(-)		(+)			(+) (+) (+)
	Panel A: Socio	-Demogra	phic Varial	sles			
Female	0.580	0.550	0.547	0.624	0.527	0.494	0.361
Age	20.31	20.47	20.42	20.47	0.624	0.749	0.626
$I(Education \ge Higher Secondary)$	0.591	0.558	0.561	0.603	0.504	0.536	0.805
Religion: Hindu	0.927	0.939	0.924	0.926	0.634	0.884	0.946
Religion: Muslim	0.0466	0.0519	0.0314	0.0437	0.789	0.448	0.882
Religion: Prefer No Answer	0.0259	0.00866	0.0448	0.0306	0.278	0.238	0.770
Social Category: SC or ST	0.290	0.303	0.296	0.319	0.774	0.898	0.525
Social Category: OBC	0.591	0.550	0.534	0.555	0.400	0.244	0.458
Social Category: General	0.0933	0.121	0.157	0.114	0.382	0.0482	0.526
Social Category: Prefer No Answer	0.0259	0.0260	0.0135	0.0131	0.996	0.359	0.343
	Panel B: Prio	r Labor M	larket Belie	fs			
Location (Candidates Outside Bihar)	4.249	4.641	4.345	4.258	0.148	0.724	0.974
Salary (monthly average - Rs)	9860	9791	9684	6866	0.677	0.290	0.436
Less than Rs 6000 per month	1	1.087	1.139	1.044	0.574	0.370	0.777
Rs 6000 - Rs 8000 per month	1.539	1.649	1.749	1.332	0.514	0.218	0.222
Rs 8000 - Rs 10,000 per month	2.352	2.100	2.148	2.179	0.219	0.324	0.400
Rs 10,000 - Rs 12,000 per month	2.378	2.550	2.480	2.528	0.464	0.667	0.523
More than Rs 12,000 per month	2.731	2.615	2.484	2.917	0.683	0.389	0.512
Difficulty to family during training [0-10]	3.352	2.861	3.552	3.341	0.158	0.570	0.973
Difficulty to family 1 year outside Bihar [0-10]	4.021	3.450	3.583	3.812	0.120	0.237	0.571
Probability to join training	0.786	0.786	0.792	0.783	0.996	0.831	0.925
Number of Observations				880			
	material accuracy	taco par ta	adilased to lo	the follow	ing model fo	fontron for "	

Table A2: Balance Statistics

25

ionowing iniouer for each control variable Ľ Notes: To check that our randomization achieved balance between treatment and control at baseline, we estimate X'_i and test the null of no difference between the treatment groups and control group ($\beta_s = 0$, $\beta_l = 0$ and $\beta_{sl} = 0$).

 $X_i = \beta_s T_i^s + \beta_l T_i^l + \beta_{sl} T_i^s \times T_i^l + \varepsilon_i$

Attr	rition
(1)	(2)
Followup 1w	Followup 4w
-0.011	-0.026
(0.024)	(0.025)
-0.001	-0.012
(0.025)	(0.028)
-0.006	-0.031
(0.020)	(0.026)
0.060	0.058
63	63
Yes	Yes
876	876
	Attr (1) Followup 1w -0.011 (0.024) -0.001 (0.025) -0.006 (0.020) 0.060 63 Yes 876

Table A3: Attrition

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Posterior – Prior				
	(1)	(2)		
	Followup 1w	Followup 4w		
Panel A: Location (Candidates Outside Bihar)				
Treatment Location	1.912***	1.516***		

Table A4: Spillover Effects of Treatment (Camps with more than 50% treatment)

Panel B: Salary (Earnings Distribution Mean)

(0.404)

0.684

4.452

410

Mean DV [Control]

Prior [Control]

Observations

(0.426)

0.632

4.452

403

Treatment Salary	-0.635*** (0.226)	-0.618** (0.233)
Mean DV [Control]	0.095	0.219
Prior [Control]	9.833	9.833
Observations	387	389
Camp FE	Yes	Yes

Notes: This table presents the effect of the treatment affects on labor market beliefs for location (Panel A) and salary (Panel B) in the camps where more than 50% of the sample got treated. The outcome variables in Panel A measure the number of candidates (out of 10) who will get a job outside Bihar. The outcome variables in the Panel B measure earnings distribution mean calculated using the number of candidates in each bin. All outcomes in Panel B are scaled by 1000. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Posterior – Prior					
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Baseline Posterior	Followup 1w	Followup 4w			
Panel A:	Location (Candidat	tes Outside Bih	ar)			
Treatment Salary	-0.487 (0.295)	-0.424 (0.305)	-0.279 (0.285)			
Mean DV [Control] Prior [Control]	1.761 4.292	1.586 4.292	1.464 4.292			
Panel B:	Panel B: Salary (Earnings Distribution Mean)					
Treatment Location	-0.014 (0.166)	0.169 (0.155)	0.141 (0.204)			
Mean DV [Control] Prior [Control]	0.506 9.873	0.001 9.873	0.117 9.873			
# of Camps	59	59	58			

Table A5: Cross Interaction Effects of Treatment

Notes: This table presents the effect of the salary treatment affects the labor market beliefs on location (Panel A) and how the location treatment affects the labor market beliefs on salary (Panel B). The outcome variables in Panel A measure the number of candidates (out of 10) who will get a job outside Bihar. The outcome variables in the Panel B measure earnings distribution mean calculated using the number of candidates in each bin. All outcomes in Panel B are scaled by 1000. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Yes

386

Yes

384

Yes

412

Camp FE

Observations

	Pos	sterior – Prior				
	(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Baseline Posterior	Followup 1w	Followup 4w			
Panel A: Loca	Panel A: Location (Candidates Outside Bihar)					
Treatment Location	1.354*** (0.340)	0.497* (0.254)	0.292 (0.333)			
Location (Signal – Prior)	0.609*** (0.077)	0.737*** (0.060)	0.653*** (0.057)			
Location (Signal – Prior) \times Treatment Location	0.276*** (0.088)	0.202*** (0.051)	0.230*** (0.063)			
Mean DV [Control] Prior [Control]	0.246 4.452	0.684 4.403	0.632 4.478			

Table A6: Heterogeneity by Signal: Effect of Treatment on Labour Market Beliefs

Panel B: Salary (Earnings Distribution Mean)

Treatment Salary	-0.952*** (0.114)	-0.412*** (0.115)	-0.303** (0.143)
Salary (Signal – Prior)	0.500*** (0.054)	0.627*** (0.045)	0.603*** (0.049)
Salary (Signal – Prior) $ imes$	0.277***	0.138**	0.182***
Treatment Salary	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.064)
Mean DV [Control]	0.506	0.095	0.219
Prior [Control]	9.770	9.790	9.774
# of Camps	63	62	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	876	823	826

Notes: This table presents the heterogeneity in treatment effect by signal for the location treatment (Panel A) and the salary treatment (Panel B) on how the respondents update their labour market beliefs (Posterior - Prior). Column 1 measure the outcomes after the intervention during the baseline survey. Columns 2 and 3 measure the outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. The dependent variables in Panel A measure the number of candidates (out of 10) who will get a job outside Bihar. The dependent variables in the Panel B measure earnings distribution mean calculated using the number of candidates in each bin. All outcomes in Panel B are scaled by 1000. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Expectati	on – Counterfa	ictual
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Baseline Posterior	Followup 1w	Followup 4w
Panel A	A: Location – I(Out	side Bihar)	
Salary (Posterior)	0.004	-0.004	0.012
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Location (Posterior)	0.039***	0.053***	0.061***
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Mean DV [Control]	0.223	0.302	0.298
Expectations [Control]	0.337	0.396	0.376
Counterfactuals [Control]	0.113	0.093	0.077
1	Panel B: Average Sa	lary	
Salary (Posterior)	0.655***	0.582***	0.669***
	(0.119)	(0.137)	(0.142)
Location (Posterior)	-0.153**	-0.140*	-0.099
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.082)
Mean DV [Control]	6.814	6.489	6.314
Expectations [Control]	13.173	13.959	13.442
Counterfactuals [Control]	6.358	7.470	7.128
# of Camps	63	62	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	876	823	826

Table A7: Effect of Treatment on Own Location and Earnings (1 year later) [OLS Estimates]

Notes: This table presents the OLS estimates of the respondents posterior beliefs on salary and location on beliefs of their own location and earnings one year later. Column 1 measure the outcomes after the intervention during the baseline survey. Columns 2 and 3 measure outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. The dependent variables in Panel A is an indicator variable for whether the respondent expects to be outside of Bihar one year later with training (expectation) and without training (counterfactual). The dependent variables in the Panel B measure average monthly salary one year later with training (expectation) and without training (counterfactual). All outcomes in Panel B are scaled by 1000. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	I	Expectations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Baseline Posterior	Followup 1w	Followup 4w
Pane	l A: Location – I(O	utside Bihar)	
Salary (Posterior)	-0.010	-0.033	-0.036
	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.035)
Location (Posterior)	0.053***	0.084***	0.098***
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Mean DV [Control]	0.337	0.396	0.376
KP F Stat	28.96	18.05	8.98
F Stat (Salary)	73.81	29.16	13.61
E Stat (Location)	37.44	19.2	11.23
	Panel B: Average	Salary	
Salary (Posterior)	1.237***	1.136***	1.000***
	(0.150)	(0.361)	(0.332)
Location (Posterior)	-0.085	-0.453**	-0.307
	(0.094)	(0.207)	(0.195)
Mean DV [Control]	13.173	13.959	13.442
KP F Stat	29.14	18.05	9.04
F Stat (Salary)	74.23	29.16	13.71
F Stat (Location)	37.4	19.2	11.33
# of Camps	63	62	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	876	823	826

Table A8: Expected Effects of Training on Own Location and Earnings (1 year later)

	Сс	ounterfactuals	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Baseline Posterior	Followup 1w	Followup 4w
Pane	l A: Location – I(O	outside Bihar)	
Salary (Posterior)	-0.000	-0.015	-0.007
Location (Posterior)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.007 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)
Mean DV [Control] KP F Stat F Stat (Salary)	0.113 29.14 74 23	0.093 18.05 29.16	0.077 9.15 13 53
F Stat (Location)	37.4	19.2	11.88
	Panel B: Average	Salary	
Salary (Posterior)	0.346* (0.181)	0.196 (0.486)	0.201 (0.346)
Location (Posterior)	0.157 (0.153)	-0.257 (0.235)	0.171 (0.234)
Mean DV [Control] KP F Stat	6.358 29.14	7.470 18.05	7.128 9.01
F Stat (Salary) F Stat (Location)	74.23 37.4	29.16 19.2	13.58 11.29
# of Camps Camp FE	63 Yes 876	62 Yes	63 Yes
Observations	876	823	826

Table A9: Expected Effects of Training on Own Location and Earnings (1 year later)

	Admis	ssion – Prob Joir	n Prior
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Followup 1w	Followup 4w	Admin
Salary (Posterior – Prior)	0.010*	0.014**	0.013***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Location (Posterior – Prior)	0.002	0.003	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Mean DV [Control]	-0.602	-0.544	-0.684
Prior [Control]	0.787	0.787	0.787
Admission [Control]	0.187	0.238	0.103
# of Camps	62	63	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	826	826

Table A10: Effect of Treatment on Training Admission [OLS estimates]

Notes: This table presents the OLS estimates of the respondents updated beliefs on their admission into the training program. Columns 1 and 2 measure outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. Column 3 measure the admission outcome from the administrative dataset. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Admissi	on – Prob Join I	Prior
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Followup 1w	Followup 4w	Admin
Treatment Location	-0.013	-0.007	-0.043
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.043)
Location (Signal – Prior)	-0.004	-0.009	-0.011**
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Location (Signal $-$ Prior) \times Treatment Location	-0.000	0.004	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Treatment Salary	-0.028	-0.122***	-0.031
,	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.033)
Salary (Signal – Prior)	0.017	0.033***	0.022**
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Salary (Signal – Prior) \times Treatment Salary	-0.006	-0.035**	-0.013
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Mean DV [Control]	-0.602	-0.544	-0.684
Prior [Control]	0.787	0.787	0.787
Admission [Control]	0.187	0.238	0.103
# of Camps	62	63	63
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	826	876

Table A11: Effect of Treatment on Training Admission (Reduced Form)

Notes: This table presents the reduced form estimates of the heterogeneity in their treatment status by the gap between their prior and the signal on their updated probability to take admission into the training program. The updated beliefs are instrumented using the treatment status as described in the Section 3. Columns 1 and 2 measure outcomes at the followup surveys one week and four weeks after the intervention respectively. Column 3 measure the admission outcome from the administrative dataset. The KP F stat is the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. The F-stat (Salary) and F-stat (Location) are the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for the instruments' joint significance in the two separate first-stage regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

	Admission – Prob Join Prior
Salary (Posterior – Prior)	0.022**
	(0.009)
Location (Posterior – Prior)	-0.010^{*}
	(0.005)
Mean DV [Control]	-0.684
Prob Join Prior [Control]	0.787
Admission [Control]	0.103
KP F Stat	67.59
F Stat (Salary)	130.7
F Stat (Location)	70.54
# of Camps	62
Camp FE	Yes
Observations	823

Table A12: Effect of Treatment on Training Admission using Administrative Data (with 1st Followup Posterior Beliefs)

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. Control variables selected using post double-selection lasso. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

			Admissio	n (Admin) – Pro	b Join Prior		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)
	Full Sample	Females	Males	General & OBC	SC & ST	High Educ	Low Educ
Salary (Posterior – Prior)	0.024^{***}	0.022^{*}	0.015	0.015	0.050^{**}	0.00	0.050^{***}
	(600.0)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.020)	(6000)	(0.016)
Location (Posterior – Prior)	-0.012**	-0.004	-0.010	-0.013	-0.010	0.005	-0.028***
	(900.0)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(600.0)
Mean DV [Control]	-0.684	-0.733	-0.614	-0.706	-0.623	-0.678	-0.692
Prior [Control]	0.787	0.813	0.750	0.804	0.748	0.800	0.768
Admission [Control]	0.103	0.080	0.135	0.097	0.125	0.121	0.076
Bootstrapped Ratio Mean	-2.14	0.157	-0.841	-1.267	-3.896	0.780	-1.855
Bootstrapped Ratio 95% CI	[-5.77, -0.50]	[-24.07, 85.24]	[-17.70, 9.08]	[-9.38, 1.95]	[-103.62, 50.54]	[-20.51, 13.21]	[-4.58, -0.60]
# of Camps (Clusters)	63	52	51	58	45	58	53
Camp FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	826	473	345	555	244	483	334
Notes: The total number of replic post double-selection lasso. $* p <$	ations for each colu $0.10, ** p < 0.05, **$	turn is 200. Boots ** $p < 0.01$	trapped standard	errors are clustered	at the camp level. Co	untrol variables sele	scted using



Figure A1: Location Intervention Video Snippets (Female)

(c) Snippet 3

(d) Snippet 4



Figure A2: Location Intervention Video Snippets (Male)

(c) Snippet 3

(d) Snippet 4



Figure A3: Location Intervention Video Snippets (Female)



Figure A4: Location Intervention Video Snippets (Male)



Figure A5: Prior Salary Distribution by Gender

Notes: The figure shows prior salary distribution by gender. The vertical line shows the truth/signal by gender.



Figure A6: Heterogeneity in Labour Market Beliefs

Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in treatment effect for the salary and location intervention for sub-samples by gender, education levels and social category of candidates. The circles and error bars show the point estimate and 95% CI on the indicator variable for the salary treatment (red colour) and the location treatment (green colour) regressed on the outcome variable: posterior - prior. The triangle shows the average gap between the signal and the prior. Posterior/Prior for salary is the earnings distribution mean calculated using the number of candidates in each bin. Posterior/Prior for location is the number of candidates outside Bihar. The negative x-axis is scaled by 1000.

A Video Transcripts

A.1 Introduction Video

Voiceover: In the households of the village where there was not much enthusiasm so far, today there is hope. The young men in the rural areas, and especially the young women of the villages, who had never imagined their future outside the threshold of their houses, are today dreaming big and giving wings to their dreams because of their skills and self-confidence.

Now they are getting jobs in the organized work sector of big and metro cities.

Now happiness and smile never leaves their faces.

For lakhs of 15-35 years old rural youth, Indian Government has initiated this Rural Skill Development program.

To bring the youth from rural areas to the best training institutes and companies, this program is run on a public private partnership model.

Youth from rural areas of this country are brought and given free of cost training. Arrangements are also made for their free of cost boarding and lodging.

During the training, candidates are given books and uniform as well in the DDUGKY program.

DDUGKY program has opened lakhs of such opportunities for young men and women across this country, so that it has enabled them to write their own future with their own hands."

Female candidate: "I come from a poor family. Our family works on the farms and I have studied while working on the farms myself. My parents have taught me with great difficulty. I got to know about this free of cost training, DDU-GKY. I enquired where to get the form for this training and where is this happening. They called me that we have to leave for ranchi.... The facilities are good here. We had to live in hostel, the food was good.. three months we got training there. It was good, we used to have fun and play, everything was there. It feels good when we get our salaries. If we are independent people will give us importance and talk with respect.."

Male candidate: "I have my mother and father at home. We are 7 siblings, 3 brothers and 4 sisters. Before this I used to work as a daily laborer. I did not study much. I have passed my matriculation, that too with much difficulty, while working. I worked as a labour worker in a construction site where they make buildings. I worked as a helper for the masons. About DDU-GKY, they told this was a good course and they will teach us computers.."

Voiceover: "Their progressing steps towards their own brighter present are also making a stronger and developed future for India. This will turn this nation into a place of skilled

individuals." "My skill is my identity."

A.2 Intervention Video: Salary (Male)

In this video we will tell you about the monthly salary distribution of the male candidates after their training completion, in the last one year under the DDU-GKY skill development program.

Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 candidates like you got jobs, then nobody got a job for a monthly salary below Rs 6000. After completing the training in the last one year, if 10 candidates like you got jobs, then 2 male candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 6000 to Rs 8000. Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 candidates like you got jobs, then 6 male candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 8000 to Rs 10000. Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 candidates like you got jobs, then 2 male candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 10000 to Rs 12000. After completing the training in the last one year, if 10 candidates like you got jobs, then nobody got a job for a monthly salary above Rs 12000.

Through this video we learn that after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 candidates like you got jobs, then nobody got a job for a monthly salary below Rs 6000, 2 male candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 6000 to Rs 8000, 6 male candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 8000 to Rs 10000, 2 male candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 10000 to Rs 12000 and nobody got a job for a monthly salary above Rs 12000.

Thank you for paying attention to this.

A.3 Intervention Video: Salary (Female)

In this video we will tell you about the monthly salary distribution of the female candidates after their training completion, in the last one year under the DDU-GKY skill development program.

Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, then 2 female candidates got a job for a monthly salary below Rs 6000. Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, then 3 female candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 6000 to Rs 8000. Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, then 5 female candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 8000 to Rs 10000. Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, then nobody got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 10000 to Rs 12000. After completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, then nobody got a job for a monthly salary above Rs 12000.

Through this video we learn that after completing this training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, then 2 female candidates got a job for a monthly salary below Rs 6000, 3 female candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 6000 to Rs 8000, 5 female candidates got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 8000 to Rs 10000, nobody got a job for monthly salary ranging between Rs 10000 to Rs 12000 and nobody got a job for a monthly salary above Rs 12000.

Thank you for paying attention to this.

A.4 Intervention Video: Location (Male)

In this video we will tell you about the job location of the male candidates after their training completion, in the last one year under the DDU-GKY skill development program. Male candidates who got placed inside Bihar are in yellow color and male candidates who were placed outside Bihar are in blue color.

Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 male candidates like you got jobs, out of them 3 male candidates got a job inside Bihar and through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 male candidates like you got jobs, out of them 7 male candidates got a job outside Bihar.

Through this video we learn that after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 male candidates like you got jobs, out of them 3 male candidates got a job inside Bihar and 7 male candidates got a job outside Bihar.

Thank you for paying attention to this.

A.5 Intervention Video: Location (Female)

In this video we will tell you about the job location of the female candidates after their training completion, in the last one year under the DDU-GKY skill development program. Female candidates who got placed inside Bihar are in yellow color and female candidates who were placed outside Bihar are in blue color.

Through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, out of them 1 female candidate got a job inside Bihar and through our survey we have come to know that, after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, out of them 9 female candidates got a job outside Bihar.

Through this video we learn that after completing the training in the last one year, if 10 female candidates like you got jobs, out of them 1 female candidate got a job inside Bihar and 9 female candidates got a job outside Bihar.

Thank you for paying attention to this.