The Naxalite Conflict in India: Does Ethnic Distance Matter?[1]

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Extended Abstract

Introduction

We analyse if group-specific heterogeneity markers based on ethnicity could play an important role in instigating the Naxalite conflict in India. The Naxalite conflict started in 1967 at the Naxalbari village in the Indian state of West Bengal (and hence the name) as an armed peasant uprising where the peasants protested against the landlords for their persistent injustice and corruption. It was a watershed event as it opened up a large number of follow-on protests and resistant movements across India.[2] The Naxalbari uprising and subsequent strife could be viewed as class-based conflict where the wealthy landlords or the rich class of people were targeted by the landless or poor people. The peasants had some ideological and political support from one faction of the Communist Party of India, i.e., the followers of Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) who believed in the armed revolt to help the peasants and landless people. The state government of West Bengal used police and paramilitary forces to quell the violent uprisings and largely succeeded in containing the armed struggle within West Bengal by the mid-1970s.

However, in the 1980s, the armed struggle spread in other states of India like Telangana, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra including the neighbouring states of West Bengal, namely Bihar, Odisha, and Jharkhand. During this time, the People's War Group with violent left-wing Maoist ideology was formed and they started guerrilla warfare with the states police and national para-military forces. Later on, there were different left-wing groups or factions joined the armed rebellion in the mid-1980s and the conflict intensified in the late 1990s and starting from 2001 onward when a number of different groups merged together and started fighting in unison with the government forces. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs report in 2017, around 2162 civilians and 802 security force personnel have been killed by the Maoists in different parts of India in between 2010 and 2015. Gawande et al. (2015) mention that as per the official Indian government data, the conflict has resulted in 7,862 deaths in the period 2000–2009. The overwhelming reason for the Naxalite insurgency is establishment of left-wing, Maoist regime with the political power transferred to Maoist groups. This is akin to civil strife over control of a 'public prize' (Esteban et al 2012) based on ideology and political control.

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[1] This is work in progress. Please do not quote or cite. I thank the participants at the Department of Economics, Deakin University *Brownbag Seminar* and the *2019 Conflict and Economic Development* workshop for their comments and suggestions.

[2] The Hindu article

At the peak of the conflict, there were 13 states affected which would cover 104 districts in India (Figure 1, South Asia Terrorism Portal 2016). Most of these districts and states are traditionally under-developed for a long period of time. Thus, the Naxalite groups had sympathizers within the marginal, landless and poor people in these districts and villages. Gomes (2015) writes, *"As far as the participation is concerned, landless and small peasants with marginal landholdings are supposed to form the social base of the movement. In caste terms it is the Scheduled Castes and tribes who form the base of the movement (Bhatia, 2005; Guha, 2007)."*

A brief overview of relevant literature

The extant literature points to a number of driving factors behind the Naxalite conflict. Gawande et al (2015) find that adverse shocks to land productivity enhances the conflict intensity. They also report that the proportion of Scheduled tribes (ST) in the population plays significant role in the civil strife. Borooah (2008) and Iyer (2009) linked the Naxalite violence with persistent poverty in the region. Hoelscher, Miklian, and Vadlamannati (2011) report that the conflict increases with forest cover, prevalence of strife in neighbouring districts (contagion effect), and the population share of scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes. Gomes (2015) focuses on landholdings and historical land institutions and finds a strong effect of land inequality on Maoist violence. Interestingly, in line with other studies, Gomes (2015) also finds that the proportion of SC and ST in the population remain important indicators of the violence. Eynde (2016) finds poor rainfall tends to increase Naxalite violence against government forces, but only in areas where mining activity is sufficiently important. In contrast, the rain shortfall spurs targeted attacks against civilians regardless of whether the district has mining activity.

Focus of the paper

Given the ideological background of the conflict, i.e., establishing and controlling a left-wing Maoist state which could be termed as a 'public prize' as in Esteban et al. (2012) and the nature of the participants (note that the proportions of SC and ST in the population remain positive predictors of conflict), we investigate if one specific ethnic marker, viz., 'ethnic distance' plays an important role in instigating and prolonging the Naxalite conflict.

The ethnic distance idea is rooted with the extant literature on ethnic markers (Esteban and Ray, 2011; Esteban et al. 2012) which establishes that ethnicity matters if the conflict is over public good like ideology/political power. From the empirical perspective, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) find that the "deep cleavages" along large group lines affect conflict across the world. Arbatli et al. (2020) establish that the degree of diversity within ethnic groups plays an important role in instigating and prolonging social conflict across the world. In a different setting, Gomes (2020) reports that ethnic distance adversely affects maternal health outcome in 14 sub-Saharan African countries.

In our context, we want to analyse if ethnic distance between different groups could influence the Naxalite conflict. Caselli and Coleman (2013) define ethnic distance as "*the cost to be borne by a member of one group to successfully pass himself as a member of the other group"*. This could be a very good testing ground for India as there are marked caste divisions or *jatis* which are very rigid as people inherit their castes by their birth (born in a particular sub-caste or *jati*) and movements across castes are extremely rare. Some castes are

linked with occupations like the caste 'naiya' means barber or people in the haircutting profession. Historically, higher caste people have more education and higher income earning opportunities than lower caste people. The Government of India introduced affirmative action for lower castes in the Indian Constitution in 1950 (hence the name Scheduled Caste) and similar action was put forward for indigenous tribes in the Constitution in 1950 (hence the name, Scheduled Tribes). There is some evidence of income convergence (during the period between 1983 and 2005) between the higher castes (like Brahmins) and SCs and STs due to the prolonged affirmative action (Hnatkovska, Lahiri and Paul, 2012). However, there remains stark regional disparities in wage earnings across these caste groups especially in the above conflict prone states. In addition, there is no information about the income convergence at the jati/sub-caste level as the jati data is not available after 1931. Hence, investigating the impact of caste distance on initiation and duration of Naxalite conflict is of first-order importance.

A brief background on different castes and sub-castes

The caste-based heterogeneity is mainly prevalent in the Hindu religion based on one of the ancient scriptures, *Manusanghita,* which classified people based on their occupations and determines their social strata. The highest social order is allocated to a particular caste, *Brahmins*, who were generally well educated and well versed with religious teachings and performing the religious rituals. Within Brahmins, there are different sub-castes like 'barendra brahmins', 'rarhi brahmins', 'kulin brahmins', 'arjya brahmins' etc which are sometimes based on their regional locations like where they reside in West Bengal, Odisha and Bihar (barendra) versus the western fringes in West Bengal (rarh region). Then, as per the social ladder, *Kshatriya*, *Vaisya* and *Shudra*, were ranked with their broad, general occupations like farming and fighting (kshatriya), trading (vaisya) and *shudra*s engaged in other menial jobs (like barber service, washing clothes, cleaning houses etc). The social ladder also culminates into the distance across different castes in the sense that *Shudras* are the farthest from the *Brahmins* and *Kshatriyas* would be the closest to the *Brahmins*.

We exploit this social distance and calculate the ethnic distance based on the caste-based enumeration data from the Indian Census in 1931 at the district level. The caste specific, detailed enumeration was carried out only in the 1931 Census and the later Census reports do not include the caste and sub-castes level data. In the 2001 Census, some broad groupings of SCs and STs are reported, but the thorough information as in the 1931 Census is missing. Hence, we use the 1931 Census data to measure the ethnic distance between the caste groups at the district level. Banerjee and Somanathan (2007) employ the 1931 census data and identify 185 caste groups or sub-castes across 16 states in India. In our study, we have identified around 120 caste groups or sub-castes within the non-SC & ST categories for the conflict affected districts. Within the SC & ST categories, there are close to 20 sub-castes as of 1931 census in the conflict affected districts.

Note that there are heterogeneities across districts within states and diversity between states in terms of caste sub-groups. Figures 2 to 5 show the glimpses of a number of caste groups or sub-castes for the SCs and STs in the states of Bihar and West Bengal. These lists are exhaustive in the sense that they provide information for all sub-castes for the whole state. However, not all sub-castes are present in all conflict affected districts, and hence we could work with 20 sub-castes for SCs and STs in the conflict prone districts.

Ethnic Distance Calculation

Given that we are using the pre-independence census (1931 census), we take only the Indian districts population as of the time of the Indian independence. For example, under West Bengal state in 1931 census, Dhaka was included as a district. We do not include any information about Dhaka or other contemporary Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) or West Pakistan districts as these were not part of the independent India from 15th August 1947 onward.

Our first measure of ethnic distance based on the 1931 census caste enumeration in the Naxalite conflict affected district is calculated using population shares of each sub-caste group and then taking the difference (proxy for distance) between these shares for the non-SC&ST groups and SC groups as well as for the non-SC&ST groups and ST groups.

The second measure of ethnic distance is based the following binary-distance polarization measure from Esteban et al (2012), which is defined as:

$$R = \sum_{i=1}^{m} n_i^2(1 - n_i)$$

where, n_i is the population share of group i and m is the number of groups. After calculating the binary-distance polarization measures for non-SC&ST sub-castes, SC sub-castes and ST sub-castes, we take the difference between non-SC&ST polarization and SC polarization as the polarization distance between these two groups. Similarly, we calculate the difference between non-SC&ST polarization and ST polarization measures and measure the polarization measure between these two groups.

The third metric of ethnic distance is also based on Esteban et al (2012) where we employ the fractionalization measure defined as the following:

$$F = \sum_{i=1}^{m} n_i(1 - n_i)$$

where, like before, n_i is the population share of group i and m is the number of groups. In this instance also, first we calculate the fractionalization measures for non-SC&ST sub-castes, SC sub-castes and ST sub-castes. Then we take the differences between the non-SC&ST fractionalization and SC fractionalization to measure the ethnic distance between these two cohorts. Similarly, we calculate the ethnic distance in terms of fractionalization by taking the difference between the non-SC&ST fractionalization and ST fractionalization measures.

Empirical analysis

We estimate the following empirical specification

$$BD_{dt} = \alpha_d + \varphi_t + \beta.CD_{d1931} + \boldsymbol{\Lambda Z}_{dt} + \varepsilon_{dt}$$

where, BD is the outcome variable which stands for battle-deaths or casualties in the Naxalite conflict in district (*d*) at time *t*. The first two terms on the right-hand side of the equation depict district fixed effects and time effects. The main explanatory variable of interest is the ethnic distance or caste distance, denoted by CD. We are interested in how caste distance in district d at the time 1931 is affecting the casualties in those districts at time t. The vector **Z** denotes district specific controls as in Gawande et al (2015) and Gomes (2015). The

casualties data are taken from the South Asian Terrorism data portal. The district specific controls are taken from various years of Indian census data and from Gomes (2015).

Brief discussion of data and results

In Table 1, we provide the descriptive statistics of the outcome variable, battle-deaths or casualties. This is separated between total deaths, deaths of rebel group participants (Maoists killed), deaths suffered by the security forces, and finally deaths of civilians as a result of the ongoing conflict.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the outcome variable

Casualities in conflict					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Maoists killed	1,412	1.887394	8.8696	0	240
Security forces	1,412	1.226629	5.959316	0	100
Civilians killed	1,412	1.701841	9.851609	0	278
Total deaths	1,417	4.817925	19.14863	0	359

A quick look at the data reveals that the standard deviation is quite high which is expected in such guerrilla warfare.

In the following table (Table 2), we present the data for the main explanatory variable, the caste distance or ethnic distance. Three measures of distances are presented: the first two rows reveal the distance based on population shares, the next two rows lay out the ethnic distance based on binary polarization measures and the last two rows depict the ethnic distance based on fractionalization measures.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for ethnic distance measures

Caste distance					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
cd_sc_ps_1931	1,584	0.4980	0.1653	0.0485	0.8047
cd_st_ps_1931	1,584	0.6952	0.1197	0.3554	0.8786
cd_sc_bp_1931	1,584	0.0354	0.0226	-0.0336	0.0731
cd_st_bp_1931	1,584	0.0526	0.0157	0.0248	0.0958
cd_sc_frac_1931	1,584	0.4569	0.1456	0.1001	0.7209
cd_st_frac_1931	1,584	0.6389	0.1091	0.3234	0.7933

Taking a look at the above table, we find that the ethnic distance between non-SC&ST and SC groups are a bit smaller than the non-SC&ST and ST groups. This probably makes sense as the proportion of STs in the population are a bit less than the proportions of SCs in the population. In comparison to the outcome variable listed in Table 1, the standard deviations are not that much for the ethnic distance measures, i.e, the distances are spread quite evenly.

Preliminary results and discussions

Table 3 below presents the baseline results from the empirical model without any controls. The outcome variable is total deaths. We use the OLS method as the baseline estimation technique. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table 3. Results from total deaths without any controls

Table1N: Ethnic distance markers, unconditional, full sample

VARIABLES	(1) Total deaths	(2) Total deaths	(3) Total deaths	(4) Total deaths	(5) Total deaths	(6) Total deaths
CD_SC_PS_1931	46.16					
	(1.194)***					
	0					
CD_ST_PS_1931		98.14				
		(2.539)***				
		0				
CD_SC_BP_1931			454.1			
			(11.75)***			
			0			
CD_ST_BP_1931				1,596		
				(41.28)***		
				0		
CD_SC_Frac_1931					51.99	
					(1.345)***	
					0	
CD_ST_Frac_1931						104.0
						(2.691)***
						0
Constant	-9.830	-58.91	-5.886	-91.75	-10.17	-55.22
	(0.838)***	(1.979)***	(0.764)***	(2.804)***	(0.845)***	(1.887)***
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	594	594	594	594	594	594
Number of districts	42	42	42	42	42	42
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results provide immediate support to our conjectured hypothesis that ethnic distance as of 1931 matters in explaining the Naxalite conflict at a later point in time. In line with the theorization of Esteban et al. (2012), the binary polarization distance measure is associated with the highest level of total deaths in comparison to two other measures. Note that the distance measure based on fractionalization also matters, but the magnitude is of second order importance. The lowest impact is attributed to the distances with population shares.

In Table 4, we replicate the same results with number of rebel combatants or Maoists killed as the outcome variable.

Table 4. Results from Maoists killed as the outcome variable and without any controls

Table2N: Ethnic distance markers, Maoists killed, unconditional, full sample

VARIABLES	(1) Maoists killed	(2) Maoists killed	(3) Maoists killed	(4) Maoists killed	(5) Maoists killed	(6) Maoists killed
CD_SC_PS_1931	32.95					
	(0.674)***					
	0.000					
CD_ST_PS_1931		70.05				
		(1.432)***				
		0.000				
CD_SC_BP_1931			324.1			
			(6.628)***			
			0.000			
CD_ST_BP_1931				1,139		
				(23.29)***		
				0.000		
CD_SC_Frac_1931					37.11	
					(0.759)***	
					0.000	
CD_ST_Frac_1931						74.27
						(1.519)***
						0.000
Constant	-5.419	-40.45	-2.603	-63.89	-5.658	-37.82
	(0.236)***	(0.733)***	(0.248)***	(1.196)***	(0.236)***	(0.682)***
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	589	589	589	589	589	589
Number of cd	42	42	42	42	42	42
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TT	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The findings from Table 4 mimic the results from Table 3. Note that the binary polarization measure based caste distance still plays the most significant role in terms of magnitude in instigating the number of deaths suffered by the combatants or rebel forces. Tables 5 and 6 below lends credence to the main results in Table 3, viz., ethnic distance matters in instigating and continuing the Naxalite conflict in absence of any external controls and in presence of district specific fixed effects and time effects which addresses any concerns with unobserved heterogeneities. In Table 5, the outcome variable is the number of security personnel killed and in Table 6, the dependent variable is the number of casualties for civilians. Similar to Tables 3 and 4, again, the highest magnitude of the deaths is attributed to the binary measure of polarization which supports the findings from Esteban et al (2012).

Table 5: Results from security forces killed as the outcome variable and without any controls

VARIABLES	(1) Security forces killed	(2) Security forces killed	(3) Security forces killed	(4) Security forces killed	(5) Security forces killed	(6) Security forces killed
CD_SC_PS_1931	7.906					
	(0.153)***					
	0.000					
CD_ST_PS_1931		16.81				
		(0.326)***				
		0.000				
CD_SC_BP_1931			77.77			
			(1.509)***			
			0.000			
CD_ST_BP_1931				273.3		
				(5.303)***		
				0.000		
CD_SC_Frac_1931					8.904	
					(0.173)***	
					0.000	
CD_ST_Frac_1931						17.82
						(0.346)***
						0.000
Constant	-1.618	-10.02	-0.942	-15.65	-1.675	-9.392
	(0.130)***	(0.137)***	(0.138)***	(0.223)***	(0.129)***	(0.130)***
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	589	589	589	589	589	589
Number of cd	42	42	42	42	42	42
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TT	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table 6. Results from civilians killed as the outcome variable and without any controls

VARIABLES	(1) Civilians killed	(2) Civilians killed	(3) Civilians killed	(4) Civilians killed	(5) Civilians killed	(6) Civilians killed
CD_SC_PS_1931	4.478					
	(0.325)***					
	0.000					
CD_ST_PS_1931		9.520				
		(0.690)***				
		0.000				
CD_SC_BP_1931			44.05			
			(3.192)***			
			0.000			
CD_ST_BP_1931				154.8		
				(11.22)***		
				0.000		
CD_SC_Frac_1931					5.044	
					(0.366)***	
					0.000	
CD_ST_Frac_1931						10.09
						(0.731)***
						0.000
Constant	-1.092	-5.853	-0.709	-9.039	-1.125	-5.495
	(0.185)***	(0.310)***	(0.199)***	(0.520)***	(0.184)***	(0.288)***
	3.29e-09	0.000	0.000354	0.000	8.94e-10	0.000
Observations	589	589	589	589	589	589
Number of cd	42	42	42	42	42	42
District FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
District TT	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Later on, we re-estimated the above models with an alternative negative binomial estimation and find similar findings from the baseline models. A quick robustness check using controls from Gawande et al. (2015) paper, viz., district-level gini coefficient and food consumption expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure, also yields very similar findings from the baseline regressions above with one interesting twist: in presence of controls and using high-quality outcome variable data from Gawande et al. (2015) paper for the years 2001 to 2008, only the ethnic distance between non-SC&ST and SCs remain statistically significant in explaining the deaths associated with conflict (see Table 7 below). Note that in this setting also, the ethnic distance measure associated with polarization shows the highest impact in terms of the magnitude.

Table 7. A quick robustness check with outcome variable and control variables from Gawande et al. (2015) paper

Table 2: Ethnic distance markers, conditional

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	ltotaldeaths	ltotaldeaths	ltotaldeaths	ltotaldeaths	ltotaldeaths	ltotaldeaths
cd_sc_ps_1931	1.704					
	(0.483)***					
	0.000481					
cd_st_ps_1931		-0.882				
		(0.635)				
		0.166				
cd_sc_bp_1931			9.628			
			(3.476)***			
			0.00593			
cd_st_bp_1931				0.810		
				(4.909)		
				0.869		
cd_sc_frac_1931					1.875	
					(0.548)***	
					0.000707	
cd_st_frac_1931						-0.884
						(0.699)
						0.207
gini	2.064	1.830	2.113	1.942	2.039	1.845
	(1.079)*	(1.099)*	(1.088)*	(1.099)*	(1.080)*	(1.099)*
	0.0567	0.0968	0.0530	0.0783	0.0600	0.0943
vmng	0.0385	-0.0172	-0.0531	-0.0202	0.0591	-0.0296
	(0.149)	(0.151)	(0.150)	(0.156)	(0.150)	(0.151)
	0.796	0.909	0.724	0.897	0.694	0.845
Constant	-0.0608	1.462	0.440	0.781	-0.0632	1.412
	(0.372)	(0.539)***	(0.310)	(0.378)**	(0.378)	(0.544)***
	0.870	0.00705	0.157	0.0394	0.867	0.00983
Observations	336	336	336	336	336	336
Number of districts	42	42	42	42	42	42

Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Conclusion

This study sheds light on one important historical ethnic marker, caste distance, in explaining one of the later civil strife, Naxalite conflict in India. We find consistent support that ethnic distances based on sub-castes of non-SC&ST groups and SC groups and ST groups play statistically significant role in explaining the conflict onset and continuation. The findings are in line with the ethnicity and conflict literature pioneered by Esteban et al. (2012). The robustness checks reveal that the caste distance between non-SC&ST and SC groups play pertinent role in the civil strife.

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Figure 1. Total affected districts and states in the Naxalite conflict in 2017



Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal 2017.

Figure 2. Scheduled caste groups in Bihar as per the 1950 Constitutional Schedule (a glimpse)



PART II—BIHAR

1. Throughout the State:—

1 Bauri
2 Bantar
3 Bhogta
4 Chamar
5 Chaupal
6 Dhobi
7 Dom
8 Dusadh, including Dhari or Dharhi
9 Ghasi
10 Halalkhor
11 Hari, including Mehtar
12 Kanjar
13 Kurariar
14 Lalbegi
15 Mochi
16 Musahar
17 Nat
18 Pan
19 Pasi
20 Rajwar
21 Turi

2. In Patna and Tirhut divisions. and the districts of Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Purnea and Palamau:—

Bhumij

3. In Patna, Shahabad. Gaya and Palamau districts:—

Bhuiya

Source: *The Indian Constitution 1950 schedule*

Figure 3. Scheduled caste groups in West Bengal as per the 1950 Constitutional Schedule (a glimpse)



PART IX—WEST BENGAL

Throughout the State:—

1 Bagdi
2 Bahelia
3 Baiti
4 Bauri
5 Bediya
6 Beldar
7 Bhuimali
8 Bhuiya
9 Bhumij
10 Bird
11 Chamar
12 Dhoba
13 Doai
14 Dom
15 Dosadh
16 Ghasi
17 Gonrhi
18 Hari
19 Jalia Kaibartta
20 Jhalo Malo or Malo
21 Kadar
22 Kandra
23 Kaora
24 Karenga
25 Kastha
26 Kaur
27 Khaira
28 Khatik
29 Koch
30 Konai
31 Konwar
32 Kora
33 Kotal
34 Lalbegi
35 Lodha
36 Lohar
37 Mahar
38 Mahli
39 Mal
40 Mallah
41 Malpahariya
42 Mehtor
43 Muchi
44 Musahar
45 Nagesia
46 Namasudra
47 Nuniya
48 Paliya
49 Pan
50 Pasi
51 Patni
52 Pod
53 Rabha
54 Rajbanshi
55 Rajwar
56 Sunri
57 Tiyar
58 Turi

Figure 4. Scheduled tribe groups in Bihar as per the 1950 Constitutional Schedule (a glimpse)

PART III.—*Bihar*

1. Asur, [2][Agaria]
2. Baiga
3. Banjara
4. Bathudi
5. Bedia

[4]***

[5][6.] Bijhia
[5][7.] Birhor
[5][8.] Birjia
[5][9.] Chero
[5][10.] Chik Baraik
[5][11.] Gond
[5][12.] Gorait
[5][13.] Ho
[5][14.] Karmali
[5]15.] Kharia
[5][16.] Kharwar [2][Dhelki Kharia, Dudh Kharia, Hill Kharia]
[5][17.] Khond
[5][18.] Kisan
[5][19.] Kora [2][Nagesia]
[5][20.] Korwa [2][Mudi-kora]
[5][21.] Lohara, Lohra
[5][22.] Mahli
[5][23.] Mal Paharia
[5][24.] Munda [2][Kumarbhag Paharia]
[5][25.] Oraon [2][Patar]
[5][26.] Parhaiya [2][Dhangar Oraon]
[5][27.] Santal
[5][28.] Sauria Paharia
[5][29.] Savar.
[2][31. Kawar
32. Kol
33. Tharu.]

Figure 5. Scheduled tribe groups in West Bengal as per the 1950 Constitutional Schedule (a glimpse)

PART XVI.—*West Bengal*

1. Asur
2. Baiga
3. Badia, Bediya
4. Bhumji
5. Bhutia, Sherpa, Toto, Dukpa, Kagatay, Tibetan, Yolmo
6. Birhor
7. Birjia
8. Chakma
9. Chero
10. Chik Baraik
11. Garo
12. Gond
13. Gorait
14. Hajang
15. Ho
16. Karmali
17. Kharwar
18. Khond
19. Kisan
20. Kora
21. Korwa
22. Lepcha
23. Lodha, Kheria, Kharia
24. Lohara, Lohra
25. Magh
26. Mahali
27. Mahli
28. Mal Pahariya
29. Mech
30. Mru
31. Munda
32. Nagesia
33. Oraon
34. Parhaiya
35. Rabha
36. Santal
37. Sauria Paharia
38. Savar
[1][39. Limbu (Subba)
40. Tamang.]