Does local leadership lower bias in law enforcement? Evidence from experiments with India's rural politicians

Tanushree Goyal^{*} Sam van Noort[†] Mats Ahrenshop[§]

Abstract: Do elected local representatives lower bias in law enforcement? We conducted four vignette experiments with a representative sample of rural politicians in Bihar. Each vignette randomly varies the gender and caste of a citizen in a law enforcement situation enforcement of lockdown rules, inheritance law, land encroachment, and the open-defecationfree policy. We find that local representatives intervene to ensure citizens compliance and, regardless of their gender or caste, strongly discriminate against (minority) women but mainly in inheritance enforcement. Conversely, we find little evidence for overt caste or gender discrimination in non-gender-progressive vignettes. We find strikingly similar results on conducting the inheritance experiment with local politicians who have judicial powers. Data indicate entrenched gender norms as a key explanation for bias. The findings show that local leaders are unlikely to enforce progressive reforms that clash with entrenched gender norms, with implications for the study of decentralization and law enforcement in patriarchal rural settings.

^{*}Harvard University (tanushreegoyal@g.harvard.edu)

[†]Princeton University (samvannoort@princeton.edu)

[‡]University of Oxford (mats.ahrenshop@politics.ox.ac.uk)

[§]Data collection and fieldwork were funded by the IGC. We thank Isha Fuletra, Medha Mathur, Haniya Rumaney, and Augustus Smith for excellent program and data management and research assistantship. The following research assistants were instrumental in the data collection: Bhagya Raj Rathod, Chaitali Pant, Senjuti Basu, Pranjal Chavanke, Akriti Shrivastava, Akshita Saini, Chetna Priya, Hannin Fatima, Lakshita Chahar, Nupur Rastogi, Vareni Awasthi, Samra Maaz, Kriti Pandya, Hitender Kumar, Abhinav Pandey, Shamik Vatsa, Ankit Singh, Aastha Jha, Karishma Kharbanda, Shruti, and Khaleefa Banu. We owe a huge debt of gratitude to all the men and women politicians who participated in this research despite their difficult circumstances. The project received Oxford's Central University Research Ethics Committee Ref No.: SSH DPIR C1A 20 005.

1 Introduction

Many developing countries have adopted political decentralization reforms with the goal of improving the quality and impartiality of government (Bardhan, 2002; Mookherjee, 2015; Treisman, 1999). This paper asks whether local leaders achieve these objectives for law enforcement and ensuring citizens' compliance with progressive reforms that challenge entrenched norms and restructure power relations. Studying this question is of fundamental importance in low-income settings where decentralized development has intensified conflict and the need for local law enforcement (Sage, Menzies and Woolcock, 2019). At the same time, peripheral, poor, rural, and marginalized citizens, who have limited access to legal justice, turn to local level political elites for law enforcement. The responsiveness of local elites in-turn shapes citizens' trust and legitimacy in state institutions (Rothstein and Holmberg, 2011). Posing this question is urgent. National and state governments worldwide are rapidly devolving the enforcement of social and gender reforms to locally elected leaders (Mansuri and Rao, 2012), shaping the terrain for citizenship practice in both the rural and rapidly urbanising Global South (Auerbach and Kruks-Wisner, 2020; Bussell, 2019), but we know little about the consequences of this devolution on equality in law enforcement.

India, where more than 3 million local leadership roles exist in village-level electoral politics is a case in point. Local villages politicians undertake more than the implementation of public goods provision and development schemes, which are the thrust of the literature on decentralization and representation in India (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Beaman et al., 2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Goyal, 2019; Gulzar, Haas and Pasquale, 2020; Jensenius, 2017).¹ Elected local leaders act as street-level state agents. They are responsible for informing and alerting the police to stop child marriage, issuing fines, enforcing inheritance

¹For decentralization research in other low-income settings, see excellent reviews by Mookherjee (2015) and Grossman and Slough (Forthcoming).

rights, protecting rapidly disappearing common land, raising awareness and implementing progressive social policy, and ensuring citizen compliance with open-defectation-free policy. More recently, local leaders were responsible for enforcing social distancing rules and for quarantining returning migrants (Dutta and Fischer, 2021), and were at times given powers equivalent to India's elite civil servants.² For example, in Bihar, one of the poorest Indian state with a population larger than the UK and Nepal combined, and which is the focus of this paper, local leaders have judicial powers to hold court, order punishment, and impose fines against those who violate the law. Political affirmative action also ensures gender and caste representation in these roles. Yet, few studies investigate how local leadership engage in these everyday acts of law enforcement.

We present a theoretical framework that builds on existing research investigating decentralization and the local provision of public goods and welfare schemes, which we summarize in our theory section, combined with insights from our fieldwork. We argue that local leaders face may have incentives, competence, preferences, and superior capacity to ensure citizen compliance with and to enforce laws — mechanisms that we collectively refer to as 'equality promoting effects' of decentralization. On the other hand, they may also face electoral or violent backlash when ensuring compliance. Locally elected leaders may also hold norms that conflict with law enforcement, particularly in regards to progressive legal reforms that challenge existing gender and inter-group relations — mechanisms that we refer to as 'equality impeding effects' of decentralization. Our framework summarizes these mixed theoretical predictions.

We use vignette survey experiments to investigate whether local village politicians from across gender and caste groups — enforce the law equitably for marginalized citizens and doubly marginalized women in Bihar. We focus on elected local leaders called 'mukhiyas' — development leaders — who oversee jurisdictional areas called 'Gram Panchayat' (GP) (a cluster of villages). We present four commonly occurring law enforcement situations as vi-

²see, Sarpanches to get District Collector's powers to fight against Covid-19: Odisha CM, Mint, April 19 2020.

gnettes and randomly vary the gender and caste identity of the individuals involved in these situations. The four experimental vignettes always occur in the same order: enforcement of lockdown rules, enforcement of inheritance law, prevention of encroachment of common land, and enforcement of open-defecation policy. We discuss the selection and design rationale in more detail in our paper. Elected politicians are prone to give socially desirable answers, which raises the bar for uncovering discrimination using this approach. The generalizability of survey experiments to real world outcomes remains an open research question, and for which the answer is likely to be specific to the research question. However, social desirability biases that are more endemic to discrimination experiments, biases us against finding evidence for discrimination (Barabas and Jerit, 2010; Bertrand and Duflo, 2016). Therefore, we interpret our results as a lower bound on discrimination in the real world.

Our state-level representative and phone-based rural politician survey is the first of its kind and was conducted in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike being restricted to purposely selected districts, we randomly reached out to half of all mukhiyas in Bihar, a mammoth exercise which culminated in 18000 phone calls. Using administrative electoral and demographic background data for the universe of Bihar's politicians, we can assess that our final sample of N = 734 respondents is representative of Bihar's mukhiya population (N = 7761) on key observables. Our survey includes measures of politician's roles and activities, anticipated electoral and violent backlash, their gender and caste norms, networks, and policy preferences. We collected this rich data to test and explore mechanisms underlying our findings.

Our fieldwork informed our innovative measurement approach. At the end of each vignette, we ask local leaders whether they will take any action in each of the hypothetical situation and to verbally describe the action that they will they take. Almost all leaders choose to intervene. Crucially, their verbal response is then manually transcribed, yielding a qualitative data comprising over 2800 quotes, and is coded into close-ended measures. These are: whether the politician allowed the violation of or enforced the law, whether they choose to engage verbally in a conversation about the law, and whether they involved any state official, and the type of state officials they choose to involve. Research assistants code these measures live during, and to ensure quality, at the end of every interview. Instead of only asking a direct question about law enforcement at the end of the vignette, we took this approach to minimize social desirability bias, reduce cheap talk, and address attention-deficit concerns. This pre-tested approach also generates rich qualitative data that is experimental and generalizable to the study sample. While we present select qualitative quotes in the paper, our additional appendix supplements this with 30 randomly selected quotes. At the end of each vignette, we also ask a close-ended attitudinal feeling thermometer question to investigate the extent to which rural politicians find the individuals' law enforcement request or its violation acceptable on a scale of 0-10, which measures politicians' attitudes towards citizens who demand justice or violate the rule of law.

Our results are striking. We find strong evidence for gender discrimination in the inheritance vignette. This vignette randomly varies whether an unmarried son or daughter in a general or SC caste family demands their legal share in family inheritance, a highly contentious gender issue in India. Analyzing this vignette, we find that mukhiyas are equally likely to discriminate against women from both upper and SC caste backgrounds. They are both significantly and substantively more likely to find a woman's inheritance claim less appropriate, to suggest a lower property share relative to the legal share, to suggest marriage as a pre-requisite, and dowry as alternative to property rights. They are also less likely to involve formal state actors, and more likely to take matters into their own hands when women make a claim to inheritance relative to men. Worse, both men and women mukhiyas and mukhiyas from general, SC/ ST, and OBC backgrounds are all equally likely to discriminate against women. This is remarkable considering that the most agentic set of women leaders answered our survey themselves, a result of our survey approach that we discuss in more detail in our paper. Furthermore, we conducted a follow-up abridged inheritance experiment with sarpanchs, who are formally responsible for enforcing inheritance laws, and find similar but slightly stronger results.

Conversely, we find no evidence of overt discrimination in other vignettes that present non-gender-progressive enforcement situations. Only in the open-defecation vignette, village leaders find the reluctance of upper caste women to use toilets marginally more inappropriate than upper caste men. We also find weak or no evidence for caste based or double marginalization in any of our vignette. We discuss two potential inter-related explanations for this heterogeneity in our results. Firstly, the Indian state has invested a relatively greater amount of resources and incentives for village leaders and attached more symbolic importance to ensure compliance with lockdown, open-defecation, and land encroachment which makes it more likely that local leaders are equitable in enforcing these rules. This was evident in the field and phone interviews, where politicians routinely credited national and state leaders for their support. No such value has been ascribed to the inheritance reform, nor are any incentives given to village politicians to enforce the inheritance law. Secondly, it is plausible that as a result of this greater attention from the national government together with caste-based political and social mobilization (and lack of gender mobilization), local leaders have become attuned to giving socially desirable answers on caste but have not yet learnt to hide their gender bias. It is not possible for us to entirely rule out this possibility, but we deem it less plausible given our respondents' somewhat open expression of prejudice on both caste and gender, in the interview and in our fieldwork. It is also plausible that local leaders anticipate stronger discrimination from a male-dominated bureaucracy on gender progressive issues. Research indeed finds that bureaucrats discriminate against women and minority leaders in India (Purohit, 2021). However this discrimination does not explain why they find a woman's demand for equal inheritance "less appropriat" than a man's demand.

By theorizing and highlighting the potential and limits of local leadership for law enforcement, our paper contributes to research on decentralization and development both in economics (Martinez-Bravo et al., 2017; Mookherjee, 2015) and political science (Bohlken, 2016; Carter and Hassan, 2021; Gulzar and Pasquale, 2016), and is related to a vast literature on representation and development (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Chauchard, 2014; Jensenius, 2014; Parthasarathy, Rao and Palaniswamy, 2019). Within this literature, fewer studies have investigated the effects of representation on everyday acts of law enforcement.³ Moreover, these aggregate analysis take decentralization as their starting point and are less amenable to investigating the mechanisms through which local leaders and descriptive representation influence these outcomes. We supplement this research by testing one plausible mechanism and providing experimental evidence showing that it is unlikely that local leaders take direct action to enforce progressive gender reforms in a substantive patriarchal setting. Our findings suggest that we need more research to theorize and test causal mechanisms that can help us understand the mixed overall effects observed in the literature.

Our paper contributes to a vast literature on discrimination (Banerjee et al., 2009; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Many of the responsibilities that rural politicians render are closer to those of street-level bureaucrats, and our paper is related to studies that provide evidence for discrimination by street-level bureaucrats, (Ash et al., 2021; Neggers, 2018; White, Nathan and Faller, 2015) and politicians (Bussell, 2019; Dinesen, Dahl and Mikkel, 2021).⁴ Most of these studies focus on either gender or caste discrimination, our paper contributes by investigating discrimination by elected village leaders against (hypothetical) citizens from marginalized gender, caste, and doubly marginalized identities. Our paper echoes Dinesen, Dahl and Mikkel (2021) who find that electoral mechanisms do not mitigate discriminatory behaviour from politicians in Denmark. Empirically, studies of labour market discrimination are increasingly relying on factorial survey designs to provide evidence (Bertrand and Duflo, 2016). We use this approach to show discrimination from elected local leaders. Survey experiments also shed light on our specific mechanism of interest which is whether local leaders are likely to *directly* intervene to enforce the law impartially. Our pa-

³There are a few exceptions. See for child marriage (Castilla, 2018), and inheritance laws (Brule, 2020; Deininger, Goyal and Nagarajan, 2013; Roy, 2015).

⁴Borrowing from Bertrand and Duflo (2016), we define discrimination as: 'members of a minority group (women, Blacks, Muslims, immigrants, etc.) are treated differentially (less favorably) than members of a majority group with otherwise identical characteristics in similar circumstances.'

per is therefore in the spirit of 'mechanism experiments' which are well-suited to investigate behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions (Ludwig, Kling and Mullainathan, 2011). It also speaks to growing research in comparative politics which uses surveys and experiments to study the performance of political elites (Chaudhuri et al., 2020; Garcia-Hernandez, Grossman and Michelitch, 2022).

2 Theory

Decentralization is an eternally important topic in the research on constitution design, finance, development, and democracy. In particular, decentralization has altered the landscape of local democracy and governance in the Global South in last three decades (Bohlken, 2016). A rich formal literature in economics has discussed the benefits and costs of decentralization (Oates, 2007; Tiebout, 1961), what Mookherjee (2015) refers to as the first generation of federalism. Subsequent scholars have focused on how political decentralization can improve local accountability and governance in poor countries (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Seabright, 1996; Treisman, 1999). Several world bank led development initiatives emphasize the advantages of decentralization, particularly for multi-ethnic democracies with diverse regional, language, and ethnic cleavages (World Bank, 2004), and have recently discussed the challenge of providing legal justice for the poor in development processes (Sage, Menzies and Woolcock, 2019).

Our paper studies whether locally elected leaders can equitably enforce citizens' compliance with social policy and the rule of law in multi-ethnic democracies. We review the existing literature on decentralization which offers mixed expectations. We refer to the arguments which suggest that local elected leaders will equitably ensure citizens' compliance with social policy and equally enforce the rule of law as 'equality promoting effects.' We refer to the arguments which suggest that local elected leaders will hinder citizens' compliance with social policy and partially enforce the rule of law as 'equality impeding effects.' This cogent scheme builds on the existing literature on decentralization and public goods provision and service delivery to provide a rich theoretical framework for understanding the costs and benefits of decentralization with regards to law enforcement — a relationship that has been understudied in the research on decentralization.

2.1 Equality promoting effects

A key way in which decentralization can equitably improve compliance with social policy and the rule of law is through selection effects. By screening candidates in competitive and highly localised and information rich elections, citizens can select the most competent leaders who can improve impartiality in local government (Besley, 2007). Such 'principled' candidates may hold preferences to equitably enforce the law for citizens from diverse caste, gender, and religious identity. Citizens may also select candidates from their own identity groups (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), increasing diversity in local bodies and lowering chances of institutional dominance by one group; this in-turn can create internal checks and balances which improve local governance. Moreover, local bodies provide ambitious candidates with a platform where they can develop strong reputations for being impartial governance actors and launch national careers (Myerson, 2014). Investigating, the rise and fall of local elections in China, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017) find that the introduction of local elections improves political selection as local officials become younger and more educated.

Political decentralization can also improve accountability and information flow in local governance and law enforcement (Fan, Lin and Treisman, 2009; Khemani, 2001). Citizens can not only observe leaders more closely but they can also learn about rules and legal reforms through enforcement activities in other neighbouring or closely located local jurisdictions, and punish discriminatory or corrupt leaders (Escobar-Lemmon and Ross, 2014). Citizens will find it much easier to attribute the performance of local governments (Goyal and Harding, 2021), and sanction locals rather than outsiders, as they are more likely to have repeated dealings with locals and may find it easier to meet embedded politicians socially (Bhavnani and Lee, 2018; Tsai, 2007). At the same time, politicians will have better information about citizens who are more likely to comply with or defy policy rules and the law. Local politicians can pre-emptively alert other law enforcement actors such as the police or the local bureaucrat (Castilla, 2018). Local actors may help increase citizen's trust and co-operation with central and sub-national state authorities, specially during times of crises (Dutta and Fischer, 2021), which can improve citizen's compliance with the law, which in turn can increase local politicians' ability and intention to enforce the law. Local politicians will have better knowledge of language and culture and can propose communication and rhetorical solutions that are more conducive for ensuring citizen's compliance with progressive policies (Kasara, 2007).

Affirmative action combined with political decentralization can further improve equality in local governance by increasing substantive representation, changing citizen's attitudes and beliefs towards out-group members, and by increasing the capacity of local activists from marginalized groups. A vastly rich literature on local representation,⁵ with relatively more studies in India, has shown that affirmative action improves substantive representation and enables marginalized groups to benefit from development and welfare schemes. Investigating India's scheduled tribe reservations in local government, Gulzar, Haas and Pasquale (2020) find that reservations more closely align employment benefits distributed under India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme to each group's population share, alloying concerns of overcompensation for inequalities. Evidence shows that women leaders directly negotiate and help unmarried women to bargain for property rights instead of dowry from their brothers (Brule, 2020; Deininger, Goyal and Nagarajan, 2013; Roy, 2015). Caste reservations are also seen to lower caste-based stigmatization in India (Chauchard, 2014; Jensenius, 2017). Goval (2019) shows that descriptive representation can increase the presence and capacity of party activists from marginalized groups who enable citizens to demand more equitable treatment from state institutions, in settings where bureaucracies

⁵See reviews by Clayton (Forthcoming) and Jensenius (2017).

are politicized.

2.2 Equality impeding effects

The literature on decentralization and development highlights elite capture and corruption as two key concerns which suggest that local leaders may fail to equitably enforce the law. Elites can capture political positions and hurt local governance outcomes (Anderson, Francois and Kotwal, 2015). While research shows the existence of elite capture, the losses it creates appear small, as far as the mis-allocation of welfare schemes is concerned Alatas et al. (2019). However, even if elite capture only marginally affects the distribution of welfare schemes, elite capture of local institutions which have law enforcement responsibilities can still have dire consequences for marginalized groups. For instance, fearing status loss, elites can hollow out the state such that higher status groups can use partiality in law enforcement to consolidate their power and hold over lower status groups (Suryanarayan, 2019).

Ethnic favouritism is another way in which elites can use their greater control over political institutions to favour their in-group. A rich literature in distributive politics investigates whether political or ethnic favoritism affects the allocation of goods and services (Golden and Min, 2013). Many studies of countries in developing countries identify tribal or caste affiliation as an important determinant of allocations (Chandra, 2004), but this view has been recently challenged (Harding and Stasavage, 2014), and the findings in the literature are mixed (Golden and Min, 2013). For example, studies find that favoritism toward one group with one good can be offset by favoritism toward another with an alternate good (Kramon and Posner, 2013). In other words, regardless of whether elite may or may not target their own group with welfare schemes or public goods, they may still choose to favour their own by tolerating their groups non-compliance with unpopular policies (Holland, 2016).

Local elections by increasing accountability of local leaders to citizens can lower the likelihood of ensuring citizen's compliance with unpopular liberal policies or progressive legal reforms. Studying local elections in China, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017) argue that local elections should improve the performance of local officials for congruent policies, where both citizens and (national) government agree on what they want. However, for incongruent policies, the local official should perform worse in the eyes of the central government as elections make the official more accountable to citizens. Local elites highlight concerns of electoral backlash when they aim to improve redistribution towards marginalized groups (Jensenius, 2017), and electoral concerns may be stronger when local politicians enforce compliance with policies and reforms that are unpopular with majority of their constituents. In addition to electoral backlash, local politicians, particularly from marginalized groups may face violent backlash when they ask non-compliers from majority groups to observe the rule of law. The widespread prevalence of violence against women in politics is a case in point (Krook, 2017).

A rich literature in economics outlines the role of culture and norms in influencing policy implementation, decision making, and trust in institutions (Ashraf et al., 2020; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), and in particular the role of gender norms in shaping gender inequality (Jayachandran, 2015). Local leaders who hold regressive and patriarchal beliefs, including marginalized citizens, are less likely to implement policies and enforce legal reforms that challenge those beliefs and restructure power relations in society and descriptive representation is therefore unlikely to lead to equality in law enforcement. Investigating role model effects in India, Goyal (2020) finds that women react negatively to women in politics because they hold patriarchal norms and have lower household autonomy, which binds their interests to the household. Ashraf et al. (2020) investigate Indonesia's school construction program, and find that among ethnic groups without the custom of paying bride price, the program had no effect on girls' schooling. In contrast, among ethnic groups with the custom, it had large positive effects. While most studies investigating the role of norms highlight how citizens, who hold values and beliefs that contradict progressive reforms, react adversely to policies, the findings are likely to generalize to local leaders, who are relatively closer in values and embedded in the communities from which they are elected.

To summarize, our theoretical framework yields mixed expectation about whether local leaders will equitably implement policies and enforce the law, and suggests that it is not theoretically clear whether locally elected leaders — and descriptive representation in these roles — can improve law enforcement for marginalized groups, particularly when it concerns progressive reforms that challenge existing power relations in society.

3 Context: Rural Bihar

Bihar's gram panchayat (GP) institutions and its elected leaders are the subject of our paper. Bihar is composed of roughly 8000 gram panchayats (GP) single-member electoral districts serving over 44874 villages. Every five years elections take place for a variety of village level posts such as mukhiyas, sarphanchs, ward-level members, panchs and so on. We pay attention to two key actors who are the highest level political officials at the GP level. Mukhiyas are responsible for implementation of development schemes, conducting the 'Gram sabha' – the village assembly, and overseeing public service delivery. Sarpanchs are responsible for law enforcement and have judicial powers to issue minor punishment and fines. They organize and chair the 'Gram katchary' – the village court. Their duty as the chair of the Gram Katchahry is to bring about amicable settlement of disputes. Informally, our fieldwork suggests that due to greater access to development funds, mukhiyas are more powerful and involved in resolving village conflicts and ensuring citizen compliance with multiple social reform policies; it is one key reason why we conducted our main survey with mukhiyas.

Our survey provides rich data showing the vast range of activities in which these elected elites are involved. Figure 1 plots the top responsibility reported by Mukhiyas. Mukhiyas report development and welfare related tasks as their main responsibility, followed by resolving fights, disputes and restoring law and order. Sarpanchs report resolving fights, disputes and restoring law and order as their top responsibility and meeting and speaking with villagers as their second main responsibility. Mukhiyas' distribution of responses to roles and responsibilities is wider relative to sarpanchs, showing their broader informal involvement in a variety of local level problems. Like rest of the country, Bihar observes caste and gender affirmative action policies in local politics. The reservation of caste and gender is based on population of SC, ST and women.



Figure 1: Mukhiyas' and sarpanches top responsibilities: Development and Disputes

Notes: We asked mukhiyas "What are the top three roles and responsibilities of the Mukhiya that are most important to you and the ones that you spent most of your time on?" Here, we plot the proportion of valid responses within each hand-coded category. The same procedure is applied to winner sarpanches.

With regards to our theory, we consider Bihar a typical case of India's BIMAROU or 'Hindi Heartland' sickly region, where it is ambiguous whether local leaders will be effective in law enforcement. On the one hand, Bihar has a highly politicized state bureaucracy with high bureaucratic overload which is detrimental to policy implementation (Dasguta and Kapur, 2020). Paradoxically, Witsoe (2013) examining the rise of lower-caste politics in Bihar concludes that an increase in democratic participation has weakened state institutions and disrupted development projects, and there is high level of caste-based conflict and discrimination. Furthermore, Bihar is a typical case of a patriarchal setting within India. For instance, Figure 2 top panel shows, that as per NFHS 2015-2016, close to 93% women, and men require their wives, to seek permission to visit friends or family, which is marginally above the national average of 90%. However, at the same time, Figure 2 bottom panel shows that Bihar is amongst the states with the highest percentage of women owning land in India. Figure 2: High constraints on women's mobility (top), but many women own land (bottom)





Source: NFHS-4, 2015-16

Yet, for these reasons, Bihar is also precisely the Indian state that can benefit the most from effective local leadership and where local leaders can significantly improve law enforcement. Bihar's local elections are highly competitive with close to 90,000 candidates contesting for under 9,000 mukhiya positions. There are qualitative accounts of successful men and women politicians emerging from these local elections and improving policy implementation and challenging entrenched norms (Agarwal, 2015).⁶ Our fieldwork echoed the mixed nature of Bihar's local governance. We met leaders who were radical activists and change agents operating under striking resources constraints. We met in greater numbers, those who were invested in maintaining the status quo.

4 Data and Fieldwork

State election commission data: We scraped digitized data on election results from the State Election Commission website for all candidates who contested mukhiya and sarpanch elections in Bihar in 2016. The data has information about: vote share, caste, age, gender, education qualification and mobile phone number for each candidate. We sample respondents and assess the representativeness of our survey using this data.

Fieldwork: We made several visits to Bihar during 2019, and in Dec-Jan 2019-2020 conducted fieldwork in one district and purposely selected three geographically proximate blocks within this district. There were 37 GPs in total (64 mukhiyas and sarpanchs). We keep them anonymous to protect the identity of our respondents. We reached out to all sarpanchs and mukhiyas in these blocks via phone numbers from the state election commission data. We interviewed in-person everyone whom we could speak to on the phone, who was available to interview during our field visit, and for safety reasons was available in a place accessible by a car. We also met some respondents directly in the field without making phone contact. We interviewed approximately 25 leaders.

⁶For example, See *How women panchayati officials in Bihar are challenging the practice of proxy candidates*, 21 March 2019, The Caravan Magazine.

Our experience with women leaders is worth emphasizing and foregrounds why our phone survey has fewer direct interviews with women, but more with their husbands. While we met with women leaders, we found that a majority of them were not the acting representative. Instead, their husbands or other male relatives had 'captured' their roles, were active on their behalf, and answered the survey in their presence. The next category of women were what we call 'coordinating' leaders, where the woman was involved in more village-bound tasks within the GP and official visits, while the husband was active in the broader GP. A sizeable minority of women were highly 'independent' and active village leaders. Our fieldwork enables us to offer this novel classification of women leaders: captured, coordinating, and independent adding nuance to the dominant dichotomous conceptualization of women leaders as either proxies or non-proxies. Our phone survey, which we discuss next, reinforced the validity of this scheme.

In addition to mukhiyas and sarpanchs, we interviewed block development officers, gram sevaks, police officials, self-help group organizers, and other street bureaucrats in these blocks. Our fieldwork is one source that informs our experimental and measurement design and the choice of law enforcement situations in our vignettes. We were exposed firsthand to the wide variety of activities village leaders were involved in and were beyond sanctioning development schemes. We were exposed to the advantages local leaders have in ensuring citizen compliance and law enforcement in regions of weak state capacity, what we theorized as 'equality promoting effects', but became wary of the types of challenges that politicians were facing such as backlash and lack of resources, as well as themselves holding regressive beliefs, what we theorized as 'equality impeding effects'.

Phone-based politician survey: We conducted two phone-based politician surveys, the first one with mukhiyas, and another with sarpanchs.⁷ Our main results in this paper rely on our first phone-survey conducted with mukhiyas in July-September 2020. Roughly

⁷These surveys were initially designed to be a baseline and endline surveys for our field experimental project on child marriage which was disrupted and eventually cancelled due to COVID-19. We discuss the ethical and practical challenges in data collection during this unprecedented crisis in the Appendix.

50% (N = 3824) of all Mukhiyas in Bihar were contacted via phone and comprise our target population. Panel B shows that we oversampled women and Muslim mukhiyas, but undersampled OBC mukhiyas. The appendix provides more details about our sampling. Table 1 shows the sociodemographic characteristics of this target population more clearly in Panel A in terms of electoral competition, age, gender, education, caste, and religion.

Our overall response rate from the mukhiya survey was 19.2%. However, over 60% of phone numbers that were called were "no-connections", and in the case there was any interaction the response rate was 50%. Table 1 shows that the survey sample that responded is fairly representative of overall Mukhiya population of Bihar. We do not see any unexpected differences in terms of observable socio-demographic and electoral variables between the target population and our final interviewed sample, except on demographics where we definitely over/ under sampled. Appendix plot A.1 confirms the same.

	Ν	Close	Vote	#	Age	Prop.	Prop.	Prop.	Prop.	Prop.	Prop.	Prop.
		election	share	$\operatorname{candidates}$		GEN	OBC	SC/ST	low edu	high edu	Hindu	Muslim
Panel A: All mukhiya winner	rs											
Total	7750	0.45	0.31	11.90	40.93	0.30	0.50	0.20	0.66	0.34		
Female	3991	0.45	0.31	11.78	39.07	0.30	0.52	0.18	0.78	0.22		
Male	3759	0.45	0.31	12.02	42.91	0.30	0.49	0.21	0.53	0.47		
Panel B: Population eligible	for int	erview										
Total	3816	0.46	0.31	11.64	40.47	0.32	0.36	0.32	0.70	0.30	0.79	0.21
Female	2505	0.46	0.31	11.49	39.06	0.32	0.35	0.33	0.78	0.22	0.82	0.18
Male	1311	0.48	0.31	11.93	43.17	0.32	0.39	0.28	0.55	0.45	0.72	0.28
Panel C: No response												
Total	3082	0.46	0.31	11.68	40.40	0.32	0.35	0.33	0.71	0.29	0.78	0.22
Female	2072	0.46	0.31	11.51	39.04	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.78	0.22	0.82	0.18
Male	1010	0.48	0.31	12.01	43.18	0.32	0.39	0.30	0.57	0.43	0.71	0.29
Panel D: Interviewed sample	•											
Total	734	0.46	0.31	11.48	40.77	0.32	0.40	0.27	0.66	0.34	0.81	0.19
Male (total)	301	0.47	0.31	11.65	43.11	0.34	0.41	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.78	0.22
Male (self answered)	291	0.48	0.31	11.66	43.05	0.34	0.41	0.25	0.49	0.51	0.78	0.22
Male (answered by relative)	10	0.30	0.34	11.40	45.00	0.40	0.40	0.20	0.60	0.40	0.90	0.10
Female (total)	433	0.45	0.32	11.36	39.13	0.31	0.39	0.29	0.78	0.22	0.82	0.18
Female (self answered)	93	0.41	0.32	10.78	35.91	0.34	0.42	0.24	0.65	0.35	0.92	0.08
Female (answered by relative)	340	0.47	0.31	11.52	40.01	0.30	0.39	0.31	0.82	0.18	0.80	0.20

 Table 1: Population and survey sample characteristics

Note: The data for panel A and B is the SEC data and the rest is from our survey.

Figure 3 shows for 61% of the women mukhiyas, their surveys were answered by their husbands. 20% of women mukhiyas answered the survey themselves. In absolute numbers, 93 female mukhiyas answered themselves. For 340 women mukhiyas we have responses from their spouses or another mostly male family member. For 301 men mukhiyas, 291 answered



Figure 3: For majority of women mukhiyas, their husbands answered the survey

themselves and for 10 men mukhiyas a relative answered instead. Our fieldwork helps us to more confidently conclude that our survey outreach is not radically different from the ground reality we witnessed during fieldwork. While the pandemic and the phone survey may have complicated who we spoke with in unknown ways, this outreach is not only an artefact of conducting interviews over the phone or during the pandemic. During our fieldwork, we were able to technically meet with women leaders and conduct interviews in their presence, the majority or all of the answers were given by their spouses.

We also interviewed sarpanchs over the phone during Jan-June 2021. Our approach here was different from mukhiyas, as we did not only interview incumbents. Instead, we interviewed both sarpanch winners and runners of close elections in Bihar (N = 1153) (as part of another study). The survey sampling for these actors is described in the Appendix. We conduct the inheritance vignette with sarpanchs to show that our results hold for these formal law enforcement actors. The results also hold only for sarpanch incumbents and are stronger (See Appendix B.7).

5 Experimental design

To investigate whether local leaders implement social policy equitably we conducted survey vignette experiments. We conducted four experiments, each with a different law enforcement situation. These situations are: lockdown rules, inheritance laws, land enchroachment, and open-defecation. Each vignette has four treatment arms and while the situation remains entirely the same, we vary caste (upper caste, UC, Other backward castes, OBC or scheduled castes SC), religion (Hindu or Muslim), and gender (man or woman). We vary the caste, for example in the inheritance and open-defecation vignette, at the family level. We used pretested names to signal these identities. Table A.1 provides the text of each of the vignette translated from Hindi into English. The survey and vignettes was written in Hindi by one of the co-authors. Names were used to signal identity and the names of the additional actors (fathers, siblings) reinforced the identity of the situation's protagonist. We refer to (and in the encroachment vignette combine) all non-UC caste and Muslim identities as 'minority' identity. Our results do not vary much within the caste category and this eases the interpretation of our results.

Our rationale for selecting these four enforcement situations is informed by our fieldwork and existing research. All four situations are realistic and very common to not only India, but other developing countries. We included lockdown rules as a situation of deep contemporary relevance. Inheritance and property disputes comprise 76% of all litigation in India.⁸ India's disappearing common lands are also a major concern in rural political economy and is a key issue relevant to other developing countries (Robinson, 2008). Finally, there is immense research highlighting the problems of low compliance with open-defecation-free policy in Bihar (Jain et al., 2020), and (perceived) non-compliance has also led to violent attacks on minorities and even children.⁹

We did not randomize the order in which the experiments appear to ease implementation.

⁸See, Property and family disputes account for 76% of litigation, April 26 2016, The Times of India. ⁹See, India: Two held for killing children for 'defecating in the open, Septemeber 26 2019, The BBC.

Situation	Description	Condition (X)	Condition (Y)
Lockdown	X who is returning to Bihar from Delhi, is refusing to go to the quarantine center or to get quarantined at home. X wants to meet [his or her] sick sister. X's sister's home is only 10 kms away	Hindu man Hindu woman Muslim man Muslim woman	
Inheritance	Y has passed away recently. He has three children. Two elder brothers who are married and one younger [brother sister] who is unmarried. His 2 married sons, are not willing to share the ancestral property of 9-acre farmland with their unmarried younger [brother sister]. The younger [brother sister], X, has demanded an equal share in the farmland.	UC Hindu man UC Hindu woman SC Hindu man SC Hindu woman	UC father SC father
Land encroachment	X's and his brother, Y's farmland is next to the gram panchayat's pond. The pond has no water, and for many years it is lying remained dried, empty, and useless.Both brothers, because the pond land is not in use, have started to farm on it.X says that, using an empty common land does not cause any harm to anyone.	UC Hindu man OBC Hindu man SC Hindu man Muslim man	UC Hindu man OBC Hindu man SC Hindu man Muslim man
Open-defecation	X and her [brother sister] Y often go the open field to relieve themselves. They have a 2 pit-latrine in their house which is 100 feet deep. But they wish to keep their house "pure" or clean and prefer to go to the open field, because everyone in their family has been doing the same.	UC Hindu man UC Hindu woman SC Hindu man SC Hindu woman	UC Hindu man UC Hindu woman SC Hindu man SC Hindu woman

In terms of ordering our experiments, we fielded lockdown as our first vignette with the aim to ease mukhiyas in into the survey. In our pilot, many mukhiyas were expecting and were keen on expressing COVID-19 related views; our survey provided them with an audience. Our second experiment was inheritance laws. Because it was more socially sensitive than land encroachment, we decided to field it right after the more gender neutral COVID vignette. We followed this with land encroachment, and ended with open-defecation, which we felt was the most sensitive issue to talk about. The vignettes are presented below.

5.1 Measurement

At the end of each vignette, we ask local leaders whether they will take any action in each of the hypothetical situation and to verbally describe the action that they will they take. Each response was transcribed into Hindi and translated into English at the end of the interview. During the interview, enumerators code the responses alongside specific questions. These are: whether the politician allowed the violation or restored the rule, whether they choose to engage in a conversation about the rule, take an action, whether they took the action unilaterally, and the quantity and type of state officials they choose to involve and so on. For improving quality, enumerators hand code the responses again after listening to the audio of the surveys and transcribing and use this data for our analysis. We also code some scenario specific outcomes for the inheritance scenario.

Furthermore, we ask a close-ended feeling thermometer question at the end of each vignette to investigate the extent to which rural politicians find the individuals' request to demand enforcement or violate the law as acceptable on a scale of 0-10. The question is: On a scale of 0 to 10, 10 being completely acceptable, 0 being completely unacceptable, how acceptable is it for X to [demand to visit their sister | demand equal property share| farm on common land | engage in open-defecation]?

Table 4 reports the mean of the outcomes, that are common to all our four vignettes, in the control or reference group, which is the subsample of vignettes where that Mukhiyas are treated with an upper caste Hindu man. Appendix Table A.2 presents summary statistics with standard deviation. Panel A shows that mukhiyas choose to intervene in all four policies. Only in land encroachment, we had a high refusal rate to answer. This can be because either mukhiyas did not get involved in those issues as much or found it too sensitive to answer. There is also some variation in the nature of mukhiyas' involvement across situation types. For example, open-defection situation is where 45% of mukhiyas wanted to only talk and convince the non complying citizens to stop from and provided explanations why it was bad to defecate in the open.



Figure 4: Outcome means in reference group

Notes: Among mukhiyas exposed to the reference group in the vignette, which are upper caste Hindu man, we plot in Panel A mukhiya's willingness to take action (coded as 1 if selected 'taking action' and 'talking and taking action' and 0 if 'only talking'), and in Panel B the mean of the main outcomes that are common to all scenarios *Acceptability of individual's request* and *Likelihood of taking unilateral action*.

Panel B left figure shows that mukhiyas do not find that it is appropriate that individuals want to violate the law or policy and there is some variation across policy which reflects the severity of the issue. For example, violating open-defecation-free policy had an approval rating of 0.52 (std. dev. 2.01), while violating lockdown rules had a higher approval at 3.79 with the most variation in response (std. dev. 4.4). Demand for equal inheritance had the highest approval rating of 9.29 and was considered extremely fair in the reference group. Although there was some variation and the standard deviation was 2.17. Panel B right figure shows that mukhiyas were most likely to act on their own, without taking any support from other state or non-state actors, in the lockdown situation. They were most likely to involve third parties in the inheritance situation, followed by land encroachment, and open-defecation. These statistics are not unexpected and seem reasonable in this context.

6 Main results

We estimate the effects of each condition, that is, whether hearing about a (i) Minority man (ii) UC Hindu woman and (iii) Minority woman, relative to the reference group which is Upper caste Hindu man, influences mukhiyas's responses as measured on our key outcomes. Figure 5 plots point estimates of each of these categories in reference to UC man. All estimates are computed via OLS regressions of respective outcome on the categorical variable of treatment assignment. Throughout, we compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC2) and 95% confidence intervals as based on those standard errors.¹⁰ We report all results in a tabular format in the Appendix section B. Note that we find no carryover effects as seen in Appendix Table D.3. The randomization for all the experiments was done digitally via Qualtrics at the survey session level. Therefore, while we find some imbalance on respondent characteristics in Table D.1, it is purely by chance. Our results are robust to co-variate adjustment as seen in Appendix section C.¹¹

Panel A plots show that citizen's identity in the lockdown and the land encroachment vignette does not influence how acceptable mukhiyas find the request to visit a sick sister during lockdown or farm on common land. However, in sharp contrast, mukhiyas find a daughter's demand for equal inheritance in deceased father's property — for both upper caste and SC caste women — as more unacceptable relative to a son's demand. The effect size is substantive and statistically powerful. Mukhiyas rated a woman's demand as 1.1 (UC woman) to 1.8 points (SC woman) less acceptable (on a scale from 0 to 10) than respondents in the baseline UC man group (mean 9.29), a difference which is statistically significant at p < 0.001. This is a highly substantive effect and is close to 50% of one standard deviation (2.17 in the reference group as reported in Table A.2). Mukhiyas find the violation of opendefecation-free policy only by an upper caste Hindu woman — a decrease of 0.365 scale units or 18% of one standard deviation (2.01 in the reference upper caste Hindu man group).

¹⁰In particular, analysis was done using the R package estimatr (Blair et al., 2022).

¹¹Note that we estimated p-values with randomization inference and this alternative approach makes no difference to our interpretation of statistical significance of the results.



Figure 5: Main experimental results

Notes: 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Acceptability of individual's request ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 being completely acceptable and 0 being not acceptable at all. Likelihood of taking unilateral action is a probability between 0 and 1.

Panel B shows similar findings as Panel A. Mukhiyas are 71% more likely to take unilateral action (13.5% points increase over a baseline of 19%), without involving any state or third party actor, when a daughter is making a demand for equal inheritance. The effect is both substantively and statistically significant only in the inheritance vignette. Mukhiyas are also close to 26% more likely to take unilateral action when a minority man (8.3% points over baseline of 31%) or an UC Hindu woman (8.7% points over baseline of 31%) in violating the open-defection-free policy, and the effect is statistically significant at 10% level. To conclude, we find strongest evidence for discrimination against women from both UC and SC groups in the inheritance vignette, followed by discrimination against minority man and UC Hindu woman in the open-defection vignette. In the rest of the situations, we uncover little evidence of overt caste or gender discrimination.

6.1 Heterogeneity by mukhiyas' caste

We do not find consistent or strong evidence that descriptive representation lowers bias against women. Figure 6 plots the main results for UC and minority (OBC, SC, Muslim) mukhiyas. With regards to how mukhiyas rate the acceptability of the citizen's request, we find that both UC and minority mukhiyas find a minority woman's demand for equal inheritance less acceptable. UC mukhiyas do not find UC woman's demand for inheritance less acceptable than UC man. In the open-defecation situation, both the upper caste and minority mukhiyas find the reluctance of minority man or upper caste hindu woman to use toilets less acceptable relative to an upper caste hindu man. The effects are close to zero for the minority woman treatment condition.

With regards to the actions that mukhiyas prescribed, we find that both UC and minority mukhiyas are both less likely to involve third party actors. Instead, they are more likely to take unilateral action in the inheritance situation. In the open-defection situation, minority mukhiyas are less likely to take unilateral action and are more likely to engage third party actors when women or minority men are not complying with the open-defection-free policy. There are no differences in acceptability or prescribed action between UC and minority mukhiyas in other situations.

6.2 Heterogeneity by mukhiyas' gender

Figure 7 shows that both men and women mukhiyas are equally likely to discriminate against minority and UC women in the inheritance situation with regards to acceptability of a given situation. This is striking because as we noted earlier, we expect that the women leaders who answered the survey themselves are the most agentic set of leaders in Bihar and are most likely to enforce gender progressive laws.

Although the estimates are noisier, we still find striking evidence for discrimination against women from both UC and minority backgrounds. Women mukhiyas, but not men mukhiyas, are also less likely to find the non-compliance of UC women with the open-



Figure 6: UC and minority mukhiyas discriminate against minority (woman)

Notes: We present OLS coefficients from separate regressions for upper caste hindu mukhiyas and minority mukhiyas. 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

defecation-free policy as less acceptable relative to the non-compliance of any other social group. With regards to the action take by men and women mukhiyas, our estimates are noisier for woman politicians as there are fewer observations, but lead us to the same conclusion that both men and women act in similar ways.

7 Equal inheritance law: Additional Results

Our most strongest and consistent evidence for gender discrimination is from the inheritance situation. To summarize, we find that both UC's and minority woman's demand for equal inheritance is considered less acceptable by any caste or gender mukhiya. We also find that men or women or UC or minority mukhiyas are less likely to involve a third party actor and instead are more likely to take unilateral action in the inheritance situation that contains



Figure 7: Men and women mukhiyas discriminate against (minority) woman A. Acceptability of individual's request

Notes: We present OLS coefficients from separate regressions for men and women mukhiyas. 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

a woman actor. The inheritance situation we presented is also a most likely situation for a young woman to secure some inheritance, making our results even more startling. As demonstrated in existing research, the demand for property rights is often easier to make for unmarried women who have not yet forgone their inheritance share in the form of dowry (Brule, 2020; Roy, 2015). Married woman hardly make this demand to avoid damaging relationships with their brothers. Therefore, we chose to present unmarried siblings to relax what we saw as less realistic or or even *less socially* acceptable situation, from which our results would have been less generalizable.

In this subsection, we present results on two additional outcomes that we coded which were specific to the inheritance vignette only. We find discrimination against UC and minority women alongside both theses parameters, by men and women as well as UC and minority mukhiyas. We also present selective interview quotes, which highlight the discursive and rhetorical ways in which discrimination manifests in mukhiyas' responses which are not captured in these hand coded responses. We also present results from a replication exercise where we replicated an abridged version of our vignette experiment — involving only UC men and women — with sarpanchs. We also only collected sarpanchs' response on the feeling thermometer question.

7.1 Additional outcomes

Figure 8 shows that mukhiyas assert that the unmarried woman should be first married before making any inheritance demand. As our quotes below show, some even considered marrying the woman their personal responsibility. Mukhiyas also stated with much less certainty that a woman should get equal share, instead they highlighted that the woman should get *something*, or be married. When the inheritance vignette featured a man, all mukhiyas were quick to explicitly note that the man deserved an equal inheritance shared, despite his age or marital status.

Figure 8: Women unlikely to get equal share and more likely to be asked to first marry



Notes: *Equal share* takes on 1 if mukhiyas stresses that equal share should be given, 0 if some or no share is prescribed, and missing if no information about the share is given. *Marriage needed* is 1 if marriage is a requirement for inheritance, 0 if marriage is stated as irrelevant, 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.



Figure 9: Additional inheritance outcomes by mukhiya's gender and caste identity

Notes: We plot OLS estimates from segressions conducted in subgroups of UC and minority mukhiyas and

Echoing our earlier findings, Figure 9 shows that mukhiya's caste or gender identity does not lower discrimination, that is, UC or SC mukhiyas, men and women mukhiyas, all are equally likely to prescribe marriage first and lower inheritance share to women. Conditional on explicitly stating marriage, 100% of women respondents suggested marriage as necessary before a woman's demand for equal inheritance could be considered.

men and women mukhiyas. 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

7.2 Qualitative data

Mukhiyas' verbal responses highlight the discursive and rhetorical ways in which woman's demand for equal inheritance is considered less acceptable and eventually denied. Firstly, in the man condition, mukhiya responses are shorter, preciser, and much more to the point. In the woman condition, the responses are longer, mukhiyas more hesitant, and the action described more ambiguous and full of extraneous irrelevant information. While all these rich rhetorical aspects cannot be quantified, we conducted quantitative text analysis to investigate the wordiness, that is, the number of words in mukhiya's Hindi response. We find that mukhiyas are wordier in the woman treatment condition in the inheritance vignette. Figure 10 plots the results for the full sample, and shows that results do not vary by subgroups: men and women mukhiyas, and UC and minority mukhiyas. Table A.2 shows that in the 'man condition', a mukhiyas response is approximately 50 words long with a std. dev. of 34 words. However, in the 'woman condition', the response is 8 words or 23% std. dev. longer, which is both a substantive and a statistically significant effect.

Figure 10: Rhetorical discrimination: Mukhiyas give wordier responses in woman condition



Notes: We plot OLS estimates from regressions of the number of words given in an open-ended response on a binary treatment indicator that collapses the male and female treatments, conducted in subgroups of UC and minority mukhiyas and men and women mukhiyas as well as the overall sample. 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

Second, mukhiyas explicitly state that marriage or age or social norms should not be a reason for a young unmarried man to be denied his inheritance share by his older brother. Instead, marriage is often a necessity for a woman to secure her inheritance rights. Because it is even more challenging to secure inheritance rights after being married away, which in most cases involves migration to another village, we interpret mukhiyas requiring marriage for the woman as a way to make it even harder for her to secure her property rights in the future.

VR1 and man treatment condition: 'In the father's ancestral wealth, all three brothers have an equal share, that is why he should get an equal share, that is right both in the eyes of law and society. We have panchayati raj, gram court we have - if he brings an application/appeal to me we will take that appeal and give both the brothers notice and take the decision.'

VR2 and man treatment condition: 'I will take action. The brother has a share. There is no relevance to marriage he has a share. I will request that he should get a share in the property.'

Only in the woman condition, mukhiyas differentiate between legal rights and social norms and conclude that as per social norms it is inappropriate for Hindu women to demand equal inheritance, especially because they can instead marry in a good home and would not like their sister-in-law to make demand on their husband's property. Take for instance, the following two quotes.For the purpose of demonstrating generalizability, our additional qualitative appendix presents 30 randomly selected responses from man and woman treatment condition, and also heterogeneity by men and women politician.

VR3 and woman treatment condition: 'See social way is different. Social thinking is different, legal norm is different. Supreme court has long ago said that all children of one parents, whether 3 sister 1 brother or 3 brothers 1 sister,

everyone should get equal share but this is not how its done from a social perspective. The right holder lives there. After father's death, they are dependent on the brother, so its his duty to get sister married in a rich household, though its about your destiny. When they come to their father's place, they have brother and sister-in-law. They are the guardian. Legally they have a right but this doesn't happen. Only in some rare cases...'

VR4 and man treatment condition: 'Yes, I will take action in this, I will tell them that share is necessary, she has to be married off, so the action will be taken. If they are not giving the share in this situation, we will make them sit in society. The share should be given. This is alright as per Hindu customs/society, In the Muslim customs/society she should get a share. In the current social arrangement daughters are not given a share, the law says something different but the girl will not get a share as per social arrangements, I will try to get her married. In parental property if the father wants, firstly the law has changed, if the father wants only then she will get the share.'

7.3 Vignette experiment with Sarpanchs

We find a strikingly similar pattern of results in an abridged version of the experiment conducted with sarpanchs. Figure 11 shows that sarpanchs, regardless of their gender or caste identity, find UC women's demand for equal inheritance less acceptable. This is striking as sarpanchs are formally the first point of contact involved in enabling women to secure their inheritance rights. The magnitude of the effect is stronger that what we found in our experiment with mukhiyas and is statistically significant. Considering the whole sample, mukhiyas find an UC woman's demand for inheritance less appropriate by 1.33 units, which is equal to 81% of one standard deviation (1.64 units, see Table A.3). This effect is relatively stronger as compared to gender discrimination by mukhiyas (71% of one std dev.).



Figure 11: Sarpanchs discriminate against women demanding equal inheritance

Notes: This replication experiment contained two treatment conditions *Upper caste Hindu man (reference group)* and *Upper caste Hindu woman* and was conducted with sarpanch winner and runner-up candidates in competitive races. The outcome variable *Acceptability of individual's request* ranges from 0 to 10. 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

7.4 Evidence on mechanisms

We investigated whether electoral or violent backlash or holding regressive norms can explain our findings. Figure 12 plots the interaction estimate of the interaction of treatment condition with the mechanism of interest. We find little to no evidence for treatment effects varying by the anticipation of an electoral or violent backlash to law enforcement. We find that mukhiyas who hold gender regressive norms, as measured by son preference, are substantively more likely to find woman's demand for equal inheritance less acceptable. Mukhiyas with high son preference are also more likely to take unilateral action than mkhiyas with low son preference, although the estimate is statistically insignificant.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we theorize and investigate whether local leaders hinder or improve influence law enforcement. We use survey experiments to provide evidence that local leaders discrim-



Figure 12: Regressive gender norms underlie bias

Notes: Electoral backlash is 1 if the mukhiya reports concerns of being voted out of office for enforcing the law and 0 otherwise; *Violent backlash* is 1 if the mukhiya fears being verbally abused or harassed for enforcing the law and 0 if not; *Son important* is 1 if having a son is considered very important, rated 6 and above on a scale of 0-10, and 0 otherwise.

inate against higher caste and SC women in Bihar, regardless of their own gender or caste identity, and that this discrimination mainly occurs in the context of women's demand for equal inheritance. We expect our findings to generalize to other patriarchal settings within India. Our findings reaffirm the conclusion in gender and development research that gender norms segment the empowering effects of policy solutions often aimed at improving gender equality (Jayachandran, 2015).

We find that the lack of anticipation of electoral or violent backlash does not lower the extent of this discrimination, but holding regressive gender norms increases discrimination. We conduct experiments with both mukhiyas and sarpanchs in Bihar and find identical results, bolstering support for our findings. In sharp contrast, we find little evidence of discrimination in our other survey vignettes, all of which concern non-gender-progressive policies. We interpret this heterogeneity as reason for cautious optimism. We expect that greater attention and resource investment by national and state leaders can motivate local leaders to impartially implement gender-progressive policies. Our fieldwork and qualitative data suggests that local leaders do not have the resources, training, and sensitivity to challenge the status-quo on highly contentious gender issues.

Our findings do not mean that decentralization or representation has no effect on the overall enforcement of progressive gender reforms but improves our understanding of and narrows down the range of causal mechanisms. Local leadership can influence change through other indirect mechanisms such as improving coordination among citizens (Bhalotra et al., 2021; Chaturvedi, Das and Mahajan, 2021), bolstering the presence and influence of NGOs focused on women's issues (Roychowdhury, 2020), increasing the partisan mobilization of citizens and responsiveness by diverse activists that are recruited by mandated representatives (Goyal, 2019), that in turn can further intensify citizen demands. Local representation can even promote mechanisms that can lower caste prejudice both among citizens and elites in the long run (Chauchard, 2014).

Far from discounting the role local leaders can play directly, our findings suggest that policy makers are far from realizing the full potential of local leadership. Our findings strengthen our belief that policy makers may also benefit from using local leadership to implement progressive gender reforms, by giving gender progressive reforms the same attention that is targeted at other social and legal reforms. We echo others who have found striking improvements in policy implementation by raising and signalling its salience and value to street-level bureaucrats (Kruks-Wisner, Mangla and Sukhantar, 2022). Our results suggest that policy makers can reap far greater benefits of local leadership by building capabilities, fostering peer-networks, giving the same attention to implementing gender progressive laws as to other social policies, and providing technology and resources that can enable local leaders to be impartial and effective state agents.

References

- Agarwal, Smita. 2015. A Study of Women as Panchayat Leaders in Bihar. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK pp. 153–172.
- Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Ririn Purnamasari and Matthew Wai-Poi. 2019. "Does Elite Capture Matter? Local Elites and Targeted Welfare Programs in Indonesia." AEA Papers and Proceedings 109:334–39.
- Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois and Ashok Kotwal. 2015. "Clientelism in Indian Villages." American Economic Review 105(6):1780–1816.
- Ash, Elliot, Sam Asher, Aditi Bhowmick, Daniel Chen, Tanaya Devi, Christoph Goessmann, Paul Novosad and Bilal Siddiqi. 2021. "Measuring Gender and Religious Bias in the Indian Judiciary." Working Paper.
- Ashraf, Nava, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn and Alessandra Voena. 2020. "Bride Price and Female Education." Journal of Political Economy 128(2):591–641.
- Auerbach, Adam Michael and Gabrielle Kruks-Wisner. 2020. "The Geography of Citizenship Practice: How the Poor Engage the State in Rural and Urban India." *Perspectives on Politics* p. 1–17.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Marianne Bertrand, Saugato Datta and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2009. "Labor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment." Journal of Comparative Economics 37(1):14–27.
- Barabas, Jason and Jennifer Jerit. 2010. "Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?" American Political Science Review 104(2):226–242.
- Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(4):185–205.
- Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee. 2006. "Pro-poor targeting and accountability of local governments in West Bengal." Journal of Development Economics 79(2):303 327.
- Beaman, Lori, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova. 2009. "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?"." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4):1497–1540.
- Bertrand, Marianne and Esther Duflo. 2016. Field Experiments on Discrimination. Working Paper 22014 National Bureau of Economic Research. URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22014
- Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination." *American Economic Review* 94(4):991–1013.
- Besley, Timothy. 2007. Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government. Oxford University Press.

- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India^{*}." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4):1415–1451.
- Bhalotra, Sonia, Irma Clots-Figueras, Lakshmi Iyer and Joseph Vecci. 2021. "Leader Identity and Coordination.".
- Bhavnani, Rikhil R. and Alexander Lee. 2018. "Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India." *The Journal of Politics* 80(1):71–87.
- Blair, Graeme, Jasper Cooper, Alexander Coppock, Macartan Humphreys and Luke Sonnet. 2022. estimatr: Fast Estimators for Design-Based Inference. https://declaredesign.org/r/estimatr/, https://github.com/DeclareDesign/estimatr.
- Bohlken, Anjali Thomas. 2016. Democratization from Above: The Logic of Local Democracy in the Developing World. Cambridge University Press.
- Brule, Rachel. 2020. "Reform, Representation and Resistance: The Politics of Property Rights' Enforcement." *The Journal of Politics* 0(ja):null.
- Bussell, Jeniffer. 2019. Clients and Constituents: Political Responsiveness in Patronage Democracies. Oxford University Press.
- Carter, Brett L. and Mai Hassan. 2021. "Regional Governance in Divided Societies: Evidence from the Republic of Congo and Kenya." *The Journal of Politics* 83(1):40–57.
- Castilla, Carolina. 2018. "Political role models and child marriage in India." *Review of Development Economics* 22(4):1409–1431.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. Why ethnic parties succeed : Patronage and ethnic head-counts in India. Cambridge University Press.
- Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72(5):1409–1443.
- Chaturvedi, Sugat, Sabyasachi Das and Kanika Mahajan. 2021. The Importance of being Earnest: What Explains the Gender Quota Effect in Politics? Working Papers 52 Ashoka University, Department of Economics. URL: https://ideas.repec.org/p/ash/wpaper/52.html
- Chauchard, Simon. 2014. "Can Descriptive Representation Change Beliefs about a Stigmatized Group? Evidence from Rural India." American Political Science Review 108(2):403– 422.
- Chaudhuri, Ananish, Vegard Iversen, Francesca R. Jensenius and Pushkar Maitra. 2020. "Time in Office and the Changing Gender Gap in Dishonesty: Evidence from Local Politics in India.". Working paper.
- Clayton, Amanda. Forthcoming. "How Do Electoral Gender Quotas Affect Policy?" Annual Review of Political Science 0(ja):null.

- Dasguta, Aditya and Devesh Kapur. 2020. "The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India." *American Political Science Review* 114(4):1316–1334.
- Deininger, Klaus, Aparajita Goyal and Hari Nagarajan. 2013. "Women's Inheritance Rights and Intergenerational Transmission of Resources in India." *The Journal of Human Resources* 48(1):114–141.
- Dinesen, Peter Thisted, Malte Dahl and Schioler Mikkel. 2021. "When Are Legislators Responsive to Ethnic Minorities? Testing the Role of Electoral Incentives and Candidate Selection for Mitigating Ethnocentric Responsiveness – ERRATUM." American Political Science Review 115(2):728–728.
- Dutta, Anwesha and Harry W. Fischer. 2021. "The local governance of COVID-19: Disease prevention and social security in rural India." *World Development* 138:105234.
- Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Ashley D. Ross. 2014. "Does Decentralization Improve Perceptions of Accountability? Attitudinal Evidence from Colombia." American Journal of Political Science 58(1):175–188.
- Fan, C. Simon, Chen Lin and Daniel Treisman. 2009. "Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world." *Journal of Public Economics* 93(1):14–34.
- Garcia-Hernandez, Ana, Guy Grossman and Kristin Michelitch. 2022. Gender Gap in Politician Performance and its Determinants. Working paper.
 URL: https://guygrossman.com/assets/pdf/workingpaper_gender_gap.pdf
- Golden, Miriam and Brian Min. 2013. "Distributive Politics Around the World." Annual Review of Political Science 16(1):73–99.
- Goyal, Tanushree. 2019. Representation from below: How women's grassroots party activism promotes equal political participation. Working paper Available at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3583693.
- Goyal, Tanushree. 2020. How patriarchal norms segment the empowering effects of descriptive representation: Experimental evidence from India. Working paper https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4023697.
- Goyal, Tanushree and Robin Harding. 2021. "Do voters prefer campaign promises about attributable policies? Evidence from India and Ghana." Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3886411.
- Grossman, Guy and Tara Slough. Forthcoming. "Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries." Annual Review of Political Science.
- Gulzar, Saad and Benjamin J. Pasquale. 2016. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development : Evidence from India." *American Political Science Review* pp. 1–22.

- Gulzar, Saad, Nicholas Haas and Benjamin Pasquale. 2020. "Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India's Scheduled Areas." American Political Science Review p. 1–17.
- Harding, Robin and David Stasavage. 2014. "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." The Journal of Politics 76(1):229–245.
- Holland, Alisha C. 2016. "Forbearance." American Political Science Review 110(2):232–246.
- Jain, Anoop, Ashley Wagner, Claire Snell-Rood and Isha Ray. 2020. "Understanding Open Defecation in the Age of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan: Agency, Accountability, and Anger in Rural Bihar." International journal of environmental research and public health 17(4):1384.
- Jayachandran, Seema. 2015. "The Roots of Gender Inequality in Developing Countries." Annual Review of Economics 7(1):63–88.
- Jensenius, Francesca R. 2017. Social Justice through Inclusion: Consequences of Electoral Quotas in India. Oxford University Press.
- Jensenius, Francesca Refsum. 2014. "The Fieldwork of Quantitative Data Collection." *PS: Political Science & amp; Politics* 47(2):402–404.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa." *The American Political Science Review* 101(1):159–172.
- Khemani, Stuti. 2001. Decentralization and Accountability : Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections? Policy research working paper no. 2557.
- Kramon, Eric and Daniel N. Posner. 2013. "Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcome One Studies Affects the Answer One Gets." *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2):461?474.
- Krook, Mona L. 2017. "Violence against women in politics." *Journal of Democracy* 28(1):74–88.
- Kruks-Wisner, Gabrielle, Akshay Mangla and Sandip Sukhantar. 2022. "Policing in Patriarchy: An Experimental Evaluation of Reforms to Improve Police Responsiveness to Women in India.".
- Ludwig, Jens, Jeffrey R. Kling and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2011. "Mechanism Experiments and Policy Evaluations." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 25(3):17–38.
- Mansuri, Ghazala and Vijayendra Rao. 2012. Localizing Development. The World Bank.
- Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró I Miquel, Nancy Qian and Yang Yao. 2017. The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off. Working Paper 24032 National Bureau of Economic Research. URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w24032

- Mookherjee, Dilip. 2015. "Political Decentralization." Annual Review of Economics 7(1):231–249.
- Myerson, Roger. 2014. "Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan." World Development 53:46 – 54. Decentralization and Governance.
- Neggers, Yusuf. 2018. "Enfranchising Your Own? Experimental Evidence on Bureaucrat Diversity and Election Bias in India." *American Economic Review* 108(6):1288–1321.
- Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101(7):3221–52.
- Oates, Wallace E. 2007. On the Theory and Practise of Fiscal Decentralization. Technical report.
- Parthasarathy, Ramya, Vijayendra Rao and Nethra Palaniswamy. 2019. "Deliberative Democracy in an Unequal World: A Text-As-Data Study of South India's Village Assemblies." American Political Science Review 113(3):623–640.
- Purohit, Bhumi. 2021. "The laments of getting things done: The case of gender and ethnic bias in India's bureaucracy.".
- Robinson, Elizabeth J. Z. 2008. "India's Disappearing Common Lands: Fuzzy Boundaries, Encroachment, and Evolving Property Rights." *Land Economics* 84(3):409–422.
- Rothstein, B and S Holmberg. 2011. The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
- Roy, Sanchari. 2015. "Empowering women? Inheritance rights, female education and dowry payments in India." Journal of Development Economics 114:233 251.
- Roychowdhury, P. 2020. Capable Women, Incapable States: Negotiating Violence and Rights in India. Modern South Asia series Oxford University Press.
- Sage, Caroline, Nicholas Menzies and Michael Woolcock. 2019. Taking the Rules of the Game Seriously: Mainstreaming Justice in Development the World Bank's Justice for the Poor Program. Working paper National Bureau of Economic Research. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710096
- Seabright, Paul. 1996. "Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incomplete contracts model." *European Economic Review* 40(1):61–89. The Domain of the State.
- Suryanarayan, Pavithra. 2019. "When Do the Poor Vote for the Right Wing and Why: Status Hierarchy and Vote Choice in the Indian States." *Comparative Political Studies* 52(2):209–245.
- Tiebout, Charles M. 1961. An Economic Theory of Fiscal Decentralization. In Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization. NBER Chapters National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc pp. 79–96.

- Treisman, Daniel. 1999. "Political Decentralization and Economic Reform: A Game-Theoretic Analysis." American Journal of Political Science 43(2):488–517.
- Tsai, Lily. 2007. "Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China." *American Political Science Review* 101(2):355–372.
- White, Ariel R., Noah L. Nathan and Julie K. Faller. 2015. "What Do I Need to Vote? Bureaucratic Discretion and Discrimination by Local Election Officials." American Political Science Review 109(1):129–142.
- Witsoe, Jeffrey. 2013. Democracy against Development: Lower-Caste Politics and Political Modernity in Postcolonial India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

World Bank. 2004. Making services work for poor people. World Bank.

Appendix

Table of Contents

A Survey sampling	1
A.1 Principles and guidance for human subjects research \ldots	1
A.2 Survey vignettes: Names	3
B Main Results: Tabular format	5
C Main Results with covariate adjustment	9
D Balance check and carryover tests	12

A Survey sampling

We conducted a baseline survey with 734 Mukhiyas in Bihar across 35 districts in Bihar and is representative at the state level. Our target population included all Mukhiyas in some of the southern and central districts of Bihar with high child marriage rates. These districts are: Gaya, Jamui, Khagaria, Lakhisarai, Samastipur, Sheikpura, Nawada, Vaishali, Nalanda, Saharsa, Darbhanga, and Jahanabad. It also includes all Muslim mukhiyas and women mukhiyas in seats not reserved for women (non-reserved seats) and a random subsample of women Mukhiyas from reserved seats from all other remaining districts in Bihar blocked on caste (General/OBC/SC/ST) and development block. GPs are randomly drawn proportional to development block size, measured as number of GP per development block, such that, 50% General GPs, 50% OBC GPs from each block, and 30% SC/ST GPS are selected from each block. The outreach sample excludes all GPs from the districts of Banka and Begusarai and randomly selected GPs from Nawada, Madhepura, Samastipur, Supaul and Jahanbad, which were in total 480 GPs, were part of training and testing the survey.

We find that our survey is representative of our target population, and is also fairly of the entire mukhiya population of Bihar. Figure A.1 plots regression estimates showing whether our interviewed final sample is different from the target that we sampled as well as the overall mukhiya population. However, there is an exception on the OBC demographics. Because we undersampled OBCs in our target sample, our final survey has fewer OBCs relative to the total population (negative coefficients on the plot), but marginally more than what we aimed for in our target sample (positive coefficients on the plot). Men who responded to our survey are marginally more educated than our target sample, but not so relative to the overall population.

A.1 Principles and guidance for human subjects research

We outline briefly how our data collection met the principles and guidance for human subjects research. We conducted our survey over the phone and during the pandemic. The survey was part of the baseline survey of a field experiment, which was cancelled due to COVID-19. We trained graduate students (with master's degree) based in various parts of India to manage and conduct the survey over the phone. The enumerators were trained to outline the purpose of the research, the source, and nature of the funding, professional affiliation, and to share with respondents that the study was reviewed by academic ethic review boards. The study did not use any deception or involve any harm or trauma, did not interfere with any political or electoral processes, nor did it violate any other exception outlined in the general principles in human subject research. The data collection was not conducted close to or during any elections.

The survey enumerators were trained to take oral consent from the participants in Hindi before they began the interview. The interviews were roughly 25-40 minutes long and the participants were made aware of the time, effort, and risk involved in participating - which was low. Respondents were also informed that their response and audio data will be stored in compliance with the legal requirements of the academic board and the host countries, and that only anonymous data will be shared publicly. All respondents were adults (over 18 years of age) and understood that they could refuse participation and request to delete their



Figure A.1: Representativeness of interviewed sample



Sample 🛉 All 📥 Men 🛊 Women

Notes: OLS coefficients from separate regressions of the covariate of interest on a binary variable that is 1 for all mukhiyas in the interviewed sample and 0 for all winning mukhiyas or mukhiyas eligible for the interview. Age and N of candidates are z-standardized to enable comparisons of representativeness of our sample across covariates. Correspondingly, positive coefficients mean that the covariate is overrepresented in the interviewed sample, and negative coefficients mean that the covariate is underrepresented in the interviewed sample.

data at a later stage should they choose to do so, and without giving any reason. We shared with each respondent series of text messages at the end of the survey which had contact details of the program manager, a brief summary of the consent material, and online links to more detailed material. Respondents were compensated with INR 100 (1.3 US dollars) for participation in the interview, which comes close to the minimum hourly wage in Bihar, and therefore, is reasonable for the given context and the time burden. They could choose INR 50 in form of a digital cash transfer or talktime. The rest of INR 50 was reserved to be given to a charity that worked on select causes that we shared with them. They could also choose to donate the entire amount.

We put stringent protocols in place to ensure the well-being of our respondents and the research team involved in the data collection. To ensure that our calls were not disturbing our respondents during the pandemic and flooding in Bihar, we kept a close watch on the news and with our local research partner, and did not call during sensitive times during the crisis. We also put in place a protocol to monitor if respondents are refusing to speak with us, are rescheduling, or are irritated with our calls at any point during the survey. Any respondent who ever refused was never contacted again. If we received more than 5% refusals or reschedules because of pandemic related exigencies, or if our respondents alerted us to a difficult situation, we stopped with the survey for couple of days and resumed when we had more information and when it seemed appropriate. However, such a situation hardly ever occurred and we were able to speak with more than 50% of respondents, who we were able to get in touch with on the phone. Most respondents were very engaged and interested in talking to the enumerators and our overall experience was largely positive, despite the difficulty of the situation. In the case, where respondents were rude (which were few), we black-listed them and ensured that none of our research team member called those respondents again. This step was taken to ensure mental well-being of our research team. Project managers were available throughout the project and regular team meetings were scheduled to limit negative and stressful experiences that can occur while conducting a phone survey during a crisis.

A.2 Survey vignettes: Names

Situation	Description	Condition (X)	Condition (Y)
Lockdown	X who is returning to Bihar from Delhi, is refusing to go to the quarantine center or to get quarantined at home. X wants to meet [his or her] sick sister. X's sister's home is only 10 kms away	Hindu man - Rameshwar Hindu woman - Gayatri Muslim man - Shaukat Ali Muslim woman - Shabana Khatoon	
Inheritance	Y has passed away recently. He has three children. Two elder brothers who are married and one younger [brother sister] who is unmarried. His 2 married sons, are not willing to share the ancestral property of 9-acre farmland with their unmarried younger [brother] sister]. The younger [brother sister], X, has demanded an equal share in the farmland.	UC Hindu man - Arvind Dubey UC Hindu woman - Kiran Dubey SC Hindu man- Pappu Sah SC Hindu woman - Pinki Sah	UC father - Kedarnath Dubey SC father - Bhola Sah
Land encroachment	X's and his brother, Y's farmland is next to the gram panchayat's pond. The pond has no water, and for many years it is lying remained dried, empty, and useless. Both brothers, because the pond land is not in use, have started to farm on it. X says that, using an empty common land does not cause any harm to anyone.	UC Hindu man - Alok Tiwari OBC Hindu man - Baldev Yadav SC Hindu man - Sildhur Turi Muslim man - Aslam	UC Hindu man - Ajay Tiwari OBC Hindu man - Birendera Yadav SC Hindu man - Raghu Turi Muslim man - Sadik
Open-defecation	X and her [brother sister] Y often go the open field to relieve themselves. They have a 2 pit-latrine in their house which is 100 feet deep. But they wish to keep their house "pure" or clean and prefer to go to the open field, because everyone in their family has been doing the same.	UC Hindu man - Raghunath Pandey UC Hindu woman - Savitri Pandey SC Hindu man - Sudama Pasi SC Hindu woman - Babita Pasi	UC Hindu man - Atul Pandey UC Hindu woman - Sarika Pandey SC Hindu man - Gango Pasi SC Hindu woman - Manju Pasi

Table A.1: Survey text and condition

	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max					
A. Acceptability of individual's request										
Lockdown	169	3.79	4.40	0	10					
Inheritance	175	9.29	2.17	0	10					
Land encroachment	171	1.93	3.53	0	10					
Open defecation	174	0.52	2.01	0	10					
B. Taking unilateral action										
Lockdown	181	0.46		0	1					
Inheritance	172	0.19		0	1					
Land encroachment	164	0.24		0	1					
Open defecation	180	0.31		0	1					
C. Equal share										
Inheritance	157	0.75		0	1					
D. Marriage needed										
Inheritance	32	0.31		0	1					
E. Number of words in open-ended response										
Inheritance (Condition - UC Man)	172	50.26	34.53	1	194					
Inheritance (Condition - Man)	344	49.21	43.53	1	430					

Table A.2: Summary statistics for mukhiya survey

Table A.3: Summary statistics for sarpanch survey

	N	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
A. Acceptability of individua	al's re	equest			
Upper caste Hindu man (ref)	472	9.59	1.64	0	10

The table A.2 presents summary statistics of outcome variables for UC Hindu Man treatment condition. Only panel E represents summary statistics for both types of treatment conditions - for UC man and man which includes UC and SC man treatment condition.

B Main Results: Tabular format

	Lockde	own	Inherit	ance	Land encro	achment	Open def	ecation
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.124	-0.094^{*}	0.098	0.065	0.051	0.068^{*}	-0.224	0.083*
Upper caste Hindu woman	(0.481) -0.145 (0.471)	(0.052) - 0.055	(0.229) -1.119*** (0.283)	(0.045) 0.135^{***} (0.046)	(0.309)	(0.039)	$(0.193) \\ -0.365^{**} \\ (0.173)$	(0.050) 0.087^{*} (0.050)
Minority woman	(0.471) 0.069 (0.484)	(0.052) -0.060 (0.052)	(0.283) -1.791^{***} (0.301)	(0.040) 0.129^{***} (0.045)			(0.173) 0.024 (0.219)	(0.030) (0.032) (0.050)
Reference group mean Observations	$\begin{array}{c} 3.787\\ 665\end{array}$	$0.459 \\ 710$	$9.291 \\ 701$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.186 \\ 714 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.930 \\ 689 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.244 \\ 673 \end{array}$	$0.523 \\ 707$	$0.311 \\ 724$
Table B.	.2: Conditi	onal ave	rage treatn	nent effec	ets: Minori	ty politic	cians	
	Lockde	own	Inherit	ance	Land encro	achment	Open def	ecation
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	0.005	-0.111^{*}	-0.132	0.063	-0.125	0.034	-0.273	0.104^{*}
Upper caste Hindu woman	0.089	(0.080) -0.072	(0.265) -1.487^{***}	(0.052) 0.131**	(0.352)	(0.044)	(0.249) -0.435^{*}	0.123**
Minority woman	(0.539) 0.303	$(0.059) \\ -0.079$	(0.333) -1.947^{***}	(0.054) 0.147^{***}			(0.230) -0.113	(0.057) 0.088
	(0.546)	(0.059)	(0.329)	(0.052)			(0.263)	(0.056)
Reference group mean Observations	$3.777 \\ 508$	$0.460 \\ 543$	9.416 543	0.200 551	$2.050 \\ 530$	$0.248 \\ 519$	0.648 545	0.271 559
Table D 2	Condition		ma traatraa	nt offect	. Unnon o	acto polit	iciana	
Table D.5		liai avera	ge treatme	int enects	s: Opper ca	aste pom	licialis	
	Lockde	own	Inherit	ance	Land encro	achment	Open def	ecation
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.503	-0.043	0.921^{**}	0.075	0.743	0.181^{**}	-0.174	0.047
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.892	0.000	-0.012	0.159^*	(0.030)	(0.088)	-0.174	(0.112) -0.017
3.6	(0.971)	(0.110)	(0.558)	(0.086)			(0.126)	(0.102)
Minority woman	(1.039)	(0.112)	(0.725)	(0.054) (0.087)			(0.420) (0.432)	(0.107)
Reference group mean Observations	$3.821 \\ 157$	$0.452 \\ 167$	$8.842 \\ 158$	$0.135 \\ 163$	$1.406 \\ 159$	$0.226 \\ 154$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.174 \\ 162 \end{array}$	$0.426 \\ 165$
Table B	.4: Condit	ional ave	erage treat	nent effe	cts: Wome	n politici	ians	
	Lockd	own	Inherit	ance	Land encro	achment	Open def	ecation
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	0.811	-0.198	0.362	-0.002	-1.310	-0.193	-1.176	-0.116
Upper caste Hindu woman	(1.303) 2.653^*	(0.149) - 0.212	(0.466) -1.012	(0.139) -0.042	(1.099)	(0.142)	(0.805) - 1.176	(0.153) 0.087
	(1.364)	(0.158)	(0.935)	(0.144)			(0.805)	(0.163)
Minority woman	2.650^{*} (1.349)	-0.084 (0.147)	-0.842 (0.696)	0.000 (0.135)			0.065 (0.990)	-0.108 (0.143)
	(1.343)	(0.147)	(0.030)	(0.133)	0.000	0 500	(0.330)	(0.145)
Reference group mean Observations	2.400 78	0.545	9.320 83	0.320	3.833 83	0.562	1.176	0.389

Table B.1: Sample average treatment effects

	Lockdown		Inheritance		Land encroachment		Open defecation	
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.250 (0.516)	-0.079 (0.056)	0.060 (0.254)	0.078^{*} (0.047)	0.197 (0.317)	0.095^{**} (0.040)	-0.110 (0.197)	0.109^{**} (0.053)
Upper caste Hindu woman	(0.502) (0.500)	-0.035 (0.055)	(0.299)	0.162^{***} (0.048)	(01021)	(0.0.00)	(0.172) (0.172)	(0.085) (0.053)
Minority woman	-0.287 (0.516)	-0.058 (0.056)	-1.930^{***} (0.329)	0.152^{***} (0.048)			-0.047 (0.207)	0.054 (0.054)
Reference group mean Observations	$3.973 \\ 587$	$\substack{0.447\\621}$	$9.287 \\ 618$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.163 \\ 624 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.706 \\ 606 \end{array}$	$0.209 \\ 592$	$0.452 \\ 619$	$\substack{0.302\\631}$

Table B.5: Conditional average treatment effects: Men politicians

Table B.6: Sample average treatment effects: Additional outcomes in inheritance scenario

	All poli	ticians	Mino	ority	Uppe	r caste	We	omen	М	en
	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed
Minority man	0.015 (0.049)	-0.062 (0.114)	-0.008 (0.055)	0.000 (0.139)	0.096 (0.103)	-0.250 (0.164)	0.156 (0.118)	-0.000	-0.006 (0.053)	-0.006 (0.053)
UC Hindu woman	-0.252^{***} (0.052)	0.595^{***} (0.092)	-0.266^{***} (0.060)	0.590^{***} (0.107)	-0.206^{*} (0.108)	0.617^{***} (0.187)	(0.139) (0.161)	1.000^{***} (0.000)	-0.264^{***} (0.055)	-0.264^{***} (0.055)
Minority woman	-0.300^{***} (0.052)	0.500^{***} (0.097)	-0.329^{***} (0.058)	0.500^{***} (0.111)	-0.179 (0.120)	0.450^{*} (0.224)	-0.072 (0.141)	1.000^{***} (0.000)	-0.334^{***} (0.056)	-0.334^{***} (0.056)
Reference group mean Observations	$\begin{array}{c} 0.752 \\ 641 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.313\\ 182 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.758 \\ 497 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.333\\ 141 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.727 \\ 144 \end{array}$	$\substack{0.250\\41}$	$0.739 \\ 78$	$-0.000 \\ 26$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.754 \\ 563 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.754 \\ 563 \end{array}$

Table B.7:	Sample	average	treatment	effects:	Sarpanch	experiment
10010 10.11	Compro	arerage	or coorritorio	0110000.	Darpanon	onpornition

	Acceptability of individual's request							
Sarpanch incumbents and runner-ups	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Upper caste Hindu woman	-1.327^{***}	-1.297^{***}	-1.396^{***}	-1.677^{***}	-1.286^{***}			
	(0.160)	(0.184)	(0.332)	(0.573)	(0.166)			
Reference group mean	9.589	9.540	9.730	9.511	9.598			
Observations	941	717	224	95	846			
Sarpanch incumbents only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)			
Upper caste Hindu woman	-1.409^{***}	-1.566^{***}	-0.736^{*}	-2.523^{***}	-1.295^{***}			
	(0.240)	(0.281)	(0.407)	(0.888)	(0.248)			
Reference group mean	9.589	9.540	9.730	9.511	9.598			
Observations	426	331	95	42	384			
Sample	All	Minority	Upper caste	Women	Men			

N $\hat{\beta}$ SE p A. Acceptability of individual's request Minority man X Electoral backlash 624 0.03 0.49 0.95 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 624 -0.08 0.62 0.89 Minority man X Violent backlash 631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 631 -0.25 0.47 0.60 Minority man X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action Minority woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.61 Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Son important					
A. Acceptability of individual's request Minority man X Electoral backlash 624 0.03 0.49 0.95 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 624 -0.08 0.62 0.89 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 624 -0.01 0.68 0.99 Minority man X Violent backlash 631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 631 0.48 0.62 0.44 Minority man X Son important 630 -1.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action Minority man X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 640 -0.05 0.99 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.99 0.55 Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.31 Minority woman X Son important <		N	\hat{eta}	SE	p
Minority man X Electoral backlash 624 0.03 0.49 0.95 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 624 -0.08 0.62 0.89 Minority man X Violent backlash 631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action Minority man X Electoral backlash 630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Electoral backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.20 0.10 0.61 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 569 0.00 0.11 0.10 Minority man X Son important 529 -0.20 0.10 0.61 Minority man X Violent backlash 576	A. Acceptability of individual's request				
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 624 -0.08 0.62 0.89 Minority woman X Violent backlash 631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 631 0.07 0.57 0.90 Minority woman X Violent backlash 631 0.48 0.62 0.44 Minority man X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important 630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Slectoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 0.02 0.10 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00	Minority man X Electoral backlash	624	0.03	0.49	0.95
Minority woman X Electoral backlash 624 -0.01 0.68 0.99 Minority man X Violent backlash 631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 631 0.07 0.57 0.90 Minority man X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action \mathbf{W} Minority woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.10 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 569 0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.51 Min	Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	624	-0.08	0.62	0.89
Minority man X Violent backlash631 0.25 0.47 0.60 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash631 -0.07 0.57 0.90 Minority woman X Son important630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action minority man X Electoral backlash630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Electoral backlash630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority man X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority man X Son important629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 Minority man X Son important629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629 0.00 0.11 0.61 Minority man X Electoral backlash569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Solent backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.24 Minority woma	Minority woman X Electoral backlash	624	-0.01	0.68	0.99
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 631 -0.07 0.57 0.90 Minority woman X Violent backlash 631 0.48 0.62 0.44 Minority man X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important 630 0.05 0.10 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action $Winority man X Electoral backlash6300.070.100.51Minority woman X Electoral backlash6300.070.100.51Minority man X Violent backlash640-0.050.090.59Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash640-0.050.090.55Minority wana X Son important629-0.220.100.03Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629-0.010.100.90Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629-0.010.100.90Minority wana X Sol important629-0.010.100.90Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash5690.000.121.00Minority man X Violent backlash5690.070.120.10Minority man X Selectoral backlash576-0.070.110.24Minority woman X Violent backlash576-0.070.120.110.25Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important570$	Minority man X Violent backlash	631	0.25	0.47	0.60
Minority woman X Violent backlash 631 0.48 0.62 0.44 Minority man X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action 630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.01 0.11 0.94 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.03 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority wana X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority woman X Son important 570 <	Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	631	-0.07	0.57	0.90
Minority man X Son important 630 -0.18 0.46 0.69 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action 630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 576 -0.07 0.12 0.13 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.12 0.11 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 Dupper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.07	Minority woman X Violent backlash	631	0.48	0.62	0.44
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 630 -1.29 0.63 0.04 Minority woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action	Minority man X Son important	630	-0.18	0.46	0.69
Minority woman X Son important 630 0.39 0.61 0.53 B. Likelihood of unilateral action Minority man X Electoral backlash 630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.013 0.09 0.16 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal share Minority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Electoral backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0	Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	630	-1.29	0.63	0.04
B. Likelihood of unilateral action 630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 630 0.01 0.11 0.94 Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.03 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.55 Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal share Minority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash 569 0.01 0.10 0.66 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper cas	Minority woman X Son important	630	0.39	0.61	0.53
Minority man X Electoral backlash630 0.05 0.10 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority man X Son important629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629 0.06 0.11 0.61 Minority woman X Son important629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Electoral backlash569 0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Violent backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededImority woman X Son important570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededImority woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 161 <	B. Likelihood of unilateral action				
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash630 0.07 0.10 0.51 Minority woman X Electoral backlash630 0.01 0.11 0.94 Minority man X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority man X Son important629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash569 -0.07 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority man X Son important570 0.07 0.12 0.17 Minority woman X Son important570 0.00 0.12 0.97 Minority woman X Son important570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededIf 0.06 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Mi	Minority man X Electoral backlash	630	0.05	0.10	0.65
Minority woman X Electoral backlash6300.010.110.94Minority man X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority man X Son important629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important629 -0.06 0.11 0.61 Minority woman X Son important629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Violent backlash576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Son important570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededIf -0.08 0.26 0.76 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral	Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	630	0.07	0.10	0.51
Minority man X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.59 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.06 0.11 0.61 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24	Minority woman X Electoral backlash	630	0.01	0.11	0.94
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.05 0.09 0.55 Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.06 0.11 0.61 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash 569 -0.07 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backl	Minority man X Violent backlash	640	-0.05	0.09	0.59
Minority woman X Violent backlash 640 -0.13 0.09 0.16 Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.26 Upper caste Hindu woman X Ele	Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	640	-0.05	0.09	0.55
Minority man X Son important 629 -0.22 0.10 0.03 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 0.06 0.11 0.61 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.12 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededImority man X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededIf -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Minority woman X Violent backlash	640	-0.13	0.09	0.16
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 629 0.06 0.11 0.61 Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal share Minority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage needed Minority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash	Minority man X Son important	629	-0.22	0.10	0.03
Minority woman X Son important 629 -0.01 0.10 0.90 C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority man X Violent backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65	Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	629	0.06	0.11	0.61
C. Equal shareMinority man X Electoral backlash 569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Minority woman X Son important	629	-0.01	0.10	0.90
Minority man X Electoral backlash569 0.03 0.11 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash576 -0.07 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash162 0.08 0.20 0.70	C. Equal share				
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 569 0.00 0.12 1.00 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.24 Minority woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage needed I61 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper ca	Minority man X Electoral backlash	569	0.03	0.11	0.76
Minority woman X Electoral backlash 569 -0.19 0.12 0.13 Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	569	0.00	0.12	1.00
Minority man X Violent backlash 576 -0.20 0.10 0.06 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Minority woman X Electoral backlash	569	-0.19	0.12	0.13
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.07 0.11 0.51 Minority woman X Violent backlash 576 -0.13 0.11 0.24 Minority man X Son important 570 0.12 0.11 0.25 Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage neededMinority man X Electoral backlash 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash 161 0.16 0.22 0.24 Minority man X Violent backlash 162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Minority man X Violent backlash	576	-0.20	0.10	0.06
	Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	576	-0.07	0.11	0.51
	Minority woman X Violent backlash	576	-0.13	0.11	0.24
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 570 -0.07 0.12 0.55 Minority woman X Son important 570 0.00 0.12 0.97 D. Marriage needed 161 -0.08 0.26 0.76 Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash161 0.26 0.22 0.24 Minority woman X Electoral backlash161 0.16 0.22 0.49 Minority man X Violent backlash162 0.11 0.25 0.65 Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Minority man X Son important	570	0.12	0.11	0.25
Minority woman X Son important5700.000.120.97D. Marriage needed161-0.080.260.76Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash1610.260.220.24Minority woman X Electoral backlash1610.160.220.49Minority man X Violent backlash1620.110.250.65Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash1620.080.200.70	Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	570	-0.07	0.12	0.55
D. Marriage needed161-0.080.260.76Minority man X Electoral backlash1610.260.220.24Minority woman X Electoral backlash1610.160.220.49Minority man X Violent backlash1620.110.250.65Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash1620.080.200.70	Minority woman X Son important	570	0.00	0.12	0.97
Minority man X Electoral backlash161-0.080.260.76Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash1610.260.220.24Minority woman X Electoral backlash1610.160.220.49Minority man X Violent backlash1620.110.250.65Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash1620.080.200.70	D. Marriage needed				
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash1610.260.220.24Minority woman X Electoral backlash1610.160.220.49Minority man X Violent backlash1620.110.250.65Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash1620.080.200.70	Minority man X Electoral backlash	161	-0.08	0.26	0.76
Minority woman X Electoral backlash1610.160.220.49Minority man X Violent backlash1620.110.250.65Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash1620.080.200.70	Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	161	0.26	0.22	0.24
Minority man X Violent backlash1620.110.250.65Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash1620.080.200.70	Minority woman X Electoral backlash	161	0.16	0.22	0.49
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash 162 0.08 0.20 0.70	Minority man X Violent backlash	162	0.11	0.25	0.65
	Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	162	0.08	0.20	0.70
Minority woman X Violent backlash 162 0.28 0.21 0.20	Minority woman X Violent backlash	162	0.28	0.21	0.20
Minority man X Son important 162 0.29 0.26 0.26	Minority man X Son important	162	0.29	0.26	0.26
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important 162 0.04 0.21 0.86	Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	162	0.04	0.21	0.86
Minority woman X Son important 162 0.01 0.23 0.96	Minority woman X Son important	162	0.01	0.23	0.96

Table B.8: Test of mechanisms for inheritance scenario

Note: Coefficients on treatment interactions with pre-treatment variables. In each panel, the three treatment groups are interacted with the relevant covariate and their interaction coefficient from the OLS model is reported for the inheritance scenario only. 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors. Electoral backlash is 1 if the mukhiya fears being voted out of office for enforcing the law; Violent backlash is 1 if the mukhiya fears being verbally abused or harassed for enforcing the law; Son important is 1 if having a son is considered very important by the respondent (scale value 6 and larger on a scale 0-10; midpoint 5 is excluded from analysis).

	DV: Number of words given in open-ended response								
	All politicians Minority Upper caste Women Men								
Woman	8.004**	4.888	18.042**	13.234	7.333**				
	(3.329)	(3.750)	(6.958)	(10.378)	(3.512)				
Reference group mean	49.206	49.257	49.027	49.766	49.118				
Observations	715	552	163	90	625				

Table B.9: Sample average treatment effects: Number of words given in open-ended response

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. We present OLS coefficients from a regression of the outcome of interest on a binary variable for treatment assignment where we collapse all male treatments into Man (UC Male + SC Male) and all female treatments into Woman (UC Female + SC Female). 95% confidence intervals are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We count the number of words given in the open-ended response to the inheritance scenario. Given the response bias presented in Figure 3, we use mukhiya gender as reported by the Bihar State Election Commission. Upper caste Hindu mukhiyas include the caste category General, while minority mukhiyas include the caste categories Other Backward Caste as well as Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Given social desirability bias, we use mukhiya status as reported by the Bihar State Election Commission.

C Main Results with covariate adjustment

	Lockdown		Inherit	Inheritance		achment	Open defecation	
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.161 (0.482)	-0.096^{*} (0.053)	0.059 (0.234)	0.061 (0.045)	0.051 (0.309)	0.068^{*} (0.039)	-0.250 (0.195)	0.087^{*} (0.050)
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.148 (0.471)	-0.055 (0.052)	-1.183^{***} (0.292)	0.125^{***} (0.046)			-0.370^{**} (0.173)	0.087^{*} (0.050)
Minority woman	0.045 (0.484)	-0.062 (0.052)	-1.824^{***} (0.301)	0.129^{***} (0.045)			-0.022 (0.221)	0.038 (0.050)
Reference group mean Observations	$4.544 \\ 665$	$0.524 \\ 710$	8.372 699	$0.143 \\711$	1.930 689	0.244 673	0.596 707	$\begin{array}{c} 0.327 \\ 724 \end{array}$

Table C.1: Covariate-adjusted sample average treatment effects

Table C.2: Covariate-adjusted conditional average treatment effects: Minority politicians

	Lockde	own	Inheritance		Land encroachment		Open defecation	
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.034 (0.553)	-0.114^{*} (0.060)	-0.135 (0.271)	0.056 (0.052)	-0.125 (0.352)	0.034 (0.044)	-0.280 (0.251)	0.105^{*} (0.056)
Upper caste Hindu woman	0.080 (0.540)	-0.072 (0.059)	-1.522^{***} (0.345)	0.124^{**} (0.054)			-0.439^{*} (0.231)	0.124^{**} (0.057)
Minority woman	0.281 (0.547)	-0.081 (0.059)	-1.980^{***} (0.329)	0.146^{***} (0.052)			-0.134 (0.263)	0.092^{*} (0.056)
Reference group mean Observations	$\begin{array}{r} 4.393 \\ 508 \end{array}$	$0.513 \\ 543$	$8.495 \\ 542$	$0.090 \\ 549$	$2.050 \\ 530$	$0.248 \\ 519$	$0.993 \\ 545$	0.212 559

Table C.3: Covariate-adjusted conditional average treatment effects: Upper caste politicians

	Lockd	own	Inherit	Inheritance		achment	Open defecation	
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.509	-0.044	0.696^{*}	0.077 (0.095)	0.743 (0.630)	0.181^{**} (0.088)	-0.184 (0.127)	0.041 (0.112)
Upper caste Hindu woman	(0.000) -0.852 (0.972)	(0.100) (0.003) (0.109)	(0.110) -0.191 (0.560)	(0.000) (0.150) (0.091)	(01000)	(0.000)	(0.121) -0.176 (0.126)	(0.112) -0.019 (0.102)
Minority woman	-0.788 (1.041)	0.006 (0.112)	(0.710)	0.057 (0.092)			$0.396 \\ (0.413)$	-0.164 (0.108)
Reference group mean Observations	4.983 157	$0.566\\167$	8.101 157	$0.269 \\ 162$	$\begin{array}{c}1.406\\159\end{array}$	$0.226 \\ 154$	$0.309\\162$	$0.494\\165$

Table C.4: Covariate-adjusted conditional average treatment effects: Women politicians

	Lockdo	own	ı Inheritar		ance Land encro		Open defe	ecation
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	0.933 (1.343)	-0.182 (0.155)	0.391 (0.471)	-0.005 (0.140)	-1.310 (1.099)	-0.193 (0.142)	-1.191 (0.805)	-0.114 (0.151)
Upper caste Hindu woman	2.790^{**} (1.390)	-0.191 (0.155)	-1.059 (0.978)	-0.008 (0.162)	(,		-1.178 (0.798)	(0.087) (0.162)
Minority woman	2.693^{*} (1.356)	-0.073 (0.146)	-0.799 (0.745)	(0.001) (0.148)			(0.047) (0.993)	-0.100 (0.143)
Reference group mean Observations	$4.336\\78$	0.878 89	$\frac{8.409}{83}$	0.178 90	3.833 83	0.562 81	0.902 88	$0.486\\93$

	Lockd	own	Inherit	Inheritance		Land encroachment		ecation
	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral	Acceptability	Unilateral
Minority man	-0.290 (0.518)	-0.081 (0.056)	0.008 (0.262)	0.071 (0.047)	0.197 (0.317)	0.095^{**} (0.040)	-0.128 (0.197)	0.111^{**} (0.053)
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.511 (0.500)	-0.036 (0.055)	-1.226^{***} (0.312)	0.154^{***} (0.048)		. ,	-0.277 (0.172)	0.085 (0.052)
Minority woman	-0.313 (0.517)	-0.060 (0.056)	-1.998^{***} (0.329)	0.153^{***} (0.048)			-0.072 (0.210)	0.057 (0.054)
Reference group mean Observations	$4.648 \\ 587$	0.484 621	8.219 616	$0.131 \\ 621$	$1.706 \\ 606$	0.209 592	$0.253 \\ 619$	0.330 631

Table C.5: Covariate-adjusted conditional average treatment effects: Men politicians

Table C.6: Covariate-adjusted sample average treatment effects: Additional outcomes in inheritance scenario

	All politicians		Minc	ority	Upper caste		Women		Men	
	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed	Equal share	Marriage needed
Minority man	0.021 (0.049)	-0.029 (0.114)	-0.002 (0.056)	0.043 (0.140)	0.108 (0.102)	-0.262 (0.185)	0.151 (0.120)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.054)	-0.000 (0.054)
UC Hindu woman	-0.244^{***} (0.053)	0.606^{***} (0.093)	-0.264^{***} (0.061)	0.614^{***} (0.109)	-0.176 (0.112)	0.682^{***} (0.168)	-0.133 (0.155)	1.000^{***}	-0.257^{***} (0.057)	-0.257^{***} (0.057)
Minority woman	-0.297^{***} (0.052)	(0.512^{***}) (0.095)	$(0.057)^{***}$ (0.058)	(0.108) (0.108)	(0.123) (0.123)	$(0.137)^{0.547}$ (0.182)	(0.143) (0.143)	1.000^{***} (0.000)	-0.330^{***} (0.056)	$(0.030)^{***}$ (0.056)
Reference group mean Observations	$\begin{array}{c} 0.752 \\ 639 \end{array}$	$0.313 \\ 180$	$0.758 \\ 496$	$0.333 \\ 140$	$0.727 \\ 143$	$\substack{0.250\\40}$	0.739 78	-0.000 26	$0.754 \\ 561$	$0.754 \\ 561$

Table C.7: Covariate-adjusted test of mechanisms for inheritance scenario

	Ν	Interaction coefficient	SE	р
Panel A: Acceptability of individual's request	5			
Minority man X Electoral backlash	624	0.03	0.49	0.95
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	624	-0.08	0.62	0.89
Minority woman X Electoral backlash	624	-0.01	0.68	0.99
Minority man X Violent backlash	631	0.25	0.47	0.60
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	631	-0.07	0.57	0.90
Minority woman X Violent backlash	631	0.48	0.62	0.44
Minority man X Son important	630	-0.18	0.46	0.69
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	630	-1.29	0.63	0.04
Minority woman X Son important	630	0.39	0.61	0.53
Panel B: Likelihood of unilateral action				
Minority man X Electoral backlash	627	0.04	0.11	0.67
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	627	0.06	0.10	0.58
Minority woman X Electoral backlash	627	0.00	0.11	0.97
Minority man X Violent backlash	637	-0.06	0.10	0.52
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	637	-0.06	0.09	0.49
Minority woman X Violent backlash	637	-0.14	0.09	0.14
Minority man X Son important	627	-0.21	0.10	0.04
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	627	0.07	0.11	0.53
Minority woman X Son important	627	-0.01	0.10	0.91
Panel C: Equal share				
Minority man X Electoral backlash	569	0.03	0.11	0.76
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	569	0.00	0.12	1.00
Minority woman X Electoral backlash	569	-0.19	0.12	0.13
Minority man X Violent backlash	576	-0.20	0.10	0.06
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	576	-0.07	0.11	0.51
Minority woman X Violent backlash	576	-0.13	0.11	0.24
Minority man X Son important	570	0.12	0.11	0.25
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	570	-0.07	0.12	0.55
Minority woman X Son important	570	0.00	0.12	0.97
Panel D: Marriage needed				
Minority man X Electoral backlash	161	-0.08	0.26	0.76
Upper caste Hindu woman X Electoral backlash	161	0.26	0.22	0.24
Minority woman X Electoral backlash	161	0.16	0.22	0.49
Minority man X Violent backlash	162	0.11	0.25	0.65
Upper caste Hindu woman X Violent backlash	162	0.08	0.20	0.70
Minority woman X Violent backlash	162	0.28	0.21	0.20
Minority man X Son important	162	0.29	0.26	0.26
Upper caste Hindu woman X Son important	162	0.04	0.21	0.86
Minority woman X Son important	162	0.01	0.23	0.96

Table C.8: Covariate-adjusted sample average treatment effects: Number of words given in open-ended response

	DV: Number of words given in open-ended response								
	All politicians	Minority	Upper caste	Women	Men				
Woman	8.076^{**} (3.360)	5.247 (3.749)	$ \begin{array}{c} 19.351^{***} \\ (7.134) \end{array} $	$11.160 \\ (12.046)$	$7.492^{**} \\ (3.555)$				
Reference group mean Observations	$40.578 \\ 712$	$\begin{array}{c} 37.356\\ 550 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 61.574 \\ 162 \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 34.273\\90 \end{array}$	$38.486 \\ 622$				

D Balance check and carryover tests

	Lo	ockdow	m	Inł	neritan	ce	Land	encroa	chment	Open	defeca	ation
	$\hat{\beta}$	SE	p	$\hat{\beta}$	SE	p	$\hat{\beta}$	SE	p	$\hat{\beta}$	SE	p
A. Age												
Minority man	-1.92	1.12	0.09	2.67	1.16	0.02	1.00	0.88	0.25	1.21	1.11	0.28
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.47	1.12	0.67	2.56	1.03	0.01				0.83	1.01	0.41
Minority woman	-1.49	1.12	0.18	1.14	1.02	0.26				0.80	1.06	0.45
B. Male												
Minority man	0.00	0.03	0.98	0.03	0.04	0.43	-0.04	0.03	0.17	-0.02	0.03	0.46
Upper caste Hindu woman	0.02	0.03	0.46	0.06	0.03	0.10				-0.01	0.03	0.66
Minority woman	-0.02	0.04	0.58	0.02	0.04	0.57				-0.08	0.04	0.03
C. Hindu												
Minority man	-0.03	0.04	0.53	0.03	0.04	0.54	-0.02	0.03	0.65	0.01	0.04	0.76
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.02	0.04	0.62	0.06	0.04	0.11				0.01	0.04	0.82
Minority woman	-0.03	0.04	0.51	0.03	0.04	0.43				-0.01	0.04	0.73
D. High education												
Minority man	-0.03	0.05	0.50	-0.03	0.05	0.57	-0.02	0.04	0.65	0.00	0.05	0.95
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.03	0.05	0.53	-0.03	0.05	0.61				0.00	0.05	0.95
Minority woman	0.02	0.05	0.68	0.03	0.05	0.60				-0.08	0.05	0.11
E. Upper caste												
Minority man	0.02	0.04	0.61	0.01	0.04	0.87	0.04	0.03	0.27	-0.07	0.04	0.13
Upper caste Hindu woman	0.00	0.04	0.91	0.06	0.04	0.19				-0.01	0.05	0.90
Minority woman	-0.01	0.04	0.81	-0.01	0.04	0.77				-0.08	0.04	0.05
F. N candidates												
Minority man	-0.58	0.61	0.34	0.12	0.57	0.83	-0.49	0.49	0.32	0.45	0.57	0.43
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.82	0.53	0.12	-0.69	0.55	0.21				-0.15	0.57	0.80
Minority woman	-0.56	0.57	0.33	-0.03	0.57	0.96				0.13	0.58	0.82
G. Vote share												
Minority man	0.00	0.01	0.98	0.02	0.01	0.20	0.01	0.01	0.53	0.00	0.01	0.93
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.01	0.01	0.48	0.02	0.01	0.07				0.00	0.01	0.93
Minority woman	0.00	0.01	0.99	0.02	0.01	0.21				-0.01	0.01	0.56
H. Close election												
Minority man	-0.02	0.05	0.65	-0.09	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.04	0.84	-0.04	0.05	0.47
Upper caste Hindu woman	-0.02	0.05	0.67	-0.11	0.05	0.03				0.01	0.05	0.83
Minority woman	0.03	0.05	0.61	-0.03	0.05	0.53				0.03	0.05	0.61

Table D.1: Tests for balance on covariates across treatment groups

Note: This table reports estimates, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and p-values for OLS regressions of the respective covariate on treatment groups in the respective scenario, with Upper caste Hindu man as the omitted baseline category. Apart from Age, N candidates and Vote share, all other variables are dummy variables and therefore estimates can be interpreted as differences in proportions.

	\hat{eta}	SE	p
Age	0.13	0.77	0.87
Male	0.00	0.02	0.89
Hindu	-0.02	0.03	0.40
High education	0.01	0.03	0.84
Upper caste	-0.04	0.03	0.14
N candidates	-0.03	0.15	0.85
Vote share	0.00	0.00	0.88
Close election	0.00	0.01	0.77

Table D.2: Sarpanch experiment: Tests for balance on covariates across treatment groups

Table D.3:Tests for carryover effects

	Γ	DV: Fairness Rating		
	$\hat{\beta}$	SE	p	
A. Inheritance Fairness Rating = Property x Corona				
SC Male * Muslim Male	0.98	0.63	0.12	
UC Female * Muslim Male	0.48	0.80	0.55	
SC Female * Muslim Male	0.24	0.93	0.80	
SC Male * Hindu Female	0.24	0.67	0.72	
UC Female * Hindu Female	0.40	0.84	0.63	
SC Female * Hindu Female	-0.06	0.81	0.94	
SC Male * Muslim Female	0.64	0.62	0.30	
UC Female * Muslim Female	0.21	0.77	0.79	
SC Female * Muslim Female	1.28	0.77	0.10	
B. Open-defecation Fairness Rating = Toilet x Property				
SC Male * SC Male	-0.41	0.53	0.44	
UC Female * SC Male	-0.37	0.47	0.44	
SC Female * SC Male	-0.06	0.60	0.92	
SC Male * UC Female	0.06	0.53	0.91	
UC Female * UC Female	0.01	0.42	0.98	
SC Female * UC Female	0.25	0.52	0.63	
SC Male * SC Female	0.52	0.54	0.34	
UC Female * SC Female	0.79	0.47	0.09	
SC Female * SC Female	1.08	0.56	0.06	

Note: This table reports estimates, Neyman standard errors and p-values from OLS regressions of the rating outcome in the property scenario (Panel A) and the toilet scenario (Panel B) on interactions between the treatment groups Property x Corona and Toilet x Property to test for carryover effects of earlier scenarios on later scenarios.