

# Affirmative Action and Application Strategies: Evidence from Field Experiments in Colombia

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## Abstract

Affirmative action changes incentives at all stages of the employment. In this paper, we study the effects of affirmative action statements in job ads on i) the effort expended on the application process and ii) the manifestation of emotions, as measured by the textual analysis of the content of the motivation letter. To this end, we use data from two field experiments conducted in Colombia. We find that in the *Control* condition, women spend less time in the application process relative to men. Besides, female motivation letters exhibit lower levels of emotion, as measured by valence, arousal, and dominance. However, those differences vanish in the affirmative action treatment where we announce that half of the positions were reserved for women. In the *Affirmative Action* condition, the effort dedicated by women significantly increase and the motivation letters written by the female candidates show a significant increase in the expression of positive emotions. The results indicate that affirmative action policies can have significant encouraging effects on both effort and appeal of job applications of women, thereby reducing the gender gap in these outcomes. (JEL: C91, J15, M52)

Keywords: Gender, Labor economics, Field experiment.

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## 1. Introduction

Affirmative action (AA) is often a contested policy in the quest for more diversity within organizations. Critics argue that such policies could result in reverse discrimination and loss of efficiency (Coate and Loury, 1993; Welch, 1976), which is undesirable not only from a deontological perspective but also from a teleological or rational one. In this paper, we revisit the question of the impact of AA by analyzing the consequences of this policy in the behavior of jobseekers within the application process. While the literature has primarily focused on competition choice, the behavior of the jobseeker at the application stage is extremely relevant as it determines the quality of the application and so the probability of receiving offers and influences the quality of a match.

What effect can we expect from affirmative action statements in job advertisements on our outcome variables? Economic theory is not conclusive on the impact of affirmative action on ex-ante effort provision (Fang and Moro, 2011). For example, Coate and Loury (1993) show that affirmative action can decrease incentives for ex-ante effort if the employers fill the quotas by assigning the intended beneficiaries to less skilled jobs. Similarly, Franke (2012) shows that AA can cause inefficient outcomes when there is considerable heterogeneity in qualifications between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the policy. However, an affirmative action policy can have positive effects on ex-ante effort provision when both groups have equal opportunity to win the competition (Fain, 2009) and when affirmative action increases competition (Balart, 2011).

Moreover, not only effort but also the attitude towards the job and the type of emotions expressed at the application stage determines the probability of success.

It is these emotions, as expressed in application letters, that may be influenced by affirmative action policies. In particular, it is likely that AA creates more positive emotions among women, the protected group, and this may manifest itself in their motivation letters. It is easy to see why motivation letters that manifest more positive emotions may translate into better job market outcomes. Therefore, the role of AA in shaping the emotional tone of the job applications is a critical question of interest in this literature.

Despite remarkable progress in reducing educational gender gaps and increasing female labor force participation, women still face worse employment prospects than men in most of the countries. According to the 2018 data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and ILOSTAT, in Colombia, women represented a larger share of enrolled students in secondary and tertiary education (51.2% and 53.9%, respectively). However, women are 30 percent less likely to participate in the labor market, receive on average 11 percent lower wages, and have a 2 percentage point higher unemployment rate than men (Cepeda Emiliani and Barón, 2012). Such gender gaps may emerge, in part, from the gender gap in effort on the job application process. In this paper, we examine this issue and test if AA policies help increase women's *effort in job application* using two large field experiments with 4480 jobseekers in Colombia. It is important to note that a subset of the data in this paper has been used in a companion paper (Ibanez and Riener, 2018), which answers a related but distinct question, namely, if AA policies help increase the *likelihood of job application* from the protected group. Notice that the gender gap in wages or employment can emerge not only because women are dissuaded from applying for jobs but also because women may put lower effort in the application process. Both these mechanisms can lead to selection of women

applicants out of the labor force. The former channel has received some attention in the literature, our paper focuses entirely on the latter.

Similar to [Flory et al. \(2015\)](#), we use an online recruitment strategy that proceeds in two steps. First, we build a database with 4480 jobseekers. At this stage, we obtain the job-seekers' basic socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, residence, area of study, and the number of years of experience. In a second step, we invite all jobseekers to apply to the position by completing a longer application process. We vary the information that we give such that half of the job-seekers are informed that the employer is an equal opportunity employer and that at least half of the hired assistants will be women. The rest of the participants receive this information only after they submit the application form. This randomized treatment design allows us to examine the effect of affirmative action, while maintaining the ex-post information content in the two treatments identical.

We compare (i) the language the applicants used to present themselves in their motivation letters using techniques from natural language processing (NLP) and (ii) the effort they spent during the application procedure. Both of our outcomes of interest influence hiring decisions and, hence, contribute to the differential allocation of jobs over gender. To assess the emotional content of an applicant's language, we apply a popular natural language processing technique—sentiment analysis—on the letters of motivation and estimate how AA affects written emotional states, particularly with respect to valence, arousal, and dominance.<sup>1</sup> The second metric we use is how diligently jobseekers engage with the application. As is well known, measuring effort -

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1. The partition of emotions into these three parts goes back to [Mehrabian and Russell \(1974\)](#). For a review of the literature on sentiment analysis based on texts, see [Khan et al. \(2016\)](#).

an input - is considerably more difficult than measuring an output such as the call back rate. Notwithstanding such difficulties, we proxy effort with the amount of time, in minutes, used in filling the application form. Besides, we use alternative measures that can potentially signal application effort, such as the proportion of questions applicants answered, the proportion of pages they visited, and whether the applicant had visited the last page of the application form or not. We refer to these measures as the *intensive margin of application*, as opposed to the *extensive margin* or the dichotomous choice of applying or not. While the choice to apply is pivotal for being accepted, the intensive margin determines the probability of being hired.

Do AA statements have heterogeneous effects on women and men? We estimate the effect of AA on the time spent on the application and the emotional content of the application letter. While women spent the same time as men filling the application in the absence of AA, they visited a lower proportion of pages, answered a lower proportion of questions, and were less likely to visit the last page. Furthermore, women exhibit lower levels of emotional response to the statement of motivation. The AA treatment significantly increases the degree of emotion and effort that women put into the application process relative to the baseline. In particular, relative to men, the time spent by women in filling the application of an AA treatment increases by 20.4% of a standard deviation. The corresponding treatment effect is 3.7, 3.9 and 5.8 percentage points for the proportion of questions answered, proportion of pages visited, and the likelihood of visiting the last page, respectively. Likewise, the treatment effect of AA on the emotion expressed by women on application letters relative to men increases by 7.3%, 7.9% and 6.3% of a standard deviation for valence, arousal and dominance, respectively. Clearly, these effects are large enough to credibly change a jobseeker's perception of the candidates. Overall, affirmative action leads to a

significant reduction in the gender gap in behavior of applicants within the application process, and has non-significant adverse effects on male jobseekers.

Our paper contributes to various strands of the literature. First, laboratory-based experiments showed that AA can help to reduce gender gaps in selection in competitive environments, attracting relatively more skillful candidates and without discouraging the ones ‘penalized’ by affirmative action ([Niederle et al., 2013](#); [Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012](#); [Beaurain and Masclet, 2016](#)). A recent paper by [Cotton et al. \(2021\)](#) shows that AA policies helps increase study effort and improve maths exam performance of the protected group, and consequently, narrows the achievement gaps. Further, gender gaps in competitive choice has also been found to be closed by making the sense of power salient among women (and men) ([Balafoutas et al., 2018](#)). Moreover, AA does not reduce effort or cooperativeness irrespective of whether the rule is exogenous or endogenously selected ([Dulleck et al., 2017](#); [Calsamiglia et al., 2013](#); [Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012](#); [Balafoutas et al., 2016](#)). However, there is relatively little field evidence on the impact of affirmative action policies on sorting in the labor market. [Leibbrandt and List \(2018\)](#) found that AA statements can backfire, reducing applications from the ethnic minority groups they intend to benefit. However, using field experiments, [Ibanez and Riener \(2018\)](#) demonstrated that AA (quotas or preferential treatment) is effective at closing gender gaps in application submissions and that this was not associated with sorting out of the most qualified jobseekers. We extend this line of research to consider the effect of AA statements on the effort put into the job application process.

Second, while recent experiments studied interventions which reduce search costs for the unemployed ([Kircher et al., 2015](#)) or looked at changes in the search requirements ([Arni and Schiprowski, 2019](#)), there is very little research on gender differences in effort provided during the application process. This gender gap, distinct

from the gender gap in representation arising out of selection, may have an important effect on the subsequent differences in competitiveness. Our finding shows that there are significant gender gaps in effort during the job application process. This is important as it suggests that gender gaps in representation are observed not only at the extensive but also at the intensive margin. AA statements not only affect selection attracting more women, the women who choose to apply, exert more effort. The reduction in the gender gap, in the presence of affirmative actions, may go a long way in helping us understand the mechanisms through which such policies help increase greater representation of women in jobs.

We also contribute to the application of text analysis to economics (see review articles by [Algaba et al., 2020](#); [Gentzkow et al., 2019a](#); [Varian, 2014](#); [Kumar and Jaiswal, 2020](#)). Text analysis has been used to predict stock markets ([Tetlock, 2007](#); [Das and Chen, 2007](#); [Chen et al., 2014](#); [Jiang et al., 2019](#); [Siganos et al., 2014](#)), proxy corruption, discrimination and geopolitical risks ([Groseclose and Milyo, 2005](#); [Gentzkow et al., 2019b](#); [Saiz and Simonsohn, 2013](#); [Campante and Do, 2014](#); [Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014](#)), economic activity and employment ([Baker et al., 2016](#); [Da et al., 2015](#)). However, little is known about how job advertisements change the applicants' use of language in their motivation letters. Textual features may contribute to success in job application and evaluation. For example, [Brandt and Herzberg \(2020\)](#) found use of a critical tone in language, the use of prepositions and shorter applications tend to be positively correlated with success in job placement, while [Abe \(2009\)](#) shows that positive evaluations of interns are linked to the use of positive language in their written samples. We employ sentiment analysis—a technique from the toolkit of NLP—to analyze the content of motivation letters of job applicants and the effects of AA.

The remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the research design and the main experimental treatment. Section 3 presents the key results while Section 4 offers the concluding remarks.

## 2. Experimental Design and Procedures

Our data comes from two independent field experiments conducted in Colombia. In both experiments, we recruited research assistants to work on collecting data for research projects of two of the coauthors of this paper. The experiments were similar in content and structure, but were implemented in two different years. We refer to them as Assistant 1 and Assistant 2 experiment, respectively. The recruitment strategy used in the experiments is similar to [Flory et al. \(2015\)](#) and, as described in detail in [Ibanez and Riener \(2018\)](#), comprises two main stages.<sup>2</sup>

### *Stage 1: Recruitment of Job Seekers*

To build a pool of jobseekers, we announced the positions through newspapers, university employment boards, social media, and email lists. We provided general information about the positions to attract a large pool of jobseekers interested in the positions. In particular, we informed that we were recruiting research assistants who had completed or were close to completing a bachelor's degree in any area of study. No previous work experience was requested. Job-seekers were asked to fill out a statement

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2. We have 2217 and 2263 participants in Assistant 1 and Assistant 2 experiments, respectively. A subset of this data, consisting of 733 participants for Assistant 1 and 694 participants for Assistant 2, is used in the analysis by [Ibanez and Riener \(2018\)](#).



of interest form. The announcement elicited great interest and in the experiments 4480 individuals expressed interest in the position.

### ***Stage 2: Recruitment of Job Applicants***

In this stage, we gave all jobseekers detailed information on the conditions of employment, job responsibilities, salary, and duration of the contract. In addition, the sample of participants who were exogenously allocated to the affirmative action treatment (AA) received the information that the employer was an equal opportunity employer and that half of the positions were reserved for women. Job-seekers in the AA treatment saw the following statement (translated from Spanish):

The University of [...] is an equal opportunity employer. To increase female participation in areas where women are up to now underrepresented, a minimum of 50% of the hired assistants will be women.

We stratified treatment assignment based on participants' gender (male or female), degree of study (master or not), and area of residence (Bogotá or not). To achieve ex-post equality of information, participants allocated to the control group received information on equal opportunity policies only after completing the application process. Variation of the time when job-seekers received information on the use of affirmative action policies allows us to causally identify the impact of affirmative action statements without any difference in the final information available in the two treatments.

In this stage, job-seekers could start filling out a lengthy application questionnaire. They had access to a personalized page and could complete the application form over several sessions, saving the information and continuing the application over several days. However, a strict deadline was set, after which no application was accepted.

To complete the application, participants needed to obtain supporting information such as grade certificates or detailed information on previous employer contact information, write a motivation letter, and perform various tests of qualification. This demanding and time-consuming stage increases the cost of the application (time required) and serves as one of the measures that we use as a proxy for the effort participants put into completing the application (preparing to compete in the selection process).

The top 10 applicants were invited for an interview. In the Assistant 1 experiment, three candidates (all of them women) were employed. In Assistant 2, we hired 22 applicants, half of whom were women. Field experiments that go over multiple sessions and that are not conducted at the same time could suffer from information spillover. We tried to minimize this by opening the position at the same time and by recording the starting time of the applications, to control for potential timing effects.

### ***2.1. Outcome variables***

The outcome variables can be grouped into two broad categories: (i) the motivation letter and (ii) measured engagement with the application form.

*Motivation letter.* Applicants were requested to write a motivation letter arguing why they could be good candidates for the job. We use Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to analyze the emotional state of the applicant, as perceived from the contents of the motivation letter. We perform sentiment analysis by using a standard library to assign scores of valence, arousal and dominance to each word and phrase found in the text of the statement of motivation ([Warriner et al., 2013](#)). While valence gives a measure of how pleasant a word or a phrase is, arousal and dominance measure the intensity of emotion and the degree of control, respectively.

*Engagement with application procedure.* As discussed earlier, measuring input, particularly effort, is always difficult. We analyze four well-defined variables, which we believe measures the degree of the applicant's engagement with the application process. We recorded the *time* for which the applicants had each page of the application questionnaire open. Time spent in the application process is a good proxy of effort as the unique format of the questionnaire meant that it was impossible for candidates to simply copy the contents of their curriculum vitae on to the questionnaire. Many sections required applicants to search for detailed information and input it separately. Besides, [Calafiore and Damianov \(2011\)](#) show that time spent on e-learning web-platform is associated with better test scores.<sup>3</sup> To assess whether subjects *reached the last page* of the application questionnaire, we used an indicator variable equal to one for participants who reached the final page. This includes participants who visited the page but may not have completed the full application. This variable also acts as a proxy for effort as participants who proceed through all pages have a better chance of putting in a stronger application.

We also record the *proportion of questions completed*. The two experiments used slightly different versions of the application form. To account for this difference, we use as outcome variable the proportion of questions filled. As participants provided more detailed information, the employers can better assess the quality of the candidates. Moreover, more experienced candidates would have additional information to provide.

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3. A few caveats ought to be in place. We do not necessarily know whether a candidate is spending the time to put in a better application or if a procrastinating person ends up spending more time an application. While we cannot discard such interpretations, we believe such unobserved heterogeneities will be balanced across the treatment conditions. Therefore, we prefer to interpret the treatment differences in the time taken to complete the application as the effect of AA on the effort level.

The last indicator we use is the *proportion of pages visited*: Participants could complete up to 7 pages in Assistant 1 and 5 pages in Assistant 2, this measure captures how far participants progressed in preparing the application.

## 2.2. Hypothesis

Completing a job application is costly in terms of the time spent in the process, but can be associated with a higher probability to be employed. Agents will select the optimal level of effort,  $e$ , to maximize the expected utility:

$$v = \pi(e)w - c(e)$$

where the probability of being employed,  $\pi(e)$ , is an increasing and concave function of the effort provided. The cost of effort,  $c(e)$ , is assumed to be convex in effort, and the wage is  $w$ . At the optimum, the marginal expected return to effort is equal to the marginal cost of effort:  $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial e}w - \frac{\partial c}{\partial e} = 0$ . Since our sample mainly comprises students in their last year of undergraduate education, it is reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of effort is similar across genders. However, in a discriminatory labor market that favors male candidates, females,  $f$ , on average expect a lower likelihood of being employed for all levels of effort, than male,  $m$ , jobseekers, and thus,  $\pi_f < \pi_m$ . Therefore, when a non-discriminatory firm does not signal its type, we can expect that women will invest less effort in completing the application for a job in that firm. We hypothesize:

**HYPOTHESIS 1.** *In the baseline treatment, female applicants provide lower effort than male applicants.*

If indeed women anticipate discrimination in the labor market, they may get discouraged and consequently, invest lower effort in the job application. Firms that voluntarily use AA policies signal a non-discriminatory type, increasing the perceived chances for women of being employed compared to firms that do not signal the preference for gender equity. This can lead to an increase in the effort that a female applicant puts in the job application, which leads to our next hypothesis.

*HYPOTHESIS 2. The amount of effort provided by women in the job application process is higher in the presence of affirmative action.*

Given the role of expectations in discriminatory labor markets ([Hoff and Stiglitz, 2016](#)), we expect that women use less positive language in their motivation letters compared to men.

*HYPOTHESIS 3. Women manifest a lower set of positive affective emotions in the motivation letter than men in a standard recruitment procedure.*

Affirmative action changes the social environment through a change in the set of expectations of the protected group. This in turn may increase the level of positive emotions in the language that is being used in the motivation letter. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:

*HYPOTHESIS 4. Women show a larger set of positive affective emotions within the motivation letter in the presence of an affirmative action compared to a standard recruitment procedure.*

### 3. Results

#### 3.1. *Summary statistics of the two experiments*

In the first stage, following the job announcements, we received the statement of interest from 4480 jobseekers (2217 and 2263 for Assistant 1 and Assistant 2, respectively). Half of the applicants for each position were assigned to the affirmative action treatment condition, with about 55% females in Assistant 1 and 50% females in Assistant 2. In the second stage, 2144 jobseekers started the application process. In Assistant 1, about 55% of the job applicants were female, while in Assistant 2, 49% were female. Our main interest in this paper is to analyze the gender differences in the effort for job application at this stage. Table A.1 in the Appendix gives a detailed account of the statistics related to the recruitment process at each stage.

Table A.4 in the Appendix presents the treatment-wise demographic characteristics of the participants in each stage according to whether they started the application process. We separately test whether the observable characteristics are different between control and treatment within each stage and report the p-values in Col (5) and (6). We find no evidence that the treatment and control are systematically different on the basis of the observable characteristics in either of the two treatments in stage 1.

In the analysis, we want to uncover the treatment effects on effort and on effort conditional on starting the application process. Therefore, we are also interested in assessing whether there is selection on observables who started the application process. Hence, we compare the observable characteristics of job applicants versus jobseekers (Stage 2 vs. Stage 1) and report the p-values in columns (7) and (8) for the control and treatment groups, respectively. We find that the p-values are less than 0.05 for a

few observables<sup>4</sup>, suggesting that there is some evidence of selection. In particular, jobseekers who display a higher level of cognitive reflection, are more open, younger, and live in Bogotá are more likely to apply to the job under the AA condition. At the same time, jobseekers with a Master's degree sort out under the AA treatment. To address this issue, the regression analysis on the conditional effects uses inverse probability weights following [Wooldridge \(2007\)](#). This method has been widely used in the literature to account for the problem of nonrandom sample selection ([Elfenbein et al., 2010](#); [Fitzgerald et al., 1998](#)). We discuss this process further in the next section.

### ***3.2. Treatment differences in the main outcomes of interest***

In the analysis, we pool data from Assistant 1 and Assistant 2 experiments and estimate the following linear probability model:

$$Outcome_i = \alpha + \beta_1 AA_i + \beta_2 Female_i + \beta_3 AA_i \times Female_i + \beta_4 X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where  $Outcome_i$  represents the following four metric measuring effort of the  $i^{th}$  individual in our set-up: duration of time spent on the application (standardized), whether the last page has been visited, the proportion of questions filled out, and the proportion of pages visited.<sup>5</sup>  $AA_i$  is a dummy variable indicating whether the participant was in the treatment group and  $Female$  takes value equal to one for female participants and zero otherwise. Our main parameters of interest are  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_3$ , which

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4. Throughout the paper, we report two-sided tests and refer to results as (weakly/highly) significant if the two-tailed test's  $p$ -value is smaller than 0.05 (0.10 / 0.01).

5. We use the mean and standard deviation of the male applicants in the control group to standardize the outcome variable (i.e., calculate the z-score) wherever relevant.

measure the effect of Affirmative Action (AA) on male applicants and the gender gap, respectively. Additional control variables included in the vector  $X$  are a dummy variable indicating whether the observation is from Assistant 1 or 2, applicant's age, and whether the applicant holds a master's degree.<sup>6</sup>

First, we estimate the model considering the pool of all jobseekers, i.e., all those who expressed interest in the position following the job announcement. In this case, the outcome variables take the value zero for those who did not start the application process.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the estimation captures the total effect on effort provision. Second, to focus on effort provision on the intensive margin, we estimate the model only with the pool of job applicants, i.e., those who participated in stage 2 of the application process where they would fill out an application questionnaire. Here, to address the issue of selection, between stage 1 and stage 2, our estimation uses the inverse probability weighting method.<sup>8</sup> Hence, the observations are weighted by the inverse of the probability of occurrence in stage 2.<sup>9</sup> Further, we follow [Young \(2018\)](#) and

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6. As a robustness test we estimate the model separately for Assistant 1 and 2 where we include additional control variables specific to the experiment.

7. We present OLS estimates in the main tables as we are interested in the average marginal effects of AA treatment by gender, for which linear models are suitable ([Angrist and Pischke, 2008](#)). However, in a robustness analysis we also estimate other appropriate nonlinear models such as tobit, probit, and fractional probit and present the results in the Appendix. The results are not sensitive to the choice of models.

8. While the inverse probability weighting addresses selection on the basis of unobservables, it does not adjust for potential selection on the basis of unobservable characteristics. We try to minimize this risk by using a rich set of observable covariates.

9. We obtain the probability of selecting into stage 2 by taking the entire sample and estimating a probit model that includes AA, all the control variables including gender, and their interactions. The inverse of the predicted probabilities for each observation is used as weights while estimating the regressions to capture



use randomization statistical inference to test for overall experimental significance. The reported  $p$ -values in the figures and tables are corrected using Young's *randcmd* command in Stata. In terms of the number of hypotheses we correct for, we have of four outcomes analyzed in Table 1, three in Table 2 and two additional outcomes in Table C.1. We test three coefficients (AA, Female, AA  $\times$  Female) for each and this gives us a total of 27 hypotheses, for which we correct the  $p$ -values.

Panel A in Figure 1 presents the estimated coefficients for the total effects and Panel B presents the estimated coefficients for the intensive margin effects.<sup>10</sup> Qualitatively, the results are similar irrespective of whether we focus on the total effort (Panel A) or conditional effort (Panel B). The results suggest that in the absence of AA policy, women are significantly less likely to visit the last page, fill out a lower proportion of questions, and visit a lower proportion of pages than males, providing support for Hypothesis 1. When AA is introduced, females, relative to males, increase the amount of time they spend in filling out the application by 20.4% of a standard deviation and this is significant at the 1% level (col (2)). Likewise, the likelihood of visiting the last page increases by 5.8 percentage points for females compared to males due to AA treatment. Considering the proportion of questions filled out and the proportion of pages visited by the applicants, we find that gender parity increases by about 3.7–3.9 percentage points under AA treatment, with the estimates being

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effort on the intensive margin. We also get similar results when we don't use inverse probability weights; these results are available on request.

10. Panel A in Table 1 reports the estimation results for the complete sample, while Panel B present the results for the sample that began the application process. For each outcome of interest, we present the results with and without the socioeconomic controls.




FIGURE 1. Effect of Affirmative Action treatment on application-effort in Assistant-Pooled

*Note:* The figure plots the treatment effects of Affirmative Action in the Assistant-Pooled data. Panel (A) plots the coefficients for the total effects (or ITT) by including those who did not fill out the application eventually. Panel (B) plots the coefficients for the intensive margin effects by excluding those who did not apply. The regressions control for age and a dummy for masters' degree. The p-values are obtained using randomization inference (Young, 2018) and are corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using Westfall-Young multiple-testing corrections.

significant at the 5% level. This result is in line with Hypothesis 2. While there is greater gender equality in effort provision, are the corresponding outcomes of males adversely affected by AA treatment? We find that in the AA treatment, men spent less time filling out the application form, but did not change effort in terms of the proportion of questions filled, proportion of pages visited, and the likelihood of reaching the last page. The results from Table 1 suggest that AA has a positive effect on the effort provision of females, with the estimate being statistically significant for three out of the four outcomes considered in the pooled sample (the only exception is the time spent filling the application). This indicates that AA closes the gender gap in effort provision during the application process relative to the baseline, and this effect emanates both from an encouragement effect on females and a slight discouragement effect on men.

We present the results separately for Assistant 1 and 2 in the Appendix in Tables B.1 and B.2. We broadly find similar patterns suggesting that females spend significantly less effort on job application relative to males in the absence of AA, especially in the

TABLE 1. Effect of Affirmative Action Treatment on Main Outcomes (Assistant Pooled)

VARIABLES	Time spent (standardized)		Last page visited		Proportion of questions filled		Proportion of pages visited	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>A. Total Effect</b>								
AA	-0.112	-0.111	-0.020	-0.019	-0.017	-0.017	-0.018	-0.018
p-value	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.217)	(0.208)	(0.166)	(0.161)	(0.172)	(0.167)
p-value (corrected)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.273)	(0.261)	(0.216)	(0.208)	(0.218)	(0.215)
Female	-0.041	-0.043	-0.058	-0.059	-0.048	-0.049	-0.051	-0.052
p-value	(0.249)	(0.220)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
p-value (corrected)	(0.329)	(0.300)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
AA * Female	0.146	0.143	0.056	0.054	0.045	0.044	0.048	0.046
p-value	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
p-value (corrected)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(.0110)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.042)
Constant	0.008	0.248	0.391	0.503	0.403	0.524	0.429	0.555
p-value	(0.790)	(0.023)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Effect of AA on Females	0.035	0.033	0.036	0.035	0.028	0.027	0.030	0.029
p-value	(0.278)	(0.322)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)
p-value (corrected)	(0.359)	(0.400)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.050)
Observations	4,408	4,408	4,408	4,408	4,408	4,408	4,408	4,408
R-squared	0.002	0.006	0.009	0.012	0.004	0.009	0.004	0.008
<b>B. Intensive Margins Effect</b>								
AA	-0.184	-0.184	-0.016	-0.016	-0.011	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012
p-value	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.427)	(0.420)	(0.378)	(0.373)	(0.388)	(0.384)
p-value (corrected)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.467)	(0.457)	(0.422)	(0.418)	(0.414)	(0.415)
Female	0.002	0.002	-0.063	-0.063	-0.045	-0.045	-0.047	-0.047
p-value	(0.972)	(0.975)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
p-value (corrected)	(0.970)	(0.981)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
AA * Female	0.205	0.204	0.057	0.058	0.037	0.037	0.039	0.039
p-value	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
p-value (corrected)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Constant	-0.006	0.066	0.764	0.714	0.788	0.766	0.839	0.813
p-value	(0.850)	(0.559)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Effect of AA on Females	0.021	0.020	0.042	0.042	0.026	0.026	0.027	0.027
p-value	(0.648)	(0.664)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.003)
p-value (corrected)	(0.699)	(0.707)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Observations	2,144	2,144	2,144	2,144	2,144	2,144	2,144	2,144
R-squared	0.007	0.007	0.075	0.076	0.056	0.056	0.055	0.055
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* OLS regression results for the pooled data from Assistant 1 and Assistant 2 are reported. All regression models include a dummy for Assistant 2. Cols (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include the applicant's age and whether the applicant holds a master's degree. The estimates in the second panel (intensive margin) are weighted by inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin. 'p-value' presents the uncorrected p-values, while 'p-value (corrected)' presents the p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.




FIGURE 2. Effect of Affirmative Action treatment on sentiment in Assistant-1

*Note:* The figure plots the treatment effects of Affirmative Action on sentiments in the Assistant-1 data. Panel (A) plots the coefficients for the total effects (or ITT) by including those who did not fill out the application eventually. Panel (B) plots the coefficients for the intensive margin effects by excluding those who did not apply. The regressions control for age and a dummy for masters' degree. The p-values are obtained using randomization inference (Young, 2018) and are corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using Westfall-Young multiple-testing correction.

Assistant 1 experiment. The AA treatment changes the direction of the gender gap in favor of females in both experiments, with the effects being more precise for the Assistant 2 experiment. The point estimates are also very similar to those obtained in Table 1.<sup>11</sup>

As discussed in Section 2, respondents in Assistant 1 are asked to write a statement of motivation as a part of their application. We perform sentiment analysis to assign scores of valence (pleasantness), arousal (the intensity of emotion provoked), and dominance (the degree of control exerted) to the application letters. The scores are then demeaned and divided by standard deviation to make them comparable. We then estimate Equation (1) using the standardized scores as the dependent variable. Figure 2 presents the estimated coefficients for the total effect (Panel A) and intensive margin

11. The fact that the point estimates are directionally consistent, quantitatively similar but sometimes statistically insignificant indicates that the tests are possibly under-powered when conducted separately for Assistant 1.

(Panel B), with corrected p-values for multiple hypothesis testing.<sup>12</sup> We report the results of the specification that includes demographic controls and the total number of words in the motivation letter. The results show that in the absence of AA, the motivation letters written by females systematically exhibited lower valence, arousal, and dominance than the ones written by males. This is consistent with existing literature in psychology, which finds that women adopt significantly more emotion regulation strategies in communication compared to men (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Tamres et al., 2002), and supports Hypothesis 3. The AA treatment decreases the gender gap in the emotional value of the motivation letter. In particular, valence increased by 7.3%, arousal increased by 7.9%, and dominance increased by 6.3% of a standard deviation for females compared to males, as a response to the AA treatment. Correcting for multiple hypothesis testing, we find that at the intensive margin, the treatment effects of AA on the gender gap in valence and arousal are significant at the 10% level, while that of dominance is marginally insignificant.

Focusing on the effect of AA separately on males and females, we do not find any significant discouragement effects on males; rather, AA positively affects the emotion of females (Table 2). The positive effects of AA, at the intensive margin, on valence, arousal, and dominance of females remain statistically significant at conventional levels even after correcting for multiple hypothesis testing. Hence, the results provide support for Hypothesis 4 and indicate that the statements of motivation written by females in the AA treatment exhibited more pleasantness and intensity of emotion. These attributes

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12. The estimation results are reported in Table 2. We use three types of specifications: one that does not include any control variables, including demographic controls, and including the total number of words present in the statement of motivation.

TABLE 2. Sentiment Analysis (Assistant 1)

VARIABLES	Valence score			Arousal score			Dominance score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<b>A. Total Effects</b>									
AA	-0.048	-0.044	-0.020	-0.049	-0.045	-0.021	-0.047	-0.043	-0.019
p-value	(0.165)	(0.178)	(0.217)	(0.156)	(0.167)	(0.210)	(0.177)	(0.191)	(0.267)
p-value (corrected)	(0.264)	(0.287)	(0.324)	(0.259)	(0.274)	(0.314)	(0.275)	(0.297)	(0.374)
Female	-0.101	-0.125	-0.039	-0.103	-0.126	-0.041	-0.099	-0.123	-0.037
p-value	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.001)	(0.061)
p-value (corrected)	(0.084)	(0.023)	(0.117)	(0.077)	(0.019)	(0.102)	(0.087)	(0.021)	(0.150)
AA * Female	0.112	0.108	0.04	0.116	0.112	0.043	0.107	0.103	0.034
p-value	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.086)
p-value (corrected)	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.162)	(0.146)	(0.186)
Constant	-0.000	0.284	-0.533	-0.000	0.287	-0.532	0.000	0.292	-0.526
	(1.000)	(0.106)	(0.000)	(1.000)	(0.112)	(0.000)	(1.000)	(0.104)	(0.000)
Effect of AA on Females	0.065	0.065	0.020	0.067	0.067	0.022	0.060	0.060	0.016
p-value	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.010)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.001)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.032)
p-value (corrected)	(0.169)	(0.153)	(0.063)	(0.146)	(0.138)	(0.014)	(0.190)	(0.172)	(0.102)
Observations	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217
R-squared	0.001	0.024	0.937	0.002	0.024	0.938	0.001	0.025	0.939
<b>B. Intensive margin effect</b>									
AA	-0.087	-0.078	-0.031	-0.090	-0.081	-0.033	-0.086	-0.076	-0.029
p-value	(0.206)	(0.225)	(0.259)	(0.195)	(0.209)	(0.230)	(0.221)	(0.242)	(0.313)
p-value (corrected)	(0.292)	(0.309)	(0.349)	(0.284)	(0.296)	(0.319)	(0.309)	(0.323)	(0.400)
Female	-0.155	-0.183	-0.072	-0.158	-0.186	-0.075	-0.150	-0.178	-0.067
p-value	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.020)	-0.005	(0.044)
p-value (corrected)	(0.075)	(0.031)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.024)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.034)	(0.117)
AA * Female	0.184	0.176	0.073	0.190	0.182	0.079	0.174	0.166	0.063
p-value	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.023)	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.079)
p-value (corrected)	(0.144)	(0.134)	(0.085)	(0.134)	(0.120)	(0.080)	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.157)
Constant	-0.006	0.381	-0.897	-0.005	0.389	-0.895	-0.007	0.395	-0.883
p-value	(0.943)	(0.136)	(0.000)	(0.953)	(0.140)	(0.000)	(0.938)	(0.130)	(0.000)
Effect of AA on Females	0.097	0.098	0.042	0.100	0.101	0.045	0.089	0.090	0.034
p-value	(0.087)	(0.070)	(0.010)	(0.066)	(0.048)	(0.001)	(0.113)	(0.089)	(0.026)
p-value (corrected)	(0.165)	(0.154)	(0.051)	(0.137)	(0.118)	(0.015)	(0.198)	(0.176)	(0.083)
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098
R-squared	0.003	0.030	0.911	0.003	0.031	0.913	0.003	0.031	0.914
Other controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Statement length	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

*Note:* OLS regression results of the sentiment analysis on the statement of motivation (SoM) from Assistant 1 are reported. Cols (1), (4), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (5), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, a dummy for master's degree, a dummy for Bogotá, and a dummy for Coca region. Cols (3), (6), and (9) include the length (number of words) of the SoM. The estimates in the second panel (intensive margin) are weighted by inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. 'p-value' presents the uncorrected p-values, while 'p-value (corrected)' presents the p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.

are significant predictors of how an applicant is viewed by an employer and eventually how successful the job applicant is (Abe, 2009; Brandt and Herzberg, 2020). Overall, women exhibit higher emotions in the AA treatment, and this may be a result of encouragement due to the fact that an AA policy is in place. AA has no significant effect on male applicants' sentiments in the motivation letter.

*A remark on the interpretation of the results .* As discussed earlier (footnote 8), we can not completely rule out the presence of selection while interpreting the effects on the intensive margin. However, our study allows us to make causal statements on the effect of the treatments on the characteristics of the applicant pool out of which the employer can choose after stage 2 of the application process. The total effects show that women in the final pool of applicants have exerted more effort in the application process and shown higher degrees of emotion (especially valence and arousal) in their motivation letters due to the AA treatment.

### **3.3. Mediation analysis**

The analysis based on Assistant 1 sample indicates that AA treatment has a positive effect on women's emotion, motivating them to exert higher effort in the application process. In this section, we investigate to what extent women's expression of positive emotions, in response to the treatment, mediates the effect on effort provision. Following the framework of causal mediation analysis (Imai et al., 2011), we decompose the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on effort into an Average Mediation Effect, i.e., the part that is channeled through a mediating variable, and an Average Direct Effect that captures the remaining pathways. For this analysis, we consider only Assistant 1 sample that has information on the mediators – valence, arousal, and dominance scores. We also focus on females since the treatment effects for males were

found to be mostly insignificant in the previous analysis. Specifically, we estimate the following equations using ordinary least squares:

$$Mediator_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 AA_i + \delta_2 X_i + \psi_i \quad (2)$$

$$Outcome_i = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 AA_i + \lambda_2 Mediator_i + \lambda_3 X_i + \xi_i \quad (3)$$

The Average Mediation Effect is given by the product of the estimated coefficients  $\hat{\delta}_1 \hat{\lambda}_2$  and its standard error is bootstrapped. The Average Direct Effect is given by  $\hat{\lambda}_1$  from Equation (3).<sup>13</sup>

We present the results of mediation analysis in Table 3 considering the female participants from Assistant 1 experiment.<sup>14</sup> Following other studies applying mediation analysis (Alan et al., 2018; Carpena and Zia, 2020; Dalton et al., 2021), we estimate the effects separately for each of the mediating variables, i.e., valence, arousal, and dominance scores. Consistent with the results from the interaction model presented in section 3.2, we find the ATE on females to be significant and positive for all outcomes except time spent on application process. For the outcomes where ATE is significant,

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13. We acknowledge that the causal interpretation of the mediation effect rests on the assumption of “sequential ignorability” (Imai et al., 2011). It requires that the treatment assignment is independent of the potential outcomes and potential mediators; considering that AA treatment was randomized, this assumption is likely to hold in our case. However, it also requires that the mediators are independent of potential outcomes conditional on treatment assignment and pretreatment confounders. This part of the assumption is strong and may not hold.

14. The results for male participants are included in the Appendix Table E.1. However, the results for males are not meaningful because of two reasons. First, the treatment effect is not significant on any of the mediators for males, as discussed previously in the sentiment analysis. Second, the treatment effect is also insignificant for all the main outcomes of effort for males, with the only exception of time spent in the application process.



a significant proportion varying from 30% to 75% is mediated through the factors capturing emotion. This finding suggests that emotional response to the affirmative action treatment is an underlying mechanism through which women exert greater effort in the application process.

#### **4. Discussion and Conclusion**

The effort and diligence shown by applicants in the job application process are often important signals for employers and shape their hiring decisions. However, the job advertisement itself may influence a jobseeker's motivation to engage with the job application. We investigate how affirmative action statements within application procedures influence the effort put into the application process and the style of the motivation letter.

Our findings show that there is a significant gender gap in applicants' effort and motivation in job applications. Without affirmative action, female jobseekers engage less in the application procedure than males. Besides, female jobseekers use language that is less dominant and shows lower levels of valence and arousal, which can be interpreted as having lower confidence. Hence, differences in application could partly help to explain the gender gaps in the employment of otherwise equivalent candidates. Affirmative action compensates for this difference by encouraging women to put in more effort and increasing positive emotions among women. The incentive effects for men are smaller in size and statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating that the cost of affirmative action at this margin is low. This suggests that affirmative action policies positively influence female engagement in the application process through showing more positive emotions, increasing the chances of being hired. This is

TABLE 3. Mediation Analysis for Female Participants (Assistant 1)

Outcome variables	Total Effect			Intensive Margin Effect		
	Valence	Mediator:		Valence	Mediator:	
		Arousal	Dominance		Arousal	Dominance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Time spent</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	0.031** (0.013)	0.032** (0.013)	0.029** (0.014)	0.028** (0.011)	0.029*** (0.011)	0.026** (0.012)
Average Direct Effect	-0.017 (0.047)	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.015 (0.048)	-0.020 (0.072)	-0.021 (0.073)	-0.018 (0.073)
Average Treatment Effect	0.014 (0.049)	0.014 (0.049)	0.014 (0.049)	0.008 (0.072)	0.008 (0.072)	0.008 (0.072)
Percent mediated	224.59	231.65	210.27	342.88	355.57	316.35
<b>Last page visited</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	0.021** (0.010)	0.022** (0.009)	0.020** (0.010)	0.020** (0.009)	0.021** (0.008)	0.019** (0.009)
Average Direct Effect	0.018 (0.011)	0.017 (0.011)	0.019* (0.011)	0.040* (0.020)	0.040* (0.021)	0.042** (0.021)
Average Treatment Effect	0.039*** (0.014)	0.039*** (0.014)	0.039*** (0.014)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)	0.060*** (0.022)
Percent mediated	54.54	55.81	50.95	33.66	34.30	30.91
<b>Proportion of questions filled</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	0.020** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	0.017** (0.007)	0.017** (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)
Average Direct Effect	0.010 (0.010)	0.010 (0.010)	0.012 (0.011)	0.026 (0.016)	0.025 (0.016)	0.027* (0.016)
Average Treatment Effect	0.031** (0.014)	0.031** (0.014)	0.031** (0.014)	0.042** (0.017)	0.042** (0.017)	0.042** (0.017)
Percent mediated	66.44	67.92	62.05	39.30	39.98	36.06
<b>Proportion of pages visited</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	0.021** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	0.016** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)	0.014** (0.007)
Average Direct Effect	0.008 (0.011)	0.007 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	0.020 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)
Average Treatment Effect	0.028* (0.014)	0.028* (0.014)	0.028* (0.014)	0.036** (0.016)	0.036** (0.016)	0.036** (0.016)
Percent mediated	73.29	74.90	68.44	43.18	43.89	39.61

*Note:* The table presents estimates of the decomposition of Average Treatment Effect into Average Mediation Effect and Average Direct Effect of the AA treatment. Percent mediated shows the percentage of Average Treatment Effect mediated through each of the mediators considered, i.e., Valence, Arousal, and Dominance. In columns (1)-(3), Total Effect considers all female participants ( $N = 1223$ ), while in columns (4)-(6), Intensive Margin Effect considers female participants who reached stage 2 of the application process ( $N = 600$ ). Control variables in all regressions include age, a dummy for master's degree, a dummy for Bogota, and a dummy for Coca region. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses; additionally, for Average Mediation Effect, the standard errors are bootstrapped. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

consistent with laboratory experiments that find that AA can help to reduce gender gaps in selection in competitive environments without discouraging the ones ‘penalized’ by affirmative action ([Niederle et al., 2013](#); [Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012](#); [Beurain and Masclet, 2016](#)). It also relates to the findings on the effect of affirmative action on performance that show that affirmative action increases performance of those favored by AA without negative impact on the performance of the others ([Calsamiglia et al., 2013](#); [Dulleck et al., 2017](#)). The underlying channel, in the context of a maths exam, has been identified as an increase in effort ([Cotton et al., 2021](#)).

We identify directions for future research to better understand the behavior of applicants under affirmative action. A caveat of our study is that while the first stage of our experiment aimed at recruiting a large pool of applicants, we cannot rule out that women might have been discouraged in the first stage itself. If that is the case, our study might underestimate the initial gender gap in behavior in the application. The context of our study considers the job profile of a research assistant in a typical middle income country, namely, Columbia, where women are more educated than men on average. [Ibanez and Riener \(2018\)](#) find that even in such an environment women are less likely to apply for jobs relative to men. Thus, AA policies have a crucial role to play not only to encourage applications from the protected group for such jobs but also to increase their effort in the application process. Consistent with the theoretical models of [Fain \(2009\)](#) and [Balart \(2011\)](#), our findings confirm that AA indeed increases the incentives to provide effort for job application. Future work should assess the validity of our results in contexts where there is more heterogeneity between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of AA in terms of the level of education.

One explanation of the gender difference in language use is brought forward by [Hoff and Stiglitz \(2016\)](#), who suggest that human behavior is guided by social contexts

and cultural mental models. In our case, the mental model associated with AA may induce members of the protected group to interpret the decision situation favorably, and in turn lead them to offer a more positive self-presentation. Whether this is due to strategic considerations of the applicant or a subconscious reaction to affirmative action statements, we can not determine, and hence should be subject to further investigation.

Preliminary research shows that in job applications, positive emotions not only increases employability ([Hodzic et al., 2015](#)) but also helps create a favorable work environment in an organization ([Staw et al., 1994](#)). However, the precise relationship between emotion and various labor market outcomes need a thorough examination. For instance, how does an employer view a candidate with a certain emotional state and how does emotional states affect one's own and others' productivity? These are important questions but lie beyond the ambit of our current paper and we leave it for future research. Further, candidates are often confronted with different expectations of role-conforming behavior - e.g., assertiveness is often considered important to be successful in a job, but it is seen as an asset for male applicants only ([Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008](#)). This poses a dilemma for female candidates—although job-relevant—showing increased levels of emotion at presentation may reduce the chances of obtaining a job. Such channels too deserve exploration in future research, as these double standards can constitute a source of gender imbalance not only in applications, but in the job itself, posing problems for firms in managing diverse teams.

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**Appendix A: Recruitment: Summary Statistics**

TABLE A.1. Recruitment Process

Stage	Assistant 1 (A1)				Assistant 2 (A2)			
	Observation		% Female		Observation		% Female	
	Control	% Female	AA Treat	% Female	Control	% Female	AA Treat	% Female
Stage 1 : Job-Seekers	1108	55.05	1109	55.28	1131	50.13	1132	50.27
Stage 2 : Job Applicants	545	54.13	553	55.15	532	48.50	533	50.28
				54.64				49.39

Note: This table shows the different stages of the experiment for Assistant 1 and 2 samples.

TABLE A.2. Summary Statistics of Assistant 1

Variable	Definition	Mean	Standard Deviation
Female	= 1 if female, 0 if male	0.55	0.50
Age	Age in years	35.64	6.42
Master	= 1 if has master's degree, 0 otherwise	0.10	0.30
Coca Region	= 1 if recruited for Coca region, 0 if recruited for Tobaco region	0.67	0.47
Bogota	= 1 if located in Bogota, 0 otherwise	0.36	0.48
Motivation count	Number of words in statement of motivation	92.99	102.34
<b>Outcomes</b>			
Valence Score   Motivation count > 0*	Valence score from statement of motivation	89.60	77.77
Valence Score*	Valence score from statement of motivation, missing values replaced by 0	36.33	66.23
Arousal Score   Motivation count > 0*	Arousal score from statement of motivation	61.64	54.28
Arousal Score*	Arousal score from statement of motivation, missing values replaced by 0	24.99	45.94
Dominance Score   Motivation count > 0*	Dominance score from statement of motivation	90.50	78.29
Dominance Score*	Dominance score from statement of motivation, missing values replaced by 0	36.70	66.78
Time Spent*	Time spent in completing the questionnaire in stage 2 (in hours)	87.82	129.00
Proportion of pages visited	Proportion of the total pages completed in the stage 2 questionnaire	0.82	0.32
Proportion of questions filled	Proportion of the total questions answered in the stage 2 questionnaire	0.78	0.33
Last page visited	= 1 if visited the last page of stage 2 survey, 0 otherwise	0.36	0.48
Sample size - stage 1			2217
Sample size - stage 2			1098

Note: The variables marked with \* have been standardized by demeaning and dividing by the standard deviation, before they were used for analysis.

TABLE A.3. Summary Statistics of Assistant 2

Variable	Definition	Mean	Standard Deviation
Female	=1 if female, 0 if male	0.50	0.50
Age	Age in years	31.61	7.14
Master	=1 if has master's degree, 0 otherwise	0.09	0.29
Relative Grade	Grade relative to maximum marks in the most recent educational program	0.84	0.09
Time Preference	Time Preference	3.28	2.04
Risk Preference	Risk Preference	5.75	2.30
CRT score	Score on Cognitive Reflective Test	1.36	1.16
Extraversion	Big 5 Personality Test Score: Extraversion	6.03	1.49
Agreeableness	Big 5 Personality Test Score: Agreeableness	4.39	1.29
Conscientiousness	Big 5 Personality Test Score: Conscientiousness	9.41	1.01
Neuroticism	Big 5 Personality Test Score: Neuroticism	4.29	1.48
Openness	Big 5 Personality Test Score: Openness	8.34	1.54
<b>Outcomes</b>			
Time Spent*	Time spent in completing the questionnaire in stage 2 (in hours)	0.53	0.22
Proportion of pages visited	Proportion of the total pages completed in the stage 2 questionnaire	0.45	0.50
Proportion of questions filled	Proportion of the total questions answered in the stage 2 questionnaire	0.45	0.49
Last page visited	=1 if visited the last page of stage 2 survey, 0 otherwise	0.44	0.50
<b>Sample size - stage 1</b>			
			2263
<b>Sample size - stage 2</b>			
			1065

Note: The variables marked with \* have been standardized by demeaning and dividing by the standard deviation, before they were used for analysis.

TABLE A.4. Balance across treatments and stages

	Stage 1		Stage 2		Comparisons			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment	p-values (1) - (2)	p-values (3) - (4)	p-values (1) - (3)	p-values (2) - (4)
<b>Assistant 1</b>								
Female	0.55	0.55	0.54	0.55	0.92	0.73	0.54	0.94
Age	35.56	35.72	35.46	35.32	0.54	0.71	0.60	0.04
Master	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.02	0.85	0.01
Coca Region	0.67	0.67	0.61	0.65	0.99	0.15	0.00	0.20
Bogota	0.36	0.35	0.40	0.40	0.95	0.96	0.02	0.01
N	1108	1109	545	553				
<b>Assistant 2</b>								
Female	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.95	0.56	0.30	0.99
Age	31.69	31.53	31.21	30.77	0.59	0.25	0.04	0.00
Master	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.52	0.4	0.00	0.03
Relative Grade	0.84	0.85	0.84	0.85	0.31	0.26	0.83	0.29
Risk Preference	5.74	5.77	5.68	5.79	0.82	0.43	0.37	0.76
Time Preference	3.29	3.27	3.28	3.30	0.76	0.86	0.79	0.63
CRT score	1.37	1.35	1.48	1.44	0.56	0.55	0.00	0.01
Extraversion	5.99	6.07	5.98	6.03	0.17	0.55	0.83	0.38
Agreeableness	4.38	4.40	4.33	4.46	0.69	0.1	0.18	0.15
Conscientiousness	9.43	9.39	9.38	9.40	0.40	0.81	0.18	0.80
Neuroticism	4.30	4.29	4.23	4.24	0.92	0.90	0.19	0.33
Openness	8.34	8.33	8.23	8.36	0.81	0.18	0.02	0.55
Sample Size	1131	1132	532	533				

Note: Col (7) reports the p-values of comparing the control group in stage 2 with those who were in the control group in stage 1 but not in the control group in stage 2 (denoted by (3')). Likewise, col (8) reports the p-values of comparing the treatment group in stage 2 with those who were in the treatment group in stage 1 but not in stage 2 (denoted by (4')).



**Appendix B: Outcomes: Time and effort**

TABLE B.1. Effect of AA Treatment on Time and Effort – Assistant 1 sample

Variables	Time spent (standardized)		Last page visited		Proportion of questions filled		Proportion of pages visited	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>A. Total effect</b>								
AA	-0.139*** (0.039)	-0.140*** (0.039)	0.006 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)
Female	-0.005 (0.050)	-0.012 (0.048)	-0.056** (0.022)	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.050** (0.021)	-0.056*** (0.020)	-0.048** (0.021)	-0.054** (0.021)
AA * Female	0.153*** (0.058)	0.153** (0.060)	0.034+ (0.023)	0.035+ (0.023)	0.032+ (0.022)	0.033+ (0.021)	0.029 (0.022)	0.030 (0.022)
Constant	0.000 (0.040)	0.037 (0.136)	0.384*** (0.020)	0.349*** (0.045)	0.400*** (0.019)	0.399*** (0.045)	0.423*** (0.020)	0.419*** (0.045)
Observations	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217
R-squared	0.004	0.009	0.003	0.017	0.002	0.018	0.002	0.019
<b>B. Intensive margin effect</b>								
AA	-0.228*** (0.065)	-0.227*** (0.064)	0.013 (0.031)	0.011 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.023)	0.002 (0.022)	0.002 (0.022)
Female	0.004 (0.075)	0.002 (0.074)	-0.093*** (0.034)	-0.093*** (0.032)	-0.079*** (0.027)	-0.079*** (0.026)	-0.072*** (0.026)	-0.072*** (0.025)
AA * Female	0.240*** (0.090)	0.237** (0.092)	0.048 (0.037)	0.050 (0.037)	0.044+ (0.029)	0.044+ (0.029)	0.035 (0.026)	0.035 (0.026)
Constant	0.002 (0.053)	0.021 (0.183)	0.766*** (0.020)	0.589*** (0.051)	0.797*** (0.014)	0.694*** (0.038)	0.845*** (0.015)	0.726*** (0.033)
Observations	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098	1,098
R-squared	0.010	0.011	0.009	0.018	0.009	0.016	0.009	0.019
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* OLS regression results for Assistant 1. Cols (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, a dummy for master's degree, a dummy for Bogotá, and a dummy for Coca region. The estimates in the second panel (intensive margin) are weighted by inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , +  $p < 0.15$

TABLE B.2. Effect of AA Treatment on Time and Effort – Assistant 2 sample

Variables	Time spent (standardized)		Last page visited		Proportion of questions filled		Proportion of pages visited	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<b>A. Total effect</b>								
AA	-0.087*** (0.032)	-0.079** (0.034)	-0.043*** (0.016)	-0.037** (0.017)	-0.032** (0.014)	-0.026* (0.014)	-0.034** (0.016)	-0.028* (0.016)
Female	-0.078** (0.034)	-0.036 (0.038)	-0.058*** (0.017)	-0.033* (0.018)	-0.046*** (0.015)	-0.023 (0.017)	-0.053*** (0.016)	-0.029+ (0.018)
AA * Female	0.145*** (0.052)	0.120** (0.056)	0.075*** (0.025)	0.060** (0.026)	0.057** (0.022)	0.042* (0.023)	0.065*** (0.024)	0.050** (0.024)
Constant	0.021 (0.055)	0.410* (0.232)	0.479*** (0.034)	0.866*** (0.104)	0.451*** (0.031)	0.795*** (0.099)	0.479*** (0.034)	0.869*** (0.106)
Observations	2,191	2,152	2,191	2,152	2,191	2,152	2,191	2,152
R-squared	0.001	0.016	0.002	0.019	0.001	0.019	0.002	0.019
<b>B. Intensive margin effect</b>								
AA	-0.169** (0.066)	-0.171*** (0.063)	-0.046** (0.022)	-0.047** (0.022)	-0.023+ (0.015)	-0.023+ (0.015)	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.020)
Female	-0.022 (0.073)	-0.037 (0.068)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.029 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.026)
AA * Female	0.224*** (0.079)	0.234*** (0.074)	0.066*** (0.019)	0.064*** (0.018)	0.030** (0.014)	0.029** (0.013)	0.044** (0.018)	0.042** (0.018)
Constant	0.013 (0.030)	-0.490 (0.425)	0.956*** (0.014)	1.244*** (0.070)	0.902*** (0.010)	1.115*** (0.053)	0.957*** (0.013)	1.248*** (0.058)
Observations	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028
R-squared	0.005	0.023	0.005	0.019	0.003	0.019	0.003	0.018
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* OLS regression results for Assistant 2. Cols (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, dummy for master's degree, relative grade, risk preference, time preference, CRT score, and the big five personality traits. The estimates in the second panel (intensive margin) are weighted by inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , +  $p < 0.15$

## Appendix C: Additional Outcomes

TABLE C.1. Effect of AA on Additional Outcomes (Assistant 2)

VARIABLES	Test score		Typing accuracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>A. Total Effects</b>				
AA	-0.028	-0.025	-0.062	-0.048
p-value	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.121)
p-value (corrected)	(0.083)	(0.130)	(0.172)	(0.266)
Female	-0.050	-0.028	-0.103	-0.054
p-value	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.135)
p-value (corrected)	(0.016)	(0.133)	(0.045)	(0.290)
AA * Female	0.043	0.034	0.122	0.089
p-value	(0.010)	(0.053)	(0.011)	(0.067)
p-value (corrected)	(0.093)	(0.194)	(0.081)	(0.199)
Constant	0.349	0.614	0.025	0.798
p-value	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.713)	(0.000)
Observations	2,191	2,152	2,191	2,152
R-squared	0.003	0.028	0.001	0.019
<b>B. Intensive margin effect</b>				
AA	-0.024	-0.025	-0.102	-0.102
p-value	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.335)	(0.311)
p-value (corrected)	(0.077)	(0.049)	(0.432)	(0.423)
Female	-0.038	-0.027	-0.077	-0.081
p-value	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.527)	(0.507)
p-value (corrected)	(0.008)	(0.045)	(0.653)	(0.645)
AA * Female	0.024	0.023	0.171	0.161
p-value	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.063)	(0.071)
p-value (corrected)	(0.114)	(0.123)	(0.173)	(0.185)
Constant	0.694	0.881	-0.016	1.348
p-value	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.799)	(0.000)
Observations	1,028	1,028	1,028	1,028
R-squared	0.009	0.056	0.002	0.017
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* OLS regression results for additional outcomes considering the Assistant 2 experiment are presented. The outcome in cols (1)-(2) is the equally-weighted average of the proportions of correct answers in the probability and reading-comprehension tests. Typing accuracy in cols (3)-(4) is the negative of the average of two standardized Levenshtein distances corresponding to two typing exercises. In each typing exercise, we calculate the Levenshtein distance between the correct paragraph that is given to the applicant and the paragraph that the applicant has actually typed. The mean and standard deviation of the males in the control group are used to calculate the z-scores. Cols (1) and (3) report the results without controls, while cols (2) and (4) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, dummy for master's degree, relative grade, risk preference, time preference, CRT score and the big five personality traits. The estimates in the second panel (intensive margin) are weighted by inverse probability weights. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. *p-value* presents the uncorrected p-values, while *p-value (corrected)* presents the p-values corrected for multiple hypothesis testing.

**Appendix D: Robustness check specifications**

TABLE D.1. Assistant Pooled - Robustness Analysis using Alternative Models

Variables	Time spent (hours) [Tobit]		Last page visited [Probit]		Proportion of questions filled [Fractional Probit]		Proportion of pages visited [Fractional Probit]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
AA	-10.004*** (3.397)	-9.972*** (3.558)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.050 (0.039)	-0.032 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.034)	-0.034 (0.036)	-0.032 (0.036)
Female	-4.581 (4.257)	-4.819 (4.358)	-0.150*** (0.036)	-0.152*** (0.037)	-0.112*** (0.033)	-0.115*** (0.034)	-0.116*** (0.036)	-0.119*** (0.036)
AA * Female	12.657** (5.762)	12.269** (6.085)	0.144*** (0.050)	0.141*** (0.049)	0.098** (0.046)	0.094** (0.045)	0.102** (0.051)	0.098** (0.049)
Constant	-3.687 (13.741)	26.315 (26.642)	-0.278*** (0.054)	0.016 (0.147)	-0.255*** (0.051)	0.058 (0.133)	-0.188*** (0.054)	0.133 (0.137)
Observations	4,480	4,480	4,408	4,408	4,480	4,480	4,480	4,480
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* Coefficients from alternative nonlinear models estimating the total effect using pooled data from Assistant 1 and Assistant 2 are reported. All regression models include a dummy for Assistant 2. Cols (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include the applicant's age and whether the applicant holds a master's degree. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , +  $p < 0.15$

TABLE D.2. Assistant 1 - Robustness Analysis using Alternative Models

Variables	Time spent (hours) [Tobit]		Last page visited [Probit]		Proportion of questions filled [Fractional Probit]		Proportion of pages visited [Fractional Probit]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
AA	-16.965*** (6.351)	-17.029*** (6.519)	0.015 (0.046)	0.012 (0.047)	-0.004 (0.039)	-0.006 (0.040)	-0.001 (0.038)	-0.003 (0.040)
Female	-7.826 (9.859)	-10.021 (9.722)	-0.150** (0.060)	-0.165*** (0.059)	-0.133** (0.056)	-0.149*** (0.055)	-0.124** (0.056)	-0.141** (0.055)
AA * Female	21.017* (11.290)	20.853* (11.909)	0.092+ (0.062)	0.094+ (0.063)	0.086+ (0.057)	0.088+ (0.058)	0.076 (0.056)	0.078 (0.057)
Constant	-31.967*** (8.814)	171.708*** (3.548)	-0.296*** (0.054)	-0.390*** (0.121)	-0.254*** (0.048)	-0.254** (0.120)	-0.193*** (0.051)	-0.204* (0.117)
Observations	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* Coefficients from alternative nonlinear models estimating the total effect using pooled data from Assistant 1 are reported. All regression models include a dummy for Assistant 2. Cols (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, a dummy for master's degree, a dummy for Bogotá, and a dummy for Coca region. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , +  $p < 0.15$

TABLE D.3. Assistant 2: Robustness Analysis with Alternative Models

Variables	Time spent (hours) [Tobit]		Last page visited [Probit]		Proportion of questions filled [Fractional Probit]		Proportion of pages visited [Fractional Probit]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
AA	-0.048** (0.019)	-0.041** (0.020)	-0.108*** (0.041)	-0.094** (0.042)	-0.057 (0.045)	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.063 (0.049)	-0.044 (0.051)
Female	-0.051** (0.023)	-0.020 (0.024)	-0.147*** (0.042)	-0.085* (0.046)	-0.091** (0.045)	-0.034 (0.049)	-0.107** (0.050)	-0.047 (0.055)
AA * Female	0.081** (0.032)	0.062* (0.035)	0.190*** (0.063)	0.153** (0.066)	0.106+ (0.069)	0.069 (0.069)	0.124+ (0.076)	0.085 (0.075)
Constant	0.040 (0.054)	0.405*** (0.140)	-0.053 (0.085)	0.964*** (0.265)	-0.152+ (0.096)	0.778*** (0.246)	-0.084 (0.104)	0.952*** (0.264)
Observations	2,191	2,152	2,191	2,152	2,263	2,219	2,263	2,219
Other controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* Coefficients from alternative nonlinear models estimating the total effect using pooled data from Assistant 1 are reported. All regression models include a dummy for Assistant 2. Cols (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, dummy for master's degree, relative grade, risk preference, time preference, CRT score, and the big five personality traits. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ , +  $p < 0.15$

TABLE D.4. Sentiment Analysis (Assistant 1) using Tobit Model

Variables	Valence Score			Arousal score			Dominance score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
AA	-3.508 (4.832)	-3.293 (4.762)	-1.361 (1.802)	-2.526 (3.352)	-2.370 (3.292)	-1.051 (1.292)	-3.478 (4.902)	-3.234 (4.814)	-1.279 (1.897)
Female	-17.138** (8.234)	-20.411*** (7.864)	-5.493*** (1.864)	-11.973** (5.631)	-14.255*** (5.369)	-3.928*** (1.222)	-17.076** (8.175)	-20.414*** (7.788)	-5.318*** (2.022)
AA * Female	14.529* (8.790)	14.262+ (8.730)	4.355** (1.901)	10.308* (6.010)	10.123* (5.939)	3.301** (1.330)	14.163+ (8.831)	13.873+ (8.724)	3.796* (2.011)
Constant	-28.987*** (6.257)	130.635*** (6.264)	28.053*** (2.034)	-20.255*** (4.836)	-3.046 (4.643)	-20.344*** (1.296)	-29.177*** (6.253)	-3.639 (6.602)	-28.573*** (1.884)
Observations	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217	2,217
Other controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Statement length control	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

*Note:* Coefficients from Tobit models for the sentiment analysis on the statement of motivation (SoM) from Assistant 1 are reported. Cols (1), (4), and (7) report the results without controls, while cols (2), (5), and (8) report the results with controls. The control variables include age, a dummy for master's degree, a dummy for Bogotá, and a dummy for Coca region. Cols (3), (6), and (9) further the length (number of words) of the SoM. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1, + p<0.15

**Appendix E: Additional Mediation Analysis**

TABLE E.1. Mediation Analysis for Male Participants (Assistant 1)

	Total Effect			Intensive Margin Effect		
	Valence	Mediator: Arousal	Dominance	Valence	Mediator: Arousal	Dominance
Outcome variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Time spent</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.016)
Average Direct Effect	-0.123*** (0.035)	-0.122*** (0.035)	-0.123*** (0.035)	-0.212*** (0.057)	-0.211*** (0.057)	-0.213*** (0.057)
Average Treatment Effect	-0.141*** (0.039)	-0.141*** (0.039)	-0.141*** (0.039)	-0.235*** (0.063)	-0.235*** (0.063)	-0.235*** (0.063)
Percent mediated	12.75	13.29	12.54	9.55	10.07	9.40
<b>Last page visited</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.016 (0.012)
Average Direct Effect	0.020 (0.017)	0.020 (0.017)	0.019 (0.017)	0.024 (0.030)	0.025 (0.030)	0.024 (0.030)
Average Treatment Effect	0.005 (0.018)	0.005 (0.018)	0.005 (0.018)	0.008 (0.032)	0.008 (0.032)	0.008 (0.032)
Percent mediated	-307.07	-317.96	-302.48	-217.65	-226.41	-214.96
<b>Proportion of questions filled</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.010)
Average Direct Effect	0.013 (0.015)	0.013 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)	0.009 (0.021)	0.010 (0.021)	0.009 (0.021)
Average Treatment Effect	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)	-0.004 (0.024)
Percent mediated	927.78	960.65	914.11	354.01	368.46	349.91
<b>Proportion of pages visited</b>						
Average Mediation Effect	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)
Average Direct Effect	0.014 (0.015)	0.015 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)	0.012 (0.020)	0.012 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)
Average Treatment Effect	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.022)	-0.000 (0.022)	-0.000 (0.022)
Percent mediated	5007.76	5183.40	4932.96	3178.67	3305.29	3140.20

*Note:* The table presents estimates of the decomposition of Average Treatment Effect into Average Mediation Effect and Average Direct Effect of the AA treatment. Percent mediated shows the percentage of Average Treatment Effect mediated through each of the mediators considered, i.e., Valence, Arousal, and Dominance. In columns (1)-(3), Total Effect considers all male participants ( $N = 994$ ), while in columns (4)-(6), Intensive Margin Effect considers male participants who reached stage 2 of the application process ( $N = 498$ ). Control variables in all regressions include age, a dummy for master's degree, a dummy for Bogota, and a dummy for Coca region. Robust standard errors clustered at the applicant's place/university of origin are reported in parentheses; additionally, for Average Mediation Effect, the standard errors are bootstrapped. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .