

## **Economics Seminar, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.**

**SPEAKER:** Debasis Mishra, ISI (Delhi)

**TITLE:** Strategy-Proof Partitioning

**TIME:** 11:30-1:00 P.M.

**DAY & DATE:** Friday, 13th May, 2011

**PLACE:** Seminar Room 2, New Building

### **Abstract:**

We consider the problem of collectively partitioning a set of objects by a set of agents. Each agent's private information is a linear order over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function collects the preferences of agents over partitions and chooses a partition. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of linear orders over the set of partitions, which we call admissible domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of the strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions in the admissible domain. We also show that a social choice function is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a meet social choice function.

<http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/seminar.html>