

## **Economics Seminar, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.**

**SPEAKER:** Soumendu Sarkar, Doctoral Student, Indian Statistical Institute (Delhi)

**TITLE:** Land Deals of the Sarkar Raj: Perspectives from Mechanism Design Theory

**TIME:** 11:30 AM-12:40 P.M.

**DAY & DATE:** Friday, 22nd August 2008

**PLACE:** Seminar Room 2.

### **Abstract:**

We extend the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem to a situation with numerous sellers and one buyer with a discontinuous valuation structure. This essentially shows the impossibility of obtaining Bayesian incentive compatible, individually rational, ex-post efficient and budget balancing mechanisms. The result can be used as a possible explanation of the incidents that followed after Singur and Nandigram episodes. Some possible directions for further research are also discussed

<http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/seminar.html>