Upcoming

 

  • TBA
    • Speaker: Achyuta Adhvaryu, University of Michigan
    • Date: Thursday, August 22nd, 2019 [unusual slot]
    • Time: 3:30 PM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      TBA
  • Transfers in Non-cooperative Games
    • Speaker: Pradeep Dubey, SUNY Stony Brook and Yale
    • Date: Friday, August 23rd, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 PM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      Consider players at a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a non-cooperative game of money, which serves as their “status quo” in that game. We examine the possibility that
      they might innovate monetary transfers amongst themselves, thereby changing the game. In the domain of transfers which — in conjunction with concomitant NE of the changed game — are “transparent” and “budget-balanced”, our focus is on those where all players are made better off compared to the status quo. By way of key examples, we analyse the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Contests, and Crime and Punishment (in a population equilibrium).
  • TBA
    • Speaker: Anirban Kar, Delhi School of Economics
    • Date: Friday, August 30th, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      TBA
  • TBA
    • Speaker: Tarun Jain, IIM Ahmedabad
    • Date: Friday, September 27th, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      TBA
  • TBA
    • Speaker: Sujata Visaria, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
    • Date: Wednesday, October 9th, 2019 [unusual slot]
    • Time: 3:30 PM to 5 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      TBA
  • The Role of Regulatory Interventions to Aid Bankruptcy Reforms in the Presence of Under-capitalized Banks
    • Speaker: Subrata Kumar Ritadhi, RBI
    • Date: Friday, October 11th, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 1
    • Abstract
      This paper studies the role of regulatory interventions in nudging under-capitalized banks to recognize distressed borrowers as non-performing assets (NPA) and facilitate a reallocation of credit towards healthy borrowers. We focus on the issuance of a fresh set of guidelines by India’s central bank (RBI) to commercial banks in 2018 concerning the recognition and time-bound referral of stressed assets to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) for resolution. Using variations in the applicability of the central bank’s guidelines across borrowers’ exposure thresholds in a difference-in-difference framework, our results show that the introduction of the new guidelines led to a significant increase in the recognition of large borrowers (with exposures in excess of Rs. 1 billion) as NPA, but only for those who are independently classified as distressed borrowers based on their ex-ante economic performance. Our results show that the regulatory intervention had a significant impact on NPA recognition in under-capitalized banks which were possibly avoiding the recognition of large borrowers as NPAs to reduce their provisioning costs. We also show that credit issuance to creditworthy borrowers increased in the aftermath of RBI’s regulatory intervention, suggesting a reallocation of credit from distressed to healthy borrowers. The results in this regard highlight the complementary but critical role played by a credible regulator to ensure the effective utilization of bankruptcy reforms such as the IBC in an environment with under-capitalized banks.
  • TBA
    • Speaker: Ujjayant Chakravorty, Tufts University
    • Date: Friday, October 18th, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 1
    • Abstract
      TBA
  • TBA
    • Speaker: Marcin Dziubinski, University of Warsaw
    • Date: Friday, October 25th, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 1
    • Abstract
      TBA