Upcoming

 

  • How do households finance private school education? Insights from NSSO data
    • Speaker: Bharti Nandwani, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
    • Date: Friday, 12th April, 2019.
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      According to the 68th round of the NSSO employment unemployment survey (EUS), conducted in 2011-12, of all students attending school, 38.12% attend a private school. This choice is not limited to richer households (HH) only. Even in the lowest consumption quartile, 19% of students attend a private school; this proportion rises to 61.6 for the highest consumption quartile. Typically, attending private school entails a higher burden of out-of-pocket expenditure on education for these HHs. Unconditionally, HHs who send at least one child to private school spend about three times more on education on average when compared to HHs who do not send any child to private school. In this paper we investigate how HHs finance this out-of-pocket expenditure using three rounds of NSS. We estimate the standard Engel curve to show that households which have a higher number of children attending private schools increase their budget share on education. Almost 50 % of this increase is financed by reducing expenditure share on food and institutional medical expenditure. All specifications include various household characteristics to account for observable differences between households. We conclude by computing the welfare cost of sending an additional child to private school using Engel’s method.
  • Inequality, corruption and cooperation: Evidence from Vietnam
    • Speaker: Saurabh Singhal, Lancaster University
    • Date: Friday, 26th April, 2019.
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      We examine the effects of randomly introduced inequality on voluntary cooperation and whether this relationship is influenced by exposure to local corruption, using data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions. Within groups with heterogeneous endowments, individuals with high endowments contribute a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. The effect of inequality on cooperation is further exacerbated by corruption. We find that beliefs about others’ contributions are lower in heterogeneous groups in the presence of corruption, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results.
  • TBA
    • Speaker: Ajay Shenoy, University of California, Santa Cruz
    • Date: Tuesday, 30th April, 2019.
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      TBA
  • FDI and International Collusion
    • Speaker: Uday Bhanu Sinha, Delhi School of Economics
    • Date: Friday, May 3rd, 2019
    • Time: 11:30 AM to 1 PM.
    • Venue: Seminar Room 2
    • Abstract
      We develop a supergame model of collusion between price-setting oligopolists when the trade between countries involves per-unit trade cost and FDI requires a fixed cost of setting up a subsidiary in a foreign country. We demonstrate that cross hauling of FDI may facilitate collusion based on territorial allocation of markets. Whenever FDI is not helpful for sustaining collusion, the collusive arrangement involves no FDI at all. With asymmetric number of home firms or with different sizes of the markets, FDI may facilitate international collusion at lower levels of trade costs and thus our analysis also throws some light on the empirical puzzle regarding the trade liberalisation and FDI flows observed since the 1990s.