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Optimal Cooperative Taxation in the Global Economy*

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ABSTRACT

We use the Ramsey and Mirrlees approaches to study how fiscal and trade policy should be set cooperatively when governments must raise revenues with distorting taxes. Free trade and unrestricted capital mobility are optimal. Efficient outcomes can be implemented with taxes only on final consumption goods and labor income. We study alternative tax systems, showing that uniform taxation of household asset returns, and not taxing corporate income yields efficient outcomes. Border adjustments exempting exports from and including imports in the tax base are desirable. Destination- and residence-based tax systems are desirable compared to origin- and source-based systems.

Keywords: Capital income tax; free trade; value-added taxes; border adjustment; origin- and destination-based taxation; production efficiency

JEL Codes: E60, E61, E62

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The design of the international tax system, in the face of increased globalization, is a pressing concern for policy makers. The European Union, for example, has conducted extensive discussions on the feasibility and desirability of tax harmonization and has also discussed the possibility of forming a fiscal union. Awareness of the ways in which fiscal policy can be used to mimic tariffs, and in this sense the ways in which it can interfere with the free flow of goods and services, is increasing. Recent discussion on the tax reform package in the United States, for example, focused on the extent to which border adjustments were being proposed to mimic tariffs.¹ These concerns of policy makers imply that free trade agreements may well need to be supplemented with agreements on fiscal policy.

In this paper, we ask how fiscal and trade policy should be set when countries can choose these policies cooperatively. Standard dynamic general equilibrium models of international trade with well-functioning markets imply that free trade in goods and services and unrestricted capital mobility lead to efficient outcomes. With lump-sum taxes available to finance government expenditures, free trade is desirable. We analyze a model in which government expenditures must necessarily be financed with distorting taxes and ask how fiscal and trade policies should be jointly set.

We study this question as well as related ones in the workhorse model of dynamic international trade with multiple countries developed by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994), though, as we argue, the results hold in a variety of other environments. We use both the Ramsey and the Mirrlees approaches to optimal taxation. In the Ramsey approach, the tax system is exogenously given, whereas in the Mirrlees approach, the tax system is restricted only by informational constraints. In both cases, we study cooperative equilibria. We consider taxes widely used in practice in developed economies.

The bulk of our analysis is conducted using the Ramsey approach. We begin with a benchmark system that taxes consumption, labor income, and international trade. We show that, if governments can make lump-sum transfers to each other, every point on the Pareto frontier has production efficiency. In this sense, we prove an analog of the second welfare theorem for multicountry environments with distorting taxes. We show that any point on the Pareto frontier can be implemented by setting all trade taxes to zero, choosing the optimal

¹See Auerbach et al. (2017) for a policy evaluation of the recent destination-based cash flow tax proposal.

time path of consumption and labor income taxes, and setting government-to-government transfers appropriately. In this sense, our theorem implies that free trade is optimal.

We go on to prove the analog of the first welfare theorem. We show that there is a point on the Pareto frontier where government-to-government transfers are zero. This result implies that if countries have chosen an allocation associated with this point, then even if they are prevented from making transfers to each other, no Pareto improvement is possible.

We show that adding other widely used taxes, such as taxes on corporate income and returns to household assets, as well as value-added taxes, does not change the Pareto frontier. For a variety of reasons, including minimizing administration and compliance costs, countries may prefer tax systems other than our benchmark system. Motivated by these considerations, we begin by considering a system that only taxes labor income, corporate income, and household asset income. We show that any point on the Pareto frontier can be implemented by setting the tax on corporate income to zero and choosing the other two taxes appropriately. In this setting, free trade continues to be optimal in the sense that if we allow for trade taxes, they would be optimally set to zero. We show that it is optimal to tax all types of household asset income at the same rate. We go on to show that tax systems that allow only labor and corporate income to be taxed cannot, in general, implement outcomes on the Pareto frontier.

These results are quite different from those in a closed economy. There, a system with only labor and corporate income taxes can always implement outcomes on the Pareto frontier. Since a uniform tax on household asset income is a residence-based tax system, while a tax on corporate income is source based, our analysis implies that residence-based tax systems have advantages over source-based systems.

Many countries use value-added taxes. The tax base of a value-added tax with border adjustment excludes revenues from exports and includes expenditures on imports. We show that such a tax, referred to as VAT with BA, is equivalent to a consumption tax. Thus, a system that has this tax, together with a tax on labor income, can implement any point on the Pareto frontier and trade taxes are not needed. Next, we consider a system in which the value-added tax has no border adjustment (VAT without BA). Here, the tax base includes revenues from exports and excludes expenditures on imports. We show that a system that

has only a VAT without BA and a labor income tax cannot achieve the Pareto frontier if, in the benchmark system, optimal consumption tax rates vary over time. Since in general consumption taxes vary over time, a system with a VAT without BA and a labor income tax cannot implement outcomes on the Pareto frontier. In this sense, systems that allow for border adjustments are desirable.

These results shed light on apparent differences between the literature in public finance (see Auerbach et al. 2017) and that in international trade (see Grossman 1980, Feldstein and Krugman 1990, and Costinot and Werning 2018) on the desirability of border adjustments. The public finance literature has argued that border adjustments are desirable, while the international trade literature has argued that they are irrelevant. The international trade literature effectively considers uniform tax systems in the sense that the VAT tax rate is the same for all goods. We can think of our dynamic economy as a static economy with an infinite number of goods. If, in the benchmark system, optimal consumption tax rates are constant over time, then the associated VAT tax rate is the same for all goods so that, regardless of border adjustments, systems with VAT and labor income taxes can implement outcomes on the Pareto frontier. If, in the benchmark system, optimal consumption taxes vary over time, then the associated VAT rate is different for different goods and the international trade results no longer apply. Our results help to reconcile these differences and suggest that, in general, border adjustments are desirable. Barbiero et al. (2017) show that permanent changes in border adjustments are irrelevant if they are unanticipated, while they are not if anticipated. The difference between the two exercises is that the first change is uniform while the second is not.

The analysis of border adjustments helps us to compare destination-based with origin-based taxes on goods and services. A tax system is destination based if tax rates at the destination of use are independent of the origin of production (a tax system is origin based if the tax rates are independent of destination of use). VAT with BA are destination based, and VAT without BA are origin based. Thus, our results suggest that destination-based systems have advantages over origin-based systems.

We go on to argue that our results generalize to other international trade models, such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Stockman and Tesar (1995), and Eaton and Kortum

(2002). Finally, we show that our results extend to a Mirrlees-like environment in which the government can use nonlinear tax systems and the productivity of households is private information. We show that these outcomes also satisfy production efficiency so that free trade and unrestricted capital mobility are optimal.

For ease of exposition, we study a deterministic model. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to stochastic models in which productivity, government consumption, and other shocks generate fluctuations in the aggregates. All our results continue to hold in the stochastic model. In such models, optimal consumption tax rates will typically vary with the underlying state, even in the stochastic steady state. These fluctuations may be large if the underlying shocks are large. This observation strengthens the case for the desirability of household asset taxes over taxation of corporate income and for the desirability of border adjustments in VAT systems.

A related paper to ours is Keen and Wildasin (2004). They argue that if governments cannot make transfers to each other,² then Pareto-efficient allocations will typically not have production efficiency.³ In our analog of the first welfare theorem, we do not allow for transfers either. In this environment, we show that there is a Ramsey equilibrium that is Pareto efficient and has production efficiency. Figure 1 illustrates the difference in the results. This figure shows the utility possibility frontiers with two countries for environments with and without transfers. Note that the utility possibility frontier without transfers lies strictly below the one with transfers, except for point *A*. This observation is a result in Keen and Wildasin (2004). Our analog of the first welfare theorem refers to point *A* on the figure.

Note that Keen and Wildasin's result applies even to pure exchange economies without government expenditures or international trade. In such economies, the utility possibility frontier without transfers lies strictly below that with transfers, except for one point. In such economies, the standard first welfare theorem asserts that a planner cannot use transfers or price distortions to Pareto-improve any competitive equilibrium. The logic behind the result

²They show that transfers can be replicated with an export subsidy and a tariff in a model with more goods than countries, which is generally the case in dynamic economies.

³According to Keen and Wildasin (2004), the three tenets of optimal international taxation, namely, the optimality of free trade, the superiority of destination-based taxation of goods, and the superiority of residence-based taxation of capital income, do not apply.

in Keen and Wildasin is the same as the one behind the familiar result that if a country has monopoly power and cannot extract transfers from the other country, it should levy a tariff. To see the similarity, consider a planner whose welfare function consists of maximizing only the welfare of, say, country 1 and cannot make transfers. This planner clearly solves exactly the same problem as the government in the optimal tariff environment.

In any event, we argue that it is reasonable to suppose that governments can make transfers. To understand our argument, consider point B on this figure, which illustrates an outcome that is consistent with Keen and Wildasin's result. This outcome has production inefficiency. Starting at point B , the two countries have strong incentives to move to a Pareto-dominating point such as point C in the figure. Moving to point C clearly requires the countries to give up the taxes and subsidies that distort production, and in return the governments will make transfers to each other. We can think of compelling reasons for cooperating countries to prefer direct transfers to inefficiencies in production induced by taxes and subsidies. We think of the restrictions on tax policies in Ramsey problems as arising from private information on the characteristics of individuals. These considerations limit the kinds of tax instruments that governments can use and often rule out lump-sum taxes. When it comes to governments, private information considerations are, in our judgment, likely to be much less important. Thus, governments are likely to be able to make voluntary transfers to one another.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the two-country economy model with consumption, labor income, and trade taxes. We compute optimal Ramsey allocations and show that trade and capital mobility should not be restricted. In Section II, we consider alternative tax systems that implement the same optimal Ramsey allocations. We first consider a common tax on all household asset income, together with a corporate income tax (Section IIA). We also discuss alternative ways of taxing consumption through value-added taxes with and without border adjustment (Sections IIB and IIC). In Section III, we extend the results to other models of international trade and nonlinear taxation. Section IV concludes.




Figure 1. Utility possibility frontiers

Notes: The figure shows the utility possibility frontiers with two countries for environments with and without transfers. The utility possibility frontier without transfers lies strictly below the one with transfers, except for point A. Point B illustrates an outcome that is consistent with the result in Keen and Wildasin (2004). Moving to point C requires the countries to forgo the taxes and subsidies that distort production; in return, the governments will make transfers to one another.

I. A Two-Country Economy

The model is that in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) with distorting taxes. There are two countries indexed by $i = 1, 2$. The preferences of a representative household in each country are over consumption c_{it} , labor n_{it} , and government consumption, g_{it} ,

$$(1) \quad U^i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u^i(c_{it}, n_{it}) + h^i(g_{it})].$$

We assume that u^i satisfies the usual properties and h^i is an increasing, concave, and differentiable function. We assume that the total endowment of time is normalized to be one. Allowing for government consumption to be chosen endogenously ensures that an equilibrium always exists. For much of what follows, we assume that government consumption, g_{it} , is exogenously given.

Each country, $i = 1, 2$, produces a country-specific intermediate good, y_{it} , according

to a production technology given by

$$(2) \quad y_{i1t} + y_{i2t} = y_{it} = F^i(k_{it}, n_{it}),$$

where y_{ijt} denotes the quantity of intermediate goods produced in country i and used in country $j = 1, 2$, k_{it} is the capital stock, n_{it} is labor input, and F^i is constant returns to scale. Note that the first subscript denotes the location of production and the second subscript denotes the location of use. The intermediate goods produced by each country are used to produce a country-specific final good that can be used for private consumption, c_{it} , public consumption, g_{it} , and investment, x_{it} , according to

$$(3) \quad c_{it} + g_{it} + x_{it} \leq G^i(y_{1it}, y_{2it}),$$

where G^i is constant returns to scale. Capital accumulates according to the law of motion

$$(4) \quad x_{it} = k_{it+1} - (1 - \delta)k_{it}.$$

Note that in this economy, only intermediate goods are traded across countries and final goods are not.

If lump-sum taxes and transfers across countries are available, the allocations on the Pareto frontier satisfy the following efficiency conditions:

$$(5) \quad -\frac{u_{ct}^i}{u_{nt}^i} = \frac{1}{G_{i,t}^i F_{nt}^i},$$

$$(6) \quad \frac{u_{c,t}^i}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^i} = 1 - \delta + G_{i,t+1}^i F_{kt+1}^i,$$

$$(7) \quad \frac{G_{1,t}^1}{G_{2,t}^1} = \frac{G_{1,t}^2}{G_{2,t}^2},$$

$$(8) \quad \frac{G_{j,t}^1}{G_{j,t+1}^1} [G_{1,t+1}^1 F_{k,t+1}^1 + 1 - \delta] = \frac{G_{j,t}^2}{G_{j,t+1}^2} [G_{2,t+1}^2 F_{k,t+1}^2 + 1 - \delta], \quad j = 1 \text{ or } 2,$$

which, together with the resource constraints, characterize the Pareto frontier. Note that

these conditions imply the intertemporal consumption efficiency condition

$$(9) \quad \frac{u_{c,t}^1}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^1} = \frac{u_{c,t}^2}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^2} \frac{G_{j,t}^2/G_{j,t}^1}{G_{j,t+1}^2/G_{j,t+1}^1}, \quad j = 1, 2.$$

The conditions above mean that there are no intratemporal wedges (conditions (5)), no intertemporal wedges ((conditions (8)), and no production distortions (conditions (6) and (7)). We say that an allocation is *statically production efficient* if it satisfies (7), *dynamically production efficient* if it satisfies (8), and simply *production efficient* if it satisfies both. Static production efficiency requires that the marginal rates of technical substitution for the two intermediate goods are equated across countries. Dynamic production efficiency requires that capital (technically, investment) be allocated so as to equate the effective rate of return on capital across the two countries.

We can use the intratemporal and intertemporal conditions, (5) and (6), to write the intertemporal condition for labor,

$$(10) \quad \frac{u_{nt}^i}{\beta u_{n,t+1}^i} = \frac{G_{i,t}^i F_{nt}^i}{G_{i,t+1}^i F_{n,t+1}^i} [1 - \delta + G_{i,t+1}^i F_{kt+1}^i], \quad i = 1, 2.$$

We explicitly characterize this intertemporal labor margin because we are interested in understanding when it is optimal not to distort this margin.

A. Equilibria with Consumption, Labor Income, and Trade Taxes

Consider now the economy with distorting taxes. Each government finances public consumption and initial debt with proportional taxes on consumption and labor income, τ_{it}^c and τ_{it}^n , trade taxes, and a tax on initial wealth, l_{i0} . The trade taxes consist of an export tax, τ_{ijt}^e , levied on exports shipped from country i to country j , and a tariff, τ_{ijt}^y , levied on imports shipped from country i to country j .

Each country has two representative firms. The *intermediate good firm* in each country uses the technology in (2) to produce the intermediate good using capital and labor, purchases investment goods, and accumulates capital according to (4). Let V_{i0} be the value of the firm in period zero after the dividend paid in that period, d_{i0} . The intermediate good firms maximize

the value of dividends

$$(11) \quad V_{i0} + d_{i0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [p_{iit}y_{iit} + (1 - \tau_{ijt}^e) p_{ijt}y_{ijt} - w_{it}n_{it} - q_{it}x_{it}], \quad i \neq j,$$

subject to (2) and (4). Here, p_{ijt} is the price of the intermediate good produced in country i and sold in country j at t , w_{it} is the wage rate, and q_{it} is the price of the final good, all in units of a common world numeraire. The intertemporal price Q_t is the price of the numeraire at time t in units of the numeraire at zero ($Q_0 = 1$). Note that we assume that the intertemporal prices Q_t are the same in both countries. This assumption captures the idea that world capital markets are fully integrated.

If we define r_{t+1}^f to be the return on one-period bonds in units of the numeraire between period t and $t + 1$, then it must be the case that

$$(12) \quad \frac{Q_t}{Q_{t+1}} = 1 + r_{t+1}^f, \quad \text{for } t \geq 0.$$

The assumption that Q_t is the same in both countries is equivalent to the assumption that interest rate parity holds.

The *final goods firm* of country i chooses the quantities of intermediate goods to maximize the value of dividends,

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [q_{it}G^i(y_{iit}, y_{jit}) - p_{iit}y_{iit} - (1 + \tau_{jit}^y) p_{jit}y_{jit}], \quad i \neq j.$$

Household. The household's problem is to maximize utility (1) subject to the budget constraint

$$(13) \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [q_{it}(1 + \tau_{it}^c) c_{it} - (1 - \tau_{it}^n) w_{it}n_{it}] \leq (1 - l_{i0}) a_{i0},$$

with

$$a_{i0} = V_{i0} + d_{i0} + Q_{-1}b_{i0} + (1 + r_0^f) f_{i0},$$

where a_{i0} denotes net holdings of assets by the household of country i , $Q_{-1}b_{i0}$ denotes holdings of domestic public debt in units of the numeraire, inclusive of interest, and $(1 + r_0^f) f_{i0}$ denotes holdings of claims on households in the other country, in units of the numeraire, also inclusive of interest. Without loss of generality, households within a country hold claims to the firms in that country as well as the public debt of the government of that country. Note again that the assumption that Q_t is the same in both countries captures the idea that consumers can freely trade in international asset markets. We explore restrictions on such trade below.

Government. We allow for initial lump-sum transfers across governments denoted by T_{i0} . The budget constraint of the government of country i is given by

$$(14) \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [\tau_{it}^c q_{it} c_{it} + \tau_{it}^n w_{it} n_{1t} + \tau_{jit}^y p_{jit} y_{jit} + \tau_{ijt}^e p_{ijt} y_{ijt} - q_{it} g_{it}] \\ = Q_{-1} b_{i0} - T_{i0} - l_{i0} a_{i0}, \quad i \neq j.$$

Since transfers made by one government are received by the other, we have

$$(15) \quad T_{10} + T_{20} = 0.$$

Combining the budget constraints of the government and the household (with equality) in each country, we obtain the following balance of payments condition:

$$(16) \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [p_{ijt} y_{ijt} - p_{jit} y_{jit}] = - (1 + r_0^f) f_{i,0} - T_{i0},$$

for $i, j = 1, 2$ and $i \neq j$, and with $(1 + r_0^f) f_{1,0} + (1 + r_0^f) f_{2,0} = 0$.

A *competitive equilibrium* consists of an allocation $\{c_{it}, n_{it}, y_{ijt}, k_{it+1}, x_{it}\}$, prices and initial dividends, $\{q_{it}, p_{ijt}, w_{it}, Q_t, V_{i0}, d_{i0}\}$, and policies $\{\tau_{it}^c, \tau_{it}^n, \tau_{ijt}^y, \tau_{ijt}^e, l_{i0}, T_{i0}, g_{it}\}$, given k_{i0} , $Q_{-1}b_{i0}$, $(1 + r_0^f) f_{i0}$ such that households maximize utility subject to their budget constraints, firms maximize value, the balance of payments conditions (16) hold, and markets clear in that (2), (3), and (4) hold, and (15) is satisfied.

Note that we have not explicitly specified the governments' budget constraints because

they are implied by the other constraints.

We say that an allocation $\{c_{it}, n_{it}, y_{ijt}, k_{it+1}, x_{it}\}$ is *implementable* if it is part of a competitive equilibrium.

Next, we characterize the competitive equilibrium. To do so, note that the first-order conditions of the household's problem include

$$(17) \quad -\frac{u_{c,t}^i}{u_{n,t}^i} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{it}^c) q_{it}}{(1 - \tau_{it}^n) w_{it}},$$

$$(18) \quad u_{c,t}^i = \frac{Q_t q_{it} (1 + \tau_{it}^c)}{Q_{t+1} q_{it+1} (1 + \tau_{it+1}^c)} \beta u_{c,t+1}^i,$$

for all $t \geq 0$, where $u_{c,t}^i$ and $u_{n,t}^i$ denote the marginal utilities of consumption and labor in period t . Note that (18) can be used to recover the familiar interest rate parity condition

$$\frac{u_{c,t}^1 (1 + \tau_{1t+1}^c)}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^1 (1 + \tau_{1t}^c)} = \frac{u_{c,t}^2 (1 + \tau_{2t+1}^c)}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^2 (1 + \tau_{2t}^c)} \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t},$$

where e_t denotes the price of the final goods in country 2 in units of goods in country 1, namely, the real exchange rate.

The first-order conditions of the firms' problems are, for all $t \geq 0$, $p_{iit} F_{n,t}^i = w_{it}$,

$$(19) \quad \frac{Q_t}{Q_{t+1}} = \frac{p_{iit+1}}{q_{it}} F_{k,t+1}^i + \frac{q_{it+1}}{q_{it}} (1 - \delta),$$

where $F_{n,t}^i$ and $F_{k,t}^i$ denote the marginal products of capital and labor in period t ,

$$(20) \quad p_{iit} = (1 - \tau_{ijt}^e) p_{ijt}, \quad i, j = 1, 2, \text{ and } i \neq j,$$

$$(21) \quad q_{it} G_{i,t}^i = p_{iit}, \quad i = 1, 2,$$

$$(22) \quad q_{it} G_{j,t}^i = (1 + \tau_{jit}^y) p_{jit}, \quad i, j = 1, 2, \text{ and } i \neq j.$$

Combining the household's and firm's equilibrium conditions, it can be shown that

the value of the firm in (11) is

$$(23) \quad V_{i0} + d_{i0} = q_{i0} \left[1 - \delta + G_{i,0}^i F_{k,0}^i \right] k_{i0}.$$

We can obtain the familiar condition that the returns on capital adjusted for the real exchange rates are equated across countries. To obtain this condition, note that (19) and (21) can be combined to obtain

$$G_{1,t+1}^1 F_{k,t+1}^1 + 1 - \delta = \frac{e_{t+1}}{e_t} \left(G_{2,t+1}^2 F_{k,t+1}^2 + 1 - \delta \right).$$

The first-order conditions can be rearranged as

$$(24) \quad -\frac{u_{c,t}^i}{u_{n,t}^i} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{it}^c)}{(1 - \tau_{it}^n)} \frac{G_{i,t}^i F_{n,t}^i}{G_{i,t}^i F_{n,t}^i},$$

$$(25) \quad \frac{u_{c,t}^i}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^i} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{it}^c)}{(1 + \tau_{it+1}^c)} \left[G_{i,t+1}^i F_{k,t+1}^i + 1 - \delta \right],$$

$$(26) \quad \frac{G_{2,t}^1}{G_{1,t}^1} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{21t}^y)(1 + \tau_{12t}^y)}{(1 - \tau_{21t}^e)(1 - \tau_{12t}^e)} \frac{G_{2t}^2}{G_{1,t}^2},$$

$$(27) \quad \frac{(1 + \tau_{12t}^y) / (1 - \tau_{12t}^e)}{(1 + \tau_{12t+1}^y) / (1 - \tau_{12t+1}^e)} \frac{G_{1t}^1}{G_{1t+1}^1} \left[G_{1,t+1}^1 F_{k,t+1}^1 + 1 - \delta \right] = \frac{G_{1,t}^2}{G_{1,t+1}^2} \left[G_{2,t+1}^2 F_{k,t+1}^2 + 1 - \delta \right].$$

Comparing these conditions with the ones for the Pareto frontier with lump-sum taxation, (5), (6), (7), and (8), we have that the consumption and labor taxes create an intratemporal wedge in (24), and that time-varying consumption taxes create intertemporal wedges in (25). The consumption and labor income taxes do not affect the production efficiency conditions (26) and (27). Trade taxes distort static production efficiency and, if they vary over time, also distort dynamic production efficiency.

Using conditions (24) and (25), we can write

$$(28) \quad \frac{u_{n,t}^i}{\beta u_{n,t+1}^i} = \frac{(1 - \tau_{it}^n)}{(1 - \tau_{it+1}^n)} \frac{G_{i,t}^i F_{n,t}^i}{G_{i,t+1}^i F_{n,t+1}^i} \left[G_{i,t+1}^i F_{k,t+1}^i + 1 - \delta \right],$$

which makes clear how the taxes affect the labor intertemporal margin. We can also use (25) and (27) to write the intertemporal consumption condition

$$(29) \quad \frac{(1 + \tau_{12t}^y) / (1 - \tau_{12t}^e)}{(1 + \tau_{12t+1}^y) / (1 - \tau_{12t+1}^e)} \frac{(1 + \tau_{1t+1}^c) / (1 + \tau_{2t+1}^c)}{(1 + \tau_{1t}^c) / (1 + \tau_{2t}^c)} \frac{u_{c,t}^1}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^1} = \frac{u_{c,t}^2}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^2} \frac{G_{1,t}^2 / G_{1t}^1}{G_{1,t+1}^2 / G_{1t+1}^1},$$

which makes clear how time-varying ratios of consumption and trade taxes distort this intertemporal margin.

Implementability

In order to characterize the Ramsey equilibrium, we begin by characterizing the set of implementable allocations for a given path of government consumption, $\{g_{it}\}$. An allocation $\{c_{it}, n_{it}, y_{ijt}, k_{it+1}, x_{it}\}$ and period zero policies and prices, $\{l_{i0}, \tau_{i0}^c, T_{i0}, q_{i0}\}$, given $\{k_{i0}, b_{i0}, f_{i0}\}$ are implementable as a competitive equilibrium if and only if they satisfy the resource constraints (2), (3), (4), and the implementability conditions

$$(30) \quad \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} [\beta^t u_{c,t}^i c_{it} + \beta^t u_{n,t}^i n_{it}] = \mathcal{W}_{i0},$$

where

$$(31) \quad \mathcal{W}_{i0} = (1 - l_{i0}) \frac{u_{c,0}^i}{(1 + \tau_{i0}^c)} \left[(1 - \delta + G_{i,0}^i F_{k,0}^i) k_{i0} + Q_{-1} \frac{b_{i0}}{q_{i,0}} + (1 + r_0^f) \frac{f_{i,0}}{q_{i,0}} \right].$$

The proof of the following proposition is standard and it is omitted.

Proposition 1 (Characterization of the implementable allocations): Any implementable allocation and period zero policies and prices satisfy the implementability constraints (30) and the resource constraints (2), (3), (4). Furthermore, if an allocation satisfies these conditions for some period zero policies and prices, then it is implementable by a tax system with consumption and labor income taxes.

B. Cooperative Ramsey Equilibria

Here we ask how fiscal policy and trade policy should be conducted when governments can cooperate in setting these policies. We assume that governments can make lump-sum transfers to each other but that taxes on households and firms must be linear. We show

that free trade and unrestricted capital mobility are optimal even when governments must raise revenues using distorting taxes. Specifically, we show that any point on the Pareto frontier has free trade and unrestricted capital mobility, as long as governments can choose transfers appropriately. We go on to show that even if governments are prevented from making transfers, a cooperative outcome with free trade and unrestricted capital mobility cannot be Pareto improved.

We assume that households in each country must be allowed to keep an exogenous value of initial wealth $\bar{\mathcal{W}}_i$, measured in units of utility. Specifically, we impose the following restriction on the policies:

$$(32) \quad \mathcal{W}_{i0} = \bar{\mathcal{W}}_i,$$

which we refer to as the *wealth restriction in utility terms*. With this restriction, policies, including initial policies, can be chosen arbitrarily, but the household must receive a value of initial wealth in utility terms of $\bar{\mathcal{W}}_i$. Chari, Nicolini, and Teles (2018) offer a rationalization and a defense of restrictions of this kind in a closed economy (see also Armenter 2008 for an analysis in a closed economy with such a restriction).⁴

Formally, a (*cooperative*) *Ramsey equilibrium* is a competitive equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated by any other competitive equilibrium. The *Ramsey allocation* is the associated implementable allocation.

Ramsey Problem

Since a competitive equilibrium is summarized by the implementability constraint and the resource constraints, it immediately follows that the cooperative Ramsey equilibrium must solve the following programming problem. This problem is to choose allocations and period zero policies to maximize a weighted sum of utilities of the households of the two countries,

⁴Clearly, if the wealth restriction does not have to be satisfied, it immediately follows that it is possible to implement the lump-sum tax allocation as the Ramsey equilibrium.

$$(33) \quad \omega^1 U^1 + \omega^2 U^2$$

with weights $\omega^i \in [0, 1]$, subject to implementability, (30), the resource constraints,

$$(34) \quad c_{it} + g_{it} + k_{it+1} - (1 - \delta) k_{it} \leq G^i(y_{1it}, y_{2it}),$$

and (2), and the wealth restriction in utility terms, (32).

Note that the wealth restriction constraint can be dropped since initial taxes can be chosen to satisfy it. We assume throughout that for any given welfare weights, the solution of the Ramsey problem is unique.

Next we state and prove the analog of the second welfare theorem for our economy. To do so, it is convenient to define

$$v^i(c_{it}, n_{it}; \varphi^i) = \omega^i u^i(c_{it}, n_{it}) + \varphi^i [u_{c,t}^i c_{it} + u_{n,t}^i n_{it}],$$

where φ^i is the multiplier of the implementability condition (30). The Ramsey problem then reduces to

$$\text{Max} \sum_{i=1}^2 \omega^i \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [v^i(c_{it}, n_{it}; \varphi^i) + h^i(g_{it})] - \varphi^i \bar{W}_i \right]$$

subject to the resource constraints (2), (34).

Proposition 2 (Optimality of free trade): For any welfare weights, there exist transfers across governments such that production efficiency is optimal.

Proof: The solution of the Ramsey problem satisfies

$$(35) \quad -\frac{v_{c,t}^i}{v_{n,t}^i} = \frac{1}{G_{i,t}^i F_{n,t}^i}, \quad i = 1, 2$$

$$(36) \quad \frac{v_{c,t}^i}{\beta v_{c,t+1}^i} = 1 - \delta + G_{i,t+1}^i F_{kt+1}^i, \quad i = 1, 2$$

$$(37) \quad \frac{G_{j,t}^1}{G_{j,t+1}^1} [G_{1,t+1}^1 F_{k,t+1}^1 + 1 - \delta] = \frac{G_{j,t}^2}{G_{j,t+1}^2} [G_{2,t+1}^2 F_{k,t+1}^2 + 1 - \delta], \quad j = 1 \text{ or } 2$$

$$(38) \quad \frac{G_{1,t}^1}{G_{1,t}^2} = \frac{G_{2,t}^1}{G_{2,t}^2}.$$

These equations imply an analog of the intertemporal consumption efficiency condition

$$(39) \quad \frac{v_{c,t}^1}{\beta v_{c,t+1}^1} = \frac{v_{c,t}^2}{\beta v_{c,t+1}^2} \frac{G_{j,t}^2/G_{j,t}^1}{G_{j,t+1}^2/G_{j,t+1}^1}, \quad j = 1, 2.$$

In Online Appendix A, we report the first-order conditions for the optimal levels of government consumption.

Conditions (37) and (38) are the production efficiency conditions (8) and (7). It follows that the solution of the Ramsey problem must have production efficiency. ■

One way of implementing the efficient allocation is to set all tariffs and export taxes to zero and use only consumption and labor income taxes. In this sense, Proposition 2 implies that free trade is optimal in a cooperative Ramsey equilibrium.

This observation implies the corollary that even if trade taxes are unavailable and only consumption and labor income taxes are available, the Ramsey outcome is unaffected.

Corollary 1 (irrelevance of trade taxes): The Ramsey outcome in an economy in which consumption, labor income, and trade taxes are available coincides with that in which only consumption and labor income taxes are available.

The logic behind Proposition 2 can be extended to show that restrictions on capital mobility are not efficient. To see this result, consider, for example, constraints on the amount of foreign assets that residents of country i can hold. These constraints can be represented as adding constraints on the household problem of the form

$$f_{it} \leq \bar{f}_{it}.$$

Using the evolution of household wealth, they can alternatively be represented as

$$(40) \quad \begin{aligned} & \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} Q_{t+s} [q_{it+s} (1 + \tau_{it+s}^c) c_{it+s} - (1 - \tau_{it+s}^n) w_{it+s} n_{it+s}] \\ & \leq V_{it} + d_{it} + Q_{t-1} b_{it} + (1 + r_0^f) \bar{f}_{it}, \quad t \geq 1. \end{aligned}$$

These are additional constraints on the Ramsey problem that can be written in terms of the allocations. Thus, in the solution to the cooperative Ramsey problem, it is optimal to ensure that these additional constraints are never binding. The same logic applies to any other restrictions on capital mobility, including taxes on capital flows. In this sense, the logic behind Proposition 2 implies that unrestricted capital mobility is optimal in a cooperative Ramsey equilibrium.

In order to further characterize the optimal wedges, it is useful to write

$$v_{c,t}^i = u_{c,t}^i [\omega^i + \varphi^i [1 - \sigma_t^i - \sigma_t^{cni}]]$$

$$v_{n,t}^i = u_{n,t}^i [\omega^i + \varphi^i [1 + \sigma_t^{ni} - \sigma_t^{nci}]],$$

where

$$\sigma_t^i = -\frac{u_{cc,t}^i c_{it}}{u_{c,t}^i}, \sigma_t^{ni} = \frac{u_{nn,t}^i n_{it}}{u_{n,t}^i}, \sigma_t^{nci} = -\frac{u_{nc,t}^i c_{it}}{u_{n,t}^i}, \sigma_t^{cni} = -\frac{u_{cn,t}^i n_{it}}{u_{c,t}^i}$$

are own and cross elasticities that are only functions of consumption and labor at time t .

Note also that if consumption and labor are constant over time, then the relevant elasticities are also constant, so $v_{c,t}^i$ and $v_{n,t}^i$ are proportional to $u_{c,t}^i$ and $u_{n,t}^i$, respectively. We say that a competitive equilibrium has *no intertemporal distortions* from period s onward if the allocations satisfy (6) and (10) for all $t \geq s$. Since the relevant elasticities are constant in the steady state, we have the following proposition.

Proposition 3 (No intertemporal distortions in the steady state): If the Ramsey equilibrium converges to a steady state, it is optimal to have no intertemporal distortions asymptotically.

For standard macro preferences,

$$(41) \quad U^i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\frac{c_t^{1-\sigma^i} - 1}{1 - \sigma^i} - \eta_i \frac{n_t^{1+\sigma^{ni}}}{1 + \sigma^{ni}} \right],$$

following the logic in Chari, Nicolini, and Teles (2018), the Ramsey solution has no intertemporal distortions for all $t \geq 0$ and can be implemented with consumption or labor taxes that

are constant over time, but possibly different across countries.

We turn next to proving the analog of the first welfare theorem. To do so, we assume that the initial debts of the governments are zero, $b_{i0} = 0$, and initial net foreign asset positions are also zero, $f_{i0} = 0$. We will show that there is a pair of welfare weights, ω^1 and ω^2 , such that the government-to-government transfers are zero. Without loss of generality, let $\omega^1 = \omega \in [0, 1]$ and $\omega^2 = 1 - \omega$. Let $T^i(\omega)$ denote the transfers to country i under the Ramsey allocation associated with welfare weight ω .

Proposition 4 (Optimality of production efficiency with zero transfers): Assume $b_{i0} = f_{i0} = 0$, for $i = 1, 2$. There exists a weight $\omega \in [0, 1]$ such that transfers are zero, $T^i(\omega) = 0$, $i = 1, 2$.

Proof: Since, by assumption, the solution to the Ramsey problem is unique, it follows that $T^i(\omega)$, $i = 1, 2$ are continuous functions. In the Online Appendix, we show that $T^1(0) \leq 0$ and $T^1(1) \geq 0$. The result follows from the intermediate value theorem. ■

Remark: The same theorem holds with more than two countries. In this case, we can apply the argument in Negishi (1972) to prove the result.

This proposition implies that a cooperative Ramsey allocation in an environment in which governments cannot make transfers to each other cannot be Pareto improved.

C. Allowing for Distributional Considerations

In the model above, we abstract from the distributional effects of policies within each country. In this section, we briefly address those considerations, allowing for the possibility that different agents may be affected differently by trade policies.⁵ For simplicity, we consider only two worker types with equal mass. The production function in country i is described by

$$y_{i1t} + y_{i2t} = y_{it} = F^i(k_{it}, n_{it}^a, n_{it}^b),$$

where n_{it}^a and n_{it}^b are the labor hours of agents a and b in country i . Notice that with this production function, the relative wages of the two agents are endogenous and are a function of trade policies. A special case in which the relative wage is exogenous is when the two

⁵Details are available upon request.

agent types only differ in their efficiency units but are perfect substitutes in production, as in $F^i(k_{it}, n_{it}^a + \eta_i n_{it}^b)$. The preferences of type a agents are

$$U^{ia} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u^{ia}(c_{it}^a, n_{it}^a) + h^i(g_{it})]$$

and are similar for type b agents.

An allocation in this economy consists of consumption and labor allocations for each household a and b , $\{c_{it}^a, n_{it}^a\}$ and $\{c_{it}^b, n_{it}^b\}$, and aggregate allocations for each country $\{y_{ijt}, k_{it+1}, x_{it}\}$. The market clearing condition for the final good is

$$c_{it}^a + c_{it}^b + g_{it} + x_{it} \leq G^i(y_{1it}, y_{2it}),$$

and the capital accumulation equation is (4).

We start by allowing for consumption and labor income taxes that are agent specific.

The intermediate good firm now must pay wages to a and b types according to

$$p_{iit} F_{n^a,t}^i = w_{it}^a \text{ and } p_{iit} F_{n^b,t}^i = w_{it}^b.$$

The other conditions of the competitive equilibrium are straightforward generalizations of the homogeneous agent case.

In this case, it is straightforward to show that the implementability conditions are analogous to those in the representative agent model (see Chari, Nicolini, and Teles 2018). Here, regardless of whether we impose the wealth constraint, the Ramsey allocation need not coincide with the lump-sum allocation. The reason is that a planner who wishes to redistribute to one of the two types may choose to use tax distortions to accomplish such redistribution (see Werning 2007). Nevertheless, the results in Proposition 2 still hold, so that free trade and unrestricted capital mobility are optimal.

If, instead, the tax rates on the two agents are restricted to be the same, then there are additional implementability conditions. In particular, the following conditions have to be

imposed:

$$-\frac{u_{c^a,t}^i F_{n^a,t}^i}{u_{n^a,t}^i} = -\frac{u_{c^b,t}^i F_{n^b,t}^i}{u_{n^b,t}^i}$$

and

$$\frac{u_{c^a,t}^i}{\beta u_{c^a,t+1}^i} = \frac{u_{c^b,t}^i}{\beta u_{c^b,t+1}^i}.$$

With these extra restrictions, it is no longer the case that the result in Proposition 2 is generally true. If the preferences of the two agent types are the same and their labor inputs are perfect substitutes in the sense that the production function is given by $F^i(k_{it}, n_{it}^a + \eta_i n_{it}^b)$, then the results in Proposition 2 go through, even if the tax rates are required to be the same.

II. Alternative Implementations

Thus far, we have considered tax systems that include taxes on consumption, labor income, and trade. Here, we discuss a variety of other tax systems, including taxes on the income from different assets and value-added taxes. Our analysis is motivated by the observation that these alternative tax systems are widely used in practice. We show that no tax system can yield higher welfare than the tax system with only consumption and labor income taxes. We show that a variety of tax systems can implement the Ramsey allocation associated with those taxes. Furthermore, some tax systems do yield lower welfare.

A. Taxes on Corporate Income and Asset Returns

Here, we consider a tax system that consists of taxes on labor income, on corporate income, and on the returns of households' asset holdings. We assume a residence-based system in which the tax rates on returns from different assets are the same. We show that the Ramsey outcome can be implemented with zero taxation of corporate income and suitably chosen taxes on household asset income.

We now describe the problems of the firms and the household in each country and define a competitive equilibrium.

Firms The representative intermediate good firm in each country produces and invests in order to maximize the present value of dividends, $V_{i0} + d_{i0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t d_{it}$, where Q_t is the pretax discount factor, given by (12). Dividends, d_{it} , in units of the numeraire, are given by

$$(42) \quad d_{it} = p_{it}F(k_{it}, n_{it}) - w_{it}n_{it} - \tau_{it}^k [p_{it}F(k_{it}, n_{it}) - w_{it}n_{it} - q_{it}\delta k_{it}] - q_{it} [k_{it+1} - (1 - \delta)k_{it}],$$

where τ_{it}^k is the tax rate on corporate income net of depreciation.

The first-order conditions of the firm's problem are now $p_{iit}F_{n,t}^i = w_{it}$ together with

$$(43) \quad \frac{Q_t q_{it}}{Q_{t+1} q_{it+1}} = 1 + (1 - \tau_{it+1}^k) \left(\frac{p_{it+1}}{q_{it+1}} F_{k,t+1}^i - \delta \right).$$

Substituting for d_{it} from (42) and using the firm's first-order conditions, it is easy to show that the present value of the dividends at time zero in units of the numeraire is given by

$$(44) \quad V_{i0} + d_{i0} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t d_{it} = \left[1 + (1 - \tau_{i0}^k) \left(\frac{p_{i0}}{q_{i0}} F_{ik,0}^i - \delta \right) \right] p_{i0} k_{i0}.$$

The problem of the final good firm is as before.

Households Here we explicitly allow for sequential trading households. In each period, households choose consumption, labor supply, and holdings of domestic and foreign bonds and equity in domestic firms. For simplicity, we assume that households cannot hold foreign equity. It is possible to show that the Ramsey allocations are the same if households can hold foreign equity.

The tax base for each unit of bond income, expressed in real terms, is given by $\left(r_t^f - (q_{it} - q_{it-1})/q_{it-1} \right)$. This way of defining the base ensures that taxes are levied only on real income. The tax base for equity income taxation is given by $(d_{it} + V_{it} - V_{it-1} - (q_{it} - q_{it-1}) V_{it-1}/q_{it-1})$, per share. Note that this tax base includes dividends received in the current period and accrued capital gains generated by changes in the price of equity as well as an adjustment to ensure that the base is expressed in real terms.

The flow of funds constraint in period $t \geq 1$ for the household in country i in units of the numeraire is then given by

$$\begin{aligned}
(45) \quad & q_{it}c_{it} + b_{it+1} + f_{it+1} + V_{it}s_{it+1} \\
& = (1 - \tau_{it}^n) w_{it}n_{it} + \left[1 + r_t^f - \tau_{it} \left(r_t^f - \frac{q_{it} - q_{it-1}}{q_{it-1}} \right) \right] (f_{it} + b_{it}) \\
& \quad + (V_{it} + d_{it}) s_{it} - \tau_{it} \left(d_{it} + V_{it} - V_{it-1} - \frac{(q_{it} - q_{it-1}) V_{it-1}}{q_{it-1}} \right) s_{it}.
\end{aligned}$$

The period zero constraint needs to be adjusted by the wealth tax and is given in the Online Appendix. Note that world capital markets are integrated in the sense that pretax returns on bonds are the same in the two countries.

The household's problem is to maximize utility (1), subject to (45), the relevant budget constraint at period zero and no-Ponzi-scheme conditions, $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} Q_{iT+1}b_{iT+1} \geq 0$, and $\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} Q_{iT+1}f_{iT+1} \geq 0$, where Q_{it}/Q_{it+1} is the return on bonds net of taxes,

$$(46) \quad \frac{Q_{it}}{Q_{it+1}} = (1 - \tau_{it+1}) \left(1 + r_{t+1}^f \right) + \tau_{it+1} \frac{q_{it+1}}{q_{it}} \text{ with } Q_{i0} = 1.$$

The first-order conditions of the household's problem in each country are, for $t \geq 0$, (17) with $\tau_{it}^c = 0$, and

$$(47) \quad u_{c,t}^i = \frac{Q_{it}q_{it}}{Q_{it+1}q_{it+1}} \beta u_{c,t+1}^i,$$

together with the arbitrage conditions that the after-tax return on bonds and equity must be equated:

$$(48) \quad \frac{Q_{it}}{Q_{it+1}} = \frac{(V_{it+1} + d_{it+1}) - \tau_{it+1} \left(V_{it+1} - V_{it} + d_{it+1} - \frac{q_{it+1} - q_{it}}{q_{it}} V_{it} \right)}{V_{it}}.$$

Using the no-Ponzi-scheme condition, the budget constraints of the household, (45) and the period zero budget constraint, can be consolidated into the single budget constraint,

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_{it} [q_{it}c_{it} - (1 - \tau_{it}^n) w_{it}n_{it}] = (1 - l_{i0}) a_{i0},$$

where, using (44) as well as $s_0 = 1$, the initial asset holdings can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} a_{i0} &= Q_{i-1} b_{i0} + (1 - \tau_{i0}) q_{i0} \left[k_0 + (1 - \tau_{i0}^k) (G_{i,0}^i F_{ik,0} - \delta) k_{i0} \right] + \tau_{i0} \frac{q_{i0} V_{i-1}}{q_{i-1}} \\ &\quad + \left[1 + r_0^f - \tau_{i0} \left(1 + r_0^f - \frac{q_{i0}}{q_{i-1}} \right) \right] f_{i0}. \end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to show that the consolidated budget constraint reduces to the same implementability constraint, (30), with

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{W}_{i0} &= (1 - l_{i0}) u_{c,0}^i (1 - \tau_{i0}) \left[1 + (1 - \tau_{i0}^k) (G_{i,0}^i F_{ik,0} - \delta) \right] k_0 + \\ &\quad (1 - l_{i0}) u_{c,0}^i \left[\frac{\tau_{i0} V_{i-1}}{q_{i-1}} + Q_{i-1} \frac{b_{i0}}{q_{i,0}} + \left[1 + r_0^f - \tau_{i0} \left(1 + r_0^f - \frac{q_{i0}}{q_{i-1}} \right) \right] \frac{f_{i0}}{q_{i,0}} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

The Ramsey problem can then be thought of as maximizing (33) subject to the implementability constraint (30) with the wealth restriction (32) and the resource constraints. In the Online Appendix, we prove that policies can be suitably chosen so that the solution to this problem can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium. These policies typically require asset taxes, and asset taxes stand in for time-varying consumption taxes.

Using Corollary 1, it then follows that the Ramsey allocation in the economy with consumption and labor income taxes coincides with the one in an economy with the taxes considered here.

Next we show that it is optimal to set corporate income taxes to zero and that, in general, asset taxes are needed to implement the Ramsey outcome. Using the first-order conditions of the firms, it is straightforward to show that any competitive equilibrium satisfies static production efficiency. Next we turn to conditions under which dynamic production efficiency holds. Using (43) for both countries, as well as the final good firms' conditions, we obtain a version of the interest rate parity condition,

$$\begin{aligned} (49) \quad & \frac{G_{j,t}^1}{G_{j,t+1}^1} \left[1 + (1 - \tau_{1,t+1}^k) (G_{1,t+1}^1 F_{k,t+1}^1 - \delta) \right] \\ &= \frac{G_{j,t}^2}{G_{j,t+1}^2} \left[1 + (1 - \tau_{2,t+1}^k) (G_{2,t+1}^2 F_{k,t+1}^2 - \delta) \right], \text{ for } j = 1, 2. \end{aligned}$$

Clearly, setting both corporate income taxes to zero ensures dynamic production efficiency.

To show that asset taxes are needed, we use the households' and firms' first-order conditions to obtain

$$(50) \quad -\frac{u_{c,t}^i}{u_{n,t}^i} = \frac{1}{(1 - \tau_{it}^n) G_{i,t}^i F_{n,t}^i}$$

and

$$(51) \quad \frac{u_{c,t}^i}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^i} = 1 + (1 - \tau_{it+1}) (1 - \tau_{it+1}^k) (G_{i,t+1}^i F_{k,t+1}^i - \delta).$$

In general, the solution to the Ramsey problem requires time-varying intertemporal distortions. Thus, implementing the Ramsey outcome with the system considered here requires asset taxes given that the corporate income tax is set to zero. If we set the asset taxes to zero, it is in general not possible to choose the corporate income tax rates in both countries to satisfy both (49) and (51) at the Ramsey allocation.

We summarize these results in the following proposition.

Proposition 5 (Common tax on domestic equity and foreign returns): The Ramsey outcome can be implemented with labor income taxes and asset taxes only and by setting the corporate income taxes to zero. In general, the Ramsey outcome cannot be implemented with labor income taxes and corporate income taxes only.

These results are quite different from those in a closed economy. In a closed economy, household asset taxes and corporate income taxes distort capital accumulation in the same way. Thus, it is possible to support the Ramsey allocations with labor income taxes and corporate income taxes, or, equivalently, with labor income taxes and household asset taxes. In the open economy, a system with corporate income taxes distorts dynamic production efficiency by distorting the allocation of capital across countries in addition to distorting capital accumulation. In this sense, a system with corporate income taxes is dominated by a system with household asset taxes.

Note that we have assumed that the tax rates on domestic and foreign asset income are the same. If these tax rates are allowed to be different, then it is straightforward to prove that in the Ramsey equilibrium, it is optimal to set these tax rates to be the same.

Thus far, we have considered a decentralization in which investment decisions are

made by firms. Much of the macroeconomics literature considers decentralizations in which investment decisions are made by households and firms simply rent capital and labor from households. It is possible to show that with this decentralization, the same Ramsey outcomes can be supported by a tax system under which household assets are taxed at a rate that may vary across countries but is uniform across asset types.

Our analysis allows for a comparison of residence-based and source-based tax systems. In our model, a residence-based system is one in which all household asset income is taxed at a rate that is independent of where the income is generated, but can depend on where the household resides. A source-based system is one in which income is taxed where it is generated, namely, at a point of production. A corporate income tax is an example of a source-based system. Since we have argued that household asset taxes have advantages over corporate income taxes, we have shown that residence-based tax systems have advantages over source-based systems.

B. Border-Adjusted Value-Added Taxes and Labor Income Taxes

Consider next an economy in which consumption taxes are replaced by value-added taxes levied on firms with border adjustment. Border adjustment means that firms in a country do not pay value-added taxes on exports and cannot deduct imports. Taxes on assets are set to zero, but labor income taxes are not. The value-added taxes are denoted by τ_{it}^v . We refer to the system with value-added taxes with border adjustment as a *VAT with BA system*.

The intermediate goods firm now maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [(p_{i1t}y_{i1t} + p_{i2t}y_{i2t}) - w_{it}n_{it} - q_{it}x_{it}] - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t \tau_{it}^v [p_{iit}y_{iit} - q_{it}x_{it}]$$

subject to (2) and (4), where p_{ijt} is the price of the intermediate good produced in country i and sold in country j . Note that the final goods firm pays taxes on the good sold domestically, but not when it is exported. In this sense, there is a border adjustment.

The final goods firm now maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [q_{it} G^i(y_{1it}, y_{2it}) - p_{1it} y_{1it} - p_{2it} y_{2it}] - \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t \tau_{it}^v [q_{it} G^i(y_{1it}, y_{2it}) - p_{iit} y_{iit}].$$

This firm is able to deduct the input produced domestically, but not the one imported. Also in this sense, there is a border adjustment. The household problem is the same as above, except that the consumption taxes are set to zero.

The first-order conditions of the household's problem now include

$$(52) \quad -\frac{u_{c,t}^i}{u_{n,t}^i} = \frac{q_{it}}{(1 - \tau_{it}^n) w_{it}}, \quad t \geq 0$$

and

$$(53) \quad u_{c,t}^i = \frac{Q_t q_{it}}{Q_{t+1} q_{it+1}} \beta u_{c,t+1}^i, \quad t \geq 0.$$

The first-order conditions of the firms' problems for an interior solution are

$$(54) \quad p_{iit} (1 - \tau_{it}^v) F_{n,t}^i = w_{it}$$

$$(55) \quad Q_t q_{it} (1 - \tau_{it}^v) = Q_{t+1} p_{iit+1} (1 - \tau_{it+1}^v) F_{k,t+1}^i + Q_{t+1} q_{it+1} (1 - \tau_{it+1}^v) (1 - \delta)$$

$$(56) \quad p_{iit} (1 - \tau_{it}^v) = p_{ijt}, \quad \text{for } j \neq i$$

$$(57) \quad q_{it} G_{i,t}^i = p_{iit}$$

$$(58) \quad q_{it} (1 - \tau_{it}^v) G_{j,t}^i = p_{jit}, \quad \text{for } j \neq i.$$

We can manipulate the households' and firms' conditions to obtain

$$(59) \quad -\frac{u_{c,t}^i}{u_{n,t}^i} = \frac{1}{(1 - \tau_{it}^n) (1 - \tau_{it}^v) G_{i,t}^i F_{n,t}^i}, \quad t \geq 0,$$

$$(60) \quad u_{c,t}^i (1 - \tau_{it}^v) = (1 - \tau_{it+1}^v) \beta u_{c,t+1}^i [G_{i,t+1}^i F_{k,t+1}^i + 1 - \delta], \quad t \geq 0,$$

together with (7) and (8). Comparing these four equilibrium conditions with the correspond-

ing ones in the economy with consumption, labor income, and trade taxes, (24)-(27), we see that the equilibrium conditions in this economy with VAT with BA coincide with the conditions in that economy if trade taxes are set to zero and

$$(61) \quad 1 + \tau_{it}^c = \frac{1}{1 - \tau_{it}^v}.$$

We have proved the following proposition.

Proposition 6 (Value-added taxes with border adjustment): A value-added tax system with border adjustment is equivalent to a system that taxes consumption and labor and has no tariffs.

Since the Ramsey allocation can be implemented by a system that taxes only consumption and labor, this proposition implies that the Ramsey allocations can be implemented by a value-added tax system with border adjustments. In this sense, a value-added tax system with border adjustments has desirable features.

C. Value-Added Taxes without Border Adjustment: The Role of Tariffs

Consider next an economy just like the one in the previous section, except that value-added taxes are levied on firms without border adjustment. This means that the taxation of intermediate goods will be source based. We will show that this system without tariffs cannot in general implement the Ramsey allocation. If we add suitably chosen import and export tariffs, then the Ramsey allocation can indeed be implemented. We refer to the system with value-added taxes without border adjustment and with tariffs as a *VAT without BA system*.

The intermediate goods firm in country 1 now maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t [(1 - \tau_{1t}^v) (p_{11t}y_{11t} + (1 - \tau_{12t}^e) p_{12t}y_{12t} - q_{1t}x_{1t}) - w_{1t}n_{1t}]$$

subject to (2) and (4).

The final goods firm in country 1 now maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} Q_t (1 - \tau_{1t}^v) [q_{1t}G^1(y_{11t}, y_{21t}) - p_{11t}y_{11t} - (1 + \tau_{21t}^y) p_{21t}y_{21t}].$$

Firms in country 2 solve similar problems.

The first-order conditions of the firms' problems for an interior solution are $p_{iit} (1 - \tau_{it}^v) F_{n,t}^i = w_{it}$, (20)-(22), and

$$Q_t q_{it} (1 - \tau_{it}^v) = Q_{t+1} p_{iit+1} (1 - \tau_{it+1}^v) F_{k,t+1}^i + Q_{t+1} q_{it+1} (1 - \tau_{it+1}^v) (1 - \delta).$$

Using these conditions, the equilibrium conditions become (59), (60), and

$$(62) \quad \frac{(1 + \tau_{21t}^y) G_{2,t}^2}{(1 - \tau_{21t}^e) G_{2,t}^1} = \frac{(1 - \tau_{12t}^e) G_{1,t}^2}{(1 + \tau_{12t}^y) G_{1,t}^1},$$

$$(63) \quad \begin{aligned} & \frac{(1 + \tau_{12t}^y) (1 - \tau_{12t+1}^e) (1 - \tau_{1t+1}^v)}{(1 - \tau_{12t}^e) (1 + \tau_{12t+1}^y) (1 - \tau_{1t}^v)} \frac{G_{1,t}^1}{G_{1,t+1}^1} [G_{1,t+1}^1 F_{k,t+1}^1 + 1 - \delta] \\ &= \frac{(1 - \tau_{2t+1}^v) G_{1,t}^2}{(1 - \tau_{2t}^v) G_{1,t+1}^2} [G_{2,t+1}^2 F_{k,t+1}^2 + 1 - \delta]. \end{aligned}$$

Using (60) and (63), we obtain the analog to (29),

$$(64) \quad \frac{(1 + \tau_{12t}^y) / (1 - \tau_{12t}^e)}{(1 + \tau_{12t+1}^y) / (1 - \tau_{12t+1}^e)} \frac{u_{c,t}^1}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^1} = \frac{u_{c,t}^2}{\beta u_{c,t+1}^2} \frac{G_{1,t}^2 / G_{1t}^1}{G_{1,t+1}^2 / G_{1t+1}^1}.$$

Condition (63) implies that if trade taxes are constrained to be zero in both countries, it is not possible to implement the Ramsey outcome for general preferences. The reason is that, in general, the Ramsey outcome implies that relative VATs in the two countries vary over time in the sense that $(1 - \tau_{1t+1}^v) / (1 - \tau_{2t+1}^v) \neq (1 - \tau_{1t}^v) / (1 - \tau_{2t}^v)$. Without trade taxes, condition (63) is inconsistent with the dynamic production efficiency condition (8).

Once we allow for tariffs, then it is possible to implement the Ramsey outcome. To ensure static production efficiency, tariffs have to compensate each other so that (62) coincides with (7). To ensure dynamic production efficiency, the tariffs have to suitably vary over time so as to undo the distortions arising from time-varying VATs.

The VAT without BA system, if $(1 - \tau_{1t}^v) / (1 - \tau_{2t}^v)$ is time varying, distorts the allocation of capital across countries and does not distort the intertemporal allocation of consumption across agents in (64). The VAT with BA system, however, does not distort the

allocation of capital and distorts the intertemporal allocation of consumption in (29). The Ramsey allocation has no distortions in the allocation of capital across countries and has distortions in the allocation of consumption across countries. Trade taxes can correct for these inefficiencies.

One implementation of the Ramsey outcome has

$$(65) \quad \frac{1 - \tau_{1t}^v}{1 - \tau_{2t}^v} = \frac{1 - \tau_{21t}^e}{1 + \tau_{21t}^y} = \frac{1 + \tau_{12t}^y}{1 - \tau_{12t}^e}.$$

It is straightforward to verify that with these policies, it is possible to implement the Ramsey allocation. This implementation has an effective export subsidy on good 2 and an effective import tax on good 1, of the same magnitude as the ratio of the two VATs $(1 - \tau_{1t}^v) / (1 - \tau_{2t}^v)$. Trade taxes chosen in this fashion do not distort static production efficiency, and they correct for the dynamic production inefficiencies induced by time-varying VATs.

We state these results in the following proposition.

Proposition 7 (Value-added taxes without border adjustment): Suppose trade taxes are constrained to be zero in both countries. Then, for general preferences, the Ramsey allocation cannot be implemented with a tax system with labor income taxes and value-added taxes without border adjustment. If trade taxes are unconstrained, then the Ramsey allocation can be implemented with consumption taxes replaced by value-added taxes and tariffs.

For standard macro preferences, VATs are constant over time in each country, and therefore there is no need for tariffs. Border tax adjustments in this case are irrelevant.

Proposition 7 is connected to results in international trade. Some of the literature in international economics (e.g., Grossman 1980, Feldstein and Krugman 1990, Barbiero et al. 2017, Erceg et al. 2018, Costinot and Werning 2018) has argued that VAT systems with border adjustment are equivalent to VAT systems without such adjustment, holding trade taxes constant. The version of the result applicable to our analysis (see Grossman 1980) is that a uniform value-added tax with border adjustment is equivalent to a uniform value-added tax without border adjustment, in the sense that, taking international prices

as given, an individual country can achieve the same allocations with either system. (The theorem requires qualifications regarding the availability of initial wealth taxes to ensure that the government's budget is balanced and requires international lump-sum transfers to ensure that the balance of payments condition is satisfied.)

The key requirement in Grossman's version of the theorem is that value-added taxes are the same across all goods. If value-added taxes differ across goods, then the two systems are not in general equivalent. We can think of our dynamic economy as a static economy with an infinite number of goods. Suppose that the dynamic economy has constant value-added taxes over time. Then, in the reinterpreted static economy, value-added taxes are the same across all goods. Inspecting the marginal conditions with BA, namely, (7) and (8), and those without BA, namely, (62) and (63), we see that the same allocations can be supported by a VAT with BA system and a VAT without BA system, with no tariffs in either case. Suppose next that in the dynamic economy, value-added taxes vary over time, so that in the reinterpreted static economy, value-added taxes are different across goods. Then, inspecting the same conditions, we see that the two systems are not equivalent in the absence of tariffs.

Our results can also be used to compare destination- versus source-based systems. To see this comparison, note that a destination-based system is one in which tax rates do not depend on origin, and an origin-based system is one in which tax rates do not depend on destination. In the case of value-added taxes with border adjustment, the goods leave the country untaxed and are taxed at the single value-added tax rate in the destination country. In this sense, the VAT with BA system is a destination-based system. With value-added taxes without border adjustments, goods are taxed at the single rate of the origin country, so that a VAT without BA system is an origin-based system. Our results imply that if countries are restricted from imposing trade taxes, then a destination-based system dominates an origin-based system.

D. Lerner Symmetry

The arguments in the previous section make clear that any competitive equilibrium allocation in a VAT without BA system and no trade taxes can be implemented in a VAT with BA system with the same VAT rates and trade taxes chosen according to (65). The

trade taxes are an effective import tariff and an export subsidy of the same magnitude. The results regarding the conditions under which VAT with and without border adjustments are equivalent are related to the Lerner symmetry. This symmetry asserts that for an individual country taking international prices as given, import taxes are equivalent to export taxes. An alternative way to state this is that import tariffs, together with export subsidies of equivalent magnitude, are neutral. We state a Lerner symmetry theorem formally in Lemma 1 below. In proving these results, we use only the properties that any competitive equilibrium must satisfy and do not use any properties of the Ramsey allocation.

Lemma 1 (Lerner symmetry): The competitive equilibrium allocations of an economy with trade taxes given by τ_{12t}^e and τ_{21t}^y coincide with the competitive equilibrium allocations with trade taxes $\hat{\tau}_{12t}^e$ and $\hat{\tau}_{21t}^y$ satisfying $(1 - \hat{\tau}_{12t}^e) = \kappa(1 - \tau_{12t}^e)$ and $(1 + \hat{\tau}_{21t}^y) = \kappa(1 + \tau_{21t}^y)$, for $\kappa > 0$, provided initial wealth taxes or international transfers are chosen appropriately.

The proof of the lemma is in Online Appendix B. This change in trade taxes raises all domestic prices in the world numeraire proportionately, so that $\hat{p}_{11t} = \kappa p_{11t}$, $\hat{q}_{1t} = \kappa q_{1t}$, $\hat{w}_{1t} = \kappa w_{1t}$.

The key idea is that a proportional change in import tariffs and export subsidies leaves domestic relative prices unaffected, although the change requires a change in the level of prices denominated in terms of the world numeraire. For this reason, the real value of outstanding assets may change, requiring changes in wealth taxes or international transfers.

No change in the level of domestic prices may be needed if those prices are denoted in terms of a domestic numeraire rather than a world numeraire. The proportional change in trade taxes would require a change in the exchange rate between the world numeraire and the domestic numeraire. We turn now to a formal proof of this suggestion.

Let tildes denote prices in terms of a domestic numeraire. Let E_t denote the exchange rate between the domestic and the world numeraire measured as units of domestic numeraire per world numeraire; for example, $\tilde{p}_{11t} = E_t p_{11t}$. In Online Appendix B, we prove the following lemma.

Lemma 2 (Exchange rate adjustment): Consider a competitive equilibrium of an arbitrary economy. Consider now an alternative economy with the same international

prices in world numeraire, Q_t, p_{12t}, p_{21t} , and the same domestic prices, in domestic currency $\tilde{q}_{1t}, \tilde{p}_{11t}, \tilde{w}_{1t}$, in which allocations, domestic policies, and the exchange rate are denoted with carets. Suppose now policies in the alternative economy satisfy $1 - \hat{\tau}_{12t}^e = \kappa(1 - \tau_{12t}^e)$ and $1 + \hat{\tau}_{21t}^y = \kappa(1 + \tau_{21t}^y)$. There is an equilibrium in the alternative economy, with the same allocations and domestic policies, and with exchange rates given by $\hat{E}_t = E_t/\kappa$, provided initial wealth taxes or international transfers are chosen appropriately.

Lemma 2 states that uniform changes in import tariffs and export subsidies have no effects on allocations or domestic prices. The required changes in prices in the world numeraire are accomplished entirely by changes in the nominal exchange rate.

In Online Appendix B, we show that if foreign assets are denominated in the world numeraire, only the initial wealth tax may have to be adjusted. There is no need to adjust international transfers to satisfy the balance of payments condition for country $i = 1$ in (16). If, instead, domestic and foreign assets of country 1, b_{i0} and f_{10} , are denominated in the domestic numeraire, there is no need to adjust the initial wealth tax, but international transfers may need to be adjusted.

Thus far in this section, we have considered uniform changes in trade taxes. Next, consider an alternative economy in which trade taxes in period t are given by $1 - \hat{\tau}_{12t}^e = \kappa_t(1 - \tau_{12t}^e)$ and $1 + \hat{\tau}_{21t}^y = \kappa_t(1 + \tau_{21t}^y)$. In Online Appendix B, we show that κ_t is not neutral if $\kappa_t \neq \kappa_s$ for some t and s .

The results in this section shed some light on the results in the literature. For example, Barbiero et al. (2017) show that, in an economy with sticky prices and no capital, permanent changes in tax systems similar to the ones studied here have no effects on allocations. This result is similar to our result that uniform changes in trade taxes have no real effects. They also show that anticipated changes in tax systems have real effects. This result is similar to our result that nonuniform changes in trade taxes may lead to changes in allocations. For another example, Costinot and Werning (2018) show that uniform changes in trade taxes have no effect on allocations.

III. Remarks on the Generality of the Results

In this section, we argue that our results generalize to other models of international trade and models of nonlinear taxation.

Other models of international trade Thus far, for concreteness, we have focused attention on one widely used model of international trade, namely, that in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994). This focus allowed us to derive explicit expressions for the optimal wedges and allowed for a detailed analysis of alternative tax systems. Here we show that Proposition 2 continues to hold in other widely used models of international trade, including Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Stockman and Tesar (1995), and Eaton and Kortum (2002). We conjecture that the analog of the other propositions would also hold in these other models, but a detailed analysis given the plethora of these models is beyond the scope of this paper. Proposition 2 is of particular interest because it addresses the central question at the intersection of public finance and international trade: is it desirable to interfere with international trade when governments must finance government consumption with distorting taxes? The other propositions are also of interest because they address a variety of issues at the forefront of policy discussions.

In many models of international trade, a vector of final consumption goods is produced using labor and possibly initial capital. The models differ in terms of details regarding the technology including the use of intermediate goods. The technology in these models can be written as

$$Y = \{(C_{it})_{t=0}^{\infty}, (N_{it})_{t=0}^{\infty}, k_{i0}\},$$

where C_{it} and N_{it} denote vectors of different types of consumption goods and different types of labor in country i in period t , and k_{i0} denotes the initial capital stock in country i . The technology set Y has constant returns to scale. For convenience, we will say that an allocation is resource feasible if it is in the technology set. Preferences of households in each country

are given by

$$U^i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u^i(C_{it}, N_{it})].$$

Suppose now that the government in each country can levy taxes on each type of consumption good and on the income of each type of labor input, and that these tax rates can be different across consumption goods and labor types. Suppose also that the government in each country is allowed to levy taxes on initial wealth and is required to respect an initial wealth constraint as in the benchmark model above, and that governments can make lump-sum transfers to each other. Consider the competitive equilibria of this model. It is possible to show that any such equilibrium allocation must satisfy an implementability condition of the form (30). Since any allocation must also be resource feasible, it follows that no Ramsey outcome can yield higher welfare than the allocation that maximizes a weighted average of country welfare subject to implementability and the resource constraints. Clearly, the solution to this problem is at the boundary of the production set and is therefore production efficient. It is possible to support this outcome as a competitive equilibrium by (possibly different) taxes on each consumption good and each type of labor. Thus, this outcome is a Ramsey equilibrium.

This result shows that Proposition 2 generalizes to environments with trade in final goods, as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), to environments with traded and nontraded final goods, as in Stockman and Tesar (1995), and to environments with a detailed structure of intermediate and final goods, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Proposition 2 does not generalize to trade models in which firms have monopoly power, as in Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Melitz (2003), or in which there are externalities, as in Alvarez, Buera, and Lucas (2013). These environments require corrective tax and subsidy instruments even absent the need to finance government expenditures with distorting taxes.

Nonlinear taxation Here we briefly show how Proposition 2 generalizes to environments with nonlinear taxation. We consider a Mirrlees-like environment in which the government can choose a nonlinear tax function to finance government expenditures and to

redistribute across households. Consider a version of our benchmark model with a continuum of households in each country in the unit interval. Household k in country i is indexed by a parameter θ_i^k . This parameter is constant over time and determines the effective units of labor supplied by household k in country i . Specifically, a household of type θ_i^k that supplies n_t units of labor supplies $l_t = \theta_i^k n_t$ units of effective labor. The distribution of household types is given by $H_i(\theta_i^k)$.

The cooperative planner observes consumption and effective labor by each household but not the household type. An allocation in this economy consists of allocations for each household $\{c_t(\theta_i^k), l_t(\theta_i^k)\}$ and aggregate allocations for each country $\{y_{ijt}, k_{it+1}, x_{it}\}$. The resource constraints are the analogs of (2) and (3),

$$(66) \quad y_{i1t} + y_{i2t} = y_{it} = F^i \left(k_{it}, \int l_t(\theta_i^k) dH_i(\theta_i^k) \right),$$

$$(67) \quad \int c_t(\theta_i^k) dH_i(\theta_i^k) + g_{it} + x_{it} \leq G^i(y_{1it}, y_{2it}),$$

and (4). The utility of household of type θ_i^k is given by

$$(68) \quad U^i(\theta_i^k) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[u^i \left(c_t(\theta_i^k), \frac{l_t(\theta_i^k)}{\theta_i^k} \right) + h^i(g_{it}) \right].$$

An allocation is *incentive compatible* if

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u^i(c_t(\theta_i^k), l_t(\theta_i^k)/\theta_i^k) \geq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u^i(c_t(\hat{\theta}_i^k), l_t(\hat{\theta}_i^k)/\theta_i^k)$$

for all $\theta_i^k, \hat{\theta}_i^k$. An allocation is *incentive feasible* if it is incentive compatible and resource feasible in that it satisfies the resource constraints.

An allocation is a cooperative Mirrlees outcome if it maximizes

$$\omega^1 \int U^1(\theta_1^k) dJ_1(\theta_1^k) + \omega^2 \int U^2(\theta_2^k) dJ_2(\theta_2^k)$$

over the set of incentive feasible allocations where $J_i(\theta_i^k)$ is a distribution that represents a combination of the underlying distribution H and Pareto weights over households of different

types.

Suppose now that the preferences of households are a variant of the standard macro form, in that

$$(69) \quad u^i(c_t(\theta_i^k), l_t(\theta_i^k)/\theta_i^k) = u^i(c_t(\theta_i^k)) - \eta_i \frac{(l_t(\hat{\theta}_i^k)/\theta_i^k)^{1+\sigma^{ni}}}{1 + \sigma^{ni}}.$$

It is straightforward to show that the Mirrleesian allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with nonlinear taxes. Using the same logic as in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), and Werning (2007), we have the following proposition.

Proposition 8 (Production efficiency and no intertemporal distortions): The Mirrleesian outcomes satisfy production efficiency so that free trade and unrestricted capital mobility are optimal. Furthermore, if household preferences satisfy (69), then it is optimal to have no intertemporal distortions.

In this formulation, workers differ from each other along a single dimension, namely, the parameter θ_i^k , which determines the effective units of labor supplied by a worker. If they differ along multiple dimensions, say, because they differ in their comparative advantage in working in the various sectors, then the planning problem becomes a multidimensional screening problem and the analysis becomes more complicated. See Hosseini and Shourideh (2018) and Costinot and Werning (2018) for analyses of optimal trade taxation with restricted systems.

IV. Concluding Remarks

We characterize cooperative Ramsey allocations in the global economy. We show that free trade and unrestricted capital mobility are optimal. In the benchmark model, Ramsey allocations can be supported by time-varying taxes on consumption and labor income. We study alternative implementations of the Ramsey allocation including taxation of equity returns and foreign asset returns as well as corporate income. We show that it is optimal to tax all types of household assets at the same country-specific rate and not to tax corporate income. We show that border adjustments are desirable if in the benchmark model it is

optimal to have time-varying consumption taxes. We clarify apparently conflicting views in the public finance and trade literatures regarding the desirability of border adjustments. We show that our results hold in a variety of trade models, and we extend our results to nonlinear tax systems.

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