From June 2020 till further notice, all our seminars will be online (webinars).
If you have not done so already, please register for these webinars in order to receive invitations, by clicking the button below:
Title: Security-bid Auctions with Information Acquisition
Speaker: Yunan Li, City University of Hong Kong
Date and time: 3 PM, 03 December, 2021 Abstract: We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an
asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the
asset's realized value and can covertly acquire information at some cost
before participating in an auction. We first consider auctions with
ordered securities in which the seller restricts the security design to
an ordered set and uses a first- or second-price auction. We show that
steeper securities give agents lower marginal returns to information and
may yield lower revenues. We then study linear mechanisms in which
payments linearly depend on the asset's realized value. We show that the
revenue-maximizing linear mechanism assigns the asset efficiently. The
winner pays in cash if their expected values are above a threshold and
pays in stock if their expected values are below the threshold. The
threshold decreases as the marginal cost of acquiring additional
information increases. This result implies that stock payments are
associated with lower merge synergies and lower information acquisition
costs. We empirically test the implications and find consistent results.
Title: Crowding in School Choice
Speaker: Yu Zhou, Kyoto University
Date and time: 3 PM, 10 December, 2021 Abstract: We consider the problem of matching students to schools when students are able to express preferences over crowding. For example, schools have varying per capita expenditures, average teacher-student ratios, etc. These characteristics of a school are now endogenously determined - matchings with more students to a particular school decrease each of the variables above. We propose a new equilibrium notion, the Rationing Crowding Equilibrium (RCE), that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. We prove the existence of RCE under mild domain conditions, and establish a Rural Hospitals Theorem and welfare lattice result on the set of RCE. The latter implies the existence of a maximal RCE, and that such RCE are student-optimal. Moreover, the mechanism defined by selection from the maximal RCE correspondence is strategy-proof. We also identify an algorithm to find a maximal RCE for a natural subdomain.