

Social Networks, Gender Norms and Labor Supply: Experimental Evidence Using a Job Search Platform*

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Abstract

We study the interaction between increased access to job opportunities and gender norms in shaping intrahousehold labor supply. In a field experiment in Delhi, we randomly offer access to a digital job search platform either to married couples only (non-network group), or together with the wife's network (network group), or not at all. A year later, non-network treatment wives reduce their labor supply, while husbands increase theirs. In contrast, network treatment wives show no detrimental impact on labor supply, even as their husbands' labor supply increases. Gender norms and the home-bound structure of (married) women's social networks can explain our findings.

JEL classification: J16, J21, J24, O33

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1 Introduction

Expanding job opportunities to promote inclusive growth is one of the core tenets of the United Nations’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Digital job platforms that provide easier access to job information and online matching of workers with employers have been deemed to hold a lot of promise in this regard (ILO, 2021). However, recent research on these platforms presents a mixed picture on their labor market impacts. For instance, Kelley *et al.* (2022); Dhia *et al.* (2022); Jones & Sen (2024) find minimal or negative effects on labor market outcomes, whereas Wheeler *et al.* (2022) finds large positive effects. One possible explanation for these contrasting findings is that existing studies focus on individual workers. However, labor supply decisions are frequently made at the household level, especially for women. Therefore, the impact of new labor market technologies or opportunities may be mediated by intrahousehold dynamics, benefiting one spouse over the other, in ways that may be missed when studying such decisions purely through an individual lens.

This paper presents the first evidence on the impact of access to hyperlocal digital job search and matching platform on spousal labor supply and earnings, using a cluster randomized field experiment conducted in Delhi, India. In the first treatment arm, the platform service was offered free of charge to a randomly selected group of married couples (non-network treatment). However, recent research has shown that interventions delivered simultaneously to spouses may undermine female labor supply if husbands have veto power in the presence of strong norms against women’s paid work (Lowe & McKelway, 2025). To counter this, in the second treatment arm, the service was offered to married couples *and* the wife’s nominated peer network (network treatment), free of charge, to leverage peer effects in employment and potentially shift norms about married women’s market work. Neither couples nor their network were offered the service in the control group. Interest in the service was quite high in our sample – nearly 70% of husbands and 65% of wives, who were offered the service, reported being interested. Unconditional on interest, 27% husbands and 23% wives registered for the service. We then assessed the impact of the intervention on husband’s and wife’s current employment status and job characteristics, irrespective of whether the work was obtained via or off the platform.

We report three key experimental findings. First, providing access to the job matching platform to couples in the non-network treatment group resulted in a degree of labor supply substitution between spouses. Wives reduced their work intensity – measured in both days and hours worked – by about 25-35% of baseline means, primarily by scaling back their involvement in casual labor. In contrast, husbands increased their work intensity by nearly 7% of baseline mean, leading to a modest rise in their own monthly labor earnings. We posit

that the most likely explanation for this pattern is a (weak) income effect, where higher earnings by husbands reduce the need for wives to work. This finding supports the U-shaped theory of female labor force participation (Goldin, 1995) where women’s participation initially declines with economic development due to rising male incomes and shifts towards domestic roles for women, before increasing later with service sector growth and reduced gender gaps in education. The decline in work observed among non-network wives in our socially conservative setting is consistent with this early downward trend in the U-shaped curve, driven by entrenched traditional gender norms and lack of supportive structures for working women. Such substitutability between male and female labor supply may also provide a plausible explanation to reconcile the divergent findings in recent research discussed above on the labor market impacts of digital job technologies.

Second, we find that in contrast to the non-network treatment group, couples in the network treatment group did not experience any substitutability. Husbands significantly increased their labor supply, both at the extensive and intensive margins (by approx. 5% and 8%, respectively, of the corresponding baseline means), without triggering any change in their wives’ labor supply. Interestingly, the overall null effect on network treatment wives’ labor supply masks a compositional shift in occupational structure: while some network wives withdrew from casual work following exposure to our intervention (similar to their non-network treatment counterparts), some others who were previously not working now engaged in self-employment. Labor earnings increased marginally for network treatment husbands but declined for their wives, though significantly less than their non-network counterparts.

As an explanation, we provide suggestive evidence that the network treatment may have improved gender attitudes about wives’ market work, making flexible (albeit less remunerative) work like self-employment more acceptable, thereby diluting the income effect observed among non-network treatment couples. Husbands in the network treatment group became more supportive of wives’ market work and less concerned about its negative impact on children, compared to their non-network counterparts. At the same time, we also find two pieces of suggestive evidence that norm constraints may have been loosened by network wives’ peers. First, wives with more gender progressive baseline peers were more likely to be employed at endline, but only in the network treatment group. This suggests that by strengthening ties to existing progressive peers, the network treatment may have eased norm constraints on wives’ labor supply. Second, such easing may have been further aided by network wives’ endogenous nomination of less gender regressive peers for platform registration.

Third, we find that husbands in the network treatment group were more likely to be employed compared to their non-network treatment counterparts. We provide suggestive evidence that this may be explained by the overlapping nature of peer networks between wives

and husbands, particularly the presence of male relatives and neighbors, facilitating greater job information sharing among men in the network treatment group. At baseline, approximately 51% of husbands' and 28% of wives' peer networks comprised male relatives and neighbors, creating an additional channel of indirect exposure for husbands to the intervention. We find that network husbands whose wives nominated baseline relatives or neighbors or male peers for treatment, were 4 to 5 percentage points more likely to be employed at endline, a pattern consistent with shared male social ties acting as a possible conduit for employment spillovers within the network treatment group.

In summary, our findings indicate that attempts to improve female labor force participation in the presence of norms against women's market work may not necessarily reduce gender disparities in the labor market, as men may benefit more from such interventions.¹ When only couples were treated, female labor force supply declined, consistent with traditional gender norms and potential negative income effects. However, when wives' peer networks were also treated, labor supply effects were stronger for both spouses. These results suggest that harnessing appropriate social networks of married women may partially offset the constraints posed by intrahousehold dynamics and gender norms on female labor supply.

Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we highlight the impacts of a new job search technology on intrahousehold labor supply. Existing literature has typically focused on individuals rather than households to study this question (Kelley *et al.*, 2022; Dhia *et al.*, 2022; Wheeler *et al.*, 2022; Jones & Sen, 2024). However, the implications for intrahousehold labor supply are also likely of paramount importance, especially in low-income, socially conservative settings, and our novel experimental design of introducing the new technology to both the wife and husband enables us to shed new light on this dimension.

Second, our paper relates to the growing literature on labor market frictions that differentially impede women's labor force participation (see Caria *et al.* (2024) for a review). Restrictions on women's mobility and outside interactions, especially in developing countries,² may lower their information about economic opportunities compared to men (Field *et al.*, 2010; Lindenlaub & Prummer, 2021), leading to fewer weak ties (Mortensen & Vishwanath, 1994; Calvo-Armengol & Jackson, 2004), higher job search costs and hence lower employment.

¹Evidence of similar persistence of gender disparities stemming from deep-rooted gender bias despite targeted effort is emerging in other contexts too. For example, Dupas & Jain (2023) show that the widening of public health insurance coverage in India failed to diminish gender disparities in health expenditures, primarily because the marginal beneficiary is a man. Similarly, Bernhardt *et al.* (2019) find that capital targeted at female entrepreneurs had no impact on women's enterprise profits but instead benefited men's enterprises within the household, indicating that interventions targeting women may not succeed due to men's role in the household.

²E.g. social norms (MacDonald, 1999), safety concerns (Eswaran *et al.*, 2013; Chakraborty *et al.*, 2018; Dean & Jayachandran, 2019), and disproportionate burden of home production (Afridi *et al.*, 2024).

While emerging research on the influence of digital platforms (Kelley *et al.*, 2022; Dhia *et al.*, 2022; Wheeler *et al.*, 2022) has revealed a mixed picture, there is little scientific evidence on their effectiveness in closing the gender disparity in labor markets characterized by pervasive gender norms, and the potential reasons thereof.³ Our paper fills this gap by highlighting that the impact of such new job search technologies may not be gender-neutral, particularly in settings where female labor supply decisions are shaped by intrahousehold dynamics embedded within societal norms against women’s market work. As the world’s most populous nation, India’s puzzlingly low female labor force participation rate, despite its rising economic prosperity and female education (Heath & Jayachandran, 2018), makes it the ideal setting to study this question.

Third, we contribute to the rich literature on the role of peer effects in driving economic outcomes, particularly for women.⁴ While peer effects have been shown to increase women’s employment in developed countries via social learning (Maurin & Moschion, 2009; Mota *et al.*, 2016; Nicoletti *et al.*, 2018) and conformism (Cavapozzi *et al.*, 2021), there is little empirical evidence on whether this extends to low-income settings, and specifically in the context of market work to increase women’s agency (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009). Our paper advances this literature by highlighting how the structure and composition of women’s social networks may mediate peer effects in labor markets differently in developing countries compared to advanced societies, beyond just the role of female peers (Field *et al.*, 2010, 2016; Beaman *et al.*, 2021). Within the developing country setting, our paper also extends our understanding of women’s peer effects in urban, blue-collar contexts, beyond the primarily rural, agricultural settings explored in other studies.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the intervention, experimental design, and sample. Section 3 discusses the data, summary statistics and estimation methodology. The main results are presented in Section 4, while we discuss the potential mechanisms that explain our findings in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

³Jones & Sen (2024) study gender impacts of a digital job platform in Mozambique for college students, but lack the intrahousehold lens that is unique to our study.

⁴Positive peer effects in agricultural technology adoption have been shown in (BenYishay & Mobarak, 2019; Beaman *et al.*, 2021), microfinance (Banerjee *et al.*, 2013), migration (Munshi, 2020), and specifically for women in entrepreneurial activity (Field *et al.*, 2016), family planning and contraception (Anukriti *et al.*, 2026), and autonomy (Kandpal & Baylis, 2019).

2 Intervention, Context and Experiment Design

2.1 Intervention: Job search platform

Our field experiment utilizes a hyperlocal digital job aggregator platform, [HelpersNearMe](#) (HNM). This nation-wide job-matching platform connects potential employers directly with nearby blue-collar workers for permanent or temporary hiring, much like Uber for taxi services. Since workers may connect with many potential nearby employers without physically looking for work or through any intermediaries or job contractors, this aggregation platform potentially reduces job search costs significantly (for both ends of the market). Workers register on the platform, where they provide information on previous work experience and their job preferences (including preferred distance to work and expected wages). This information then allows the platform to match registered workers with potential employers who are looking for candidates for specific job profiles based on their search preferences (e.g. location, type of work, tenure i.e. short-term gigs or long-term contracts, expected wages etc.). The employer can then call the matched worker on their registered phone number with the job offer. Thus, registered workers are mostly passive on the platform - they cannot reach out to prospective employers via the platform, but must wait to receive job offers from employers over phone. Any conversation between prospective employer and employee is off the platform, but workers can potentially call back an employer who has made an offer, refer or share employer/job details with peers. Workers may then accept a job offer according to their preferences, including location and wage.

Employers pay an upfront service charge to the platform. No payments are required of the worker for a successful match. There is a minimal expense of 100 INR (approximately 1 USD) per person (equivalent to 20-30% of average daily earnings in our sample) for platform registration to meet the cost of verification of worker identity. For our treated participants, this registration fee was paid for by our research project. Note that the platform is unique in catering to the potential constraints of blue-collar workers, particularly women. First, the platform does not require smartphone ownership by these low-income individuals (unlike most other job-matching portals). A feature phone is sufficient to receive calls from matched potential employers. This lowers barriers to entry into blue-collar jobs, especially for women who are less likely to own smartphones relative to men in our context. Second, the platform matches workers to employers hyperlocally. Hence workers can find jobs closer to home, which - as we show later, is preferred by women in our sample. Given these features, it is not surprising that in our study period, women made up 60% of all workers registered on the platform. We provide additional details about the platform, including details about the gender composition of registered individuals and types of work offered in Appendix Table

2.2 Context and Sample

Our experiment is set in low-income neighborhoods of the National Capital Region of Delhi, India. Delhi is an urban center with a relatively young population: over 52% are in the 18-45 age group (Periodic Labor Force Survey (PLFS), 2018-19), a majority of whom are married (73% of women and 56% of men). Female labor force participation in urban India is dismally low, 16.73% vs. 93.85% for men, and even lower in Delhi than the national average (by 8.98 percentage points (pp)) despite higher years of formal education than the national average (PLFS, 2018-19).

Our sampling strategy is described in Appendix Section B. Our baseline sample was drawn from households residing in 5 districts of Delhi and 11 Assembly Constituencies (AC) therein. Within each AC, a stratified random sample of about 10 polling stations (PS) was drawn, giving us a sample of 108 PS. Within each sampled PS, a household was considered eligible for the study if it had at least one married couple in the age group of 18-45 years. We randomly sampled 15 eligible households from each PS, giving us a total sample of 1,613 households who consented to be part of the study.

Appendix Figure B.1 shows the geographical spread across Delhi of the sampled 108 polling stations, which form our primary sampling unit (cluster). The average distance (straight-line) between any pair of polling stations is 10.6 kms. To minimize the risk of contamination, the polling station was chosen as the unit of randomization in our cluster RCT design, described below.

2.3 Experimental design

Our experimental design involves cluster-based randomization into two treatments and one control group:

Non-network treatment arm (T1): In this group, the job aggregator platform was introduced and offered to the couple, i.e. wife and husband, individually and in-person. Conditional on registration, the platform was expected to increase access to job opportunities for both wives and husbands.

Network treatment arm (T2): In this group, the job aggregator platform was introduced and offered to the couple (wife and husband, individually and in-person), *plus* up to two peers

⁵Using data of all workers (excluding our study sample) registered on the HNM platform up to June 2021, we find that 12.3% of job seekers were called for job openings by potential employers. Of the calls made by potential employers, 83% were made to women job seekers on the platform.

of the wife (individually over phone, to minimize survey costs). Wives are asked to nominate up to two peers for the platform registration offer (see Section 3.1 below for further details). Identity of the nominated peers was common knowledge between husbands and wives, and nominated peers were informed who their referee was. This effectively doubled the number of individuals with improved access to job information (two peers plus the couple), potentially providing households in this group access to additional information on job opportunities for wives (and husbands) that their peers may have received and shared, beyond what is available in the non-network treatment group. In addition, the network treatment may also affect social norms and attitudes towards women’s market work (Field *et al.*, 2021). The platform registration cost for these treated peers was also covered by the research project.

Control group (C): Neither the couple nor their network were offered the job aggregator platform.

The sampled 108 polling stations were randomly assigned to one of the three groups, with 36 clusters each: non-network treatment arm (T1), network treatment arm (T2), and control group (C). In both treatment arms, we visited the sampled households to provide information about the job search platform to the wife and her husband, separately in the same visit. We provided detailed information on how the job matching platform works, the registration process, and its potential benefits in obtaining work for each respondent. This was followed by showing a testimonial video, tailored to the gender of the respondent, that we developed with beneficiaries of the platform. Thereafter, we offered to register the respondent (both the wife and her husband) on the job-matching platform at no cost.

There were several reasons for bundling our intervention at the couple level. Recent research shows that in contexts with strong gender norms, husbands often hold veto power over their wives’ labor supply decisions, potentially limiting women’s participation in paid work (Lowe & McKelway, 2025). Since labor supply choices are typically made jointly within households in our scenario (Afridi *et al.*, 2024), one of our key goals was to understand how gender norms, that are particularly restrictive in our setting (Anderson & Eswaran, 2009), influence wives’ take-up of market work. To that end, both spouses were fully informed about each other’s platform registration offer and decision. Moreover, in India, women often face limited access to digital technologies due to patriarchal concerns, including fears over women’s sexual purity (Barboni, 2018). By involving husbands directly in the job search platform, we aimed to reduce potential suspicion or resistance to new technology, thereby increasing the likelihood of wives engaging with the platform.

In both treatment groups, once an individual (including nominated peer of wife) expressed interest in registering on the platform, we passed on their government issued ID and mobile phone number to the job-matching platform, which would then follow up with a phone call

to verify details and formally register the job preferences of the individual within 24 hours (the process of ‘on-boarding’).

3 Data, Summary Statistics and Estimation

3.1 Data

We utilize data from two sources in this study, described below.

Survey data

Main respondent sample: Our baseline survey was conducted between May and July 2019 at two levels: (a) household, and (b) individual. The household survey collected information on the demographic composition of the household and other socio-economic characteristics (e.g. assets, migration status, and other details from the household head). The information on household members was utilized to identify the currently married (and cohabiting) couples in the household for the individual survey. If there were multiple couples in the 18-45 age group, we selected the couple with the youngest wife, since they are likely to face tighter time constraints as well as higher labor market trade-offs with domestic and childcare work. The individual survey was conducted separately (and in privacy) with the husband and the wife to obtain information on their education, work history, work preferences, and attitudes toward women’s labor force participation and gender roles etc.

Our baseline sample consisted of 3,127 individuals (1,543 husbands and 1,584 wives) from 1,613 households across 108 polling stations, as shown in Appendix Table A.2. We restrict the data to matched husband-wife pairs interviewed at baseline, i.e. 1,514 couples.⁶

Peer sample: In the baseline survey of the main respondents, we also elicited information on the individual’s existing social network through a name-generator process using contextual/situational references.⁷ Thereafter, the respondents (both husbands and wives) were asked to rank the top four peers from their list of names in order of their self-perceived proximity/closeness with

⁶99 individuals out of the original sample of 3,127 were dropped because their spouses could not be surveyed.

⁷The main respondents were asked to name non-co-resident individuals that they most often interacted with under the following situations - (1) Emergencies: “Borrowing from, in case of emergency; for example, if you immediately need 400-500 rupees for a day and there is no one else at home you could borrow from?”, “In case of medical emergency when you need to call someone immediately to rush to the doctor/hospital and there is no one else at home”, “In your neighborhood if you have to immediately borrow food items like rice, tea, sugar, cooking fuel, etc, who would you go to?”; (2) Social activities: “Going for a walk/to the park and chatting with in free time”, “Shopping or going to local market with, for example, to buy vegetables or ration?”, “Attending social functions or festivals or going to religious places with; for example going to the temple/mosque or participating in group prayer in the colony or meeting during *Diwali* or *Chhat Puja* (festivals) celebrations etc?”; and (3) Workplace interactions: “Having lunch at work or spending your free time at work with; for example chatting or having tea while taking a break”, “Traveling to work with”.

these individuals. We also collected data from the respondents on the nature and intensity of their relationship with these peers to understand how their connection was formed and the frequency of their interaction respectively, along with these peers’ mobile numbers.⁸ We then conducted a phone survey of up to two of these four peers, moving down the list in rank order (conditional on mobile number availability). A total of 3,468 such peers were surveyed about information on gender, age, own work history, gender norms and attitudes, of which 3,462 peers were linked to our matched couples sample. This constitutes the sample of baseline peers in our study. Note that wives’ baseline peer sample is balanced across all three arms, and hence exogenous to treatment assignment (see Appendix Section B for details).

After treatment assignment, in the network treatment group we asked the wives to nominate up to two of her peers for the intervention. These nominated peers could be either (1) from the network wives’ baseline peer sample or (2) new peers. If latter, these newly nominated peers were also phone surveyed at this time for basic demographics (but not gender attitudes), and offered platform registration. We allowed endogenous peer nominations to ensure adequate platform take-up among peers, for two reasons. First, a referral from our main respondents was likely to lend the platform greater credibility with peers than an unsolicited offer from us. Second, our prior discussions with the platform suggested that individuals were more willing to share personal information (e.g., government ID) at registration when referred by someone they knew. Since our nominated peer sample is endogenous, when exploring any heterogeneous treatment effects by network characteristics, we use the conservative approach of restricting our analysis to only the baseline peer sample of wives (unconditional on nomination for intervention).

Timeline: The intervention was delivered between November 2019 and January 2020. Corresponding to the matched baseline couples sample of 1,514, we surveyed 3,462 baseline peers and 828 nominated peers at intervention stage, giving us a sample of 4,138 unique (baseline and new nominated) peers. To measure the impact of the intervention, we conducted two follow-up surveys. Endline 1 was conducted approximately 6 months after the intervention (August - November 2020) while Endline 2 was conducted about 14 months after the intervention (April - June 2021). At both endlines, we resurveyed the main respondents and their peers (including any new peers at intervention) to collect information on our main outcomes of interest.⁹ Further details of study timelines is provided in Appendix Table A.2

⁸Respondents were asked about the typical frequency of interaction (e.g. daily, 4-6 times a week, or once a week) with their peers, both in person and over the phone.

⁹Our study coincided with the pandemic-induced stringent national lockdown in India which began on March 24, 2020, and eased by August 2020. Our baseline survey of couples was conducted in person but due to onset of the pandemic, we switched to phone interviews thereafter. Our first endline in August-November 2020 was conducted entirely over the phone. The second endline survey began on April 2, 2021, with in-person

For our matched couples sample, the overall attrition is low – 97.8% of the couples were followed-up at Endline 1 and 94.2% at Endline 2. For our peer sample, we surveyed 3,529 peers at Endline 1 and 3,467 at Endline 2. A loss of connection over the phone with peers (baseline and new) was the primary reason for attrition of 14.9% at Endline 1 and 16.4% at Endline 2. See Appendix Section B for further details on sampling and attrition.

Platform data

We also obtained administrative data from the platform on the sample of registered respondents (main respondents and treated peers) reported job preferences and other demographic details at the time of registration, as well as job offers from the date of registration until June 2021.¹⁰

For the regression analysis, our data consist of couples observed at baseline and Endline 2, giving us a sample of 1,422 couples and their 3,353 (baseline) peers. We report results 14 months after intervention, i.e. at Endline 2.¹¹

3.2 Summary statistics at baseline

Appendix Table A.3 defines and summarizes the key variables of interest for our matched husband-wife sample at baseline. Panel A shows the household characteristics. The average household has 5.3 members with 19% being multi-generational (joint) families, and about 57% having a child below the age of five years. A majority of households are Hindu (82%) and over 43% of the households belong to the socioeconomically disadvantaged Scheduled Caste (SC) or Scheduled Tribe (ST) groups. Nearly two-thirds of the sample households are migrants from outside Delhi but have lived at the current location for over 28 years, on average.

interviews of almost 50% of our sample. However, given the devastating second wave of the pandemic in India, when cases surged from mid-April 2021, we switched to phone interviews from the end of April until the end of the survey round in June 2021. All peers surveys (at baseline, intervention and endline) were conducted only over the phone throughout the study.

¹⁰Once a potential employer placed a “job order” on the platform, the platform’s matching algorithm would match that job to multiple workers. This matched list would be visible to the employer in rank-order. The employer could then pay the platform to obtain matched workers’ phone numbers to make a job offer. We define a “job offer” as a click (recorded by the platform) by the employer on the phone icon (to see a worker’s phone number) against a matched worker’s name. However, actual offers were made via direct phone calls (off the platform). Therefore, the platform could not record acceptance of offers, unless self-reported by a worker or employer. We supplemented the platform data with a detailed self-reported survey of the treatment group respondents’ platform job offers (and acceptance) at both endlines.

¹¹The pandemic severely disrupted economic activity almost immediately following our intervention in 2020 (Center for Economic Performance, LSE). India’s GDP contracted by 23.9% during April-June and 7.5% in the second quarter (July-September) of the 2020-21 fiscal year as opposed to 4.2% GDP growth in 2019-20. Not surprisingly, unemployment peaked at 18.5% in the first quarter of 2020 but started to taper off from the second quarter onwards (7.5% in both July-September and October-December 2020), as demand recovered. Economic activity picked up following the easing of nationwide lockdown in August 2020.

Panel B presents the individual characteristics of the main respondents, i.e., the couple, in our sample. They are relatively young (32.7 years), with some education (over 62% have above the primary level of education) and high usage (94%) of mobile phones. Overall, almost 60% of them are working (irrespective of gender). 16% are engaged in casual labor, nearly 21% are self-employed and 22% have salaried jobs in government and private institutions.¹² Unemployment rate is low at 2.7%, while 37.7% of the sample is not looking for work, i.e., not in the labor force. The average individual earnings was 6,028 (10,793) INR per month unconditional (conditional) on work status. Finally, Panel C summarizes the characteristics of the baseline peers. These peers are comparable in age, education, and work status to the main respondents.

The treatment and control groups are pairwise balanced in terms of household characteristics (Appendix Table A.4) as well as individual characteristics of both husbands and wives (Appendix Table A.5) at baseline. Overall, our baseline data suggests successful randomization into the three arms at the household as well as the individual level. Nevertheless, we include these baseline characteristics in our main specifications to account for any potential pre-existing differences between treatment groups.

3.3 Gender differences at baseline

We document significant gender differences in key sets of baseline characteristics of our couples that are relevant to our study: labor market participation, social network structure and gender norms and attitudes.

Labor market participation: The gender differences in the overall labor force participation variables are shown in Table 1, Panel A. We find significant differences in the work characteristics of husbands and wives at baseline. Wives are 72 pp less likely to be working in the reference period than their husbands. While husbands are mostly engaged in salaried jobs, among wives who are working, the highest proportion is engaged in self-employment. More strikingly, three-fourths of the wives are not in the labor force, i.e., they are neither working nor actively looking for work. Not surprisingly, husbands earn more than ten times the average earnings of wives (unconditional on work status). Unconditional (conditional) on working, the average monthly earnings of husbands and their wives were about 11,147 INR (12,300 INR) and 908 INR (4,500 INR), respectively.

Social network structure: We also document gender differences in the baseline peer network structures of our couples as reported in Table 1, Panel B. First, wives' social networks are

¹²These labor market participation rates are based on reported main activity over the previous year at baseline.

significantly more family-centric and home-bound compared to their husbands. In particular, 96.7% of wives' peer networks consist of non-coresident relatives and neighbors compared to 59% for husbands; while only 3.1% of wives' peers are friends or co-workers, nearly 42% of husbands' peers are. The dominance of family relatives and neighbors in our data suggests significant overlap of wives' and husbands' baseline social connections.

Second, social networks are gender-homophilous, and more so for men. Almost three-fourths of wives' baseline peers are female, while more than 92% of their husbands' peers are male. Table 2 provides further details on the gender composition of wives' and husbands' social networks. 50.7% of husbands' peers (column 1-2, Panel A) and 28.3% of wives' peers (column 1-2, Panel B) are male relatives and neighbors. Note that, of the male peers of wives, 98.7% were relatives and neighbors.

Gender norms and work preferences: Appendix Table A.6 summarizes (own) responses of husbands and wives (asked in privacy) to gender attitudes and preferences about women's work. Panel A shows that while neither husbands nor wives oppose female mobility, wives are 6.5 pp more likely than husbands to support women working and almost 27 pp more likely to agree that married women should earn even if the husband provides support. However, only 33% of husbands approve of a married woman earning if her husband is capable of supporting her, suggesting a strong male breadwinner norm.

Panel B indicates a high prevalence of (own) attitudes supporting traditional gender roles among both husbands and wives. A vast majority of respondents support the view that women should be homemakers, although wives slightly less so than their husbands. Wives are more likely to believe they should support their husband's career over their own, that maternal relationship with children is worse if the mother works, but not that it negatively affects children.

These norms and attitudes also align with job preferences that women reported for themselves, and what husbands approved of for their wives, as shown in Panel C. Home-based jobs are considered the most suitable for women by both husbands (78%) and wives (81%), followed by salaried government or private sector work. This suggests a general preference for work that is flexible, requires limited mobility, yet is 'high status' for married women.

Using data on women working at baseline, we find that engagement in self-employment activities (e.g. family-run retail shops, tailoring) and casual labor is relatively less time intensive, requiring on average 4.5 hours per day, compared to 6.5 hours in a salaried job. Further, self-employment is typically undertaken within household premises or residential localities, while casual labor and salaried work entail travel to work. But while monthly earnings of self-employed women averaged 2,695 INR, those engaged in casual labor and salaried jobs were earning 3,333 INR and 7,686 INR, respectively. These descriptive statistics

suggest that higher flexibility of home-based work for women comes at the cost of nearly three times the average monthly earnings they could earn in relatively less flexible salaried work.¹³

Furthermore, relatives and neighbors, who overwhelmingly comprised wives' peer networks, were more likely to hold regressive gender attitudes (Appendix Table A.7), and be less supportive of women doing market work, compared to friends or co-workers.

3.4 Summary statistics at intervention

As discussed earlier, network treatment wives could nominate peers from their baseline list as well as from outside the list. Table 2, Panel C provides details on the gender composition and relationship type of these nominated peers of network treatment wives. Similar to the baseline peers (Panel B), nominated peers (Panel C) show a high degree of gender homophily (80%) and home-bound structure (94%). However, balance tests in Appendix Section B comparing the observable characteristics (for which we have data) between baseline and newly nominated peers reveal imbalance (Appendix Table B.1). New peers were significantly younger and less likely to be married. Additionally, relatives and neighbors comprised a slightly smaller proportion of new peers (93%). Together, these data confirm endogenous peer nomination by network treatment wives. We did not elicit gender attitudes from new peers at the time of their nomination during intervention. However, data from our baseline peers show that younger peers, who were significantly more likely to be the friends of main respondents ($p < 0.01$), typically held less conservative gender attitudes than relatives or neighbors (see Appendix Table A.7) at baseline. Moreover, using Predictive Mean Matching (PMM), we find that the imputed distribution of newly nominated peers' gender attitudes using the actual distribution of matched baseline peers (shown in Appendix Figure B.2 in Appendix B) reinforces the evidence above that newly nominated peers were likely to hold less regressive gender attitudes than baseline peers prior to the intervention.

Table 3 summarizes the take-up of the intervention by the main respondents and wives' nominated peers.¹⁴ Of the main respondents offered treatment, interest in registering was higher in the non-network group and higher for husbands overall (70% of husbands and 65% of wives). As shown in Panel A, the overall gender difference is primarily due to husbands in the non-network group showing significantly greater interest than wives (73.4% vs. 65%),

¹³Of course, some of these differences may be attributable to selection effects.

¹⁴The platform did not provide us with the phone numbers of the universe of registered workers, due to which we are unable to locate any control group respondents on the HNM platform. However, at endline we asked all respondents (irrespective of treatment status) whether they were aware of the HNM platform. About 10% of the control group report being aware of the HNM platform in our endline survey, of which 7% knew of HNM through relatives or friends.

while there is an insignificant gender difference in interest in the network group. In fact, the proportion of wives who showed interest is similar in both treatment groups (about 64%). This implies that the gender gap in interest was significantly smaller in the network treatment group compared to the non-network one (see columns 1-2 in Appendix Table A.8).

Actual registration rates from the platform data are shown in Table 3, Panel B. Unconditional on interest, registration rates (25% overall) were (insignificantly) higher in the network treatment group than the non-network group, both overall and by gender. Within each treatment group, registration is insignificantly higher for husbands relative to wives, but the gender gap in registration does not differ across treatment arms. Conditional on interest, both wives and husbands register at higher rates in the network group than the non-network group (significantly so for husbands), but the gender gap is statistically indistinguishable between arms (columns 5-6 in Appendix Table A.8). Among the network group wives' nominated peers who were offered registration (Panel C), the proportion interested in and registered on the platform was higher at 70% and 32.9% respectively (compared to 65% and 26.5% for the main respondents in the network group), with no gender differences.¹⁵

Appendix Table A.9 estimates the effect of treatment on registration and receipt of job offers from the platform (both using platform data) by endline. Assignment to treatment is a strong predictor of the probability of platform registration (columns 1 - 2) and weakly predicts job offers through the platform (low F-stat for columns 3 - 4). While the average registration rate was 25%, the receipt of job offers was overall low (about 2% unconditional on registration) but higher, though insignificantly, in the network treatment group. Further, we do not find any significant difference in the job offer rate between wives and husbands.¹⁶

3.5 Estimation strategy and outcomes

Our empirical specification distinguishes between the two types of treatments to estimate and compare their impact, in an ANCOVA model as follows:

$$Y_{iv} = \alpha + \beta^1 T_v^1 + \beta^2 T_v^2 + \phi Y_{iv}^0 + X_{iv} + \mu_{iv} \quad (1)$$

¹⁵Besides individuals declining to formally register after showing interest, registrations could fail due to verification issues at the platform's end. Note that while it is possible that respondents in the non-network group could, on their own, inform their peers about the platform, our data confirm very few actually did. Only 4% of non-treated peers report being informed about the platform by their friends/relatives, and of those, only 0.07% registered on the platform (data from both our survey and the platform). Of the treated peers, 98% reported being informed about the portal by our research team.

¹⁶From the start of the intervention to the endline, a total of 115 job offers were received by 476 individuals who registered on the platform in the treatment group, yielding a job offer rate of 0.24 jobs per registered individual. Only two of these offers were self-reported to be accepted. The estimated effects of treatment on registration and job offers are robust to using the platform or self-reported data.

where T_v^1 is a dummy variable indicating whether cluster v is assigned to the couples-only i.e. non-network treatment, while T_v^2 is a dummy variable indicating whether cluster v is assigned to the couple plus the wife’s peers, i.e. network treatment.

We are interested in two sets of primary outcome measures, Y_{iv} :

1. **Labor market outcomes** of individual i (i =wife, husband) in cluster v at endline. These include (i) *Work status* (extensive margin of work) which is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if an individual reports being engaged in an occupation over the past 3 months and zero otherwise; (ii) *Work days* which is the number of days worked in a month and *Work hours* which is number of hours worked in a day (intensive margin of work); and (iii) *monthly labor earnings*. The occupation categories are dummy variables constructed on the basis of the main occupation in the previous quarter.¹⁷ Note that we use the terms employment and (market) work interchangeably – both terms include any remunerative work, either through paid jobs or self-employment.

2. **Gender attitudes** of individual i in cluster v at endline. These include questions relating to progressive attitudes: (i) *Women’s mobility*: “In your opinion, is it acceptable for an adult woman to travel outside the locality if she wants to?”; (ii) *Women’s market work*: “In your opinion, should an adult woman work outside of home if she wants to?”; (iii) *Breadwinner norm*: “Do you approve of a married woman earning money if she has a husband capable of supporting her?”; (iv) *Sharing domestic chores*: “In your opinion, if the wife is working outside the home, should the husband help her with household/care duties?” We also measure four regressive gender attitudes.¹⁸

For each of these questions, the dependent variable is constructed as the standardized Z-score ($Z(y) = \frac{y - \bar{Y}}{sd}$ of the responses (yes=1; no=0) where, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean value of y for the control group and sd is the standard-deviation for the control group).

Y_{iv}^0 is the corresponding baseline labor market or gender attitude outcome of individual i in cluster v . X_{iv} are a set of baseline characteristics of individual i in cluster v that may affect

¹⁷We first asked about the main activity of an individual over the previous quarter, from the date of the survey. Work status is a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent is engaged in casual labor, self-employment or salaried work during this reference period, and zero otherwise. For this reference period, we then asked days worked in a typical month, the average number of hours worked in a day, and the monthly earnings. Note that we did not ask whether the current work was offered or accepted via the HNM platform or not.

¹⁸The regressive attitudes are as follows: (i) *Gendered home production*: “It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the home and family”; (ii) *Support husband career*: “It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to have one herself”; (iii) *Children suffer*: “When a mother works for pay, the children suffer”; (iv) *Maternal relationship*: “A working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work”.

these outcomes. These include household characteristics (household asset index, dummy for joint family, number of under-5 children, dummy for belonging to marginalized groups (i.e. scheduled caste (SC) or scheduled tribe (ST)), dummy for Hindu religion, dummy for migrant status, years living in current location) and individual characteristics (education of the individual, age, occupation code, and mobile phone usage).¹⁹

We interpret the coefficients estimated from equation (1) as the reduced-form, intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates. We also obtain treatment-on-treated (ToT) estimates by instrumenting a binary variable that equals one if the individual is reported as ‘registered’ on the HNM platform data and zero otherwise, with dummy variables for random assignment to treatment (separate dummy variables for non-network treatment and network treatment) using a 2SLS estimation model. We interpret the ToT estimates as the effect of the intervention for a given level of platform registration. The control variables included in all specifications are the same as discussed above. The standard errors are clustered by the unit of randomization (polling station) throughout.

4 Results

4.1 Labor market outcomes

Table 4, Panel A reports ITT estimates of our intervention on labor supply, both extensive and intensive margins, and monthly labor earnings, by gender. Throughout, we report results by treatment group as per equation (1) for the 14-month endline.²⁰

Extensive margin of work: We find a negative, though statistically insignificant, treatment effect on the work status of both wives and husbands in the non-network treatment group (Panel A, columns 1-2). In contrast, we find a small positive, though statistically insignificant, treatment effect for wives in the network treatment group, and a significant improvement in their husbands’ likelihood of working by 4.4 percentage points (pp) relative to the control group, equivalent to 4.7% of the baseline mean of nearly 94.3% male employment.²¹ Notably,

¹⁹The estimation strategy, including the list of control variables, is as per the pre-registered analysis plan. See Table A.3 for details on the construction of the occupation and other variables, including the asset index. Due to missing data on some control variables or outcomes, the analysis sample is reduced to 1,377 husbands and 1,377 wives. Further, we trim the ‘hours worked in a day’ at 14 hours to address outliers, due to which we lose 53 observations for husbands and 2 for wives for this outcome.

²⁰We find insignificant effects 6 months after intervention (Endline 1) using equation (1), attributable to the economic shutdown during the pandemic (see Appendix Table A.11 in the working paper Afridi *et al.* (2023)).

²¹We also analyze the heterogeneity in these treatment effects by baseline demographic characteristics. We find no statistically significant difference in the outcomes of wives or husbands in the network treatment group by poverty status, caste, religion, education (own or spouse), and having young children (aged 5 or

the estimated effect for the network treatment husbands is more than double that for their non-network counterparts ($p < 0.01$).

Intensive margin of work: In line with the extensive margin results, we find that wives in the non-network treatment group report large reductions in intensity of work, both in terms of monthly workdays by 1.23 days (nearly 25% of sample mean) and daily work hours by 0.36 hours (nearly 35% of sample mean), relative to the control group (Panel A, columns 3 and 5), while their husbands reported significantly greater intensity of work in terms of monthly workdays (Panel A, column 4) by 1.5 days (6.8% of sample mean). The work hours of non-network husbands also increased, but insignificantly (Panel A, column 6).

In contrast, wives in the network treatment group did not experience any significant decline on either dimension of their work intensity (Panel A, columns 3 and 5). Their husbands also reported greater intensity of work, both in terms of working 1.9 additional workdays per month (8.4% of sample mean) and 0.64 additional hours per day on average (7.9% of sample mean) in Panel A, columns 4 and 6, with the latter effect being marginally stronger than their non-network counterparts.

Earnings: Finally, we examine whether the observed impact on labor supply affected individual monthly labor earnings using a Poisson model (Chen & Roth, 2024) to account for zero earnings of non-working respondents, in Table 4, columns 7 and 8. Consistent with their reduced work intensity, wives in the non-network treatment experienced a contraction in their earnings by 57.4% relative to the control group (Panel A, column 7, $p < 0.01$), that appears to be somewhat compensated by their husbands’ gain in earnings of 10.2% (Panel A, column 8), due to increased work intensity. In contrast, wives in the network treatment group experienced a significantly smaller earnings loss of 32% (Panel A, column 7) compared to their non-network treatment counterparts ($p = 0.07$), while their husbands enjoyed similar gains in labor earnings as the non-network treatment husbands ($p = 0.71$).

ToT estimates: Given the relatively moderate platform registration rates (about 25% among main respondents and 35% among treated peers), we also obtain treatment-on-treated (ToT) estimates by instrumenting for registration on the portal with random assignment to treatment (either non-network or network treatment) in Table 4, Panel B. Our findings remain qualitatively unchanged, but somewhat larger in magnitude than the reduced form estimates in Table 4, Panel A. Specifically, the estimated impacts on work status, work days and work hours continue to be significantly different between the two groups of wives (p -values 0.016, 0.009 and 0.038 respectively), indicating that non-network treatment wives were more likely

below). However, the treatment effect for husbands in the network treatment group is driven by the relatively older husbands (aged 30-45 years) with no significant effect on younger husbands aged below 30 years. See Appendix Table A.12 in Afridi *et al.* (2023).

to withdraw from work as compared to network treatment wives. For registered husbands too, the ToT estimate for overall likelihood of working is significantly positive for network treatment husbands at 14.5 pp, indicating an increase in their employment at the extensive margin (Panel B, column 2). Treatment effects for workdays and work hours (~ 6.3 , $p < 0.05$; ~ 2.1 , $p < 0.10$ respectively) also continue to be significant. Treatment effects on monthly earnings for husbands in both groups remain insignificantly different (column 8).²²

4.2 Gender attitudes

Next, we examine whether our intervention shifted gender attitudes. Table 5 shows the impact of our intervention on progressive gender attitudes using equation (1). Panel A reports the ITT estimates while Panel B shows the ToT estimates. A positive coefficient indicates strengthening of progressive gender attitudes.

We find that wives in both treatment groups became generally more supportive of women’s mobility (Panel A, column 1; insignificantly for network treatment wives), women’s market work (column 3) and sharing of domestic chores (column 7). The imprecisely estimated negative coefficients in column 5 are suggestive of a modest strengthening of the male breadwinner norm among wives. However, no differential effects are observed on progressive attitudes of network treatment wives compared to the non-network treatment ones (except in column 1). The ToT results for wives in Panel B show similar findings.

In contrast, we observe no significant impact on the attitudes of husbands in the non-network treatment group towards married women’s mobility (column 2), work (column 4) and sharing household chores (column 8). However, husbands in the network treatment group were significantly more likely to support women’s market work, with a 0.15 standard deviation increase, and this is significantly different from the negligible estimated effect for their non-network treatment counterparts ($p = 0.06$; column 4). Network group husbands were also (insignificantly) more likely to favor sharing domestic responsibility. Similar to wives, the negative coefficients in column 6 suggest a modest strengthening of the male breadwinner norm among husbands, though this effect does not differ significantly between treatment groups. The ToT results for husbands in Panel B remain qualitatively similar.

In addition, we find a weakening of husbands’ regressive gender attitudes about traditional gender roles and impact of maternal work on children across both treatment groups, with statistically insignificant differences between the network and non-network groups for the former (see Appendix Table A.11, columns 2 and 4), but marginally significant difference

²²Appendix Table A.10 shows the combined treatment (i.e., individual assigned to either non-network (T1) or network group (T2), relative to control group) impacts for all the labor market outcomes, by gender, in Panel A (ITT) and Panel B (ToT).

in the latter in favor of network treatment group (column 6). We also find greater concern among network treatment husbands that the maternal relationship suffers if the mother works (column 8), though the point estimates are statistically insignificant.²³ Wives in both treatment groups also became less regressive in their views about gender roles and maternal employment (columns 1, 3 and 5). Like their husbands, the network treatment wives were also slightly more likely to believe working impairs maternal relationships relative to the non-network wives (column 7), but these estimated effects are again small and insignificant.

Taken together, gender attitudes improved broadly (though not uniformly) across most measures in both treatment groups, but the shift was significantly larger for network treatment husbands compared to their non-network counterparts for norms related to married women’s market work and its implications for children. Since husbands’ attitudes are relevant for their wives’ decision to engage in market work owing to customs of male guardianship (similar to other countries like Saudi Arabia, as discussed in [Bursztyn *et al.* \(2020\)](#)), this suggests that the intervention may have led to a weakening of attitudes against wives’ market work, but only in the network treatment group.

To summarize, our key findings are as follows:

1. Access to the job matching platform led to a degree of substitutability in the labor supply of wives and husbands in the non-network treatment group. Husbands increased their intensive margin of work and consequently, their own (labor) earnings, while their wives withdrew from the labor market.
2. In contrast, couples in the network treatment group did not, on average, experience such substitutability. Husbands significantly increased their labor supply, across both intensive and extensive margins, without triggering a fall in that of their wives’.
3. Employment effects for husbands in network treatment group were stronger on the extensive margin, and comparable on the intensive margin and earnings, relative to the non-network treatment group.
4. Both spouses’ gender attitudes improved across multiple norms for both treatment groups, with the network group husbands showing larger gains on norms related to women’s market work than their non-network counterparts.

²³That our measures of gender attitudes do not all move in tandem is consistent with [Anderson \(2025\)](#), who finds that men’s traditional stereotypical behaviors do not necessarily correlate in many conservative societies. Therefore, a possible reconciliation of the opposing effects on the two attitudes relating to impact on children may be that the network group husbands hold these two beliefs simultaneously without contradiction – that a mother’s employment strains her bond with her children, yet children need not suffer if fathers (or other family members) compensate by taking on more domestic responsibility.

4.3 Robustness checks

In this section, we present multiple robustness checks of our main results.

Attrition bias: As mentioned previously, the overall attrition rate at Endline 2 was low at 5.81%, but it was significantly different across the three groups and higher for the treatment groups (5.87% in T1, 8.45% in T2 and 3.16% in control). We also test for selective attrition by comparing the differences in the average baseline characteristics of individuals who remained in the sample at endline and those who did not, between treatment groups (see Appendix Table A.12). We find that some baseline characteristics are significant predictors of attrition. To address concerns related to selective attrition, therefore, we conduct three robustness checks of our main results: (1) entropy balancing; (2) Inverse Probability Weights; and (3) Lee bounds.

For entropy balancing (Appendix Table A.13), we re-estimate our baseline specification using weights to ensure that all control variables are balanced across the treatment and control groups. This approach makes the distribution of these covariates statistically identical between the three groups, thus addressing the concerns of selective attrition. The entropy balancing results for our main variables of interest show similar magnitudes and levels of significance as in our main specification in Table 4 and Table 5. To address concerns of selective attrition using the Inverse Probability Weighting (IPW), we first estimate the propensity scores of being present at Endline 2, i.e., the likelihood of being observed at the second endline given the observed control variables. We use these propensity scores to re-weight the sample. The IPW results shown in Appendix Table A.14 indicate similar magnitudes and levels of significance as our main results in Table 4 and Table 5.

Finally, we estimate Lee bounds (Lee, 2009) on treatment impacts and report the lower and upper bounds in Appendix Table A.15. The lower (upper) bounds are estimated under the assumption that individuals with the lowest (largest) treatment effects attrited. Therefore, the true treatment effect lies somewhere within the range of these bounds. The bounds indicate that the differential impacts on the network and non-network groups reported in Table 4 remain valid even when we account for selective attrition - in Panel A of Appendix Table A.15, labor force participation outcomes of T1 wives have negative lower and upper bounds (except earnings), but the bounds on the T2 wives are insignificantly positive for work status (column 1) and workdays (column 3). The upper (lower) bound for T2 husbands is significantly (insignificantly) positive for all outcomes in Panel A. In Panel B, the upper (lower) bound for T2 husbands is significantly (insignificantly) positive but insignificant for T1 husbands for progressive attitude towards women’s market work (column 12). Our overall results remain qualitatively robust, indicating that they are not driven by selective attrition.

Multiple hypothesis testing: Since we examine the impact of the intervention on seven labor market outcomes, this may raise the concern that these effects are simply observed by chance among all of the different outcome variables. We compute Michael Anderson’s False Discovery Rate (FDR) q -values which computes the expected proportion of rejections that are Type I errors (false rejections). Using this method, we adjust the p -values of our main estimates for multiple hypothesis testing. Our ITT estimates for employment on the extensive and intensive margin and for earnings are robust to concerns about multiple hypothesis testing (Appendix Table A.16, Panel A). Also, consistent with the results discussed previously, network husbands’ progressive attitude towards women’s market work improves marginally (Panel B, column 4), while there is a general easing of gender regressive attitudes towards traditional gender roles and impact on children across both treatment groups (Panel C, columns 2, 4 and 6).

Randomization inference testing: The experiment involved 108 polling stations randomly assigned to three treatment categories with 36 clusters in each group. While the number of clusters in each group is sufficient (Kish, 1965), we nevertheless conduct two checks that our estimates are asymptotically valid: (1) randomization inference p -values from tests of the sharp null that the treatment did not have any impact and (2) wild-cluster bootstrap of standard errors. Our results are robust to this concern as shown by the p -values for the estimates reported in Appendix Table A.17.

5 Discussion and Mechanisms

In this section, we elaborate on our three key labor supply findings, and attempt to shed light on potential mechanisms that explain these results through the lens of gender norms and the structure of spouses’ peer networks.

A. Substitutability in spousal labor supply in non-network treatment group:

Increased labor supply by husbands and reduced labor supply by wives

Our first key finding is that when access to the job platform is simultaneously presented to both spouses, it may boost husbands’ labor supply but reduce that of wives. Husbands in the non-network treatment group increased their work intensity while wives experienced a decline in labor market engagement, specifically work days and work hours. The most plausible explanation for this finding is a (weak) income effect from husbands’ increased earnings in this group owing to their higher work intensity (in conjunction with the prevailing norm against women’s work), as shown in Table 4. This explanation is consistent with the extensive literature on the estimated negative cross-wage elasticity of married women’s

labor supply found in different settings (Blundell *et al.*, 1998; Devereux, 2004; Zhang, 2014; Albanesi & Prados, 2022). It also aligns with the U-shaped hypothesis of female labor force participation (Goldin (1995)), which argues that women’s employment declines initially with economic development due to rising male wages and shifts toward family-based roles, before increasing again as economies move toward service-oriented sectors along with a rise in women’s education levels. The reduction in work status among non-network wives mirrors the early declining phase of Goldin’s U-curve, where traditional expectations and limited support structures discourage female labor force participation, particularly in socially conservative settings such as ours.

While we did not collect detailed time-use data for our respondents, we did ask wives about the amount of time they spent on domestic work. In Appendix Table A.18, we find a marginal decline in time spent on domestic work by non-network treatment wives ($p < 0.10$), and no change for network treatment wives at endline, consistent with a possible increase in non-network wives’ leisure hours due to an income effect.

B. No substitutability in spousal labor supply in network treatment group:

Increased labor supply by husbands, and also by wives relative to non-network group

Our second key finding is that substitutability in spousal labor supply weakens when access to the job platform is provided to both wives (along with husbands) and their peers simultaneously in the network treatment group. This occurs even though husbands in this group experienced significantly larger gains in likelihood of being employed compared to those in the non-network treatment group (discussed in further detail below). A plausible explanation is that the network treatment may have relaxed existing social norms that discourage wives’ market work, thereby diluting any negative income effect (attributable to the improved labor market outcomes of husbands) on wives’ labor supply.

We provide evidence in support of this explanation as follows. First, we show that the overall null effect on network treatment wives’ labor supply masks a compositional shift in occupational structure, as presented in Table 6. A decline in casual labor supply among (some) network treatment wives (Table 6, column 5), imprecisely measured but similar in magnitude to that experienced by non-network treatment wives (p -value=0.602), is offset by a 4.5 percentage point increase in self-employment (Table 6, column 1), primarily due to previously non-working women starting self-employment (see the transition matrices in Appendix Figure A.1a and Figure A.1b)²⁴. In other words, while the aggregate employment

²⁴The increase in wives’ self-employment is driven by take-up of ‘own business in manufacturing’ (see Appendix Table A.21 in Afridi *et al.* (2023)) such as tailoring, which women often run independently of their husbands or family. Hence the nature of self-employment is akin to ‘work outside home’, but also offers greater flexibility in work hours than wage employment.

effect for network treatment wives appears minimal compared to the control group, there’s an important shift in the type of work they do – some exit casual labor, likely due to the income effect from their husbands’ increased earnings (similar to the non-network treatment group), while others, previously not in the labor force, take up self-employment. In contrast, the drop in employment among non-network treatment wives appears to stem from their withdrawal from casual labor without a similar compensating shift towards other types of work (Table 6, column 5).

This brings us to the second step. Why would some wives in the network treatment group start working if higher spousal income usually leads to a reduction in women’s labor supply in the presence of regressive gender norms (Goldin, 1995)? Based on our findings on gender attitudes presented in Section 4.2, we speculate that this may be driven by the weakening of norms against women’s market work observed in the network treatment group. Network treatment husbands became significantly more supportive of women’s market work, ($p < 0.10$, Table 5, column 4),²⁵ potentially helping to mitigate any negative income effect.²⁶ We also provide two pieces of suggestive evidence that norm constraints may have been loosened by network wives’ peers. First, Table 7 shows that having baseline peers with above-median progressive attitudes toward women’s market work and male breadwinner norm significantly predicts higher endline employment for network treatment wives (columns 2 and 3), but not their non-network counterparts. This suggests that by strengthening ties to existing progressive peers, the network treatment may have eased norm constraints on wives’ labor supply. Second, any easing of such constraints may have been further aided by endogenous nomination of less regressive peers by network wives at intervention (as discussed in Section 3.1). Since the analysis in Table 7 uses the full baseline peer sample rather than nominated peer sample (to avoid endogenous peer selection concerns), it likely understates the actual peer effects, which may be potentially stronger with nominated peers at endline.²⁷

²⁵While some other gender attitudes also improved among husbands, there are no significant differences between network treatment and non-network treatment husbands (see Appendix Table A.11), as discussed previously.

²⁶We do not find any empirical support for a potential alternative explanation that such increased self-employment among wives in the network treatment group is driven by an income effect via husband’s earnings, e.g. if husbands used their higher earnings to invest in new business enterprises for their wives. Instead, the rise in self-employment appears to be concentrated among wives whose husbands were already employed at baseline, with no positive association with improvements in husbands’ employment status or earnings over time.

²⁷Estimates in Appendix Table A.19 show that baseline peers’ progressive attitudes weakened significantly more in the non-network group relative to the network group for three out of four attitudes. Similarly, Appendix Table A.20 shows that three out of four regressive gender attitudes of baseline peers strengthened in the non-network treatment, relative to the network group, except for the last norm. This differential is driven by men, as suggested by the more pronounced worsening of gender attitudes amongst male peers (columns 3 vs 4 in Panel B of Tables A.19 and A.20, and columns 7 vs 8 in Panel B of Table A.19). One possible explanation of such worsening of peers’ gender attitudes in the non-network group is backlash against the

Overall, our evidence suggests that shifts in gender attitudes of husbands and (endogenously) of peers may have made flexible, albeit less remunerative, market work by women such as self-employment more acceptable. We cannot comment on the directionality of the attitude shifts, i.e. whether from husband to wife’s nominated peers or vice versa, as it is beyond the scope of our analysis.²⁸

C. Increased labor supply of husbands on the extensive margin in network treatment group, relative to non-network group

Our third key finding is that network treatment husbands were more likely to be employed, not just relative to control group, but also in comparison to their non-network treatment counterparts. We suggest that this finding may be explained by the overlapping nature of peer networks between wives and husbands, particularly the presence of male relatives and neighbors, facilitating greater job information sharing among men (i.e. husbands and male peers of wives) in the network treatment group. As previously discussed in Section 3.3, almost 93% of the social network of husbands is male, and nearly 51% of husbands’ peer networks in baseline consist of male relatives and neighbors, as does 28% of wives’ networks. These male peers of wives are likely to be socially connected to their husbands since they are family relations and nearby neighbors. Hence the extent of overlap between spouses’ social networks may be an important driver of the positive employment effects enjoyed by the network treatment husbands.

We find suggestive evidence in support of this explanation, shown in Appendix Table A.21, Panel A. Using only baseline peers, we show that network husbands whose wives nominated baseline peers that were relatives or neighbors (column 2) or male (column 4), were significantly more likely to be employed at endline. In particular, the husband’s employment probability is significantly higher by 4.1 (5.2) percentage points ($p < 0.05$) when the nominated baseline peer was a relative/neighbor (male) rather than friend/co-worker (female). Since the overwhelming majority of male peers of wives were relatives and neighbors (both at baseline and intervention), the results here suggest that the differential impact on network treatment husbands’ work status may be attributable to sharing of labor market information with nominated peers who were male, non-coresiding relatives or neighbors of

offer of job platform to wives but not male peers. However, we remain agnostic as to the specific mechanism, as our data do not allow us to distinguish between competing explanations.

²⁸A plausible alternative explanation for our findings could be that access to the job platform affected individuals’ beliefs about the labor market in general (Abebe *et al.*, 2020; Bandiera *et al.*, 2021; Banerjee & Sequeira, 2023; Caria *et al.*, 2024), including information on job opportunities outside the platform, that subsequently impacted their labor market outcomes, rather than actual job offers from the platform *per se* (which were low at 0.24 offers per registered person). Nevertheless, our interpretation of the intrahousehold dynamics of the impact of access to the job platform still holds.

their wives.²⁹

5.1 Alternative explanations

In this section, we attempt to rule out other possible explanations for our results.

Intra-household bargaining power: The collective household model would suggest that improved employment opportunities (and consequently labor market outcomes) for husbands, relative to wives (in both treatments), might cause an exogenous increase in husbands' relative bargaining power - this could lead to wives dropping out of the labor force or reducing their work hours, along with a reallocation of household production tasks to wives. However, we do not find evidence of any increase in the relative bargaining power of husbands in either treatment group, as shown by the index of decision-making power in Appendix Table A.22.³⁰

Gender differences in technology take-up: Are women less likely to take up new digital technology resulting in our observed gender-differentiated treatment effects? As Appendix Table A.8 shows, there is no statistically significant gender difference in the take-up of the technology as measured by registration on the platform, whether unconditional or conditional.³¹ Of course, both wives and husbands have higher platform registration rates in the network treatment group (significant for latter) relative to the non-network group (Appendix Table A.8, columns 5 - 6), consistent with positive peer effects in take-up, but we find no statistically significant gender differences therein. Moreover, the fact that our collaborating platform did not require a smartphone (only a basic mobile phone) and offered several jobs that women traditionally prefer (as discussed previously in Appendix Table A.1), addresses any concern that women were less likely to take-up our intervention.

Insufficient demand for women's labor: Did women's employment not increase because there were just no jobs for women, especially in the backdrop of potentially systematic gender differences in the recovery of the labor market during the post-pandemic period? The descriptive evidence appears to belie this concern. First, the job offer rate for wives was similar (but insignificantly higher) to that of their husbands both overall (1.5% vs 1.2%,

²⁹Network wives' baseline male peers were differentially more likely to be employed at endline, relative to the non-network group (see columns 2 and 4, Panel B of Appendix Table A.21). This also suggests that social competition for jobs, which would discourage information sharing between husbands and their wives' male peers, is unlikely to explain the higher employment rate of husbands in the network group.

³⁰If anything, contrary to expectations, the insignificant negative coefficients on husbands taking decisions independently suggests that there may have been a shift towards joint decision-making between wives and husbands, particularly in the network group as indicated by the (insignificantly) larger negative coefficients in columns 1 - 2 of Appendix Table A.22.

³¹Furthermore, since registration could be completed by just having a simple mobile phone, we check for, but do not find, any heterogeneity in our results by mobile phone ownership or usage of the respondent.

respectively) and within the non-network (1.8% vs 1.5%) and network groups (2.6% vs 2.0%), as indicated by Appendix Table A.9. Second, looking at the broader time trends of female labor force participation in Delhi and urban India post-pandemic (see Appendix Figure A.3 in Afridi *et al.* (2023)), we find that female employment rates had already begun to recover from losses during the pandemic around the time of our endline in 2021, indicating the potential of digital job search platforms in further boosting demand for women’s labor at this time.

Post-pandemic recovery of male employment: Could the increase in employment rates of husbands in the network treatment group be driven by a recovery response to sharp male job losses during the pandemic? We find no differential employment outcomes for husbands in the network treatment group, either by job loss during the pandemic or work status right after the pandemic-induced lockdown at Endline 1. Thus, husbands in the network treatment group who lost their jobs during the pandemic or were not employed up to 6 months after (at Endline 1) show a similar impact of the intervention as husbands who did not lose their jobs during the pandemic or found work (see Appendix Table A.25 in Afridi *et al.* (2023)).

Network-mediated access to women’s market work: Finally, we check for any heterogeneity in treatment effects by the average minimum distance between the polling station in which the respondent resided and the closest factory (the average minimum distance was 1.4 km, while the average maximum distance was 3.9 km). We do not find any differential treatment effects, suggesting that network-mediated access to work opportunities – for instance, changes in labor demand during the pandemic that wives in the network treatment group took advantage of through their network (such as stitching face masks from home and supplying to the factory) – does not drive the self-employment results (see Table Appendix Table A.27 in Afridi *et al.* (2023)).

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we study the impact of offering access to new job search technology, in the form of a digital job matching platform, to married couples, either on their own or alongside the wife’s peer network, in a setting with entrenched social norms against women’s market work. We find that platform access improved husbands’ labor outcomes, but not wives’, unless the latter’s peer networks were also treated. In the non-network treatment, wives reduced their labor supply, primarily by exiting casual work, while husbands increased theirs, suggesting a substitution effect. In contrast, the network treatment weakened this trade-off: husbands were more likely to participate in the labor market without negatively affecting wives’ labor supply on average, as (some) wives in this group were more likely to shift into self-employment. Such

tempering of the negative impact on wives' labor supply in the network treatment group may be attributable to improved attitudes among their husbands toward married women working outside home, accompanied by less conservative gender attitudes among nominated peers in the wives' social network.

Our results underscore two areas for future research. First, while we assess the impacts of information on, and access to, a new job search technology, our findings also draw attention to the importance of studying the effect of such technologies on labor market beliefs and expectations (and any gender differences therein) to better understand the pathways through which they can impact labor market outcomes (Caria *et al.*, 2024). Second, our findings show that though restrictive social norms limit women's ability to benefit from job opportunities (Jayachandran, 2021), home-bound peer networks can both ameliorate and reinforce such barriers. Hence, our results have implications for the development of effective interventions that expand women's networks beyond family boundaries. This may be critical to ensure that new technologies do not exacerbate existing gender inequities in the labor market, constituting a promising area for future research.

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Table 1: Work status and social networks, by gender (at baseline)

	Wife	Husband	Wife - Husband
Panel A: Labor Force Participation			
Working	0.235 (0.424)	0.956 (0.204)	-0.721***
<i>Casual labor</i>	0.075 (0.263)	0.254 (0.435)	-0.179***
<i>Self-employed</i>	0.114 (0.318)	0.302 (0.459)	-0.188***
<i>Salaried</i>	0.045 (0.207)	0.397 (0.489)	-0.352***
Unemployed	0.018 (0.135)	0.036 (0.186)	-0.017***
Not in labor force	0.746 (0.435)	0.008 (0.089)	0.738***
Monthly earnings (INR)	908.482 (2929.567)	11146.818 (16969.754)	-10238.336***
N	1514	1514	
Panel B: Social Network (by relationship type)			
(Non co-resident) Relative	0.787 (0.337)	0.430 (0.410)	0.356***
Neighbor	0.180 (0.318)	0.160 (0.296)	0.020*
Friend	0.031 (0.135)	0.350 (0.402)	-0.318***
Co-worker	0.002 (0.038)	0.060 (0.188)	-0.057***
Gender homophily	0.713 (0.404)	0.926 (0.235)	-0.213***
N	1514	1514	

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs at baseline. In **Panel A**, we report the labor force participation characteristics of wives and husbands at baseline. An individual is either working, unemployed (and looking for work) or not in labor force (not working and not looking for work). Working status is classified into three categories - (1) Casual labor, (2) Self-employment and (3) Salaried work. In **Panel B**, the baseline social network of an individual is classified on the basis of relationship type at baseline. These can be relatives (who are not co-residing with the respondent), friends, neighbors or co-workers. ‘Gender homophily’ is a binary variable that equals one if the gender of the peer matches the gender of the main respondent. Gender data missing for peers who could not be surveyed. The last column reports the difference in the mean value for wife and husband (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table 2: Structure of social network, by gender

	Male Peer Type				Female Peer Type			
	Relative (1)	Neighbor (2)	Friend (3)	Co-worker (4)	Relative (5)	Neighbor (6)	Friend (7)	Co-worker (8)
Panel A: Husband (all, at baseline)								
Prop of network	0.386 (0.442)	0.121 (0.295)	0.364 (0.441)	0.055 (0.210)	0.051 (0.198)	0.019 (0.122)	0.003 (0.048)	0.001 (0.032)
Age (in years)	37.028 (11.375)	36.760 (10.883)	33.493 (9.033)	34.511 (10.091)	41.822 (12.456)	40.636 (11.710)	39.000 (16.492)	36.667 (18.717)
Prop. married	0.850 (0.358)	0.801 (0.400)	0.760 (0.427)	0.787 (0.411)	0.956 (0.207)	0.970 (0.174)	1.000 (0.000)	0.333 (0.577)
N	679	221	680	94	90	33	5	3
Panel B: Wife (all, at baseline)								
Prop of network	0.233 (0.377)	0.050 (0.197)	0.004 (0.061)	0.001 (0.030)	0.572 (0.446)	0.116 (0.290)	0.024 (0.127)	0.001 (0.033)
Age (in years)	35.647 (12.058)	36.065 (12.653)	32.600 (7.436)	32.000	37.682 (12.413)	35.957 (10.148)	29.156 (8.003)	40.000 (16.971)
Prop. married	0.777 (0.416)	0.805 (0.399)	0.800 (0.447)	1.000	0.942 (0.233)	0.941 (0.236)	0.800 (0.405)	1.000 (0.000)
N	382	77	5	1	936	187	45	2
Panel C: Wife (T2, at intervention)								
Prop of network	0.104 (0.241)	0.085 (0.217)	0.013 (0.094)	0	0.371 (0.394)	0.380 (0.402)	0.048 (0.173)	0
Age (in years)	32.291 (10.461)	31.103 (10.802)	29.636 (9.437)		35.800 (11.749)	33.878 (9.296)	31.231 (6.911)	
Prop. married	0.686 (0.467)	0.574 (0.498)	0.545 (0.522)		0.866 (0.342)	0.865 (0.342)	0.872 (0.339)	
N	86	68	11	0	305	319	39	0

Note: The sample consists of baseline peers of matched husband-wife pairs (**Panels A and B**), and nominated peers of wives in the network treatment group (T2), both from baseline list and newly nominated at intervention (**Panel C**) for whom demographic data are available. Panels A and B report the type of relationship of the top two rank-ordered peers of the husband and the wife surveyed at baseline, respectively. In Panel C, the sample is restricted to the two nominated (and surveyed) peers of wives only in the network treatment group (T2). Peer relationship as reported by the main respondent. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Summary of interest in and registration rates on job platform, by gender

Variable	Overall (1)	Wife (2)	Husband (3)	Wife - Husband (4)
Panel A: Main sample (Interest in registering, %)				
T1 (non-network)	69.178 (N=1022)	64.971 (N=511)	73.386 (N=511)	[0.004]
T2 (network)	64.889 (N=994)	64.185 (N=497)	65.594 (N=497)	[0.642]
T1 vs T2 [p -value]	[0.041]	[0.795]	[0.007]	
Panel B: Main sample (Registration, %)				
T1 (non-network)	23.679 (N=1022)	21.526 (N=511)	25.832 (N=511)	[0.106]
T2 (network)	26.459 (N=994)	24.547 (N=497)	28.370 (N=497)	[0.172]
T1 vs T2 [p -value]	[0.150]	[0.255]	[0.365]	
Panel C: Wives' peers in network group (T2), %				
	Overall	Female peer	Male peer	Female - Male
Interest	69.928 (N=828)	69.382 (N=663)	72.121 (N=165)	[0.493]
Registration	32.850 (N=828)	32.278 (N=663)	35.152 (N=165)	[0.482]

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs at baseline (**Panels A and B**) and the nominated peers of wives in network treatment group (T2) (**Panel C**, nominated from baseline peers and any new peers at intervention). Panel A summarizes the self-reported *Interest rate* of the main sample (husband and wife) in registering on the portal. Panel B reports the actual platform *Registration rate* of the main sample from the platform data. Panel C summarizes self-reported interest and actual registration rates from the platform data by all nominated peers of the wives in T2 (who were offered registration at intervention). Column (1) shows the means for both wives and husbands, column (2) shows the statistics for wives (or female peer), column (3) for husbands (or male peer). p -value of the gender difference is shown in column (4) in square brackets. The number of respondents (N) is in parentheses.

Table 4: Impact of treatment on own labor market outcomes

	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
Panel A: Reduced-form (ITT)								
T1 (non-network)	-0.044 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.020)	-1.228** (0.591)	1.539* (0.820)	-0.364** (0.176)	0.206 (0.338)	-0.854*** (0.232)	0.097* (0.056)
T2 (network)	0.019 (0.029)	0.044** (0.020)	0.286 (0.639)	1.901** (0.830)	-0.020 (0.182)	0.642* (0.348)	-0.386** (0.183)	0.080 (0.055)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.019]	[0.002]	[0.012]	[0.541]	[0.055]	[0.086]	[0.065]	[0.709]
Panel B: ToT (2SLS)								
Registered in T1 (non-network)	-0.200 (0.124)	-0.067 (0.077)	-5.652** (2.760)	5.892* (3.093)	-1.679** (0.825)	0.796 (1.268)	-4.082*** (1.443)	0.379* (0.214)
Registered in T2 (network)	0.071 (0.114)	0.145** (0.064)	1.069 (2.470)	6.269** (2.729)	-0.088 (0.702)	2.096* (1.122)	-0.842 (1.163)	0.269 (0.182)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.016]	[0.002]	[0.009]	[0.859]	[0.038]	[0.145]	[0.015]	[0.484]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,375	1,325	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.233	0.943	5.004	22.753	1.053	8.148	889.069	11515.433

Note: **Panel A** reports the reduced-form ITT results. **Panel B** reports ToT results using a 2SLS estimation model where we instrument platform registration with a dummy for assignment to either T1 or T2. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable that takes a value one if an individual is working in the reference period and zero otherwise. In columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) the dependent variable is the number of days worked in a month and the number of hours worked in a day (trimmed at 14 hours per day), respectively. In columns (7)-(8) monthly earnings has a Poisson distribution (where we report the implied estimate of the proportional effect, $E[Y(1) - Y(0)]/E[Y(0)]$, calculated as $\exp(\beta) - 1$). The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). ‘Mean Y’ denotes the mean value of the corresponding dependent variable in levels for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in the current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. The matched couple sample reduces to from 1,422 due to missing baseline data on some covariates and outcomes. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table 5: Impact of treatment on own progressive gender attitudes

Panel A: Reduced-form (ITT)								
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.215*** (0.071)	-0.012 (0.078)	0.128** (0.063)	0.019 (0.071)	-0.072 (0.074)	-0.138* (0.081)	0.150** (0.068)	-0.030 (0.068)
T2 (network)	0.047 (0.089)	-0.142 (0.087)	0.169*** (0.061)	0.147** (0.065)	-0.138* (0.073)	-0.221** (0.086)	0.135* (0.070)	0.028 (0.062)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.045]	[0.174]	[0.395]	[0.064]	[0.383]	[0.257]	[0.756]	[0.422]
Panel B: ToT (2SLS)								
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
Registered in T1 (non-network)	0.987*** (0.344)	-0.049 (0.296)	0.590** (0.292)	0.077 (0.267)	-0.331 (0.335)	-0.526* (0.306)	0.691** (0.322)	-0.113 (0.257)
Registered in T2 (network)	0.185 (0.340)	-0.469* (0.279)	0.658*** (0.246)	0.487** (0.214)	-0.535* (0.288)	-0.728** (0.289)	0.528* (0.270)	0.092 (0.202)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.026]	[0.202]	[0.770]	[0.094]	[0.530]	[0.460]	[0.475]	[0.422]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,377	1,376	1,373	1,377	1,374
Mean Y	0.016	0.003	0.109	-0.116	0.282	-0.273	-0.066	0.073

Note: The dependent variables are standardized Z-scores ($Z(y) = \frac{y - \bar{Y}}{sd}$ where, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean value of y for the control group and sd is the standard-deviation for the control group) of the response (yes/no) to a statement on gender attitudes: Column (1) - (2): In your opinion, is it acceptable for an adult woman to travel outside the locality if she wants to?; Column (3) - (4): In your opinion, should an adult woman work outside of home if she wants to?; Column (5)- (6): Do you approve of a married woman earning money if she has a husband capable of supporting her?; Column (7) - (8): In your opinion, if the wife is working outside the home, should the husband help her with household/care duties? **Panel A** reports the ITT estimates while **Panel B** reports the ToT estimates. The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). ‘Mean Y’ denotes the mean value of the dependent variable for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 6: Impact of treatment on own type of work

Employment Type	Self-employed		Salaried		Casual labor	
	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Reduced-form (ITT)						
T1 (non-network)	-0.013 (0.014)	0.042 (0.026)	0.001 (0.011)	0.016 (0.029)	-0.034* (0.020)	-0.067* (0.036)
T2 (network)	0.045** (0.022)	0.030 (0.031)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.039 (0.031)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.016 (0.039)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.003]	[0.682]	[0.810]	[0.457]	[0.602]	[0.184]
Panel B: ToT (2SLS)						
Registered in T1 (non-network)	-0.062 (0.065)	0.159 (0.100)	0.004 (0.050)	0.062 (0.108)	-0.157 (0.097)	-0.254* (0.136)
Registered in T2 (network)	0.173** (0.087)	0.097 (0.102)	-0.008 (0.043)	0.128 (0.103)	-0.098 (0.066)	-0.049 (0.127)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.003]	[0.542]	[0.815]	[0.543]	[0.462]	[0.134]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.117	0.322	0.051	0.387	0.063	0.231

Note: **Panel A** reports the reduced-form ITT results. **Panel B** reports ToT results using a 2SLS estimation model where we instrument platform registration with a dummy for assignment to either T1 or T2. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for type of work. In columns(1)-(2), it takes value one if an individual is self-employed and zero otherwise. Similarly, columns (3)-(4) and columns (5)-(6) are indicator variables for salaried and casual labor, respectively. The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). ‘Mean Y’ denotes the mean value of the dependent variable for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 7: Impact of baseline peer's gender attitude on wife's overall work status

Z	Wife's work status			
	Women's mobility (1)	Women's market work (2)	Breadwinner norm (3)	Sharing domestic chores (4)
T1 (non-network)	-0.021 (0.034)	-0.070 (0.050)	-0.075** (0.035)	-0.144* (0.080)
T2 (network)	-0.004 (0.034)	-0.074 (0.058)	-0.008 (0.035)	0.108 (0.099)
T1 x Z	-0.053 (0.044)	0.025 (0.058)	0.058 (0.048)	0.099 (0.086)
T2 x Z	0.064 (0.042)	0.134** (0.067)	0.091* (0.052)	-0.084 (0.107)
<i>p</i> -value [T1 x Z=T2 x Z]	[0.007]	[0.076]	[0.530]	[0.029]
Observations	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031
Mean Y	0.180	0.180	0.180	0.180

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the wife is working in the reference period and zero otherwise. Columns (1)-(4) report the heterogeneity results of the wife's employment by the baseline median Z-score of the norm of her peers. The median cutoff is constructed using the average Z-score of the norm across all baseline peers of the wife, and an above-median indicator is created that takes a value of 1 when the average Z-score of peers is equal to or above its median value. Columns (1) reports the coefficient for the norm of women's mobility, column (2) for women's market work, column (3) for the breadwinner norm, and column (4) for sharing of domestic chores. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in the current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. The sample consists of wives with matched peer data. Standard errors clustered at the PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

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A Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Registrations on HNM job platform, by occupation and gender

Job Profiles	Worker registrations			Featured for job opening			Called for job	
	All (1)	Female (2)	Distance (3)	All (4)	Female (5)	Distance (6)	All (7)	Female (8)
Overall	78493	0.574	5.509	18071	0.822	2.741	11866	0.833
Babysitter	1870	1.000	3.056	1439	1.000	2.347	981	1.000
Beautician	713	0.924	4.530	46	1.000	6.362	31	1.000
Cook	3493	0.873	3.583	5932	0.855	2.223	3799	0.869
Driver	3544	0.003	9.294	1033	0.003	5.470	619	0.002
Electronic Technician	609	0.013	11.360					
Maid/domestic helper	19775	0.874	3.606	8751	0.933	2.632	5849	0.942
Medicinal Helper	691	0.547	7.267	48	0.458	7.513	27	0.407
Office Helper	25485	0.376	6.595	383	0.188	3.984	239	0.138
Other	1463	0.174	8.190	95	0.000	6.330	70	0.000
Other Helper	13210	0.695	4.667	124	0.226	4.119	85	0.188
Other Technician	985	0.038	8.582	34	0.000	4.143	23	0.000
Salesperson	6655	0.414	6.786	186	0.011	5.217	143	0.000

Note: This table summarizes the job profiles of the universe of all workers (excluding our study sample) registered on the HNM portal and the job profiles for which they were ‘featured’ or listed for employers and (phone) called by employers from the date of registration up to June 2021. Columns (1)-(3) list the preferences of registered workers - the total number of job profiles workers registered for (column (1)), the proportion of women in the total works registered (column (2)), and the distance they are willing to travel (in km) (column (3)). Columns (4)-(6) record the number of workers who were featured for each job (column (4)), the proportion of women featured for each job (column (5)), and the average distance of the worker from employer (column (6)). Columns (7)-(8) list the number of workers who were called (column (7)) for the featured job and the proportion of women called for that jobs (column (8)). *Other* includes job profiles of skilled construction worker/mason, Machine Operator, Bartender, Supervisor. *Other Helper* includes Salon Helper, Stitching Helper, Security Guard. And *Other Technician* comprises Construction Painter, Electronic Technician, Construction Carpenter, Construction Plumber.

Table A.2: Timeline of study

Date	Round	Unit	Full Sample	Matched Sample			
				Total	Control	T1	T2
May-July 2019	Baseline	Household	1613	1514	506	511	497
		Individual	3127	3028	1012	1022	994
		Peers	3468	3462	1124	1186	1152
Nov 2019–Jan 2020	Intervention	Household	1549	1423	482	476	465
		Individual	2972	2846	964	952	930
		Nominated Peers	893	828	-	-	828
		<i>Baseline</i>	153	152	-	-	152
		<i>New</i>	740	676	-	-	676
Apr-Aug 2020	Nation-wide Lockdown Due to Covid-19 Pandemic						
Aug-Nov 2020	Endline 1	Household	1588	1481	501	494	486
		Individual	3069	2962	1002	988	972
		Peers	3583	3529	1001	1056	1472
Apr-June 2021	Endline 2	Household	1555	1426	490	481	455
		Individual	2981	2852	980	962	910
		Peers	3522	3467	970	1004	1493

Note: Households in all three arms were surveyed at intervention, while only the peers in the network arm (T2) were contacted at intervention. Due to the pandemic the timeline of Endline 1 and Endline 2 was delayed from the original 3 and 6 months post intervention (as per the pre-analysis plan), respectively. Throughout the regression analysis we utilize a sample of 1,377 wives and husbands, with data on all covariates, who are observed at baseline and Endline 2. Due to missing covariate data 2 wives and 2 husbands are unmatched to their spouse. Nominated peers for intervention by wives in the network arm were either selected from the baseline list of peers or were new peers not listed at baseline.

Table A.3: Summary statistics (at baseline)

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Definition
Panel A: Household Characteristics				
Household size	1514	5.294	1.837	number of household members
Joint family	1514	0.193	0.395	=1 if more than one couple present in the household, 0 otherwise
Young children	1514	0.573	0.704	=1 if the couple has children below 5 years of age, 0 otherwise
Hindu	1514	0.823	0.382	=1 if household reports Hindu religion, 0 otherwise
SC/ST	1510	0.438	0.496	=1 if household belongs to scheduled Caste or Tribe, 0 otherwise
Asset Index	1471	-0.002	0.999	PCA of assets
Native	1514	0.359	0.480	=1 if household native of Delhi, 0 otherwise
Years of stay	1512	28.755	14.082	number of years the household has stayed in current location
Panel B: Individual Characteristics				
Age	3028	32.714	6.522	years
Education	3025	0.624	0.484	=1 if above primary level of education, 0 otherwise
Mobile phone usage	3028	0.940	0.238	=1 if use mobile phone, 0 otherwise
Working	3028	0.596	0.491	=1 if working, 0 otherwise
Casual labor	3028	0.164	0.370	=1 if working for wages in factories, construction, domestic help or other casual activities, 0 otherwise
Self-employed	3028	0.208	0.406	=1 if self-employed in retail, own business manufacturing or other self-employment activities, 0 otherwise
Salaried	3028	0.221	0.415	=1 if working as salaried employee in government or non-government organisations, 0 otherwise
Unemployed	3028	0.027	0.162	=1 if not working but looking for work, 0 otherwise
Not in labor force	3028	0.377	0.485	=1 if not working and not looking for work, 0 otherwise
Earnings	3028	6027.650	13207.688	Monthly income (in INR)
Earnings (Conditional)	1691	10793.449	16154.852	Monthly income conditional on being employed
Panel C: Network Characteristics				
Age	3460	36.239	11.385	in years
Female	3462	0.378	0.485	=1 for females, 0 otherwise
Education	3456	0.655	0.476	=1 if above primary level of education, 0 otherwise
Working	3462	0.639	0.480	=1 if working, 0 otherwise
Unemployed	3462	0.055	0.228	=1 if not working but looking for work, 0 otherwise
Not in labor force	3462	0.306	0.461	=1 if not working and not looking for work, 0 otherwise

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs and their peers at baseline. SC/ST is an indicator variable for belonging to the marginalized Schedule Caste or Tribe category. The *Asset Index* is constructed using the principal components analysis (PCA) on the households' ownership of different assets (flat, box TV, LCD TV, fridge, clock, stove, cycle, bike, car fan, cooler, AC, computer, mobile, sewing machine, agricultural land, rented land and farm animals).

Table A.4: Balance on household characteristics (at baseline)

	Control	Treatment		Difference		
	C	T1	T2	C-T1	C-T2	T1-T2
	(N=506)	(N=511)	(N=497)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Household size	5.308 (0.086)	5.256 (0.068)	5.318 (0.089)	0.052 (0.109)	-0.010 (0.123)	-0.062 (0.111)
SC/ST	0.405 (0.038)	0.445 (0.043)	0.464 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.057)	-0.059 (0.057)	-0.019 (0.060)
OBC	0.344 (0.037)	0.313 (0.028)	0.302 (0.032)	0.031 (0.046)	0.041 (0.048)	0.011 (0.042)
Hindu	0.789 (0.048)	0.869 (0.038)	0.811 (0.041)	-0.080 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.063)	0.058 (0.055)
Pucca house	0.964 (0.014)	0.959 (0.013)	0.970 (0.015)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)
Have tapped water	1.263 (0.032)	1.249 (0.031)	1.276 (0.037)	0.014 (0.044)	-0.013 (0.048)	-0.027 (0.048)
Have ration card	0.638 (0.026)	0.593 (0.032)	0.630 (0.022)	0.045 (0.041)	0.008 (0.034)	-0.037 (0.039)
Asset Index	-0.042 (0.062)	0.006 (0.072)	0.031 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.095)	-0.073 (0.083)	-0.025 (0.091)
Years staying in current location	28.433 (0.904)	29.108 (1.001)	28.722 (0.977)	-0.675 (1.339)	-0.289 (1.322)	0.386 (1.389)
Joint family	0.208 (0.019)	0.182 (0.022)	0.189 (0.015)	0.026 (0.029)	0.018 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.027)
Number of young children	0.593 (0.037)	0.562 (0.029)	0.565 (0.035)	0.031 (0.046)	0.027 (0.050)	-0.004 (0.045)
Native of Delhi	0.346 (0.032)	0.372 (0.043)	0.358 (0.040)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.012 (0.051)	0.014 (0.058)
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance	-	-	-	[0.757]	[0.879]	[0.354]

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs at baseline. T1 denotes treatment where only main respondents (husband-wife pair) were offered the job aggregator service, T2 represents treatment in which the main respondents and two of the wife's peers were offered this service and C denotes the control group where no such service was offered. Fewer observations for some characteristics due to missing data. The *p*-values reported in the last row of the table correspond to F-test of joint significance of household characteristics in determining the treatment status in a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the PS level, are reported in parentheses (***p*<0.01, ***p*<0.05, **p*<0.1).

Table A.5: Balance on individual characteristics (at baseline)

	Wife						Husband					
	Control			Treatment			Difference			Control		
	C			T1			C-T1			T2		
	(N=506)			(N=511)			(N=497)			(N=506)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Asset Index	-0.042 (0.062)	0.006 (0.072)	0.031 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.095)	-0.073 (0.083)	-0.025 (0.091)	-0.042 (0.062)	0.006 (0.072)	0.031 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.095)	-0.073 (0.083)	-0.025 (0.091)
Joint family	0.208 (0.019)	0.182 (0.022)	0.189 (0.015)	0.026 (0.029)	0.018 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.027)	0.208 (0.019)	0.182 (0.022)	0.189 (0.015)	0.026 (0.029)	0.018 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.027)
Number of young children	0.593 (0.037)	0.562 (0.029)	0.565 (0.035)	0.031 (0.046)	0.027 (0.050)	-0.004 (0.045)	0.593 (0.037)	0.562 (0.029)	0.565 (0.035)	0.031 (0.046)	0.027 (0.050)	-0.004 (0.045)
SC/ST	0.405 (0.038)	0.445 (0.043)	0.464 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.057)	-0.059 (0.057)	-0.019 (0.060)	0.405 (0.038)	0.445 (0.043)	0.464 (0.043)	-0.040 (0.057)	-0.059 (0.057)	-0.019 (0.060)
Hindu	0.789 (0.048)	0.869 (0.038)	0.811 (0.041)	-0.080 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.063)	0.058 (0.055)	0.789 (0.048)	0.869 (0.038)	0.811 (0.041)	-0.080 (0.061)	-0.022 (0.063)	0.058 (0.055)
Native	0.346 (0.032)	0.372 (0.043)	0.358 (0.040)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.012 (0.051)	0.014 (0.058)	0.346 (0.032)	0.372 (0.043)	0.358 (0.040)	-0.026 (0.053)	-0.012 (0.051)	0.014 (0.058)
Years of stay	28.433 (0.904)	29.108 (1.001)	28.722 (0.977)	-0.675 (1.339)	-0.289 (1.322)	0.386 (1.389)	28.433 (0.904)	29.108 (1.001)	28.722 (0.977)	-0.675 (1.339)	-0.289 (1.322)	0.386 (1.389)
Education	0.590 (0.026)	0.551 (0.035)	0.567 (0.033)	0.039 (0.043)	0.023 (0.041)	-0.016 (0.047)	0.673 (0.030)	0.671 (0.033)	0.694 (0.031)	0.002 (0.044)	-0.021 (0.043)	-0.023 (0.045)
Age	30.547 (0.306)	30.777 (0.284)	30.934 (0.290)	-0.229 (0.415)	-0.386 (0.418)	-0.157 (0.403)	34.579 (0.347)	34.622 (0.332)	34.833 (0.301)	-0.043 (0.477)	-0.254 (0.456)	-0.211 (0.445)
Mobile phone usage	0.915 (0.020)	0.894 (0.021)	0.913 (0.017)	0.021 (0.029)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.019 (0.027)	0.962 (0.010)	0.977 (0.010)	0.978 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.001 (0.013)
Casual labor	0.063 (0.012)	0.084 (0.017)	0.076 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.021)	0.008 (0.024)	0.235 (0.028)	0.239 (0.026)	0.288 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.038)	-0.053 (0.039)	-0.049 (0.037)
Self-employed	0.123 (0.017)	0.102 (0.015)	0.119 (0.017)	0.021 (0.023)	0.004 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.023)	0.322 (0.023)	0.290 (0.025)	0.294 (0.031)	0.033 (0.034)	0.028 (0.038)	-0.004 (0.039)
Salaried	0.049 (0.012)	0.041 (0.010)	0.044 (0.010)	0.008 (0.015)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.379 (0.030)	0.431 (0.030)	0.380 (0.029)	-0.051 (0.042)	-0.001 (0.042)	0.050 (0.042)
Work days (per month)	5.162 (0.516)	5.276 (0.489)	5.215 (0.454)	-0.114 (0.706)	-0.053 (0.683)	0.061 (0.662)	22.719 (0.365)	23.022 (0.424)	22.648 (0.437)	-0.302 (0.556)	0.071 (0.566)	0.374 (0.605)
Work hours (per day)	1.075 (0.116)	1.188 (0.113)	1.105 (0.104)	-0.113 (0.161)	-0.030 (0.155)	0.083 (0.153)	8.148 (0.142)	8.425 (0.192)	8.404 (0.185)	-0.277 (0.237)	-0.255 (0.232)	0.021 (0.265)
Earnings (per month)	879.249 (140.569)	975.618 (164.297)	869.215 (102.368)	-96.369 (214.803)	10.034 (172.751)	106.403 (192.306)	11426.135 (991.707)	11307.284 (875.785)	10697.457 (356.331)	118.851 (1314.354)	728.678 (1046.856)	609.827 (939.285)
Index of progressive gender attitudes	0.041 (0.033)	0.002 (0.032)	0.070 (0.032)	0.040 (0.046)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.069 (0.045)	-0.050 (0.041)	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.007 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.062)	-0.043 (0.052)	-0.010 (0.057)
Index of regressive gender attitudes	0.080 (0.039)	0.062 (0.037)	0.081 (0.039)	0.018 (0.053)	0.000 (0.054)	-0.018 (0.054)	-0.078 (0.028)	-0.060 (0.035)	-0.092 (0.045)	-0.018 (0.044)	0.014 (0.052)	0.032 (0.056)
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance				[0.210]	[0.983]	[0.354]				[0.416]	[0.228]	[0.449]

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs at baseline. T1 denotes treatment where only main respondents (husband-wife pair) were offered the job aggregator service, T2 represents treatment in which the main respondents and two of the wife's peers were offered this service and C denotes the control group where no such service was offered. The Indexes of gender attitudes are standardized Z-scores of binary responses to gender attitude statements/questions (Kling *et al.*, 2007). Fewer observations for some characteristics due to missing data. The *p*-values reported in the last row of the table correspond to F-test of joint significance of individual characteristics in determining the treatment status in a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the PS level, are reported in parentheses (** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table A.6: Attitudes and preferences towards women's work, by gender (at baseline)

	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife - Husband (3)
Panel A: Progressive gender attitudes			
Woman can travel outside locality	0.876 (0.330)	0.880 (0.325)	-0.004
Woman can work outside home	0.909 (0.287)	0.845 (0.362)	0.065***
Woman can work even if husband provides	0.601 (0.490)	0.333 (0.471)	0.268***
If woman works husband shares domestic duties	0.950 (0.218)	0.975 (0.157)	-0.025***
N	1513	1506	
Panel B: Regressive gender attitudes			
Woman should take care of home	0.798 (0.402)	0.875 (0.330)	-0.078***
Woman should support husband's career	0.863 (0.344)	0.728 (0.445)	0.135***
If mother works children suffer	0.878 (0.328)	0.878 (0.327)	0.000
If mother works maternal relationship suffers	0.365 (0.482)	0.300 (0.458)	0.065***
N	1513	1510	
Panel C: Job preferences for women			
Salaried	0.674 (0.469)	0.775 (0.417)	-0.102***
Casual	0.078 (0.268)	0.032 (0.177)	0.046***
Domestic help	0.022 (0.146)	0.008 (0.089)	0.014***
Home-based	0.812 (0.391)	0.782 (0.413)	0.030**
Should not work	0.018 (0.135)	0.030 (0.170)	-0.011**
N	1514	1514	

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs at baseline. In Panels A and B, each row is an indicator variable that takes value one if an individual agrees with a statement, and zero otherwise. In **Panel A**, the statements corresponding to each row were: (1) In your opinion, is it acceptable for an adult woman to travel outside the locality if she wants to?; (2) In your opinion, should an adult woman work outside of home if she wants to?; (3) Do you approve of a married woman earning money if she has a husband capable of supporting her?; (4) In your opinion, if the wife is working outside the home, should the husband help her with household/care duties? In **Panel B**, the corresponding questions were: (1) It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the home and family; (2) It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself; (3) When a mother works for pay, the children suffer; (4) A working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. **Panel C** lists the type of jobs considered suitable for themselves by wives (column (1)) and by husbands for their wives (column (2)). Each row of the table indicates a type of job which takes value one if an individual reported it to be suitable for herself/wife and zero otherwise. *Salaried* indicates job in govt or private establishment (e.g. office, school, hospital), *Casual* indicates factory-based or construction work, *Domestic help* is domestic work, *Home – based* is work from home and *Not work* represents preference for not working at all. Column (3) reports the gender differences (***) $p < 0.01$, (**) $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7: Peers' gender attitudes (at baseline)

Peers	Wife's peers			Husband's peers		
	Relative/ Neighbor	Friend/ Co-worker	Difference	Relative/ Neighbor	Friends/ Co-worker	Difference
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Progressive gender attitudes						
Woman can travel outside locality	0.616 (0.486)	0.920 (0.274)	-0.304***	0.662 (0.473)	0.679 (0.467)	-0.017
Woman can work outside home	0.821 (0.383)	0.900 (0.303)	-0.079	0.782 (0.413)	0.797 (0.402)	-0.015
Woman can work even if husband provides	0.333 (0.471)	0.600 (0.495)	-0.267***	0.281 (0.450)	0.308 (0.462)	-0.026
If woman works husband shares domestic duties	0.955 (0.207)	1.000 (0.000)	-0.045	0.982 (0.133)	0.971 (0.168)	0.011
N	1538	50		1002	760	
Panel B: Regressive gender attitudes						
Woman should take care of home	0.831 (0.375)	0.600 (0.495)	0.231***	0.816 (0.387)	0.801 (0.399)	0.015
Woman should support husband's career	0.900 (0.300)	0.800 (0.404)	0.100**	0.875 (0.331)	0.834 (0.372)	0.041**
If mother works children suffer	0.872 (0.334)	0.740 (0.443)	0.132***	0.816 (0.387)	0.836 (0.371)	-0.019
If mother works poor relationship with children	0.600 (0.490)	0.480 (0.505)	0.120*	0.577 (0.494)	0.559 (0.497)	0.018
N	1538	50		1002	760	

Note: The sample consists of baseline peers of matched husband-wife pairs. In Panels A and B, each row is an indicator variable that takes value one if the peer agrees with a statement, and zero otherwise. In **Panel A**, the statements corresponding to each row were: (1) In your opinion, is it acceptable for an adult woman to travel outside the locality if she wants to?; (2) In your opinion, should an adult woman work outside of home if she wants to?; (3) Do you approve of a married woman earning money if she has a husband capable of supporting her?; (4) In your opinion, if the wife is working outside the home, should the husband help her with household/care duties? In **Panel B**, the corresponding questions were: (1) It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the home and family; (2) It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself; (3) When a mother works for pay, the children suffer; (4) A working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. Columns (1)-(2) report the average attitudes of wives' peers who are no-co-residing relatives or neighbors and friends or co-workers, respectively, followed by the difference in the means (column (3)). Similarly, for husbands' peers, columns (4) and (5) report the average attitudes of relatives or neighbors and friends or co-workers in the social network, respectively, followed by the difference in the means (column (6)) (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.8: Impact of treatment on interest in and registration on the platform

	Interested		Registered (Unconditional)		Registered (Conditional on interest)	
	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T2 (network)	-0.022 (0.050)	-0.090** (0.042)	0.027 (0.032)	0.030 (0.026)	0.055 (0.042)	0.091** (0.035)
Difference (Wife-Husband)		0.068** (0.034)		-0.003 (0.035)		-0.035 (0.048)
Observations	942	943	942	943	610	661
Mean T2	0.64	0.655	0.243	0.287	0.373	0.429
Mean T1	0.648	0.736	0.215	0.254	0.323	0.343

Note: The sample consists of matched husband-wife pairs in T1 and T2 at baseline. The dependent variables are indicator variables that take value one if an individual (self) reports being interested in registering on the portal (columns (1)-(2)), registers on the portal (column (3)-(4)) unconditional on being interested to register, and registers on the portal conditional on being interested in registering (column (5)-(6)). Columns (3) - (6) use data from the portal. The first row reports the impact of T2 relative to the benchmark category of T1. The second row (*Difference*) reports difference in the estimated coefficients of each dependent variable for the wife and the husband. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9: Impact of treatment on registration and job-offers on the platform

	Registered		Received job offer	
	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T1 (non-network)	0.217*** (0.023)	0.261*** (0.019)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.015*** (0.005)
T2 (network)	0.257*** (0.024)	0.305*** (0.019)	0.026*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.006)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.228]	[0.105]	[0.396]	[0.503]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0	0	0	0
F-stat	15.592	32.445	1.744	1.251

Note: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable that take value one if an individual is registered on the platform as per the platform data, and 0 otherwise. In columns (3)-(4) the dependent variable takes value one for an individual if their phone number was procured by an employer on the portal, and 0 otherwise. Coefficients reported from an OLS model. The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms. ‘Mean Y’ reports the mean of the dependent variable for the control group and ‘F-stat’ reports the F-statistic from the regression. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors, clustered at PS level, are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.10: Impact of overall treatment on own labor market outcomes

	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
Panel A: Reduced-form (ITT)								
Treatment	-0.013 (0.025)	0.012 (0.018)	-0.484 (0.545)	1.715** (0.771)	-0.195 (0.157)	0.420 (0.320)	-0.620*** (0.167)	0.089* (0.051)
Panel B: ToT (2SLS)								
Registered	-0.055 (0.104)	0.042 (0.063)	-2.040 (2.279)	6.087** (2.712)	-0.825 (0.656)	1.474 (1.109)	-1.929* (1.086)	0.322* (0.182)
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,375	1,325	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.233	0.943	5.004	22.753	1.053	8.148	889.069	11515.433

Note: **Panel A** reports the reduced-form ITT results for overall treatment (i.e., individual assigned to either T1 or T2). **Panel B** reports ToT results using a 2SLS estimation model where we instrument platform registration with a dummy for assignment to either T1 or T2. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if an individual is working in the reference period and zero otherwise. In columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) the dependent variable is the number of days worked in a month and the number of hours worked in a day, respectively. In columns (7)-(8) monthly earnings has a Poisson distribution. ‘Mean Y’ denotes the mean value of the corresponding dependent variable in levels for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in the current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table A.11: Impact of treatment on own regressive gender attitudes

Panel A: Reduced-form (ITT)								
	Gendered home production		Support husbands career		Children suffer		Maternal relationship suffers	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.452*** (0.143)	-0.453*** (0.085)	-0.272** (0.136)	-0.303*** (0.097)	-0.168* (0.093)	-0.025 (0.073)	-0.007 (0.102)	-0.114 (0.117)
T2 (network)	-0.430*** (0.136)	-0.489*** (0.106)	-0.104 (0.120)	-0.171* (0.102)	-0.237** (0.099)	-0.183* (0.097)	0.192 (0.116)	0.189 (0.130)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.894]	[0.770]	[0.213]	[0.268]	[0.474]	[0.101]	[0.060]	[0.010]
Panel B: ToT (2SLS)								
	Gendered home production		Support husbands career		Children suffer		Maternal relationship suffers	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
Registered in T1 (non-network)	-2.084*** (0.700)	-1.730*** (0.346)	-1.255* (0.643)	-1.161*** (0.368)	-0.773* (0.418)	-0.102 (0.274)	-0.030 (0.464)	-0.429 (0.438)
Registered in T2 (network)	-1.688*** (0.570)	-1.605*** (0.355)	-0.414 (0.461)	-0.561* (0.334)	-0.921** (0.390)	-0.605* (0.317)	0.744* (0.446)	0.632 (0.417)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.598]	[0.789]	[0.159]	[0.159]	[0.716]	[0.124]	[0.073]	[0.009]
Observations	1,376	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,376	1,375	1,377	1,375
Mean Y	-0.098	0.088	0.207	-0.222	-0.019	0.024	0.054	-0.101

Note: The dependent variables are standardized Z-scores ($Z(y) = \frac{y - \bar{Y}}{sd}$ where, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean value of y for the control group and sd is the standard-deviation for the control group) of the responses to the following statements on gender attitudes: Column (1)-(2): It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the home and family; Column (3)-(4): It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself; Column (5)-(6): When a mother works for pay, the children suffer; Column (7)-(8): A working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). 'Mean Y' denotes the mean value of the dependent variable for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.12: Attrition by individual and household characteristics at baseline

	Wife						Husband					
	Control		Treatment		Difference		Control		Treatment		Difference	
	C	T1	T2	C-T1	C-T2	T1-T2	C	T1	T2	C-T1	C-T2	T1-T2
	(N=486)	(N=494)	(N=480)				(N=469)	(N=478)	(N=468)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Asset Index	-0.008** (0.003)	0.001 (0.018)	-0.022** (0.009)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.008** (0.003)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.025*** (0.008)	0.009 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.026 (0.019)
Joint family	-0.016 (0.024)	0.012 (0.027)	0.051 (0.048)	0.027 (0.035)	0.067 (0.054)	0.039 (0.055)	-0.021 (0.026)	0.034 (0.031)	0.049 (0.044)	0.055 (0.040)	0.070 (0.051)	0.015 (0.054)
Number of young children	0.009 (0.012)	-0.007 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.028)	0.006 (0.030)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.032)	0.003 (0.033)
SC/ST	0.023 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.024)	-0.025 (0.033)	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.004 (0.038)	0.031* (0.016)	-0.006 (0.029)	0.012 (0.025)	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.030)	0.018 (0.038)
Hindu	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.001 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.034)	0.038 (0.042)	0.032 (0.040)	-0.006 (0.049)	-0.043 (0.026)	0.028 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.038)	0.071 (0.040)	0.032 (0.046)	-0.039 (0.049)
Native	-0.030 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.030)	0.004 (0.030)	0.009 (0.036)	0.034 (0.036)	0.025 (0.042)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.012 (0.026)	0.008 (0.031)	0.027 (0.034)	0.047 (0.038)	0.021 (0.040)
Years of stay	0.001** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.001)
Education	-0.013 (0.020)	0.081*** (0.025)	-0.031 (0.022)	0.094** (0.032)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.112** (0.033)	0.028 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.029)	-0.039 (0.031)	-0.041 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.037)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Mobile phone usage	0.021 (0.024)	0.005 (0.031)	-0.111** (0.044)	-0.016 (0.039)	-0.132* (0.050)	-0.116* (0.053)	-0.093 (0.085)	0.070*** (0.022)	-0.316* (0.179)	0.163 (0.087)	-0.223 (0.197)	-0.386* (0.179)
Casual labor	-0.054 (0.051)	0.019 (0.044)	-0.054 (0.053)	0.073 (0.067)	0.000 (0.073)	-0.072 (0.069)	-0.012 (0.033)	-0.095 (0.063)	-0.084 (0.093)	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.071 (0.098)	0.011 (0.111)
Self-employed	-0.013 (0.035)	-0.071 (0.048)	-0.043 (0.068)	-0.058 (0.059)	-0.029 (0.076)	0.028 (0.082)	0.002 (0.037)	-0.084 (0.058)	-0.033 (0.087)	-0.086 (0.068)	-0.035 (0.094)	0.051 (0.104)
Salaried	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.104** (0.046)	-0.005 (0.046)	-0.085 (0.058)	0.015 (0.059)	0.100 (0.064)	-0.031 (0.033)	-0.089 (0.062)	-0.081 (0.091)	-0.058 (0.070)	-0.050 (0.096)	0.008 (0.110)
Work days (per month)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)	0.005** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
Work hours (per day)	0.003 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.011)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.013* (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)
Earnings (per month)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Index of progressive gender attitudes	0.001 (0.011)	0.020 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.022)	0.019 (0.019)	-0.007 (0.025)	-0.026 (0.027)	0.026* (0.013)	0.025 (0.025)	-0.019 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.028)	-0.045 (0.025)	-0.044 (0.033)
Index of regressive gender attitudes	-0.001 (0.009)	0.004 (0.020)	0.008 (0.027)	0.004 (0.022)	0.009 (0.028)	0.005 (0.033)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.027* (0.015)	-0.018 (0.018)	0.037 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.045 (0.023)
Test of joint significance				[0.002]	[0.167]	[0.034]				[0.305]	[0.056]	[0.031]

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for attrition that takes value one if a respondent dropped from the main sample at Endline 2 and zero otherwise. The Indexes of gender attitudes are standardized Z-scores of binary responses to gender attitude statements/questions (Kling *et al.*, 2007). The total number of observations is less than the 1514 matched couples at baseline because of missing data on control variables and outcome variables for some respondents. Standard errors, clustered at the PS level, in parentheses (* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$).

Table A.13: Robustness (Entropy weights): Impact of treatment on own labor market outcomes and gender attitudes

Panel A: Labor market outcomes								
	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.049* (0.029)	-0.025 (0.022)	-1.360** (0.634)	1.490* (0.866)	-0.424** (0.189)	0.179 (0.340)	-0.835*** (0.229)	0.078 (0.061)
T2 (network)	0.019 (0.032)	0.046** (0.021)	0.283 (0.695)	1.784** (0.872)	-0.068 (0.194)	0.628* (0.346)	-0.350** (0.176)	0.064 (0.060)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.010]	[0.001]	[0.010]	[0.651]	[0.050]	[0.083]	[0.039]	[0.744]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,375	1,325	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.233	0.943	5.004	22.753	1.053	8.148	889.069	11515.433
Panel B: Progressive gender attitudes								
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.231*** (0.073)	-0.024 (0.080)	0.138** (0.065)	0.010 (0.072)	-0.089 (0.073)	-0.175** (0.082)	0.140** (0.070)	-0.021 (0.078)
T2 (network)	0.064 (0.087)	-0.126 (0.087)	0.169** (0.065)	0.130** (0.064)	-0.115 (0.078)	-0.204** (0.087)	0.128* (0.065)	0.034 (0.069)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.040]	[0.292]	[0.530]	[0.092]	[0.730]	[0.688]	[0.790]	[0.511]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,377	1,376	1,373	1,377	1,374
Mean Y	0.016	0.003	0.109	-0.116	0.282	-0.273	-0.066	0.073

Note: We re-estimate our baseline specification using weights to ensure that all control variables are balanced across the treatment and control groups. **Panel A** reports the reduced-form ITT results for the labor market outcomes corresponding to Table 4. **Panel B** reports the reduced-form ITT results for the progressive attitudes towards women's market work corresponding to Table 5. The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). 'Mean Y' denotes the mean value of the corresponding dependent variable in levels for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in the current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table A.14: Robustness (IPW Weights): Impact of treatment on own labor market outcomes and gender attitudes

Panel A: Labor market outcomes								
	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.044* (0.027)	-0.018 (0.020)	-1.248** (0.593)	1.532* (0.819)	-0.369** (0.176)	0.204 (0.338)	-0.856*** (0.232)	0.096* (0.056)
T2 (network)	0.018 (0.029)	0.043** (0.020)	0.282 (0.642)	1.888** (0.829)	-0.022 (0.183)	0.637* (0.347)	-0.385** (0.182)	0.079 (0.055)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.020]	[0.002]	[0.010]	[0.548]	[0.050]	[0.088]	[0.063]	[0.703]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,375	1,325	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.233	0.943	5.004	22.753	1.053	8.148	889.069	11515.433
Panel B: Progressive gender attitudes								
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.217*** (0.071)	-0.011 (0.078)	0.129** (0.063)	0.020 (0.071)	-0.071 (0.073)	-0.139* (0.081)	0.150** (0.068)	-0.030 (0.069)
T2 (network)	0.048 (0.089)	-0.141 (0.087)	0.170*** (0.061)	0.148** (0.065)	-0.137* (0.073)	-0.220** (0.086)	0.136* (0.070)	0.028 (0.062)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.040]	[0.175]	[0.400]	[0.064]	[0.390]	[0.264]	[0.760]	[0.426]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,377	1,376	1,373	1,377	1,374
Mean Y	0.016	0.003	0.109	-0.116	0.282	-0.273	-0.066	0.073

Note: We re-estimate our baseline specification using the propensity scores generated using the controls to model the likelihood of being present at the endline as weights. **Panel A** reports the reduced-form ITT results for the labor market outcomes corresponding to Table 4. **Panel B** reports the reduced-form ITT results for the progressive attitudes towards women's market work corresponding to Table 5. The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). 'Mean Y' denotes the mean value of the corresponding dependent variable in levels for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in the current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, (**) $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.1$.

Table A.15: Robustness (Lee Bounds): Impact of treatment on own labor market outcomes and gender attitudes

Panel A: Labor market outcomes								
	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)								
Lower	-0.046* (0.026)	-0.022 (0.021)	-1.277** (0.586)	1.447* (0.817)	-0.378** (0.174)	0.163 (0.336)	-0.869*** (0.229)	0.093 (0.056)
Upper	-0.045* (0.027)	-0.017 (0.020)	-1.035* (0.606)	1.579* (0.824)	-0.232 (0.191)	0.243 (0.343)	0.152 (0.417)	0.204* (0.104)
T2 (network)								
Lower	0.015 (0.029)	0.014 (0.021)	0.118 (0.633)	1.281 (0.854)	-0.058 (0.181)	0.386 (0.355)	-0.427** (0.180)	0.051 (0.055)
Upper	0.025 (0.030)	0.046** (0.019)	0.835 (0.676)	2.171*** (0.825)	0.356 (0.219)	0.844** (0.350)	0.671* (0.359)	0.571*** (0.104)
Observations	1,401	1,399	1,401	1,399	1,399	1,347	1,401	1,399
Panel B: Progressive gender attitudes								
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (9)	Husband (10)	Wife (11)	Husband (12)	Wife (13)	Husband (14)	Wife (15)	Husband (16)
T1 (non-network)								
Lower	0.198*** (0.071)	-0.024 (0.079)	0.109* (0.065)	0.008 (0.074)	-0.081 (0.074)	-0.143* (0.080)	0.115 (0.073)	-0.051 (0.072)
Upper	0.216*** (0.070)	-0.011 (0.078)	0.130** (0.063)	0.021 (0.070)	-0.066 (0.072)	-0.133 (0.081)	0.152** (0.068)	-0.028 (0.068)
T2 (network)								
lower bound	-0.023 (0.088)	-0.215** (0.084)	0.080 (0.064)	0.056 (0.068)	-0.172** (0.072)	-0.249*** (0.085)	-0.018 (0.080)	-0.128* (0.066)
upper bound	0.061 (0.087)	-0.129 (0.086)	0.175*** (0.060)	0.152** (0.064)	-0.108 (0.072)	-0.187** (0.086)	0.143** (0.069)	0.035 (0.061)
Observations	1,401	1,399	1,400	1,399	1,400	1,394	1,401	1,396

Note: The lower and upper bounds indicate the minimum and maximum possible impact of assignment, respectively, to treatment on the outcomes reported in Tables 4 and Table 5, with their std errors in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$). For the Wives (Husbands) in T1, 1.28% (1.38%) of the control group was trimmed to match the attrition rate in the non-network treatment group and for wives (Husbands) in T2, 4.17% (4.07%) of the control group was trimmed to match the attrition rate in the network treatment group.

Table A.16: Robustness (Multiple Hypothesis Testing): Impact of treatment on own labor market outcomes and gender attitudes

Panel A: Labor market outcomes								
	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.044 (0.104) [0.128]	-0.018 (0.380) [0.216]	-1.228 (0.040) [0.101]	1.539 (0.063) [0.115]	-0.364 (0.041) [0.101]	0.206 (0.544) [0.272]	-0.854 (0.000) [0.001]	0.097 (0.086) [0.127]
T2 (network)	0.019 (0.527) [0.272]	0.044 (0.029) [0.092]	0.286 (0.656) [0.302]	1.901 (0.024) [0.092]	-0.020 (0.912) [0.411]	0.642 (0.068) [0.115]	-0.386 (0.035) [0.101]	0.080 (0.145) [0.149]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,375	1,325	1,377	1,377
Panel B: Progressive gender attitudes								
	Attitude 1 Women's mobility		Attitude 2 Women's market work		Attitude 3 Breadwinner norm		Attitude 4 Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.215*** (0.003) [0.019]	-0.012 (0.880) [0.403]	0.128** (0.044) [0.103]	0.019 (0.785) [0.355]	-0.072 (0.330) [0.197]	-0.138* (0.091) [0.127]	0.150** (0.030) [0.092]	-0.030 (0.664) [0.302]
T2 (network)	0.047 (0.597) [0.289]	-0.142 (0.106) [0.128]	0.169*** (0.006) [0.032]	0.147** (0.026) [0.092]	-0.138* (0.061) [0.115]	-0.221** (0.012) [0.057]	0.135* (0.056) [0.115]	0.028 (0.655) [0.302]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,377	1,376	1,373	1,377	1,374
Panel C: Regressive gender attitudes								
	Attitude 1 Gendered home production		Attitude 2 Support husband's career		Attitude 3 Children suffer		Attitude 4 Maternal relationship suffers	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.452*** (0.002) [0.016]	-0.453*** (0.000) [0.001]	-0.272** (0.048) [0.107]	-0.303*** (0.002) [0.016]	-0.168* (0.075) [0.115]	-0.025 (0.729) [0.331]	-0.007 (0.948) [0.421]	-0.114 (0.331) [0.197]
T2 (network)	-0.430*** (0.002) [0.016]	-0.489*** (0.000) [0.001]	-0.104 (0.386) [0.216]	-0.171* (0.096) [0.128]	-0.237** (0.019) [0.081]	-0.183* (0.062) [0.115]	0.192 (0.101) [0.128]	0.189 (0.147) [0.149]
Observations	1,376	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,376	1,375	1,377	1,375

Note: Original p -values from estimates in Tables 4 for **Panel A** and Table 5 for **Panel B** are reported in parentheses, while p -values of Anderson's sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q -values which adjust for multiple hypothesis testing are reported in square brackets (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).

Table A.17: Robustness (Randomization Inference): Impact of treatment on own labor market outcomes and gender attitudes

	Panel A: Labor market outcomes							
	Work Status		Workdays (per month)		Work hours (per day)		Earnings (per month)	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.044 [0.050] {0.114}	-0.018 [0.397] {0.383}	-1.228** [0.025] {0.043}	1.539* [0.009] {0.053}	-0.364** [0.012] {0.046}	0.206 [0.416] {0.551}	-0.854*** [0.003] {0.001}	0.097* [0.071] {0.071}
T2 (network)	0.019 [0.424] {0.553}	0.044** [0.018] {0.029}	0.286 [0.610] {0.676}	1.901** [0.002] {0.015}	-0.020 [0.901] {0.938}	0.642* [0.009] {0.062}	-0.386** [0.100] {0.029}	0.080 [0.115] {0.131}
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,375	1,325	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.233	0.943	5.004	22.753	1.053	8.148	889.069	11515.433
	Panel B: Progressive gender attitudes							
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)	Wife (5)	Husband (6)	Wife (7)	Husband (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.215*** [0.001] {0.007}	-0.012 [0.847] {0.889}	0.128** [0.019] {0.049}	0.019 [0.760] {0.773}	-0.072 [0.240] {0.352}	-0.138* [0.028] {0.101}	0.150** [0.013] {0.026}	-0.030 [0.649] {0.665}
T2 (network)	0.047 [0.475] {0.614}	-0.142 [0.043] {0.118}	0.169*** [0.000] {0.008}	0.147** [0.022] {0.023}	-0.138* [0.034] {0.055}	-0.221** [0.002] {0.015}	0.135* [0.024] {0.062}	0.028 [0.615] {0.654}
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,376	1,377	1,376	1,373	1,377	1,374
Mean Y	0.016	0.003	0.109	-0.116	0.282	-0.273	-0.066	0.073

Note: p -values from the randomization inference (RITEST) reported in [square brackets] and wild cluster-bootstrap in {curly brackets}, respectively. The RITEST p -values are based on randomization inference with 1,000 permutations of the treatment assignment. This method adjusts for clustering effects and provides exact p -values under the null hypothesis. The wild cluster-bootstrap p -values are calculated with 1,000 replications accounting for clustering at the polling station level. 'Mean Y' denotes the mean of dependent variables for control group at baseline. (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.18: Impact of treatment on time spent on household chores by wives

	Time
T1 (non-network)	-0.249* (0.140)
T2 (network)	0.024 (0.132)
p -value [T1=T2]	[0.090]
Observations	1,375
Mean Y	4.302

Note: The dependent variable is a categorical variable signifying the range of average weekly hours that wives reported spending on household chores (like cooking, cleaning, shopping), in the reference period, as follows: (1) 0 to 7 hours, (2) more than 7 to 14 hours (3) more than 14 to 21 hours, (4) more than 21 to 28 hours, (5) more than 28 to 35 hours, and (6) More than 35 hours per week. Estimates from ANCOVA specification in Equation (1) in the paper. The p -values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms. ‘Mean Y’ reports the mean of the dependent variable for the control group, which in this case indicates that, on average, wives were spending 21-28 hours weekly on household chores at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors, clustered at PS level, are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.19: Impact of treatment on peer's progressive gender attitudes, by peer type

	Attitude 1		Attitude 2		Attitude 3		Attitude 4	
	Women's mobility		Women's market work		Breadwinner norm		Sharing domestic chores	
Panel A: All baseline peers (by relationship)								
	Relative/ Neighbor (1)	Friend/ Co-worker (2)	Relative/ Neighbor (3)	Friend/ Co-worker (4)	Relative/ Neighbor (5)	Friend/ Co-worker (6)	Relative/ Neighbor (7)	Friend/ Co-worker (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.318*** (0.083)	-0.537*** (0.121)	-0.483*** (0.070)	-0.726*** (0.142)	-0.068 (0.052)	-0.005 (0.093)	-0.126* (0.066)	-0.269** (0.120)
T2 (network)	-0.103 (0.099)	-0.111 (0.140)	-0.077 (0.073)	-0.172 (0.111)	-0.070 (0.067)	-0.073 (0.097)	-0.114** (0.057)	0.127* (0.073)
p-value [T1=T2]	[0.038]	[0.009]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.973]	[0.477]	[0.865]	[0.000]
p-value [Diff T1]	[0.092]		[0.101]		[0.558]		[0.282]	
p-value [Diff T2]	[0.950]		[0.421]		[0.981]		[0.010]	
Observations	2,080	704	2,081	705	2,075	701	2,072	703
Mean Y	-0.035	0.111	0.006	-0.042	-0.027	0.061	0.005	-0.001
Panel B: All baseline peers (by gender)								
	Female (1)	Male (2)	Female (3)	Male (4)	Female (5)	Male (6)	Female (7)	Male (8)
T1 (non-network)	-0.290*** (0.102)	-0.434*** (0.090)	-0.379*** (0.085)	-0.657*** (0.089)	-0.053 (0.075)	-0.059 (0.068)	0.022 (0.080)	-0.286*** (0.079)
T2 (network)	-0.125 (0.111)	-0.100 (0.107)	-0.128 (0.081)	-0.089 (0.084)	-0.134 (0.093)	-0.042 (0.072)	-0.149* (0.087)	0.004 (0.055)
p-value [T1=T2]	[0.136]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.000]	[0.368]	[0.799]	[0.040]	[0.000]
p-value [Diff T1]	[0.222]		[0.014]		[0.958]		[0.005]	
p-value [Diff T2]	[0.801]		[0.686]		[0.427]		[0.154]	
Observations	1,091	1,705	1,091	1,707	1,088	1,700	1,087	1,700
Mean Y	0.057	-0.026	0.139	-0.083	0.13	-0.072	-0.039	0.027

Note: The sample consists of all baseline peers of both husbands and wives. The dependent variables are standardized Z-scores ($Z(y) = \frac{y - \bar{Y}}{sd}$ where, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean value of y for the control group and sd is the standard-deviation for the control group) of the responses (yes/no) to questions on gender attitudes (Column (1) - (2): In your opinion, is it acceptable for an adult woman to travel outside the locality if she wants to?; Column (3) - (4): In your opinion, should an adult woman work outside of home if she wants to?; Column (5) - (6): Do you approve of a married woman earning money if she has a husband capable of supporting her?; Column (7) - (8): In your opinion, if the wife is working outside the home, should the husband help her with household/care duties?). **Panel A** includes all baseline peers (by relationship), **Panel B** includes all baseline peers (by gender) of main respondent. All specifications control for the peer's education (dummy for above primary level schooling), age (in years), and dummy variables for occupation type (salaried, casual, self-employed, house-wife or other (e.g. student) work status) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, (**) $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.1$.

Table A.20: Impact of treatment on peers' regressive gender attitudes, by peer type

	Attitude 1		Attitude 2		Attitude 3		Attitude 4	
	Gendered home production		Support husbands career		Children suffer		Motherly relationship suffers	
Panel A: All baseline peers (by relationship)								
	Relative/ Neighbor (1)	Friend/ Co-worker (2)	Relative/ Neighbor (3)	Friend/ Co-worker (4)	Relative/ Neighbor (5)	Friend/ Co-worker (6)	Relative/ Neighbor (7)	Friend/ Co-worker (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.276*** (0.053)	0.388*** (0.094)	-0.015 (0.068)	0.205* (0.110)	0.096 (0.069)	0.164* (0.097)	0.251*** (0.089)	0.273** (0.115)
T2 (network)	0.090 (0.062)	0.186 (0.114)	-0.024 (0.070)	-0.042 (0.153)	-0.012 (0.081)	-0.060 (0.109)	0.531*** (0.064)	0.492*** (0.108)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.001]	[0.061]	[0.890]	[0.057]	[0.130]	[0.038]	[0.005]	[0.078]
<i>p</i> -value [Diff T1]		[0.207]		[0.046]		[0.493]		[0.844]
<i>p</i> -value [Diff T2]		[0.363]		[0.897]		[0.626]		[0.695]
Observations	2,067	700	2,059	695	2,057	700	2,036	690
Mean Y	0.044	-0.082	0.039	-0.124	0.014	-0.069	0.008	-0.035
Panel B: All baseline peers (by gender)								
	Female (1)	Male (2)	Female (3)	Male (4)	Female (5)	Male (6)	Female (7)	Male (8)
T1 (non-network)	0.304*** (0.076)	0.306*** (0.064)	-0.046 (0.076)	0.099 (0.077)	0.135 (0.106)	0.091 (0.066)	0.298*** (0.095)	0.229** (0.097)
T2 (network)	0.159* (0.081)	0.086 (0.078)	0.038 (0.079)	-0.062 (0.093)	0.083 (0.107)	-0.082 (0.082)	0.483*** (0.078)	0.561*** (0.077)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.057]	[0.004]	[0.293]	[0.029]	[0.550]	[0.031]	[0.078]	[0.002]
<i>p</i> -value [Diff T1]		[0.975]		[0.084]		[0.690]		[0.478]
<i>p</i> -value [Diff T2]		[0.459]		[0.267]		[0.109]		[0.388]
Observations	1,083	1,696	1,077	1,689	1,078	1,691	1,065	1,673
Mean Y	-0.057	0.042	0.037	-0.026	-0.001	-0.013	-0.012	0.002

Note: The sample consists of all baseline peers of both husbands and wives. The dependent variables are standardized Z-scores ($Z(y) = \frac{y - \bar{Y}}{sd}$ where, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean value of y for the control group and sd is the standard-deviation for the control group) of the responses to questions on gender attitudes (Column (1)-(2): It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the women takes care of the home and family; Column (3)-(4): It is more important for a wife to help her husband's career than to have one herself; Column (5)-(6): When a mother works for pay, the children suffer, Column (7)-(8): A working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work). **Panel A** includes all baseline peers (by relationship), **Panel B** includes all baseline peers (by gender) of main respondent. All specifications control for the peer's education (dummy for above primary level schooling), age (in years), and dummy variables for occupation type (salaried, casual, self-employed, house-wife or other (e.g. student) work status) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, (**) $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.1$.

Table A.21: Heterogeneity in the impact of treatment on work status

	Panel A: Work status of main respondents			
	Relatives/Neighbors overlap		Male overlap	
	Wife (1)	Husband (2)	Wife (3)	Husband (4)
T1 (non-network)	-0.043 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.044 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.020)
T2 (network): No-Overlap	0.008 (0.029)	0.033 (0.021)	0.019 (0.030)	0.041** (0.020)
T2 (network): Overlap	0.049 (0.050)	0.074*** (0.020)	0.018 (0.091)	0.093*** (0.017)
<i>p</i> -value [No-Overlap=Overlap]	[0.355]	[0.022]	[0.994]	[0.001]
Observations	1,377	1,377	1,377	1,377
Mean Y	0.233	0.943	0.233	0.943
	Panel B: Work status of wife's baseline peers			
	Relatives/Neighbors		Gender	
	Female (1)	Male (2)	Female (3)	Male (4)
T1 (non-network)	0.024 (0.031)	-0.034 (0.043)	0.019 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.043)
T2 (network)	-0.009 (0.030)	0.054 (0.046)	-0.007 (0.031)	0.053 (0.046)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.311]	[0.071]	[0.407]	[0.079]
Observations	950	292	995	296
Mean Y	0.191	0.877	0.199	0.879


Note: In **Panel A** the dependent variable is an indicator for overall work status of the main respondent, which takes value one if the respondent is working in the reference period and zero otherwise. The first row reports the estimate for non-network treatment group (T1). The second and third rows report estimates for the network treatment group (T2), distinguishing between respondents with and without overlap between the baseline networks of the wife and husband, respectively. Specifically, there is an ‘Overlap’ if the network wife nominated any baseline peer who was a relative or neighbor (male) for treatment; ‘No-Overlap’ if the network wife did not nominate any baseline peer who was a relative or neighbor for treatment (i.e. nominated only baseline friend/co-worker (female) peers) in columns (1) - (2) (columns (3) - (4)). All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in the current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. In **Panel B** the dependent variable is an indicator for overall work status of the baseline peers of the network treatment wives, which takes value one if the peer is working in the reference period and zero otherwise. Columns (1) - (2) show estimates for relative/neighbor peers by gender and columns (3) - (4) show estimates for all peers by gender. All specifications control for the peer’s education (dummy for above primary level schooling), age (in years), and dummy variables for occupation type (salaried, casual, self-employed, house-wife or other (e.g. student) work status) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at the PS level are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.22: Impact of treatment on intra-household decision-making of husbands


	Index of decision-making		Major purchases		Daily purchases		Children's healthcare		Children's schooling		Spending wife's earnings		Spending husband's earnings		Wife visiting relatives	
	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband	Wife	Husband
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
T1 (non-network)	-0.006 (0.040)	-0.037 (0.041)	0.088 (0.089)	0.101 (0.065)	-0.018 (0.071)	-0.054 (0.069)	-0.016 (0.067)	-0.056 (0.065)	0.004 (0.067)	-0.043 (0.083)	-0.032 (0.059)	-0.079 (0.059)	-0.152** (0.062)	-0.104 (0.096)	0.068 (0.094)	-0.012 (0.080)
T2 (network)	-0.038 (0.043)	-0.069 (0.046)	-0.015 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.056)	-0.086 (0.066)	-0.065 (0.066)	-0.055 (0.065)	-0.120* (0.064)	0.057 (0.070)	-0.044 (0.079)	-0.019 (0.076)	-0.100* (0.057)	-0.134** (0.062)	-0.075 (0.086)	-0.026 (0.097)	-0.048 (0.096)
<i>p</i> -value [T1=T2]	[0.489]	[0.421]	[0.241]	[0.073]	[0.352]	[0.863]	[0.477]	[0.177]	[0.437]	[0.983]	[0.858]	[0.654]	[0.754]	[0.763]	[0.332]	[0.678]
Observations	1,370	1,320	1,376	1,376	1,375	1,378	1,377	1,363	1,377	1,363	1,376	1,339	1,374	1,375	1,376	1,377
Mean Y	-0.004	0.005	0.044	-0.048	-0.052	0.056	-0.040	0.050	0.032	-0.015	0.032	-0.049	-0.030	0.015	-0.013	0.019

Note: The dependent variables are standardized Z-scores ($Z(y) = \frac{y - \bar{Y}}{sd}$ where, $\bar{Y}$ is the mean value of y for the control group and sd is the standard-deviation for the control group) of the responses to questions on husband's decision-making. Responses take a value one if the husband independently takes decisions on each domain, and zero otherwise - reported separately by the wife and husband for each domain. Columns (1)-(2) report the index of all decision-making domains (Kling *et al.*, 2007) and columns (3)-(16) report it by each domain (Decision1: who should have a greater say on making major household purchases?; Decision2: who should have a greater say on making daily household purchases?; Decision3: who should have a great say in decision about health care of children?; Decision4: who should have greater say in the decision of children's schooling?; Decision5: who should have a great say in decision about how wife's earnings should be spent?; Decision6: who should have a greater say in decision about how husband's earnings should be spent?; Decision7: who should have a greater say about visits to wife's relatives?). The *p*-values correspond to test of equivalence in the treatment effect between the two treatment arms (T1 and T2). 'Mean Y' denotes the mean value of the dependent variable for the control group at baseline. All specifications control for household characteristics (asset index, joint family, number of children, SC/ST, Hindu religion, native, and years staying in current location) and individual characteristics (above primary education, age (in years), occupation type, mobile usage) at baseline. Standard errors clustered at PS level are reported in parentheses (***p*<0.01, ***p*<0.05, **p*<0.1).

Figure A.1: Labor force transition matrices of wives, by treatment



(a) **T1**: Non-network treatment



(b) **T2**: Network treatment

Note: The figures above show the occupational transition that wives made between Baseline and Endline 2. Figure (a) is based on the sample of 481 wives in the T1 group, while Figure (b) consists of the sample of 452 wives who were part of the network treatment group T2. *Non-working* includes wives who reported being housewives or unemployed.

B Sampling and Attrition

B.1 Overall sampling

We use publicly available household listing from electoral registers as the basis of our sampling frame. Delhi has over 300 Electoral Board (EB) wards contained in 70 Assembly Constituencies (AC) across its 11 districts.

Our sample consists of EB wards in which the proportion of households residing in slum clusters (low-income residential areas) was the highest. To identify such clusters, EB wards were matched to the Census (2011) wards to obtain their observable characteristics, viz. population, employment, literacy, and civic amenities. 24 such EB wards spread across 11 ACs within 5 districts of Delhi - West, North, North-west, Shahadra, and North-east - with a high proportion of slum clusters were selected for the study. On average, an AC consists of around 150-180 polling stations (PS), with approx. 500-1000 eligible voters (or 250-500 households) per PS. For each of the 11 sampled AC, a stratified random sample of about 10 PS was drawn. Stratification of PS was by proportion of low-income residential households. Within each sampled PS, 15 households were randomly sampled for inclusion in our study by systematic random sampling during the baseline survey.³² To ensure sufficient power in the event of attrition and replace households where both husband and wife could not be interviewed, we randomly sampled additional households beyond our target sample size. A household was considered eligible for the study if it had at least one married couple in the age group of 18-45 years. Appendix Figure B.1 shows the geographical spread across Delhi of the sampled 108 polling stations, which form our primary sampling unit (cluster).

B.2 Sampling of peers

At baseline the main respondents were given three sets of situational questions and asked to list names (and relationship type) of non-co-resident individuals that they most often interacted with under those situations. They then rank-ordered these peers by closeness (viz. in the order of highest to lowest frequency of interaction). We collected the phone numbers of the top four rank-ordered peers of the main respondents. 88% of the respondents provided the mobile number of at least one peer. We were able to phone survey the peers (for information only on individual characteristics such as gender, age, employment and gender attitudes) of 77% of the 1,377 matched husband-wife pairs at baseline and the endlines. The

³²Following this sampling procedure, first, an estimate of the total number of households (N) in the PS was obtained through mapping of the entire PS by the survey team. Then, every N/15th household, starting from the center of the PS and moving in a clockwise direction to come back to the starting point, was randomly selected for the survey.

characteristics of the wives whose peers were surveyed over phone are balanced on household and individual characteristics, as shown in Appendix Table B.2. We also find balance on the observable individual characteristics of the baseline peers of wives between all the three groups, as shown in Panel A of Appendix Table B.3.

At intervention, the network treatment (T2) wives were asked to nominate up to two peers from their baseline network for receiving the offer to register on the platform. In addition, they were allowed to nominate peers not in the baseline network. These new peers were also contacted and offered platform registration over the phone along with obtaining data on their characteristics. The observable characteristics of the baseline and new nominated peers were imbalanced, as shown in Panel A of Appendix Table B.1. We did not elicit gender attitudes of the new peers at intervention. However, the new nominated peers were more likely to be younger and unmarried, and also include marginally fewer relatives/neighbors (92% (93.1%) vs 100% (98.4%) of male (female) new and baseline nominated peers, respectively). PMM simulation of the gender attitudes of the new nominated peers shown in Appendix Figure B.2 indicate that these new peers were likely to hold less regressive attitudes relative to the baseline peers of network wives.

B.3 Overall attrition

Overall attrition is low in our data (below 6%) but significantly different across the three groups (5.87% in T1, 8.45% in T2 and 3.16% in control).

B.4 Attrition of peers

The attrition rates of all baseline peers were comparable between non-network (T1) and control groups, while network group (T2) exhibited a relatively higher attrition rate. At Endline 1 (Endline 2), the attrition rate of baseline peers was 10.94% (13.70%) for the control group, 10.96% (15.35%) for the T1 group, and 19.01% (18.49%) for T2. The attrition rates of new peers of T2 wives at Endline 1 (Endline 2) was 20.27% (18.20%), both insignificantly different from the baseline peers of the T2 wives. The characteristics of the attriting baseline peers of wives between all three groups are balanced, as shown in Panel B of Appendix Table B.3. We find balance on the observable characteristics of attrited (all) baseline peers and new peers nominated at intervention by T2 wives (column 5 of Panel B, Appendix Table B.1).


B.5 Adherence to pre-analysis plan

Our pre-analysis plan (PAP) is available at <https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/5153>, and our analysis is as per the PAP. However, we collected Endline 1 and Endline 2 data 6 and 12 months after intervention, respectively, as against 3 and 6 months in our pre-analysis plan, due to the pandemic. All analyses mentioned in the plan, but not included in this version of the paper, are included in our working paper [Afridi *et al.* \(2023\)](#).


Figure B.1: Sampled districts, and polling stations by treatment status



Figure B.2: Distribution of network wife's peers' gender attitudes



(a) Progressive gender attitudes



(b) Regressive gender attitudes

Note: Each figure shows the actual distribution of the Z-score of the overall index of gender attitude for all baseline peers of network wives (blue, solid line) and the simulated distribution for new peers nominated by network wives at the intervention stage (red, dashed line). The unobserved baseline attitude scores for new peers are imputed using Predictive Mean Matching (PMM) method with baseline peers who are their nearest neighbors to create 60 imputed distributions (White *et al.*, 2011). The gender attitudes are an equal weighted average of the standardized Z-scores of binary responses to progressive (regressive) gender attitude statements/questions in Fig. a (Fig. b). Higher values on the X-axis indicate more progressive (Fig. a)/ regressive (Fig. b) attitudes. The above figures show one randomly selected simulated distribution of new nominated peers for each index. The average p -value of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of the difference between baseline and new peer attitude distributions over the 60 imputations is 0.409 for progressive attitudes (Fig. a) and 0.023 for regressive attitudes (Fig. b). The p -value of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is significant at 10% level for 36.66% and 96.66% of simulated distribution of the index of progressive and regressive gender attitudes, respectively. These simulations indicate that prior to intervention the new nominated peers were likely to have the same median progressive gender attitude but lower median regressive gender attitudes ($p < 0.05$), compared to the baseline peers.

Table B.1: Balance on characteristics and attrition of baseline and new peers of network treatment (T2) wives

Panel A: Balance on individual characteristics						
	Baseline		Intervention	Differences		
	All	Nominated	New nominated	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(2)-(3)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Working	0.343 (0.024)	0.382 (0.045)	0.342 (0.026)	-0.039 (0.041)	0.001 (0.033)	0.040 (0.046)
Education	0.577 (0.025)	0.579 (0.039)	0.608 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.029)	-0.029 (0.042)
SC/ST	0.364 (0.036)	0.428 (0.054)	0.451 (0.042)	-0.063 (0.042)	-0.087** (0.034)	-0.024 (0.051)
Age	36.919 (0.572)	36.132 (0.919)	33.536 (0.457)	0.788 (0.857)	3.384*** (0.725)	2.596** (0.986)
Married	0.887 (0.017)	0.888 (0.031)	0.803 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.027)	0.084*** (0.027)	0.085** (0.036)
Female	0.770 (0.024)	0.822 (0.036)	0.796 (0.022)	-0.053* (0.030)	-0.026 (0.029)	0.027 (0.035)
N	560	152	676	712	1236	828
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance				[0.124]	[0.000]	[0.042]
Panel B: Balance on attrition						
Working	0.061 (0.039)	0.151** (0.065)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.090 (0.067)	-0.064 (0.041)	-0.153* (0.069)
Education	-0.007 (0.031)	0.039 (0.059)	-0.023 (0.033)	0.045 (0.048)	-0.016 (0.047)	-0.062 (0.074)
SC/ST	0.006 (0.033)	0.036 (0.079)	0.084** (0.033)	0.030 (0.066)	0.077 (0.044)	0.048 (0.069)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.004)
Married	-0.067 (0.070)	-0.102 (0.108)	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.035 (0.102)	-0.006 (0.081)	0.030 (0.116)
Female	-0.208*** (0.057)	-0.278** (0.126)	-0.109* (0.056)	-0.070 (0.109)	0.099 (0.082)	0.169 (0.139)
N	556	152	674	708	1230	826
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance				[0.497]	[0.122]	[0.006]

Note: The sample consists of all peers in the baseline network of T2 wives (Column (1)), the subset of baseline peers nominated by T2 wives for treatment (Column (2)), and peers newly nominated by T2 wives for treatment at the intervention stage who were not part of the baseline network (Column (3)). Data on individual characteristics are at baseline (intervention) for baseline (new nominated) peers. Columns (4)-(6) report OLS estimates of pairwise differences between the respective column samples. The dependent variable in **Panel B** is an indicator of attrition that takes the value one if a peer dropped from the sample at Endline 2 and is 0 otherwise. The *p*-values reported in square brackets correspond to the F-test of joint significance of peers' characteristics for the respective columns. The sample size decreases in Panel B due to missing data on some covariates. Standard errors, clustered at the PS level, are reported in parentheses (***p*<0.01, ***p*<0.05, **p*<0.1).

Table B.2: Balance on household and individual characteristics of wives with surveyed peers (at baseline)

	Control	Treatment		Difference		
	C	T1	T2	C-T1	C-T2	T1-T2
	(N=360)	(N=366)	(N=363)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Household size	5.244 (0.091)	5.279 (0.080)	5.220 (0.105)	-0.034 (0.120)	0.024 (0.138)	0.058 (0.131)
SC/ST	0.428 (0.042)	0.448 (0.042)	0.450 (0.044)	-0.020 (0.059)	-0.022 (0.061)	-0.002 (0.061)
OBC	0.328 (0.039)	0.305 (0.028)	0.326 (0.032)	0.023 (0.047)	0.002 (0.050)	-0.021 (0.043)
Hindu	0.794 (0.049)	0.863 (0.041)	0.818 (0.041)	-0.069 (0.063)	-0.024 (0.063)	0.045 (0.057)
Pucca house	0.964 (0.015)	0.967 (0.012)	0.970 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.018)
Have tapped water	1.233 (0.037)	1.247 (0.034)	1.275 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.050)	-0.042 (0.055)	-0.029 (0.053)
Have Ration card	0.631 (0.030)	0.601 (0.033)	0.630 (0.028)	0.029 (0.044)	0.001 (0.041)	-0.029 (0.043)
Asset Index	-0.107 (0.063)	-0.029 (0.071)	0.070 (0.072)	-0.077 (0.094)	-0.177* (0.095)	-0.099 (0.101)
Years staying at current location	28.675 (0.919)	29.921 (1.008)	28.942 (1.075)	-1.246 (1.355)	-0.267 (1.405)	0.979 (1.464)
Joint family	0.214 (0.020)	0.189 (0.026)	0.196 (0.021)	0.025 (0.033)	0.018 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.033)
Number of young children	0.603 (0.040)	0.574 (0.033)	0.551 (0.037)	0.029 (0.052)	0.052 (0.054)	0.023 (0.049)
Native of Delhi	0.367 (0.037)	0.396 (0.047)	0.380 (0.044)	-0.030 (0.060)	-0.013 (0.057)	0.016 (0.064)
Education	0.613 (0.028)	0.552 (0.037)	0.581 (0.033)	0.061 (0.046)	0.032 (0.043)	-0.029 (0.050)
Age	30.228 (0.392)	30.697 (0.318)	30.826 (0.385)	-0.469 (0.501)	-0.599 (0.546)	-0.130 (0.496)
Mobile phone	0.914 (0.022)	0.918 (0.018)	0.926 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.012 (0.028)	-0.008 (0.025)
Casual labor	0.058 (0.012)	0.063 (0.014)	0.080 (0.020)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.024)	-0.017 (0.025)
Self-employed	0.119 (0.021)	0.107 (0.018)	0.116 (0.020)	0.013 (0.028)	0.004 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.027)
Salaried	0.050 (0.014)	0.041 (0.011)	0.052 (0.012)	0.009 (0.018)	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.016)
Work days (per month)	4.800 (0.534)	4.842 (0.582)	5.488 (0.562)	-0.042 (0.785)	-0.688 (0.770)	-0.646 (0.804)
Work hours (per day)	0.967 (0.104)	1.098 (0.140)	1.191 (0.139)	-0.132 (0.173)	-0.224 (0.173)	-0.093 (0.196)
Earnings (per month)	765.000 (126.724)	929.893 (181.280)	1013.499 (142.216)	-164.893 (219.770)	-248.499 (189.269)	-83.605 (228.937)
Index of progressive gender attitudes	-0.027 (0.039)	-0.017 (0.036)	-0.061 (0.035)	-0.011 (0.053)	0.034 (0.052)	0.045 (0.050)
Index of regressive gender attitudes	0.111 (0.040)	0.061 (0.036)	0.078 (0.039)	0.050 (0.053)	0.032 (0.055)	-0.017 (0.052)
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance				[0.140]	[0.543]	[0.507]

Note: The sample consists of wives in the matched husband-wife pairs whose peers were surveyed at baseline. The *p*-values reported in the last row of the table correspond to F-test of joint significance of wife's characteristics in determining treatment status in a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the PS level, are reported in parentheses (***p*<0.01, ***p*<0.05, * *p*<0.1).

Table B.3: Balance on characteristics and attrition of baseline peers of wives

	Male Peers						Female Peers					
	Control	Treatment		Difference			Control	Treatment		Difference		
	C	T1	T2	C-T1	C-T2	T1-T2	C	T1	T2	C-T1	C-T2	T1-T2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Balance on individual characteristics												
Working	0.880 (0.027)	0.901 (0.022)	0.860 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.035)	0.020 (0.042)	0.040 (0.040)	0.199 (0.019)	0.217 (0.027)	0.188 (0.020)	-0.018 (0.033)	0.011 (0.028)	0.029 (0.033)
Education	0.759 (0.046)	0.675 (0.045)	0.612 (0.049)	0.084 (0.064)	0.146** (0.067)	0.063 (0.066)	0.520 (0.029)	0.459 (0.033)	0.566 (0.029)	0.061 (0.044)	-0.047 (0.041)	-0.107** (0.044)
SC/ST	0.320 (0.046)	0.385 (0.049)	0.333 (0.049)	-0.065 (0.067)	-0.013 (0.067)	0.052 (0.069)	0.307 (0.031)	0.355 (0.033)	0.374 (0.039)	-0.048 (0.045)	-0.067 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.050)
Age	34.400 (1.113)	35.988 (1.037)	37.016 (1.189)	-1.588 (1.512)	-2.616 (1.619)	-1.028 (1.568)	37.168 (0.571)	37.235 (0.623)	36.890 (0.620)	-0.067 (0.840)	0.277 (0.838)	0.344 (0.873)
Married	0.771 (0.032)	0.807 (0.035)	0.767 (0.046)	-0.036 (0.047)	0.004 (0.056)	0.040 (0.057)	0.940 (0.013)	0.949 (0.011)	0.923 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)	0.017 (0.021)	0.026 (0.019)
Index of progressive gender attitudes	0.069 (0.051)	0.108 (0.054)	-0.006 (0.064)	-0.040 (0.074)	0.075 (0.082)	0.115 (0.083)	0.020 (0.044)	0.020 (0.040)	-0.045 (0.041)	0.001 (0.059)	0.065 (0.060)	0.064 (0.056)
Index of regressive gender attitudes	-0.071 (0.065)	-0.043 (0.043)	-0.148 (0.060)	-0.028 (0.078)	0.077 (0.088)	0.105 (0.073)	0.055 (0.039)	0.002 (0.033)	0.046 (0.034)	0.053 (0.051)	0.008 (0.051)	-0.044 (0.047)
N	175	161	129	336	304	290	352	392	431	744	783	823
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance				[0.253]	[0.158]	[0.141]				[0.740]	[0.600]	[0.425]
Panel B: Balance on attrition												
Working	0.021 (0.135)	0.046 (0.121)	0.050 (0.148)	0.025 (0.180)	0.029 (0.199)	0.005 (0.190)	0.064 (0.050)	0.066 (0.052)	0.063 (0.044)	0.002 (0.072)	-0.000 (0.066)	-0.003 (0.067)
Education	-0.104 (0.087)	0.002 (0.062)	-0.078 (0.096)	0.106 (0.107)	0.026 (0.129)	-0.080 (0.114)	0.055 (0.033)	-0.033 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.033)	-0.088* (0.046)	-0.065 (0.046)	0.024 (0.046)
SC/ST	0.030 (0.079)	-0.035 (0.072)	-0.115 (0.087)	-0.065 (0.107)	-0.144 (0.117)	-0.079 (0.112)	-0.037 (0.037)	-0.029 (0.033)	0.049 (0.046)	0.009 (0.049)	0.087 (0.058)	0.078 (0.056)
Age	0.000 (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Married	0.098 (0.094)	0.210** (0.092)	-0.118 (0.138)	0.112 (0.131)	-0.217 (0.165)	-0.328* (0.165)	0.056 (0.053)	-0.016 (0.099)	-0.077 (0.094)	-0.071 (0.112)	-0.132 (0.107)	-0.061 (0.136)
Index of progressive gender attitudes	-0.020 (0.069)	-0.170*** (0.058)	0.060 (0.093)	-0.150* (0.089)	0.081 (0.115)	0.230** (0.108)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.048)	0.013 (0.037)	0.022 (0.054)	0.009 (0.055)
Index of regressive gender attitudes	-0.037 (0.056)	-0.073 (0.073)	0.092 (0.056)	-0.036 (0.092)	0.128 (0.078)	0.165* (0.092)	-0.017 (0.035)	0.026 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.032)	0.043 (0.047)	0.005 (0.047)	-0.038 (0.045)
N	169	151	124	320	293	275	342	384	418	726	760	802
<i>p</i> -values for joint significance				[0.400]	[0.492]	[0.196]				[0.637]	[0.501]	[0.646]

Note: The sample consists of all baseline peers of the wife. T1 denotes the non-network treatment where only main respondents (husband-wife pair) were offered the job aggregator service, T2 represents the network treatment in which the main respondents and two of the wife's peers were offered this service and C denotes the control group where no such service was offered. The dependent variable in **Panel B** is an indicator for attrition that takes value one if a respondent dropped from the main sample at Endline 2 and zero otherwise. The Indexes of gender attitudes are standardized Z-scores of binary responses to gender attitude statements/questions (Kling *et al.*, 2007). The *p*-values reported in the last row of the table correspond to F-test of joint significance of peers' characteristics in determining survey round in a linear probability model. Standard errors, clustered at the PS level, are reported in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$).