Does Subsidising the Cost of Capital Really Help the Poorest? An Analysis of Saving Opportunities in Group Lending

Kumar Aniket *

September 29, 2006

Abstract

This paper shows that subsidising the cost of capital restricts the ability of the poorest to participate in the group lending mechanisms that offer opportunities to save. We document the group lending mechanism used by a typical microfinance lender in Haryana, India. We found that the groups have significant income heterogeneity within them. Individuals can participate in the group either as a borrower or a saver. The lender requires that the borrower partly self-finance’s their project with their own cash wealth. Consequently, a borrower requires a minimum amount of cash wealth to borrow. The poorest participate in the group by co-financing the borrower’s project with their meagre savings. In return, they obtain higher than market returns on their savings. Subsidising the cost of capital reduces the cash wealth required to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely, it increases the cash wealth required to participate as a saver, thus curtailing the opportunity for the poorest to enrich themselves.

Keywords: Group Lending, Microfinance, Savings, Outreach

JEL Classification: D82, G20, O12, O2

---

*I am extremely grateful to Oriana Bandiera, Maitreesh Ghatak and József Sákovics and Jonathan Thomas for their guidance and support. I would also like to thank Ravi Kanbur, Santiago Sánchez-Pagés, Stuart Sayer, Stéphane Straub and Santiago Sánchez-Pagés for their comments and suggestions.

†Economics Department, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, UK, +44(0) 131 662 1300 Email: Kumar.Aniket@ed.ac.uk URL: http://www.aniket.co.uk/
1 Introduction

The paper challenges the long held view in microfinance that subsidising the cost of capital is the most effective way of helping the poorest.

The model envisages a moral hazard environment with costly monitoring. We model the way in which the lender can most effectively use wealth to engender peer monitoring, when lending to jointly liable groups. In the process of doing so, the lender unwittingly creates incentives for the poorest borrowers to group with relatively wealthier (yet still poor\(^1\)) borrowers. The poorest become equity investors in the relatively-wealthy borrower’s project, giving them explicit incentive to monitor her.

We find that subsidising the cost of capital and thus lowering the opportunity cost of capital harms the ability of the poorest to join the group. Conversely, it lowers the wealth threshold for borrowing in the group. Consequently, we find the cost of capital which allows the poorest to join the group as savers and graduate to becoming a borrower in one time period with a positive probability. If the governments can influence the cost of capital, it should aim for this rate.

The microfinance literature has hitherto mainly focussed on mechanisms that allow the wealth-deprived (collateral-less) individuals to borrow in groups. The liability they bear for each other within the group compensates for their lack of ownership of stock assets that can serve as collateral. The literature, with the exception of Banerjee et al. (1994), has ignored the implication of offering saving opportunities within the group-mechanism.

Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, pp.172) highlights the changing attitudes toward offering saving opportunities when they write that “microfinance practitioner and policymakers are coming around to the view that facilitating savings may often be more important than finding better ways to lend to low income customers, especially for the most impoverished house-
holds ... the two are complementary ...”

Whilst analysing the internal structure of a cooperative, where members of the cooperative borrow both internally and externally, Banerjee et al. (1994) show that a premium needs to be paid on the internally borrowed funds. The net savers in the group-mechanism are thus compensated for monitoring the net borrower’s actions and bearing the liability for the net borrower’s failure to repay. Using this as a starting point, we analyse the effect of offering saving opportunities within the group-mechanism on the depth of outreach achieved by the mechanism.

Depth of outreach is the mechanism’s ability to reach the poor. It depends on the poorest person who is able to participate in the mechanism. The poorer this person is, the greater the depth of outreach of the mechanism. We differ in our approach from Banerjee et al. (1994), in that, our objective is to evaluate the efficacy of the group mechanisms that offer saving opportunities, in terms of their depth of outreach.

Using the data collected for the paper, we model the group-mechanism used by Society for Promotion of Youth and Masses (SPYM), a typical microfinance lender in Haryana, India. The microfinance lender is part of the Self-Help Group (SHG) Linkage Programme, India’s new national microfinance programme.

The programme is quite unlike the operations of the large-scale microfinance lenders like BancoSol or Grameen Bank. Any small-scale microfinance lender across the country can join the programme. The programme is envisaged as a decentralised network of small-scale lenders with access to preferential credit lines from the banking industry in the country. Using this network of local lenders throughout the country, the aim of the programme is the “provision of thrift, credit and other financial services ... to the poor in rural, semi-urban or urban areas, enabling them to raise their income levels and improve [their] living standards.” (NABARD, 2000)
Table 1: Group Leaders Proportion of Total Borrowing
(after 18 months of group formation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Group</th>
<th>No. of Members</th>
<th>No. not Borrowed</th>
<th>Total Borrowing</th>
<th>Average per Borrower</th>
<th>Group Leaders' Borrowing</th>
<th>Group Leaders' Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sahil</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>135,500</td>
<td>16,938</td>
<td>70,500</td>
<td>52.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poornima</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>107,800</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>27.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahim</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>26.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrikant</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>10.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chahat(^1)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Chahat’s group leader were member of multiple groups and had borrowed from other groups.

Table 2: Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Members</th>
<th>Members excl. Group Leaders</th>
<th>Group Leaders only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td>34,038</td>
<td>31,525</td>
<td>41,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per capita)</td>
<td>(21,855)</td>
<td>(21,181)</td>
<td>(22,935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,928</td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>7,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4,200)</td>
<td>(3,998)</td>
<td>(4,597)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>6.51</td>
<td>6.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.41)</td>
<td>(2.48)</td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been a long tradition of ‘social and development banking’ in India. Under its guise, the policymakers specify the proportion of credit the banks in the country are required to direct towards ‘targeted’ areas. By increasing or decreasing this proportion, the policymakers can effectively augment or curtail the supply of loanable funds to the ‘targeted’ areas.

The overarching aim of the SHG linkage programme is to funnel this ‘targeted’ credit to groups, through the local microfinance lenders. The local lenders get access to capital from the banks, which they then lend on to the groups. The policy of targeted credit implies that the profitable sectors of the banking industry in India effectively cross-subsidises the ‘targeted’ areas. The question the paper addresses is whether this cross-subsidisation enhances or deters the depth of outreach of the SHG Linkage Programme.
In our study of SPYM’s groups, we found three salient features. These features are typical of the group-mechanism used by the microfinance lenders in the SHG programme.

Firstly, the group members save a fixed amount every month which is lent internally. Thus, the SHG mechanism offers its members opportunities to save. A borrower pays 24% per annum for borrowing internally in the group. On the other hand, the lender lends externally sourced funds to the group members at 18% per annum. Chavan and Ramakumar (2005) quote numerous sources like Harper (1998), Harper (2002), Gaiha (2001), Puhazhendi and Satyasai (2000) and Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) which show that premium on internal capital is a regular feature of such groups.

The lender decides on the amount each member saves per month as well as the returns they get on their savings. In this way, the lender is able to give the net savers in the group the requisite incentives to monitor the net borrowers in the group. Each of the five SPYM groups which we studied, had a significant proportion of net savers. Column 2 in Table 1 shows us that, even after 18 months, a little less than half the members in each group had not borrowed at all.

Second, the microfinance lender decides on the repayment schedule of the loan. The lender requires that the borrowers pay back the principal in ten equal installments. This implies that the interest payment is very high to start with and decreases with time. The repayment schedule is too tightly structured to allow the borrowers to use only the returns from the project for repayment. From our calculations in endnote 1, it is clear that the borrower needs to finance a significant part of the repayment from her own cash wealth.

Jain and Mansuri (2003) suggest that the widespread use of these tightly structured repayment schedules is to encourage the borrowers to repay by borrowing from the informal sector. According to them, this allows the microfinance institutions to incorporate the superior monitoring technology
of the informal sector in monitoring the borrowers. In our study, we did not find any evidence that the group members were actively borrowing from the local moneylender once they had joined the group. In our sample of the 58, only 7 interviewees reported to have borrowed from the moneylender in the recent past.

The hypothesis in this paper is that extracting the early repayment of the loan is akin to requiring the borrower to partly self-invest in her own project. This allows the lender to align the borrower’s interest with her own. Thus, a borrower requires some cash wealth to be able to borrow.

The more tightly structured the repayment schedule, the greater the portion of the project that is self financed by the borrower and therefore the greater the cash wealth required to borrow. In our model, the lender decides on the cash wealth the borrower is required to self-invest in her project in order to borrow from the lender.

This matches the inference from Table 1 that the group leaders, whose income levels are significantly higher than the rest of the group (see Table 2), dominate the credit in at least three of the five groups. Given that very few interviewees reported owning any assets at all, we can take income levels as a proxy for wealth, which is held mainly in form of cash wealth.

The third salient feature was that there was significant income or wealth heterogeneity within the groups. Every group had two group leaders who had initiated the group. As mentioned above, without exception, these were also the members with the highest income levels in the group. Further, these relatively wealthy group leaders dominated the credit in the group. (See table 1). In a seminal paper, Ghatak (1999) has shown in an adverse-selection framework that with joint liability, the borrowers flock together with their own type. The safe-type group with the safe-type and the risky-type with the risk-type of borrowers. The lender can screen the borrowers by varying the interest rate and the degree of joint liability of the loan contract.
We observed a new dimension that influenced group formation in the SPYM groups. Heterogenous groups were formed as the relatively wealthy individuals grouped with the poorer individuals. Using the first two salient features discussed above, the paper models the SHG mechanism in an attempt to explain the heterogenous group formation.

We show that the relatively wealthy agents prefer to group with poorer agents. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, the supply of credit is not entirely elastic in the group. Second, given the tightly structured repayment schedule, the borrowers require some cash wealth to be able to borrow. Thus, when the relatively wealth borrowers group with poorer borrowers, there is less competition in the group for credit. The poorest join the group to participate just as savers.

Further, we analyse how the mechanism’s depth of outreach varies with the cost of capital. We find that as the cost of credit is lowered through subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a borrower is reduced. Conversely, with subsidy, the minimum wealth required to be a saver is higher. Consequently, subsidy closes the gap between the wealth required to be a saver and a borrower.

We find that there is an optimal cost of capital, at which, the poorest saver in the group-mechanism has a definite probability of becoming a borrower in the next period. This is possible if the saver can accumulate the requisite wealth in one period.

If the policymakers have the ability to influence the cost of credit, they should aim for this optimal rate. Thus, subsidy only helps the poor if the cost of credit in the market is higher than this optimal rate. Conversely, if the market cost of credit is lower than the optimal rate, subsidy can decrease the depth of outreach.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We analyse individual lending in Section 3 and group lending mechanism in Section 4.
Section 5 examines the interest rate policy, followed by the conclusions in Section 6.

2 Model

There are two agents. Each agent has access to an identical project which requires a lump-sum investment of 1 unit of capital. The project produces an uncertain and observable outcome $x$, valued at $\bar{x}$ when it succeeds $(s)$ and 0 when it fails $(f)$.

2.0.1 Agents

Each agent $k$ is risk neutral, with zero reservation wage income and $w_k$ cash wealth. Agents have no collateralizable wealth. ($w_k < 1 \forall k$)

Agents may choose to pursue the project with a high $(H)$ or low $(L)$ effort, which is unobservable to everyone. With a high (low) effort, $\bar{x}$ is realised with probability $\pi^h (\pi^l)$ and 0 with $1 - \pi^h (1 - \pi^l)$. ($\pi^h > \pi^l$)

By exerting low effort, agents obtain a private benefit of value $B$ from the project which is non-pecuniary and non-transferable amongst the agents. The private benefits can be curtailed by monitoring, which is undertaken at cost $c$ to the monitor. The cost of monitoring is non-pecuniary.

The only connection that agents have amongst themselves is their ability to monitor each other and curtail each other’s private benefits. The agents can observe the monitoring amongst themselves but it is unobservable to the lender. We impose the following assumptions on the monitoring function $B(c)$.

Assumption 1 (Monitoring function).

i. $B(0) > 0$, $\lim_{c \to \infty} B(c) = 0$

ii. $B(c)$ is continuous and twice differentiable
iii. $B'(c) < 0$, $B''(c) > 0$;

2.0.2 Lender

The lender is risk-neutral. The lender does not have the ability to monitor or punish the agents in any way, except through their payoffs. The lender can costlessly observe the initial capital invested in the project as well as the output from the project. We assume that the lender has the ability to enforce the contracts after the outcome of the projects is realised.

2.0.3 Cost of Capital

The opportunity cost of capital for everyone in the area is $\rho$. The lender has access to capital at $\rho$ and the agents can obtain a return of $\rho$ on their savings. The lender faces competition and is unable to earn any rents on his lending. Thus, the lender makes zero profit.
2.0.4 Agent’s Payoff

The lender requires all loans be partly financed by another agent, who is a peer of the first agent. Thus, agents form groups of two to borrow from the lender. We call the agent undertaking the project the borrower. The agent co-financing the project is called the saver.

The lender decides on three aspects of the contract that he offers the group. Firstly, he sets out the extent to which the project should be co-financed by the peer. Second, he sets out the rate of return the peer gets on her capital used for co-financing the project. Third, he sets out the extent to which the agent is required to self finance her project. This, in turn, determines the amount of capital the lender would lend to the group. Even though the lender specifies the rate of return on the capital he lends, it is effectively bounded by his zero profit condition.

In a group-contract, the saver is required to finance the borrower’s project with $w_s$. The borrower is required to self-invest $w_b$ in the project. The group borrows the rest of the capital $(1 - w_s - w_b)$ from the lender. We assume that $w_s + w_b < 1$.

If the project succeeds, the saver and lender get returns of $R$ and $r$ on their capital. The borrower keeps the rest of the output.

Let $s_i$ be the saver’s pecuniary payoff in state $i = \{s, f\}$.

$$ s_s = Rw_s $$

$$ s_f = 0 $$

If the project succeeds, the savers gets $Rw_s$ and if it fails she gets nothing.
Let $l_i$ be the lender’s payoff in state $i$.

\[ l_s = r(1 - w_s - w_b) \]
\[ l_f = 0 \]

The lender gets $r(1 - w_s - w_b)$ if the project succeeds and nothing if it fails.

Let $b_i$ be the borrower’s pecuniary payoff in state $i$.

\[ b_s = \bar{x} - s_s - l_s \]
\[ = \bar{x} - Rw_s - r(1 - w_s - w_b) \]
\[ b_f = 0 \]

If the project succeeds, the borrower gets to keep whatever is left after paying the saver and the lender. If the project fails, the output is zero and no one gets anything.

3 Individual Lending

In this section, we examine the case where an individual borrower undertakes a project by investing 1 unit of capital. The lender lends her $(1 - w_b)$ and requires that she invest $w_b$ of her own cash wealth in the project.

3.1 First-Best

As a benchmark, we look at the perfect information case, where the lender can observe the borrower’s effort. The lender will be willing to lend $(1 - w_b)$
at interest rate $r$, if it solves the following problem:

$$\max_{w_b} \pi^h r(1 - w_b)$$

$$E \left[ b_i \mid H \right] \geq \rho w_b$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

where $\rho$ is the opportunity cost of capital and $b_i$ the borrowers payoff in state $i = \{s, f\}$. If the project succeeds, the borrower repays the lender $r(1 - w_b)$, and keeps the rest of the output $\bar{x}$ for herself. If the project fail, she gets 0. Thus, $b_s = \bar{x} - r(1 - w_b)$; $b_f = 0$. The borrower’s expected pecuniary payoff with effort level $j$ is

$$E \left[ b_i \mid j \right] = \pi^j [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_b)]$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

The participation constraint (1) gives us the minimum wealth required for borrowing.

$$w_b \geq - \left[ \frac{\bar{x} - r}{r - \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}} \right]$$

This does not bind for $r \in \left[ \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \bar{x} \right]$ if $\bar{x} \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}$. It implies that even borrowers with no wealth ($w_b = 0$) can borrow from the lender if they have a socially viable project.

We assume that the lender, due to the competition he faces, is unable to obtain an ex ante return on the capital he lends, over and above his opportunity cost of capital. Thus, the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC) is satisfied if

$$\pi^h r(1 - w_b) = \rho(1 - w_b)$$

$$r = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}$$  \hspace{1cm} (L-ZPC)
At this interest rate, all the borrowers, irrespective of their wealth, can borrow. In the first-best world, where effort is observable, there is no minimum wealth required for borrowing from the lender

\[ w_b \geq 0 \]  

if the project is socially viable, that is \( \bar{x} \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi} \).

**Proposition 1.** *If effort is observable and the project is socially viable, there is no minimum wealth required to borrow from the lender.*

### 3.2 Unobservable Effort

In the first-best world, there is no tension between \( r \) and \( w_b \) because effort is observable and thus contractible. The tension between \( r \) and \( w_b \) emerges when the effort is unobservable and thus needs to be incentivised.

With unobservable effort, increasing \( r \) reduces the borrower’s incentive for high effort.\(^3\) This can be compensated by increasing \( w_b \), the borrower’s stake in her own project. Thus, given \( r \), there is a minimum \( w_b \) required for the contract to be *incentive compatible*. Further, the minimum stake \( w_b \) required by the lender increases with \( r \).

The lender’s zero profit condition requires that \( r = \frac{\rho}{\pi} \). Consequently, the minimum \( w_b \) required for borrowing increases with \( \rho \), the cost of capital.

#### 3.2.1 Borrower’s Incentive Compatibility Constraint

We add the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint to the lender’s problem from the previous section.

\[ E[b_i \mid H] \geq E[b_i \mid L] + B(0) \]

13
The condition ensures that the borrower has the incentive to pursue the project with high effort. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (4) can be written as

\[
\Delta \pi \bar{x} - B(0) \geq \Delta \pi r (1 - w_b)
\]

where \(\Delta \pi = \pi^h - \pi^l\). The LHS is the net social gain and the RHS is the increase in the lender’s expected payoff, from the borrower’s high effort.

The borrower keeps whatever is left of the output after repaying the lender. Consequently, the borrower’s incentive for high effort is maintained if the lender does not extract more than the net social gain accruing to the borrower by exerting high effort. Using the lender’s zero profit condition, we obtain

\[
w_b \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\left(\frac{\rho}{\pi^h}\right)} \left[\frac{\Delta \pi \bar{x} - B(0)}{\Delta \pi}\right]
\]

The RHS is the lower bound on the borrower’s wealth for a given \(\rho\), the cost of capital.\(^4\)

### 3.2.2 Contract

The lender’s objective function is decreasing in \(w_b\). In order to align the borrower’s incentive in his favour, the lender offers the borrower a contract \((r, w^I_b)\). This requires the borrower to invest at least \(w^I_b\) of her own cash wealth in the project where

\[
w^I_b = 1 - \frac{1}{\left(\frac{\rho}{\pi^h}\right)} \left[\frac{\Delta \pi \bar{x} - B(0)}{\Delta \pi}\right]
\]

We know from the lender’s objective function that he would like to lend as much as he can to the borrowers and would not let the borrowers invest more
Lemma 1. \( w^I_b \), the minimum wealth required to borrow from the lender increases with \( \rho \) the cost of capital and decreases with \( \bar{x} \), the productivity of the project.

We can see from Figure 1 that as \( \rho \) increases, the borrower’s repayment obligation to the lender increases, lowering her incentive for high effort. This is compensated by requiring her to have a greater stake in her own project. Similarly, we can see that the wealth required to borrow is increasing in \( \bar{x} \), the productivity of the project.

Lemma 2. An agent with wealth greater than \( w^I_b \) will accept the lender’s contract if her project is socially viable.

Any agent \( k \) with cash wealth \( w_k(\geq w^I_b) \) will accept the contract \((r, w^I_b)\)
offered by the lender if

$$\rho (w_k - w_b^I) + \pi h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_b^I)] \geq \rho w_k$$

The above condition is satisfied for \( \bar{x} \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi h} \).

4 Group Lending

A group consists of two agents, a borrower and a saver (non-borrower). The borrower is the agent that undertakes the project, and the saver, the agent that co-finance’s the project.

We assume that the combined cash wealth of the borrower and the saver is less than the initial capital required for the project. The group is formed with the purpose of borrowing the rest of the capital from the lender to enable the borrower to undertake her project.

4.1 The Mechanism

The lender specifies the amount of wealth the borrower and the saver are required to invest in the project. The borrower invests \( w_b \) and the saver invests \( w_s \) in the project. The group borrows \( 1 - (w_s + w_b) \), rest of the capital required for the project, from the lender.

If the project succeeds, the saver gets a return \( R \) on her capital. The
lender gets a return $r$ on his capital and the borrower keep the rest. Conversely, if the project fails, everyone gets 0.

### 4.1.1 Timing

The timing is as follows:

$t=1$ The Lender offers a group-contract.

*The saver and borrower get contracts $(w_s^*, R)$ and $(w_b^*, r)$ respectively.*

$t=2$ The agents self-select into the roles of the *saver* and the *borrower*. Subsequently, they pair up to form a group.

$t=3$ The group borrows $(1 - w_b^* - w_s^*)$ from the lender.

*The Borrower invests 1 unit of capital into the project.*

$t=4$ The saver chooses her monitoring intensity $c$.

$t=5$ The borrower chooses her effort level.

$t=6$ The project outcome is realised.

*If the project succeeds, the output $\bar{x}$ gets distributed as follows. The saver and the lender get $Rw_s^*$ and $(1 - (w_s^* + w_b^*))$ respectively and the borrower keeps whatever remains.*

*If the project fails, everyone gets 0.*

The borrower’s and monitor’s contracts work in conjunction with each other. The borrower’s contract aims to influence her effort choice directly through her payoff. The lender is also able to influence the borrower’s effort choice indirectly through the saver’s contract. The saver’s contract gives the saver incentives to monitor the borrower and curtail her private benefits. An
optimal contract ensures that the borrower pursues her project with high effort.

4.2 The Constraints

The borrower and saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints are examined below. \( r \), as before, is determined by the lender’s zero profit condition.

4.2.1 Borrower

The borrower’s participation constraint (B-PC) is given by

\[
\pi^h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - R w_s] \geq \rho w_b \]

This condition ensures that the borrower’s return from exerting high effort level should not be less than the opportunity cost of her cash wealth \( w_b \) invested in the project. The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint (B-ICC) is given by

\[
\pi^h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - R w_s] \geq \pi^l [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - R w_s] + B(c) \]

This condition ensures that the borrower has the requisite incentive to pursue the project with a high effort.

4.2.2 Saver

The saver’s participation constraint (S-PC) is given by

\[
\pi^h R w_s - c \geq \rho w_s \]
The condition ensures that the saver’s return from participating in the group and monitoring with intensity $c$ are not less than her returns from investing $w_s$ in a safe asset. The saver’s incentive compatibility constraint (S-ICC) is given by

$$\pi^h Rw_s - c \geq \pi^l Rw_s$$

(S-ICC)

The condition ensures that the saver’s return from inducing the borrower to exert high effort on her project by monitoring with intensity $c$ is not less than the returns from monitoring with 0 intensity.

4.3 Discussion

4.3.1 Borrower’s Decision

Given the contracts $(R, w_s)$ and $(r, w_b)$ that the lender offers the group, the borrower exerts high effort if the following condition is met.

$$\Delta \pi [\bar{x} - r (1 - w_s - w_b) - Rw_s] \geq B(c)$$

(B-ICC)

The gain in the borrower’s payoff from a high effort should at least compensate her for the lost private benefit $B(c)$. This condition can be rewritten as

$$w_b \geq 1 - \frac{1}{r} \left[ \bar{x} - \frac{B(c)}{\Delta \pi} \right] + \left( \frac{R}{r} - 1 \right) w_s$$

(B-ICC)

Given the saver’s contract $(R, w_s)$, the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint gives us the lower bound on $w_b$, the minimum wealth required for borrowing. Using the lender’s zero profit condition, the borrower’s participation constraint can be rewritten as

$$\pi^h (\bar{x} - r) \geq (R - r) w_s$$

(B-PC)
The condition restricts the total premium that the saver gets can get on her savings \( w_s \), thus effectively restricting the contracts the saver can be offered.

### 4.3.2 Saver’s Decision

There are two relevant ranges for \( R \). For \( R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^2}, \frac{\rho}{\pi^1} \right) \), the saver’s participation constraint binds and the incentive compatibility constraint remains slack. For \( R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi^1} \), the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint binds and the participation constraint remains slack. This holds true for all \( c > 0 \).

![Figure 3: Borrower’s and Saver’s Constraints for a given c](image)

Figure 3: Borrower’s and Saver’s Constraints for a given \( c \)

Figure 4 shows the saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraint for a positive value of \( c \). The saver’s participation and incentive
compatibility constraint, respectively, are violated on the left of the curves. In Appendix A we show that (S-PC) and (S-ICC) will always intersect at $R = \frac{\rho}{\pi}$. The borrower’s participation constraint is violated on the right of the curve.

As discussed above, the borrower’s participation constraint serves to restrict the saver’s contract. Thus, any contract which is to the left of the (B-PC) in figure 4 will satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint.

A saver’s contract $(R, w_s)$ in the area ABCD will satisfy the saver’s incentive compatibility and participation constraint as well as the borrower’s participation constraint.

An optimal contract from the lender would give the saver the incentive to monitor the borrower with an intensity that is sufficient to induce the borrower to exert a high effort on the project. Thus, given an optimal contract $(R, w_s)$, the saver will choose her monitoring intensity. If $R$ is in the first range, she would choose a monitoring intensity that would make her participation constraint bind. If $R$ is in the second range, she would choose a monitoring intensity that would make her incentive compatibility constraint bind. A detailed discussion follows in Appendix A.

### 4.4 Lender’s Problem

The lender’s problem is

$$\max \phi = \pi^b r (1 - w_s - w_b)$$

subject to his zero profit condition, the saver’s and the borrower’s participation and incentive compatibility constraint. Thus, the lender maximises his expected payoff by choosing a optimum $R$ and $c$. Substituting (S-PC), (S-ICC), (B-ICC) and (L-ZPC) into the lender’s objective function, the lender’s
problem can be written as

\[
\min_{R,c} w_b(R, c, w_s(R, c)) + w_s(R, c)
\]

We solve the lender’s problem in Appendix B. Solving the lender’s problem gives us the following set of Propositions.

**Proposition 2.** For projects \( \bar{x} \geq \frac{\rho + c^*}{\pi} \), the lender induces the saver to monitor with intensity \( c^* \) by setting \( R = R^* \) where \( R^* = \frac{\rho}{\pi} \), \( B'(c^*) = -1 \).

The proof is given in the Appendix B.

The saver gets a contract \((R^*, w^*_s)\) where

\[
R^* = \frac{\rho}{\pi}, \quad w^*_s = \frac{\pi l c^*}{\rho \Delta \pi}.
\]

The borrower gets a contract \((r, w^*_b)\) where

\[
r = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \quad w^*_b = 1 - \frac{\pi^h}{\rho} \left[ \bar{x} - \frac{B(c^*)}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{c^*}{\pi^h} \right].
\]

**Proposition 3.** Group lending is only feasible if \( \rho > \tilde{\rho} \) where

\[
\tilde{\rho} = \pi^h \left[ \bar{x} - \frac{B(c^*)}{\Delta \pi} - c^* \left( 1 - \frac{\pi l}{\Delta \pi} \right) \right].
\]

For very low interest rates, namely \( \rho \leq \tilde{\rho} \), we have \( w^*_s \geq w^*_b \). The wealth required to be a borrower is less than the wealth required to be a saver. In Appendix B.2, we show that the borrower gets all the rent and saver gets no rent from the above given contract. Thus, all agents with wealth in the range \([w^*_b, 1]\) would prefer to become a borrower and no agent would be willing to become a saver. Consequently, forming group would not be possible and the lender would have to revert to individual lending.

Group lending works only if \( \rho > \tilde{\rho} \). In this range, the wealth required
to be a borrower is always greater than the wealth required to be a saver, namely $w_s^* < w_b^*$. Wealth is able to sort agents in their role as borrower and saver. Agents with the wealth in the range $[w_s^*, w_b^*)$ are only eligible to be savers in the group. Agents with wealth in the range $[w_b^*, 1)$ are eligible to be both borrower and saver in the group. They choose to be borrowers in the group as only in this role they can retain rents.

**Proposition 4.** The minimum collective group wealth required to borrow in group lending is lower than in individual lending.

In individual lending, the minimum wealth required to borrow is given by

$$w^I_b = 1 - \frac{\pi}{\rho} \left[ \bar{x} - B(0) \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

In group lending, the minimum wealth required to borrow is given by

$$w^*_b = 1 - \frac{\pi}{\rho} \left[ \bar{x} - B(c^*) + c^* \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Given that $B(0) \geq B(c^*) + c^*$, comparing (7) and (8), gives us

$$w^I_b \geq w^*_b$$

### 4.5 Group Formation

**Proposition 5.** If $\rho > \tilde{\rho}$, an agent with enough wealth to be a borrower in the group will always prefer to pair up with an agent who has enough wealth to be a saver but not a borrower and vice versa.

Let’s assume that agent $k_1$ and $k_2$ have cash wealth such that $w_{k_1}, w_{k_2} \in [w_b^*, 1)$. Agents $n_2$ and $n_2$ have cash wealth such that $w_{n_1}, w_{n_2} \in [w_s^*, w_b^*)$. 

23
For agent $k_1$, paring up with agent $n_1$ (and similarly agent $n_2$) will ensure that she would be able to borrow in the group. Agent $k_1$‘s payoff from this pairing is

$$\rho(w_{k_1} - w^*_b) + E[b_i \mid H]$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

For agent $k_1$, paring up with agent $k_2$ would imply that she would have to compete with agent $k_2$ to become the borrower in the group. We assume that if agents in the group compete for the role of the borrower, the role is allocated randomly to an agent. The other agent has to take on the role of the saver.

Agent $k_1$‘s payoff from pairing with agent $k_2$ is given by

$$\frac{1}{2} \left[ \rho(w_{k_1} - w^*_b) + E[b_i \mid H] \right] + \frac{1}{2} \left[ \rho(w_{k_2} - w^*_s) + E[s_i \mid H] - c^* \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

In Appendix B.2, we show that for the optimal contract $(r, w^*_b)$ and $(R, w^*_s)$ given by (??) and (??), the borrower’s and the saver’s rents are given by

$$E[b_i \mid H] - \rho w^*_b = \pi^h(\bar{x} - r) - c^*$$

$$E[s_i \mid H] - \rho w^*_s - c^* = 0$$

Comparing (9) with (10), agent $k_1$ would prefer to pair up with agent $n_1$ over agent $k_2$ if the following condition holds

$$\pi^h \left( \bar{x} - \rho \pi^h \right) - c^* \geq -\rho w^*_s$$

The condition always holds for projects $\bar{x} \in \left[ \frac{c^* + \rho}{\pi^h}, \infty \right)$. Similarly agent $n_1$ would prefer to pair up with an agent $k_1$ (and similarly agent $k_2$) over agent
Agent $n_1$’s final payoff from pairing up with agent $k_1$ is given by the LHS. Her payoff from pairing with agent $n_2$ is given by the RHS. Given that (11) holds with an equality, agent $n_1$ is indifferent between the two choices.

5 Interest Rate Policy

In this section we examine the role of the interest rate policy. We analyse the cost and benefits of influencing the cost of capital in terms of its effect on the depth of the outreach or the ability of the group-lending mechanism to reach the poorest.

The policymaker intervenes in this market is by either augmenting or decreasing the supply of loanable funds. This would have the effect of lowering the cost of capital or decreasing $\rho$ in the particular market. We assume that the policymaker’s ability to influence $\rho$ is limited. She can influence $\rho$ by a small amount, $\delta$ in either direction.

The policy maker cares about the outreach or the ability of the group-lending mechanism to reach the wealth deprived. Her objective is to minimise the amount of cash wealth required by an agent to access the financial services offered by the group-lending mechanism. Minimum cash wealth required to access the services offered by the microfinance institution is $w^*_s(\rho)$ if $\tilde{\rho} < \rho$. If $\rho \leq \tilde{\rho}$, the minimum cash wealth required is $w^*_b(\rho)$. 

\[\left[ \rho (w_{n_1} - w^*_s) + E[s_i \mid H] - c^* \right] \geq \rho w_{n_2} \]

(11)
5.1 Subsidising the Cost Of Capital

We examine the effect of subsidising the cost capital on the wealth required to participate in the group as a saver and as a borrower.

**Proposition 6.** Subsidising the cost of capital decreases the wealth required to participate in the group as a borrower. Conversely, it increases the wealth required to participate in the group as a saver.

Differentiating $w^*_s$ and $w^*_b$ with respect to $\rho$ allows us to examine the effect of subsidising the cost of capital on group lending contract.

\[
\frac{dw^*_s}{d\rho} = -\left[ \frac{\pi^l c^*}{\Delta \pi \rho^2} \right] < 0
\]
\[
\frac{dw^*_b}{d\rho} = \frac{\pi^h}{\rho^2} \left[ \frac{\bar{x}}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{B(c^*)}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{c^*}{\pi^h} \right] > 0
\]

Thus, decreasing $\rho$ or subsidising the cost of capital decreases $w^*_b$, which in turns allows poorer agents to become borrowers in the group. Conversely, decreasing $\rho$ increases $w^*_s$. This implies that the minimum cash wealth required to participate in the group as a saver has increased. Overall, $(w^*_s + w^*_b)$, the collective group wealth required increases with $\rho$.

\[
\frac{d(w^*_s + w^*_b)}{d\rho} = \frac{\pi^h}{\rho^2} \left[ \frac{\bar{x}}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{B(c^*)}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{c^*}{\pi^h} \right] > 0
\]

As $\rho$ increases, the increase in $w^*_b$ is greater than the decrease in $w^*_s$. With increasing $\rho$, the policymaker gets a greater depth of outreach. At the same time, some agents that could have borrowed at the lower $\rho$ would not be able to borrow now. They would have to participate as savers.

**Proposition 7.** There exists a $\hat{\rho}$ such that for all $\rho \in (\check{\rho}, \hat{\rho})$ the savers are able to accumulate enough wealth to be able to borrow in the next period, if the current project succeeds.
If the current projects succeeds, the savers of this period can accumulate enough cash wealth to borrow in the next period if the following condition is met.

\[ w_s^* R_s^* \geq w_b^* \]  

(12)

\[ \rho \leq \pi^h \left[ \bar{x} - \frac{B(c^*)}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{c^*}{\Delta \pi} \right] = \hat{\rho} \]

\( \hat{\rho} \) is the optimal \( \rho \) for allowing the poorest agents to escape the poverty trap. It maximises depth of outreach subject to the constraint (12).

With \( \rho = \hat{\rho} \), the poorest agents with sufficient wealth to be savers in this period can hope to become borrowers with the probability \( \pi^h \) in the next
period. This would start a process by which $\pi^h$ proportion of all savers in this period would become borrowers in the next period and pair up with agents aspiring to be savers. This process would be particularly helpful if wealth distribution is skewed and the relatively wealthy agents with cash wealth $w_k \geq w^*_b$ are in short supply.

Thus, on one hand, as $\rho$ increases, depth of outreach increases. On the other hand, with an increasing $\rho$, the gap between $w^*_s$ and $w^*_b$ also increases making it more difficult for the poorest in the groups to bridge the gap.

Thus, if $\rho$ in the market is greater than $\hat{\rho}$, then subsidy is warranted. Conversely, if $\rho$ in the market is less than $\hat{\rho}$, the policymaker should curtail the supply of funds and drive up the cost of capital towards $\hat{\rho}$.

6 Conclusion

We documented the group lending mechanism of a typical microfinance lender in India’s SHG Linkage Programme. All the agents are poor and have no collateralizable assets. Given their inability to bear any liability for failure, the mechanism requires that the borrower partly self-finance’s the project with her own cash wealth. This helps the lender align the borrower’s incentive with his own. A borrower requires certain cash wealth to be able to borrow.

The lender specifies the cash wealth required to participate in the group as either a saver or a borrower. The poorest take on the role of savers in the group. Agents with sufficient wealth to borrow take on the role of borrowers in the group.

By allowing saving opportunities and restricting the number of borrowers per group per period, the mechanism gives the agents an incentive to group across wealth levels. We showed that the relatively wealthy agents, who have sufficient wealth to borrow, prefer to pair up with the relatively poor agents. This is because the poorest agents, with insufficient wealth to borrow, will
not compete for the loans in the group.

The lender gives the savers the requisite incentives to monitor the borrower. The monitoring by the saver induces the borrower to exert a high effort level on her project. Even though the savers get zero rents, the mechanism allows the saver to get a premium on her savings in return for her monitoring effort. Thus, if the project succeeds, the savers are able to increase their cash wealth.

We showed that if the cost of capital is subsidised or lowered, the wealth required to be a borrower decreases with it and the wealth required to become a saver increases with it. Thus, subsidy actually limits the ability of the mechanism to reach the poorest. On the other hand, subsidy also closes the gap between the wealth required to be a saver and the wealth required to be a borrower. Closing the gap is helpful in letting the current savers become the next period’s borrowers.

We found that there was an optimal cost of capital where the wealth required to be a saver was minimised subject to the constraint that the savers could transform themselves into borrowers in one period with a definite probability. Thus, if the policymaker’s have an ability to influence the cost of capital, they should try to push the cost of capital towards this optimal rate. Thus, to answer the question in the title, subsidy only helps the poorest if the cost of capital is above this rate. Conversely, if the cost of capital is below the optimal rate, subsidy would harm the interest of the poorest by excluding them from the group lending mechanism.
A Group Lending: Saver’s Contract

A.1 Saver’s Constraints

Saver’s participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint are

\[ \pi^h Rw_s - c \geq \rho w_s \quad \text{(S-PC)} \]

\[ \pi^h Rw_s - c \geq \pi^l Rw_s \quad \text{(S-ICC)} \]

These constraints can be written as

\[ w_s \left( R - \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \right) \geq \frac{c}{\pi^h} \quad \text{(S-PC)} \]

\[ Rw_s \geq \frac{c}{\Delta \pi} \quad \text{(S-ICC)} \]

For the saver’s constraints, there are two relevant ranges for \( R \). In the first range, \( R \in (\frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \frac{\pi^l}{\pi^h}) \), the saver’s participation constraint binds and the incentive compatibility constraint is slack. This is because a saver’s contract \((R, w_s)\) that satisfies the participation constraint always satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint in this range, but not vice-versa.

In the second range, \( R \geq \frac{\pi^l}{\pi^h} \), the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint binds and the saver’s participation constraint is slack. Again, this is because a saver’s contract \((R, w_s)\) that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint always satisfies the participation constraint in this range, but not vice-versa.

As \( c \) increases, the curves (S-PC) and (S-ICC) in figure 4 shift towards the right. It is important to note that for all \( c > 0 \) the two curves continue to intersect at \( R = \frac{\pi^l}{\pi^h} \). This implies that the two ranges do not depend on \( c \).
Further, the saver’s participation constraint binds on the first range and her incentive compatibility constraint binds on the second range for any $c > 0$.

The range $R \in (0, \frac{1}{\rho}]$ is irrelevant. In this range the saver’s participation cannot be satisfied for any non-negative combination of $R$ and $w_s$.

In the first range, the saver does not get any rents given that her participation constraint binds. Her contract $(R, w_s)$ is always on her participation constraint. In the second range, her rent increases with $R$.

As we can see from Figure 4, the saver gets no rent along the segment AB in the first range. As $R$ increases in the second range along the segment BC, the saver moves away from her participation constraint. As she moves away, her rent starts increasing. The saver’s rent increases as the distance between the saver’s contract and her participation constraint increases.

**A.2 Borrower’s Participation Constraint**

The borrower’s participation constraint is given by

$$\pi^h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - Rw_s] \geq \rho w_b$$

(B-PC)

which can be written as

$$\bar{x} - r \geq (R - r) w_s$$

(B-PC)

This condition restricts the range of the saver’s contract. In figure 4, all contracts to the left of the curve B-PC satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint.

Thus the three curves (S-PC), (S-ICC) and (B-PC) give us the area ABCD in figure 4. A saver’s contract in this area would satisfy the three constraints. It may be noted that the area ABCD starts contracting if either $c$ or $\rho$ increase. Similarly, the area contracts if $\bar{x}$ decreases.
For the area ABCD to exist, we need a condition that ensures that (B-PC) is not on the left of (S-PC). We also need to find conditions under which the (S-ICC) and (B-PC) intersect.

A.2.1 Existence of \( \bar{R} \)

As the saver’s contract \((R, w_s)\) moves down the segment BC in figure 4, the saver’s rent increases. Concomitantly, the borrower’s rent decreases. At C, the borrower gets no rent and the saver ends up getting all the rent. Consequently, any \( R > \bar{R} \) will not satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint.

\( \bar{R} \) is defined by the intersection of the borrower’s participation constraint and the saver’s incentive compatibility constraint.

\[
\bar{R} = \begin{cases} 
\frac{r}{1 - \left(\frac{(\bar{x} - r)}{\bar{x}}\right) \Delta \pi} & \text{if } c > \Delta \pi(\bar{x} - r), \\
\notin & \text{if } c \leq \Delta \pi(\bar{x} - r).
\end{cases}
\]  

(13) implies that \( \bar{R} \) exists only for a low-productivity high-monitoring combination.

Given a project’s productivity \( \bar{x} \), a monitoring intensity \( c < \Delta \pi(\bar{x} - r) \) can be induced without driving the borrower’s rent to zero. For higher monitoring intensity \( c \geq \Delta \pi(\bar{x} - r) \), the maximum return the saver can be given on her capital is given by \( \bar{R} \).

A.2.2 Maximum Monitoring

We derive the upper bound on the monitoring intensity \( c \) from the borrower’s and the saver’s participation constraint.

\[
(\bar{x} - r) \geq w_s \left( R - \frac{\rho}{n^h} \right) \geq \frac{c}{n^h}
\]
The borrower’s participation constraint gives us the first inequality and the saver’s participation constraint gives us the second inequality. The maximum monitoring that can be induced for a project is given by the following inequality.

\[ c \leq \pi^h(\bar{x} - r) \]

To summarise, the set of all the saver’s contracts \((R, w_s)\) which satisfies the saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraint along with the borrower’s participation constraint are given by

\[
w_s \geq \max \left[ \frac{c}{\pi^h R - \rho}, \frac{c}{\Delta \pi R} \right] \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
\forall R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \bar{R} \right] & \text{if} \ c \in \left( \Delta \pi (\bar{x} - r), \pi^h (\bar{x} - r) \right] \\
\forall R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \infty \right) & \text{if} \ c \in \left( 0, \Delta \pi (\bar{x} - r) \right]
\end{array} \right.
\]

where \(\bar{R}\) is given by (13).
B  Group Lending: Lender’s problem

Proof for Proposition 2. The lender’s problem is

$$\max_{R, c} \pi^h r \left( 1 - (w_s + w_b) \right)$$

subject to

$$\pi^h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - Rw_s] \geq \rho w_b \quad \text{(B-PC)}$$

$$\pi^h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - Rw_s] \geq \pi^l [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - Rw_s] + B(c) \quad \text{(B-ICC)}$$

$$\pi^h Rw_s - c \geq \rho w_s \quad \text{(S-PC)}$$

$$\pi^h Rw_s - c \geq \pi^l Rw_s \quad \text{(S-ICC)}$$

$$r = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \quad \text{(L-ZPC)}$$

Using the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC) the borrower’s participation constraint can be written as

$$\pi^h \left( \bar{x} - \rho \frac{\pi^h}{\pi^l} \right) \geq \left( R - \rho \frac{\pi^h}{\pi^l} \right) w_s \quad \text{(B-PC)}$$

The saver’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints can be written as

$$\left( \pi^h R - \rho \right) w_s \geq c \quad \text{(S-PC)}$$

$$\Delta \pi Rw_s \geq c \quad \text{(S-ICC)}$$

As discussed in the previous section, We can summarise the three constraints above, namely the saver’s participation and incentive compatibility
constraint and the borrower’s participation constraint, with

\[ w_s \geq \max \left[ \frac{c}{(\pi^h R - \rho)}, \frac{c}{\Delta \pi R} \right] \quad \forall \ c \leq \pi^h (\bar{x} - \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}) \quad (14) \]

There are two relevant ranges for \( R \). In the first range, \( R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \frac{\rho}{\pi^l} \right) \), the (S-PC) binds and (S-ICC) is slack. In the second range, \( R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi^l} \), the (S-ICC) binds and (S-PC) is slack. The (B-PC) is satisfied if \( c \leq \pi^h (\bar{x} - \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}) \).

Using the lender’s zero profit condition (L-ZPC), the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint can be written as

\[ w_b \geq 1 - \frac{1}{(\pi^h)} \left[ \bar{x} - B(c) \left( \frac{c}{\Delta \pi} \right) \right] + \frac{1}{(\pi^h)} \left( R - \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \right) w_s \quad (15) \]

Substituting (14) and (15) in the lender’s objective function can be written as a function of \( R \) and \( c \).

\[ \phi = \pi^h \left[ 1 - \left( w_b \left( R, w_s, c \right) + w_s \left( R, c \right) \right) \right] \]

\[ = \begin{cases} 
\pi^h \bar{x} - \pi^h \left( \frac{B(c)}{\Delta \pi} + \frac{c}{\pi^h - \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}} \right) & \text{for } \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} < R \leq \frac{\rho}{\pi^l} \\
\pi^h \bar{x} - \pi^h \left( \frac{B(c) + c}{\Delta \pi} \right) & \text{for } R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi^l} 
\end{cases} \quad (16) \]

For the first range, \( R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^h}, \frac{\rho}{\pi^l} \right) \), we find that

\[ \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial R} = \frac{\pi^h pc}{(\pi^h R - \rho)^2} > 0 \quad \forall \ c > 0 \]
\[
\frac{\partial \phi}{\partial c} = -\pi^h \left( \frac{B'(c)}{\Delta \pi} + \frac{1}{\pi^h - \frac{\rho}{R}} \right)
\begin{cases}
> 0 & \text{if } B'(c) < -\frac{\pi^h - \pi^l}{\pi^h - \frac{\rho}{R}} \\
\leq 0 & \text{if } B'(c) \geq -\frac{\pi^h - \pi^l}{\pi^h - \frac{\rho}{R}}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \phi^2}{\partial c^2} = -\pi^h \left( \frac{B''(c)}{\Delta \pi} \right) < 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \phi^2}{\partial c \partial R} = -\pi^h \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^h R - \rho} \right) < 0
\]

For the second range, \( R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \), we find that

\[
\frac{d\phi}{dc} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad B'(c) = -1
\]

\[
\frac{d^2\phi}{dc^2} = \frac{\pi^h}{\Delta \pi} B''(c) < 0
\]

The optimal \( c \) as a function of \( R \) is given by the following function

\[
B'(c) = \max \left[ -\left( \frac{\pi^h - \pi^l}{\pi^h - \frac{\rho}{R}} \right) , -1 \right]
\]  \hspace{1cm} (17)

Consequently, the lender’s objective function, \( \phi = \pi^h r \left[ 1 - (w_s + w_b) \right] \), is maximised by the following set of conditions
\[ R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi l} \quad \forall \bar{x} \in \left[ \frac{\rho + c^*}{\pi h}, \infty \right) \quad \text{where} \quad B'(c^*) = -1 \]

\[ R = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h + \Delta \pi \frac{\pi h}{B'(\tilde{c})}} \quad \forall \bar{x} \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h}, \frac{c^* + \rho}{\pi h} \right) \quad \text{where} \quad \bar{c} = \pi^h \bar{x} - \rho \]  

(18)

**B.1 Contracts**

For projects with \( \bar{x} \in \left[ \frac{\rho + c^*}{\pi h}, \infty \right) \), the lender induces monitoring \( c^* \) by setting \( R = R^* = \frac{\rho}{\pi l} \). Thus, the saver would be offered a contract \((R^*, w_s^*)\) and the borrower would be offered a contract \((r, w_b^*)\) where

\[ R^* = \frac{\rho}{\pi l} \]
\[ w_s^* = \frac{1}{R^*} \frac{c^*}{\pi h} \]
\[ r = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \]
\[ w_b^* = 1 - \frac{1}{\left( \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \right) \left[ \bar{x} - \frac{B(c^*)}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{c^*}{\pi h} \right]} \]  

(19)

For projects with \( \bar{x} \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h}, \frac{c^* + \rho}{\pi h} \right) \) the lender induces monitoring \( \tilde{c} < c^* \) by setting \( R = \tilde{R} < R^* \). Thus, the saver would be offered a contract \((\tilde{R}, \tilde{w}_s)\) and the borrower would be offered a contract \((r, \tilde{w}_b)\) where

\[ \tilde{R} = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h + \Delta \pi \frac{\pi h}{B'(\tilde{c})}} \]
\[ \tilde{w}_s = \frac{1}{\tilde{R}} \frac{\tilde{c}}{\Delta \pi} \]
\[ r = \frac{\rho}{\pi^h} \]
\[ \tilde{w}_b = 1 - \frac{1}{\left( \frac{\pi^h}{\pi h} \right) \left[ \bar{x} - \frac{B(\tilde{c})}{\Delta \pi} - \frac{\tilde{c}}{\pi h} \left( \frac{-1}{B'(\tilde{c})} \right) \right]} \]  

(20)
For projects $\bar{x} \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h} \right)$, the lender is not able to induce monitoring intensity $c^\ast$. This is because the saver’s contract $(R^\ast, w_s^\ast)$, which is required to induce the saver to monitor with intensity $c^\ast$ would not satisfy the borrower’s participation contract.

### B.1.1 Low Productivity Project and Borrower Participation Constraint

Let’s suppose that for a project $\bar{x} \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h}, \frac{c^\ast + \rho}{\pi h} \right)$ the lender tries to induce the saver to monitor with intensity $c^\ast$ by offering her a contract $(R^\ast, w_s^\ast)$. The contract would satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint if

$$\bar{x} - \frac{\rho}{\pi h} \geq (R^\ast - \frac{\rho}{\pi h}) w_s^\ast$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \bar{x} \geq \frac{c^\ast + \rho}{\pi h}$$

Thus contradicting the initial assumption about the project.

### B.2 Economic Rents

Economic rents obtained by the borrower in group lending are given by

$$E[b_i | H] - \rho w_b = \pi h [\bar{x} - r(1 - w_s - w_b) - Rw_s] - \rho w_b$$

$$= \pi h [\bar{x} - r - (R - r)w_s]$$

(Equation 21)

Economic rents obtained by the saver in group lending are given by

$$E[s_i | H] - \rho w_s - c = \pi h Rw_s - c - \rho w_s$$

$$= (\pi h R - \rho)w_s - c \begin{cases} = 0 & \forall R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h}, \frac{\rho}{\pi h} \right] \\ \geq 0 & \forall R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi h} \end{cases}$$

(Equation 22)
In the first range, $R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h}, \frac{\rho}{\pi l} \right]$, the saver gets zero rent as her participation constraint binds. In the second range, $R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi l}$, the saver gets non-negative rents as her participation constraint is slack.

Using (21) and (22), we it is clear that in the first range, $R \in \left( \frac{\rho}{\pi h}, \frac{\rho}{\pi l} \right]$, the total rents obtained by the saver and the borrower are decreasing in $R$.

$$E[b_i \mid H] - \rho w_b + E[s_i \mid H] - \rho w_s - c = \pi^h[x - r - (R - r)w_s]$$

Conversely, in the first range, $R \geq \frac{\rho}{\pi l}$, the total rents obtained by the saver and the borrower are constant for a given $c$.

$$E[b_i \mid H] - \rho w_b + E[s_i \mid H] - \rho w_s - c = \pi^h[x - r] - c$$

Thus, $R$ just serves the purpose of transferring rents from the borrower to the saver. For the optimal contract $(r, w_b^*)$ and $(R, w_s^*)$ given by (19) in the previous section, the rents are given by

$$E[b_i \mid H] - \rho w_b^* = \pi^h(x - r) - c^*$$

$$E[s_i \mid H] - \rho w_s^* - c^* = 0$$

For the optimal contract $(r, \tilde{w}_b)$ and $(R, \tilde{w}_s)$ given by (20) in the previous section, the rents are given by

$$E[b_i \mid H] - \rho \tilde{w}_b = \pi^h(x - r) - \tilde{c}$$

$$E[s_i \mid H] - \rho \tilde{w}_s - \tilde{c} = 0$$

The borrower gets all the rent and the saver gets zero rent.
Notes

1 Poor borrower are ones who do not have sufficient wealth to obtain individual loans from the lender.

2 Most group members borrowed to buy buffaloes. For a typical loan of Rs. 10,000 at 24% per annum, the borrower was required to repay Rs. 1200 in the first month. Even if the buffalo starting producing milk from the very first day, the borrower would still have a shortfall of Rs. 450 in the first month. This is assuming that the buffalo produces 5 kgs of milk a day which sells at Rs. 5 a kg. The shortfall in the tenth month would be of Rs. 270.

3 Increasing \( r \) reduces the borrowers expected pecuniary payoff from high effort (\( \pi^h[\bar{x} - r(1 - w_b)] \)) more than from the low effort (\( \pi^l[\bar{x} - r(1 - w_b)] \)), given that \( \pi^h > \pi^l \). This reduces her incentive to pursue the project with high effort and lose \( B(0) \), the private benefits associated with low effort.

4 Thus, individual lending is feasible if the project is sufficiently productive namely, \( \bar{x} \geq \frac{B(0)}{\Delta \pi} \).

5 Given the competition amongst the lenders, if a particular lender gets his funds at a subsidised cost, he would just end up retaining the subsidy in the form of rents for himself. He would have no incentive to pass on the benefits of the subsidy to the agents participating in the group.

References


