

Economics Seminar, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi

SPEAKER: Shurojit Chatterji, Singapore Management University

TITLE: On domains that admit well behaved strategy proof social choice functions

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we investigate domains that admit well behaved strategy proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy proof social choice function must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits a anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy proof social choice function. Semi-single peaked domains are generalizations of single peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982). We provide sharper versions of the results above when tops-onlyness is replaced by top-selectivity and the richness condition is weakened.