

Economics Seminar, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.

SPEAKER: Subrato Banerjee, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi

TITLE: **Bargaining and Asymmetry: An Experimental Investigation.**

TIME: 11:30 AM - 01:00 PM

DAY & DATE: Friday , 10th May, 2013

PLACE: Seminar Room 2

Abstract:

We experimentally revisit the axiom of feasible set contraction (independence of irrelevant alternatives) in the literature on bargaining, with the exogenous introduction of asymmetry. We see if the existence of asymmetries facilitate or enhance the effects of contraction of the feasible set. We conclude that the validity of this axiom is only limited to symmetric games in the sense that 'irrelevant alternatives' do begin to matter when there is bargaining asymmetry.

<http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/seminar.html>