

Economics Seminar, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.

SPEAKER: Francoise Forges, Universite Paris-Dauphine

TITLE: Bayesian Games with Contracts

TIME: 3:30 PM - 5:00 PM.

DAY & DATE: Wednesday, 30th November, 2011

PLACE: Conference Room

Abstract:

The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by signing (conditional) commitments before playing a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.

<http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/seminar.html>