

# Soumendu Sarkar

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CONTACT INFORMATION      Planning Unit  
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi      *Phone:* (011) 41493992  
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RESEARCH INTERESTS      Auction Theory, Mechanism Design, Contract Theory

EDUCATION      **Indian Statistical Institute Delhi**, New Delhi, India

Ph. D. in Quantitative Economics (expected graduation: July 2011)

- Advisor: Professor Arunava Sen
- Co-Advisor: Professor Debasis Mishra
- Areas of Study: Auctions and Mechanism Design

**Visva Bharati University**, Santiniketan, India

M.A. in Economics, June 2001

- *First Class*
- Specialization in Money and Finance
- Masters Dissertation: *Rationale and Importance of Federal Fiscal Transfers in India*

B.A. with major in Economics, June 1999

- *First Class First Position*

AWARDS AND HONOURS      Indian Statistical Institute

- Senior Research Fellowship 2008-
- Junior Research Fellowship 2006-2008

National Educational Research and Development Programme, India

- Study Abroad Scholarship, 2004

Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India

- Merit Scholarship, 1994–2001

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE      **Indian Statistical Institute Delhi**, New Delhi, India

- Senior Research Fellow (July 2008 to present)
- Junior Research Fellow (July 2006 to July 2008)
- Teaching Assistant for Introductory Microeconomics for Indian Statistical Service Probationers, 2007 batch

WORK IN  
PROGRESS

**Land Deals in the Sarkar Raj: Perspectives from Mechanism Design Theory** (joint with Debasis Mishra and Arunava Sen)

Large scale land acquisitions of the government that displaces people and productive activity have always been a matter of dispute. The mechanism designer's job is to devise procedures that facilitate exchange in a desirable manner — that exchange should result in the highest level of social welfare (efficiency), that agents must participate (individual rationality) and should not be able to cheat (incentive compatibility), and that this whole procedure should not be too costly to run (budget balance). This paper aims to show using common insights from mechanism design theory that exchanges like large scale land acquisitions have a negative feature: there exists no mechanism for such cases that fulfill these desirable properties. This sparks off the immediate research question of whether there is a second-best, or in other words, given this impossibility result, which mechanism is the best one under the given circumstances.

PROFESSIONAL  
EXPERIENCE

National Sample Survey Organisation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India

- Investigator, December 2003 to September 2004
  - Collection of data on rural and urban price levels

TECHNICAL  
SKILLS

Programming: C, C++, Gauss, Ox

Applications:  $\text{\TeX}$ ,  $\text{\LaTeX}$ ,  $\text{\BIBTeX}$ , Microsoft Office, and other common productivity packages for Windows and Linux platforms

Operating Systems: Microsoft Windows XP/Vista, Linux

MATHEMATICAL  
EXPERTISE

Linear Algebra

Calculus

Mathematical Statistics

Optimization Techniques

Game Theory

PERSONAL  
INFORMATION

Born June 10, 1978. Citizenship: India.