game theory, social choice theory, mechanism design, voting, and auctions.

• Strategy-proofness and Pareto Efficiency in Classical Exchange Economies (with Mridu Prabal Goswami and Manipushpak Mitra). [Download] (version: August 2011); Earlier version (May 2011):[Download].
• Strategy-proofness and Equal-cost Sharing for a Binary Excludable Public Good with Fixed Cost (with Jordi Masso and Antonio Nicolo). [Download] (version: June 2011).
• On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions (with Shurojit Chatterji and Remzi Sanver). [Download] (version: October 2010).
• An Extreme Point Characterization of Random Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions: The Two Alternatives Case (with Jeremy Picot). [Download] (version: September 2011).
• Incentive-Compatible Voting Rules with Positively Correlated Beliefs (with Mohit Bhargava and Dipjyoti Majumdar). [Download] (version: April 2011).
• The Shapley Value as the Maximizer of Expected Nash Welfare (with Anirban Kar). [Download]
• Uniform Expected Utility Criteria for Decision Making under Ignorance or Objective Ambiguity (with Nicolas Gravel and Thierry Marchant). [Download]

• The Theory of Mechanism Design: An Overview. Economic and Political Weekly, December 2007. [Download]
• ``Fair and Lovely": Some Theoretical Considerations in the Equitable Allocation of Resources. [Download]