THEORY OF MECHANISM DESIGN

Approxymate syllabus: [Download]

Lecture notes on mechanism design: [Download]

Assignment 1: [Download]

Readings:

• Proofs of Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: [Reny's proof]; [Barbera's proof]; [Svensson and Reffgen's proof]
  
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in voting: [Sen and Majumdar] and [Mishra]
  
• Optimal voting rules: [Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Shi]
  
• Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities: [Ergin]
  
• Matching with floor constraints: [Akin]
  
• Robust stability in matching markets: [Kojima]
  
• Matching with constraints: [Kamada and Kojima]
  
• Ironing for auctions: [Hartline]
  
• Contingent contracts: [Overview]; [Hansen]; [Samuelson]
  
• Undominated mechanisms: [Borgers, Li, and Wang]
  

Guidelines for referee report: [Download]